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In 1713 England acquired the asiento contract to supply Spain's American 
colonies with 4,800 slaves annuallyg and assigned the privilege to the South Sea 
Company. In compensation for expected losses in the slave trade, the Company 
was permitted to carry on an extensive trade in merchandise which competed with 
the traditional outlets for British trade to America. This need to rely on 
foreign contractors to supply slaves to the American colonies offered a threat 
to Spain's trading monopolyj it was further eroded by the presence of British 
merchants residing at strategic ports throughout America trading in large 
quantities of contraband slaves and merchandise in addition to Company trade. 
Although the Spanish government took numerous steps to impede the Company's 
trade including the seizure of all Company property during the wars of 17181 1727 
and 17399 they were never able to convince the Company to relinquish the asiento 
for an agreed compensation. When the Company finally ceased trading at the 
beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear, it was mainly because of dwindling 
returns and a new political environment in England. Although the treaty of 
Aix-la-Chapellej which ended the war, provided for the Company to continue 
trading for another four years, it was in no position to resume the trade. 
Company agents had all returned to England at the beginning of the wart and after 
a severe financial loss the directors concentrated on obtaining compensation. 
In 17.50 the asiento contract was terminated and the South Sea Company paid 
Z1009000 to cover their losses in the trade. 
2 
INTRODUCITON 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the formation and development 
of the South Sea Company as it relates to the acquisition and operation of the 
asiento contract to supply slaves to Spanish colonies in America. The 
institutional structure developed for the purchase, transport and sale of slaves 
will be discussed. The additional concessions granted to the Company to send 
licensed and annual merchant ships to the colonies will also be analysed. 
The banking activities of. the Conpany in Britain and the diplomatic impact 
it had on Anglo-Spanish relations have been studied elsewhere, and therefore 
will be discussed only in reference to the American trade. The social and 
economic impact the Company had on Spain's colonies is also outside the scope 
of this paper. 
Because the quantification of slave introductions is a major aspect of 
this paper3 Statistics that have been compiled are included in the paper 




List of Abbreviations ................ 00*90*04 
Acknowledgement ............ 000a. 00000.0.000............................ 05 
1. The Asiento and British Opinion .......... 0 .... 0 .................... 
6 
Ii. Derivations of Spanish Economic Reforms in the Eighteenth Century.. 25 
III. The First Trading Period., 1714-1718 ......... 
40 
IV. The Licensed Ships, ........ 0 ........... 0 ............ 00 ............. 70 
V. The First Represalia, 1718 .... 
87 
Vio The Second Trading Period., 1722-1728 ....... o ....................... 107 
VII. The Second Represalia., 136 
VIII. The Third Trading Period, 1728-1739: Trade,, Policies and Problems.. 156 
Ix. The Third Trading Period: Trade of the Factors ..................... 184 
X. The kmual Ships ...... 00.. 0 ...... 00 ........... 0 ...... 0 ............. 217 
xio The Third Represalia,, 1739.99#ooooooooooo. oo*oooooeotoooooesse-oose 248 
XII. Asiento Slave Accounts 1714-1739: An Approach at Quantification .... 258 
XIII. Conclusion.... *ooooooo4, oooooo*4,0000,6,, o ... 
424 
Bibliography .............. 0 ..................................... 0 ........... 
428 
ABBFEVIATIONS 
Add. Additional Manuscripts., British Museum. 
AcIn. Ac1miralty Papers, Public Record Office. 
AGI Archivo General de Indias (Seville). 
AGS Archivo General de Simancas. 
AHN Archivo Hist6rico Nacional (Madrid). 
BM British Museum (London). 
C. L. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). 
C. O. Colonial Office., Public Record Office (London). 
Eg. Egerton Papers., British Museum. 
HKC Historical Manuscripts Camiission. 
Ind. Gen. Indiferente General., Archivo General de Indias (Seville). 
PRO Public Record office (London) 
Shel. Shelburne Papers, William L. Clements Library (Am Arbor). 
S. P. State Papers., Public Record Office (London). 
T. Treasury Papers., Public Record Office (London). 
5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
Without the assistance of numerous people and institutions this work 
would not have been possible. The staffs of the Archivo General de Indias 
and the Archivo General de Simancas in Spain., and those of the British Museum 
and the Public Record Office in London were Mst helpful. I am particularly 
grateful to the University of London forgrants from the Central Research Fund 
which made it possible for me to do necessary research in Spain, and to 
Professor John Lynch., who has guided me in my work and mde so many invaluable 
Suggestions. Finally, I thank nV husband., Bill., who, after suffering through 
years of burnt dinners., was still willing to type this thesis. 
6 
Chapter I 
The Asiento and British Opinion 
It was the contention of many British statesmen and merchants in the 
eighteenth century that the balance of power in Europe was dependent on the 
balance of trade. Prior-tothe Treaty of Utrecht (1713) they believed that 
this balance favoured the French,, one of the reasons being that the French 
had acquired in 1701 the asientol to supply slaves to the Spanish colonies in 
America. However the aspect of French trade that most agitated the British 
Was the illicit merchandise which was sent to the far reaches of Spain's 
eIrPire in America, much of it on French Guinea Corrpany slave ships. They also 
accused the French of destroying British forts and settlements in Africa, and 
of plundering British slave ships in the struggle for slaves to supply markets 
throughout America. I 
The French took advantage of their asiento to send great quantities of 
contraband to America,, including the less accessible Pacific Coast of South 
America. Prior to their acquisition of the asiento contract., the coasts of 
Peru and Chile were visited infrequently by merchant ships; local traders 
purchased most of their merchandise at the fairs in Portobelo, and Cartagena, 
or from the occasional contrabandista. They encouraged this illicit trade, 
albeit with some risk, because French goods were relatively inexpensive., and 
because of the arduous nature of the overland journey to Portobelo and Cartagena. 
Rumours soon reached England that French merchants had warehouses in Peru from 
which they carried goods inland,, and forts and settlements in Chile for the 
protection and repair of merchant ships. This trade was estimated to bring 
E200,000 in bullion into France annually. The English feared that such large 
sums would further upset the balance of power by quickly replenishing the 
French treasury., which had been severely drained during the prolonged European 
1. Although the term asiento has a much broader meaning., in this paper it 
is used to refer only to the contract for the slave trade. 
7 
wars., and by increasing Spain's dependence on France. 
British merchants and politicians were eager to tap the exaggerated wealth 
of Spain's colonies in America., and in the process to sap France's econanic 
strength. As one observer concluded, 
The French must be remov1d from their Settlements in the Spanish 
West-Indies,, as the most effectual Means, both to procure a lasting 
Peace, and to settle the'Grand Trade and Wealth of Europe on a due 
ballance., -- 
At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht the Spanish colonies 
were, in fact., saturated with French and other foreign goods. Furthermore, 
British merchants in Jamaica reported that vigilant Spanish guardacostas also 
hurt trade. They prophesized a sanbre future, as did British merchants in 
Spain whose trade had been erratic throughout the War of the Spanish Succession 
(and only slightly improved afterwards)., due to the scarcity of ships available 
to transport goods to America. 
These lugubrious predictions were modified by the negotiations leading 
to the Treaty of Utrecht. The English believed that the most practical way 
to infiltrate Spain's trading monopoly in America was to obtain legal entry., 
as the French had done, by procuring the asiento de negros. The British 
government submitted an unsuccessful bid for the contract in 1707,, and then 
demanded that it-be considered in the peace discussions in 1711. These 
2. Directors to Stanhope., 25 May 1715, BM, Add. 25,555., ff. 22-23; Anon.., 
A True Account of the Desi , and Advantages of the South-Sea Trade: With Answers to all the Objections rais'd Egainst it (London., 1711)., PP. 6-7; 
Anon., Sorm Considerations upon Trade (London., 1715), P. 1; Anon.,, The 
Considerable Advantages of a South-Sea Trade to our English Nation TITndon., 
C. 17117 , P. 5; Anon.., An Essay on the Nature and Methods for carrying on a Trade to the South Sea., n. d.., BM., Add. -28,140, pp. 25-26; Hubert Aimes., 
ýýHistory of Slavery in Cuba 1511 to 1868 (New York, 1967),, p. 20. 
Spanish officials in Chilean and Peruvian coastal towns were tolerant 
to visiting French merchants. They were frequently permitted to sell their 
illegal merchandise if duties ýiere paid, and in exchange for chasing British 
pirates from. the area. The Spanish did not have the ships to do it alone. 
During the War of the Spanish Succession the fleets could not sail regularly., 
so the French merchants served a useful purpose in supplying necessary goods. 
Sergio Villalobos R.., "Contrabando Franc6s en el Pacifico., 1700-172411, 
Revista de Historia de Am6rica ni1nero 51 (1961), PP. 55,66. 
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negotiations led to the signing of the asiento contract between England and 
Spain on 26 March 1713 .3 
For 185 years prior to 1713 Spain had granted licenses to numerous 
individuals and companies to supply her colonies with negro, slaves. The first 
license was given in 1528; from then until 1601 all contracts were with Spanish 
subjects. After 1601 foreigners were allowed to participate in the trade. 
Several Portuguese merchants held asiento contracts prior to 1640., traders of 
various nationalities until 1685, and the Dutch from 1685 to 1687. The 
Portuguese Guinea Coirpany had a monopoly on the trade between 1687 and 1701., 
as did the French Guinea Canpany f)? (= 1701 until 1713.4 
The British had a large stake in the trade*even before their acquisition 
of the contract. In 1667 two Genoese merchants who had the asiento granted 
sub-contracts to the English Royal Adventurers and to the Dutch India Conpany 
to supply them with slaves., and several years later,, in 1684., they hired an 
agent to represent them in Jamaica and to purchase slaves there. 
The British government encouraged British merchants to participate in 
this lucrative trade. 'In Februax-j 1663 they decreed that Spanish merchants 
could buy slaves in Jamaica and Barbados upon payment of a duty of ten pesos 
3. To Thomas onslow, August 1716, PRo, c-0.137/12, part i., f. 35; Daily 
Courant, 21 April. and 7 June 1714; Anon. letter., 27 March 1714, s PRO,, S. P. 94/82; L. F. Horsfall, "British Relations with the Spanish Colonies in the 
Caribbean 1713-1739"., Unpublished M. A. dissertation, 1935, London University) 
Institute of Historical. Research, pp. 50-51; ElIzabeth Doman., "The Early 
Days of the South Sea Company, 1711-1718"., Journal of Econcmic and Business 
History, 11 (1930), p. 421; L. Batcheler., IýT-he South Sea CaTany and the 
Assiento", Unpublished M. A. dissertation) 1925,, London University, Institute 
of Historical Research. Horsfall and Batcheler ana-lyse the negotiations 
which led to the British acqusition of the asiento contract in 1713. 
Considerable research has also been done on the chronology of the asiento 
Contracts, and the variations in the treaty stipulations. See Georges 
Seelle, La Trait6 Mgriýre aux Indes de Castille (2 vols.., Paris,, 1906). 
4. Elena F. S. de Studer., T-a Trata de Negros en el Rio de la Plata durante el 
Siglo XVIII (Buenos Aires, 1958)., pp. 5b-59; For another work quantifying 
the early asiento trade see Enriqueta Vila Vilar, "Aigunos datos sobre la 
navigaci6n y los navios negreros en el siglo xvii", reprint from 
HistorioVafla y Bibliograffa knericar4tas, vol. xvii (December 1973. 
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per slave. Spaniards who took advantage of this privilege seldan travelled 
personally to the British colonies. - They usually had resident agents purchase 
the slaves, or requested that cargoes be brought to them. For the British slave 
dealer it was more profitable by about 25% to deliver slaves to the Spanish 
colonies than to sell them to resident Spanish agents; the greater profit was 
worth the risks of shipwreck, seizure by ER2ncostas,, mortality,, and bad debts, 
5 and little chance of redress. 
Private British slave traders were further encouraged in 1698 by the 
suspension of the monopoly which the Royal African Carpany had maintained in the 
African trade. Upon payment of 10% of the value of their cargoes to help with 
the maintenance of Company forts., private traders received permission to trade 
on the African coast. One person who was involved in this trade., and who later 
worked for the South Sea Company, was Nathaniel Uring, well-known in the 
contemporary -literature of the period. Uring commanded a sloop that took 150 
slaves and manufactured goods to New Spain in 1711, and later described the 
devious means used by both Spanish and English merchants to avoid contact with 
royal officials. He anchored near Portobelo., with Spanish merchants visiting 
his ship to select and bargain for goods and slaves. They made their purchases 
on the first visit, and collected them on a sedond,, often travelling as poor 
peasants accompanying mule trains. Most of the cargo purchased in Portobelo 
was destined for resale across the isthmus. Except for the slaves., for whCM 
the merchants needed false documentation, or who had to be taken by hidden 
routes at night, everything was packed in small parcels that were easy to hide. 
Besides slaves and merchandise., Uring also supplied provisions used in the 
Journey across the isthmus. 
64 
5. Curtis Pitman Nettels., The E2ne Y of the American Colonies before 
., y 
Syal) 
1720 (Madison, 1934), p-. --17; -J. F. Osborne, "Jams Castillo-Asiento Agent"., 
The Jamaican Historical RevieW3 V"' (1971)., p. 9; A. P. Thornton., "Spanish 
Slave-Ships liý the English West Indies. 1660-85", - Hispanic American Historial 
Review,,. no. 3 (1955), P. 379. 
6. Account of ports on the Spanish Main John Fengass traded to., n. d.,, PRO., 
C. O. 5/123 ff. 8-10. 
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There were several places on the Spanish coast favoured by British traders 
for making rendezvous with Spanish merchants. Naturally they preferred secluded 
spots to principal ports. A small uninhabited island named Bastimentos near 
Portobelo was one such place, Another was the bay near, the river leading to 
Santa Marta. They met the merchants of Cartagena at a place known as Fellow, 
a small fishing village about 35 leagues southwest of the city. The Mosquito 
Coast was also favoured for the introduction of slaves and goods because of 
the presence of British settlers and the protection afforded by the Mosquito 
Indians. 
During the negotiations which led to the asiento contract the English 
requested the right to occupy and fortify four Spanish ports in America to 
Protect the trade. Chile was considered to be an ideal site for one such 
camunity because of its reasonable climate and remoteness from other Spanish 
colonies. They said that a force of 4,000 men, 20 war ships., and 40 transport 
ships would be necessary to establish each ca=nity. Spanish negotiators 
refused even to consider the request. Instead they offered the British the 
equivalent of a 15% reduction on duties on British goods imported at Cadiz., 
a Swiss garrison there under British control--and, by far the most inportant-the 
asiento contract for 10 years (later extended to 30) if they would agree to 
drop their demand for fortified ports. The 15% duty preferential was 
eventually exchanged for the privilege of sending a British ship annually, 
containing'500 tons of merchandise duty free., to acconpany the galleons or 
flotas to America. 8 
7. The Voyages and Travels of CRtain Nathaniel Uring (London., 1928)s PP. 
22,47; D. A. G. Waddell, "Queen Anne's Goverment and the Slave Trade"., 
Caribbean_QuarterLy', vi (1960), P. 7. 
8. Monteleon to Grimaldo., 1 March 1713, AGS., Estado 6822; R6sun6 of a 
proposition by Lexington concerning the treaties of 1713., n. d., AGS, Estado 
6820; Bateman and Ongley to Robert, Earl of Oxford., 31 January 1711., BM,, 
Add. 253559, f. 8; George H. Healey, ed., The Letters of Daniel Defoe 
(Oxford, 1955). Pp. 339-346; Batchelor., "The 8outh STa U-oiFpany"., P. 76; 
Runours that the British hoped to settle on the Spanish coast of 
America greatly disturbed other trading nations, especially the Dutch. 
From John Bristol, 3 June 1712., PRO., S. P. 105/271. 
11 
According to the terms of the Anglo-Spanish aziento treaty as ratified 
by both nations, England was authorized to introduce into the Spanish colonies 
4,800 negroes, or piezas de indias,., per year for thirty years frm 1 May 1713. 
The treaty did not differentiate between a slave and a pieza de indias, 
although technically the term pieza de indias indicated a measurement of seven 
P. 22Ms, or quartas, each palm equivalent to only about eight inches. 
9 
A duty of 33 1/3 pesos was to be levied on each of the first 4,, 000 piezas 
(the duty was paid on the number of piezas and not on the number of slaves) 
Introduced each year., with the remaining 800 to be duty free. During the first 
25 years of the contract permission could be obtained to import more than 4,811'. 100 
slaves if there was a need for them on projects such as public works. In the 
last five years 4,800 was the maximum that could be introduced yearly. The 
duty on slaves in excess of 4,800 was 16 2,13 pesos per pieza, and was due at 
the time of disembarcation., except for slaves who were ill during the visita 
Le_ sanidad (a health inspection performed on all slave ships). Duty was not 
levied on them if they died within the 15 day period after the visita. However 
slaves not certified as ill who died before they were sold were liable for 
duty. Slaves too ill to be measured on the first visita were rescheduled for 
meazurement two weeks' later, and again two weeks after that if necessary. 
Duties were calculated by royal officials at the ports of landing, but paid 
by the Company from. London. 10 The contract did not specify the sale price of 
9. The term was introduced in the middle of the seventeenth century, and 
referred to a prime male sltLve in good physical condition between 14 and 
30 years of age and about 418" tall. By the time the British asiento 
contract was signed this measurement was the standard used to enumerate a 
cargo of slaves. It was rare for the number of piezas to equal the number 
of slaves on a ship's manifest. Deductions were made for physical defects, 
such as filed teeth., missing limbs and tribal scars, as well as for women, 
children and old people. The fluctuation in measurement between ports was 
the result of this rather vague system of conputation. James King., 
"Descriptive Data on Negro Slaves in Spanish Importation Records and Bills 
of Sale", The Journal of NeEZ2 HisýM,, xxviii (1943)., pp. 209-210; David 
L. ChandleF-. "Health Conditions in the Slave Trade of Colonial New Granada" 
in Robert Brent Thplin, ed. 3 Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America (Westport, 1974). pp. 62-63) 6T. 
10. The king of Spain used the revenue from the asiento contract to pay the 
salaries of his ministers and anbassadors in Europe., and to honour juros (annuities or pensions) granted to various creditors. See below p. 168. 
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: 51avez except at Santa Marta,, Cumaný and Maracaibo on the windward coast 
("Spanish Main") of South America, where it was. not to exceed 300 pesos because 
Of the general poverty of the area. 
11 Slaves introduced illegally during the 
period of the contract were subject to seizure and resale by the asiento c(rPany 
for its own benefit after payment of 33 1/3 pesos per pieza in duty to the 
Spanish crown and 110 pesos per pieza in payment to the owner of the slave. 
The asiento contractor was perTrdtted to send clothing, provisions., naval 
stores and medicine to the various factories on slave ships. A special 
stipulation provided that the Buenos Aires factory could receive from England 
special provision ships of 150 tons each when need dictated because of the 
difficulties of supplying this distant outpost. None of these supplies were 
to be resold,, and an inventory of each cargo was to be sent to the Council of 
the Indies. 
There were several other articles that referred only to Buems Aires. 
NO more than 1,200 slaves could be introduced there annually, of which no more 
than 400 could be sold in the provinces outside the city; and a plot of 
PubliclY-owned land suitable for cultivation or grazing near the city was to 
be donated to the asiento contractor. Philip V ordered the governor of Buenos 
Aires to give them the land that had been used by the French Guinea Conpany 
which was within "a rifle shot" of the city. However the two houses built by 
the French company on the property were to be purchased by the new asentistas. 
The proceeds from the slave trade, in bullion or local products., could 
be remitted on English or Spanish ships duty free. Profits were calculated 
quinquennially and the king of Spain's percentage paid in Europe. In the event 
Of war between the two crowns the asentistas were given 18 months without 
hindrance to remove their effects frm the Spanish colonies. However the 
asiento, contract was suspended inmediately. When the contract expired they 
Were to have three years to adjust accounts and remit effects. 
11. In any case the sale price of slaves seldom exceeded 300 pesos. 
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In addition to the slave trade the treaty. granted a limited camerce in 
merchandise. The contractor was authorized to send a ship of 300 tons to the 
Canary Islands one time during the 30 year contract to acquire a cargo of winej 
rLn and madeira to be sold in the Spanish colonies. This bonus had been granted 
to two previous asentistas: the Portuguese Guinea Company and Bernardo Francisco 
Marin. By far the most controversial article was one allowing a ship to be sent 
to America annually with 500 tons of merchandise for sale duty free at the 
fairs-in Cartagena., Portobelo and Vera Cruz. It was given in consideration of 
losses sustained by past contractors,, to avoid illicit trade on the slave-ships.,, 
and to demonstrate Spain's good intentions. Lastly., the contractors were granted 
all privileges and concessions given to past asentistas, and the retiring 
French Guinea Company were ordered to cease trading. 
King Philip V's share in the asiento trade consisted of a duty of 33 1/3 
pesos for each pieza sold, and 25% of the profit of the annual ships plus 5% 
of the remaining profit. In exchange he was required to advance a quarter of 
the amount of money needed to begin the trade. If,, however., he declined to 
do this, the asentistas would advance his share. 
The English contractor was required to advance 200., 000 pesos (Z45,000) 
to Philip for their share in the trade, to be paid in two equal installments, 
the first two months after the contract was signed,, the second two months after 
the first. Repayment was not due to begin until 20 years of the contract had 
expired., then it was to consist of ten annual payments of 20., 000 pesos to be 
deducted from the duties on slaves introduced. Philip was to pay 8% interest 
12 
annually on the money advanced to him. As this money was used to purchase 
cargoes for the annual ships it meant in practice that he was charged fran the 
date of the purchase of the cargo until the proceeds were disposed of in Europe. 
12. Interest rates in the 18th century varied considerably from country to 
country. In France the interest was about 7%, in Italy and Holland 3%., in Spain and Barbados 10%., and in England interest could not exceed 5% 
after September 1714. Edward Hatton*'The'Merchantfs Magazine: or., Trades-man's Treasury (London., 1726): p-. 77171-5. .4 
14 
If there happened to be a loss on this investment the king was liable at the 
sama percentage as he'was to receive in case of profit, i. e., 25% plus 5%. 
These articles did not apply to the purchase of slaves. 
The asiento trade was monitored in America by governors and royal officials 
at the various ports of entry, in England by a Spanish official who had 
instructions to attend all meetings of the contractor and to collect as much 
infoniation on the trade as he could., and in Spain by a junta del asiento de 
negros composed of the fiscal, the secretary of the Council of the Indies., and 
three ministers. The junta., which was first established when the French Guinea 
Company had the contract, advised the king on all petitions or disputes 
concerning the slave trade and the annual'ships. 
13 
Soon after the asiento trade began (with the contract having been given 
to the South Sea Company, see below., p. 15) it became obvious that several 
aspects of the trade were unclear: particularly relating to the annual ships 
and negro duties. In May 1716 the treaty was amended by the "Convention for 
Explaining the Articles of the Assiento". Because no annual ships had sailed 
prior to 1716, the asentistas were permitted by the Convention to add the 
1,500 tons of merchandise that they had accumlated to subsequent voyages in 
ten equal allotments of 150 tons each. Thus the next ten annual ships were to 
be allowed to carry 650 tons of merchandise. 
The Spanish also agreed in the Convention that a, fair would be held 
annually in America and that merchandise from the annual ship could be sold 
four months after its arrival if the Spanish fleet had not arrived. This 
precaution was inserted in the treaty to prevent the destruction of cargoes 
because of poor storage conditions and the hunid climate. Finally., the revised 
13. Asiento contract adjusted between Spain and England, 26 March 1713, AGS., 
Estado 6896; Philip V to the viceroys of Peru and-New Spain., 22 April 
17133 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; *Real c6dula., 16 May 1713, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2769; 
Secret instructions to the governor of Buenos Aires., 29 July 1715., AGI., 
Ind. Gen. 2800; Philip V to governor of Buenos Aires., 9 October 1716, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Georges Scelle., "The Slave-Trade in the Spanish 
Colonies of America: The Assiento",, The Agierican Journal of International 'Law, iv (1910), pp. 653-654. 
15 
treaty clarified the date when the English became responsible for paying duties 
on slaves. Because none had been introduced during the first year of the 
contract., the contractor was exenpted fran paying duties that year. Effectively, 
therefore., the contract began in May 1714.14 
The South Sea Company was established by an Act of Parliament in May 1711 
as negotiations were being held which led to England's acquisition of the 
asiento contract. Originally the Coupany was founded to resolve an acute 
financial problem. The public debt (which was about Eq. 000., 000) was considered 
by the Whig ministry to be a political threat to them, and a diplomatic threat 
to peace negotiations in Utrecht. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) 
had taxed British resources., and Parliament had made no provisions for the 
payment of interest on the debt. The Ccupany., which was caTposed of the most 
powerful businessmen in England, 
15 issued stock and took over short ten-a public 
debts. Government establIshed a fund to pay the Company a tax-free annuity., 
thus allowing them to paY 5% interest on the issued stock. As an added 
inducement to investors to purchase stock., the Canpany was given a monopoly of 
all trade to the South Seas. 
16 
As early as June 1711 the Company began preparations to open trade to 
the Spanish Indies., anticipating that the asiento contract would be assigned 
to them. However not all stock holders favoured accepting an invitation to 
manage the trade. No statistics were available to them., but many Opponents 
14. Treaty signed by Bubb and the Marquis of Piedmar, 26 May 1716., AGIs 
Ind. Gen. 2769. 
15. As an indication of the wealth and power of sane persons involved in 
the Canpany., the first deputy director., Samuel Shepheard., was reputed 
to be worth Z400,000. Even Sir Robert Walpole, who originally withheld 
his support., invested a small sun in the asiento trade. The Original 
Weekly, Journal., 5-12 April 1718; J. H. PluTb, Sir Robert Walpole 
(London, 1956)-3 P. 304. 
16. The tem "South Seas" was misleading. Canpany ships were not perrdtted 
to sail to any Pacific port in the Spanish colonies., and the only factory 
on the Pacific Coast was in Panama. Slaves were delivered there across 
the isthmus. Company representatives also took slaves fran Buenos Aires 
to Santiago in Chile., but they never established a permanent outpost there- 
16 
of the-contract believed that previous companies holding the asiento had 
sustained considerable losses. They felt that it would be unwise to subject 
the Ccmpany to similar dangers. Nonetheless at a general meeting on 26 February 
1714 the proprietors voted 878 to 358 to accept the asiento contract. 
17 
Numerous problems were encountered relating to the distribution of profits 
under the terms of the contract. During the negotiations which led to the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713., the British government sent Manuel Manasses Gilligan 
18 to 
Madrid to discuss several comnercial questions between the two crowns., including 
the terms of the asiento treaty. Patricio de Laules., a Spanish negotiator, 
recarmended that Gilligan be well treated because he was Catholic and reputable- 
and it was rumoured that he would be named director of the British asiento 
corrpany and general director of all'Anglo-Spanish conmercial relations. Gilligan 
gained neither post,, but he was well rewarded by Queen Anne. She made him a 
virtual partner in the trade by giving him V in it--without the responsibility 
for any financial investment. Anne reserved 22Vo for herself., and Philip V 
received 25%. Thus the company that was to acquire the asiento contract would 
receive only 45% interest in the trade., but have 100% responsibility for its 
17. Anon. paper., n. d.., BM, Stowe 354; Montele6n to Grimald03 5 February 17133 
AGS., Estado 6822; Eric Wagstaff., "The Political Aspects of the South Sea 
Bubble"., Unpublished M. A. dissertation., 1934., London University., Institute 
of Historical Research., pp. 7-14,, 28-30. For an account of the financial 
activities of the Conpany see John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble 
(London., 1960). 
18. Gilligan, a naturalized Dane., has been much maligned by historians. Parry 
calls him "an adventurer of shifting nationality with a long record of 
smuggling, trading with the enemy in war,, and general sharp practice. " 
Others suggested that such a person representing England in international 
negotiations was detrimental to the nation. Although he did engage in 
smuggling to Spanish knerica, during the wars of the Spanish Succession., 
such trade was never condemned by the British. Furthermore., both the 
British and Spanish governments were sufficiently pleased with his services 
to award him an annual pension pension of 2., 000 pesos for life to be paid 
from duties on the slave trade. Real c6dula., 17 JulY 1713, AGS, Libro 
482; Note from Gilligan, n. d.,, AGS., Estado b820; John G. Sperlings 21e_ 
South Sea C2r4anV: an Historical Essay and Bibliographical Fin Lng Li 
(Boston, 1962),, p. 13; J. H. Parry, Trade and Daninion (London, 19'11 
P- 103; Wil II arn G. Wood, "The Annual Ships of the South Sea Ccmpany 
1711-173611, Unpublished-Ph. D. dissertation3 1936, University of Illinois 
at Urbana, p. 21. 
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administration and 75% responsibility for the financial investment. 
As negotiations progressed it became apparent that the Spanish intended 
the English contractor to finance the entire asiento trade., including even 
the share that Philip V had the option of contributing. The South Sea Company 
directors considered 45% of the profits to be insufficient to warrent the 
expenses and troubles involved. They asked Queen Anne either to surrender to 
the Conpany her share in the trade or to give it to investors who would be 
willing to supply capital investment in proportion to the percentage of the 
trade they received. If they could not have the additional 221-,, %. (30% if they 
could acquire Gilligan's share)., then they wanted someone else to finance the 
22'-121o of the initial investment. The directors also threatened to reduce the 
Coupany to a banking institution only unless the queen surrender her share. 
These difficulties led to rumours that a new conpany would be fomed to manage 
the slave trade. 
19 
Anne did finally surrender her share of the trade,, ý but Gilligan refused 
to give up his until the Lords Justices ruled that he had no right to it unless 
he paid 98,, 000 to the Company, the-amount, they said would be his proportional 
share of the initial investment. He declined to pay and his percentage also 
reverted to the Canpany., which by November 1714 had acquired the right to 75% 
of the profit derived from the asiento contract. The remaining 25%., plus the 
duties on slaves introduced into America went to Philip V. Having acquired 
the share of the expected profits that they wished., the Coupany agreed to put 
20 
up all the necessary capital. 
19. Bateman to Lords Justices,, 17 August 1714, BM., King's 73., f. 136; Directors 
to Robert., Earl of Oxford., 2 December 1713, EM, King's 73,, f. 106; Minute 
court of directors,, 23 December 1713, EM., Add. 253495, f. 112; Directors 
to Robert., Earl of Oxford., 8 June 1714, BM, King's 73, f. 122; Frcrn Laules., 
28 February 1713, AGS, Estado 6825; Laules to Grimaldo, 14 May 1714s AGs. 
Estado 6825; Laules to Grimaldo, 28,30 and 31 December 1713, and 7 January 
1714., AGS, Estado 6825. 
20. Bateman-to Lords Justices, 17 August, and 1 September 1714, EM, King's 73, 
ff. 136-137; Bolingbroke to Bateman, 17 June 1714., EM., King's 73., f- 124; 
WagStaff3 "The Political Aspect", P. 30. 
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During the general negotiations leading to the asiento contract the British 
acquired permission to send two licensed merchant ships each with a maxiMUM Of 
600 tons of merchandise (based on 166 3/8 palms per ton) to the Spanish West 
Indies. These two ships were in addition to the annual ships., but were not 
part of the asiento contract. Yet they had the same function as far as the 
British were concerned., i. e. to open a market for British manufactured goods. 
However Anne also granted this privilege to the South Sea Company,, although 
the assignment was left to her discretion and need not have gone to them. 
Initially Philip V was to receive 10% of the profit frcm the licensed 
ships., but he agreed in the Spring of 1713 to surrender it to Anne., as well 
as the 5% of the three-fourths profit of the annual ships. Unfortunately Anne 
died in 1714 and the question developed into a dispute between the Companys 
George I and Philip V. In March 1724., at the request of the directors., George I 
gave, the Company the 10% and 5% in question. His right to dispose of the shares 
was contested by the Spanish king. He had given them to Anne alone for her 
advantage during her lifetime., he said; they were not part of George I's 
inheritance. Legal advisers to the British king argued that the privilege 
had been granted to the crown and therefore was inheritable; George could 
dispose of it as he wished. 
The British goverment placed both George I's and Philip V's honour at 
stake in the dispute. George I had pranised the percentage publicly to the 
Company, and certainly Philip V did not want all of Europe to think that he 
had greaterregard for Anne than for him. While no direct documentation has 
been found to explain how the dispute was resolved., it does appear to have been 
settled in Philip V's favour. The accounts indicate that he received 10% of 
the profits fran the licensed ships and 5% of the three-fourths profits frcra 
the annual ships. 
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21. Legal opinion in Madrid,, 14 July 1724., AGS, Estado 6873; Stanhope to, 
Grimaldo, 27 October 1724, AGS., Estado 6873; From Stanhope., 7 June 1724j 
AGS, Estado, 6861; Philip V to royal. officials of Cartagena., Portobelo 
and Vera Cruz., 26 July 1715, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2769; Reales 6rdenes., 11 April 
(continued on next page) 
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The assignment of the asiento to the South Sea Company had an immediate 
effect on trade in knerica, in spite of growing hostility frK)M private 
interests in England and Jamaica to large monopolistic corporations. 
22 This 
hostility had developed primarily out of the struggle of the Royal African 
Company to retain control of the African slave trade against the encroachments 
of private interlopers. 
23 The mnopolists were accused of maintaining 
unjustfiably high prices by artificially keeping markets understocked and of 
having excessive overheads which allowed private merchants to compete favourablY. 
The Royal African Company almost bankrupted itself by maintaining numerous 
settlements with large, overpaid staffs. The possible advantages or disadvantages 
to British trade resulting from the contract were discussed exhaustively in 
London newspapers., journals and broadsides. Journals in opposition to government 
were prolific, and devoted considerable space to criticizing the Company's 
activities. 
Apologists for the South Sea Company justified its monopoly by citing its 
21. (continued fran previous page)and 17 June 1713., AGS., Estado 6861; wescanb 
to La Fay, 6 May 1724, BK., Add. 32,738, f- 358; Walpole et al to the king's 
attorney and solicitor general, 18 October 1721, EM, Add. '25,582, ff. 7-9; 
Carteret to Stanhope, 1 March 1724., PRO., s. P. 104/139; Marquis of Lede 
to Stanhope, 3 July 1724, BM, Add. 32,739, f. 225; Stanhope to Newcastle, 
10 August 1724.1 BM., Add. 32,739, ff. 424-425; Stanhope to Newcastle, 16 
November 1724., BM., Add. 32,741., f. 225. 
22. Michael Harris., "The London Newspaper Press, c. 1725-174611, Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation., 1973, London University,,, Institute of Historical 
Research, pp. 188-189. 
23. After the revolution in 1688 the Royal African Coupany faced a decrease 
in trade, the same overheads., and considerable financial strain,, since 
much of their capital was tied up by credit advanced to planters who'had 
purchased slaves. At the same time public sentiment against monopolies 
increased. While the Company had several prosperous years when it supplied 
the South Sea Company with slaves., its viability had been threatened. 
By 1719 it had to ask for public assistance to maintain the forts., and 
in 1750 it was dissolved after many years of declining trade. Waddell) 
02- cit-2 PP. 7j 9,10. 
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unique nature. They argued that the monopoly was only in slaves to be sold 
in Spain's American colonies, and thus could not effect the trade in English 
manufactured goods or the private merchants trading to Africa. Englishnen 
engaged in the Guinea slaveýtrade could trade as before if they restricted their 
sales to British and foreign colonies other than Spanish. 
24 Nevertheless 
Jamaican merchants were affected because they ran a lucrative illicit trade 
in slaves and merchandise to Spanish colonies., and were naturally apprehensive 
about their future. Once the South Sea Ccupany began to trade., this source of 
untaxed income would be greatly curtailed; they feared that Jamaica's population 
would decline., its people becane impoverished and the island's strength sapped. 
Whether in fact there was a basis for a quarrel between the Company and 
private traders is open to question. One observer suggested that an "imaginary 
Coupetition was artfully given out to blind the CorTany" against the traders 
"by creating Jealousies between them". Nevertheless when the Coupany announced 
plans to place a depot on the island to receive slaves for purposes of resting 
them from the rigours of the voyage, and to sort and select those most 
appropriate for the Spanish., a very real dispute did arise which lasted the 
duration of the asiento contract. The Corrpany postulated that in exchange for 
the privilege of settling this depot they would enploy local people., hire 
sloops to transport slaves to the various ports in America2 and purchase and 
sell provisions and negroes locally. 
25 
These apparent advantages did not assuage the islanders,, who continued 
their attenpts to discredit the Corrpany. Claiming that previous asentistas, 
had all lost money., they argued that private trade prior to the contract had 
24. Anon.., An Answer to a CalUTAV.... (London, 1728)., P. 59; K. G. Davies., 
The Royal African C2Manv (London., 1957)3 PP. 120-121; Adam Smith, 
Kn 
. 
guiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London,, 
1812. v p. 62; Doman, "The Early Days". p. 421. 
25. There were disadvantages to selling slaves in Jamaica. Planters and 
merchants purchased them frcm the Company and then shipped them to the Spanish Main and elsewhere in Spanish America in ccnpetition with the Company. Directors to Panama factors3 26 October 1717., BM,, Add- 
25)5633 f. 72. 
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been three times greater than the Company's. Even worse., they complained, 
the Company supplied slaves to Cuba,, thereby assisting the Spanish to open new 
sugar plantations which competed with British ones. Their most damaging 
accusations were against Company personnel., who were accused of immoral and 
even treasonous-activities. Ccupany agents were accused of "a scandalous 
Violation of Old English Honour., Fidelity., and Humanity ... scarce to be parallelld 
in History" by alerting the Spanish whenever private traders set out from 
Jamaica. This was done, according to the Jamaicans., to protect their own 
illicit trade. Whether by Company agents or Jamaican merchants., except for the 
occasional annual or register ships., trade to Spanish colonies was against 
Spanish law: but the merchants had not breached English law., while the asiento 
contract expressly forbade Company agents from trading privately with the 
Spanish. 26 
r1b determine accurate profit figures for the South Sea Company's trade., 
it was suggested that resulting losses suffered by Jamaican merchants should 
be considered. The difficulty in making these couparisons is the lack of 
available statistics. According to one report, between 1715 and 1739 
(approximately the duration of the British asiento contract) 722 slave ships 
brought 168,324 slaves to Jamaica., of which 74,925, or 4436., were reexported. 
Because records for Company slave ships arriving in Jamaica and the nunber 
of their slaves purchased locally., are not available., it is impossible to 
determine what percentage of these slaves belonged to the Conpany. 
27 
Resident British merchants in Cadiz and Seville were also vulnerable 
26. R. B. LeýPage,, Jamaican Creole (London, 1960), p. 66; Anon., The Assiento 
Contract Considerld (Loondon, 71714), pp. 6-16; Anon., The Trade Granted 
to the South-Sea Corrpany: Considered with Relation to Janaica. (London., 
1714).,. PP. 3., 7., 9; Anon., Some Observations on the Assiento Trade , As it has been Exercised by the South-Sea Company.... kLondon., 17-2B), p. 21; 
Anon.., Considerations on the knerican Trade, Before and Since the 
Establishment of the South-Sea Company (London,, 1739)., pp'. 93 27; Anon-j 
A Defence of the Observations on the Assiento Trade, As it hath been 
Exercised bv the South-Sea Company (London, 1728), p. 11. 
27. Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (London, 1967). p. 289. 
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to changes brought about by the asiento contract. British manufactured goods 
which they sent to America on the fleets competed directly, and unfavourably., 
with the licensed and amual ships. These merchants had to pay duties on goods 
brought to Spain for sale in America., courdssions and duties on exports, 
coraTdssions on various American and freight costsi and then camiissions and 
duties on returns. The Coupany sent their goods duty free., and in the case of 
the licensed ships, without even paying transportation costs. 
28 
Many Englishmn were sceptical for other reasons about the concessions 
granted under the asiento. One critic considered the South Sea ConTpany "as an 
Institution for carrying on a Trade to the Spanish Indies, ... a romantick and 
chimerical Project, and ruinous to our present Camerce". Echoing these 
thoughts., another suggested that "The Project and the People are unhappily 
ill sorted., by putting the Trade as an Appendix to the Debt. " Such a 
combination was 
like Two Men in the Water., who are but Young Swimmers, alone they 
might make shift to get on well enough, and People at Hand would help 
them; but clasping together they sink out of reach., and drown one another. 
Yet another argued that from the beginning "The Design of your South Sea 
28. Petition fran merchants and consul in Seville and St. Lucas to Lords 
Ccninissioners for Trade and Plantations, 14 July 1715s PRO, C. O. 388/20; 
,, 
Ihe particular Advantages that may arise to Great'Britain by the Anon. r 
Assiento for Negroes, n. d., Cambridge, Cho1mondeley Papers., Sectlon 
88/139; G. J. Walker., "The Galeones and Flotas in Spain's American Trade 
with special reference to the period 1700-1735". Unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation., 1964, Cambridge University, Fitzwilliam, Houseq p. 129. 
McLachlan claims that the amount of goods shipped in the annual ships 
was inconsequential compared to British manufactures sold privately to 
Spanish merchants, part of which were destined for the Pmerican market. 
She argues that the annual ships were too irregular to meet the needs of 
the Spanish colonists, and thus failed to create a demand for their goods. 
The Spanish, she claims, preferred to pay higher prices to insure a regular 
supply on the fleets. In fact., the question of supply was irrelevant as 
the fleets almost never sailed without an annual ship during the period 
of the British asiento. Furthermore, the annual ships had an excellent 
sales record because of the cheaper prices of their cargoes, and in spite 
-, 
Of the availability of illicit goods from Britain,, France and the-- 
Nbthei, lands. IJ- -ý,, O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750 (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 22-24. 
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Ccripany was undertook upon a wrong notion, it was undertook in imitation of 
what Riches France has got from thence since the War begun". The contract was 
"cloggld with so many invincible Obstacles, that., in my htzrble Sense, the Wit 
of Man cannot find a Method to surmount them. " It was even distrusted by a 
nLm-ber of British goverment officials. James Stanhope remarked that neither 
the country,, nor the king, nor the South Sea CoMany could gain any advantage 
from it. George I would have given it up 
if he did not apprehend that this must open a door to the French cad-ng 
into it,, which They would readily catch at, not from any profit they 
could propose from the Contract itself., but from the opportunity it would 
give them to colour a forbidden Trade in the West Indies., which collusive 
Trade is certainly far more destructive to Spain itself than to Great 
Britain. 29 
On the other hand many people believed that the contract would salvage 
the British economy and enploy numerous idle and undesirable men. Trade would 
expand the market for British cloth and bolster the lagging fortunes of the 
Royal African Company through sub-contracts. Those who supported the asiento 
concluded that the 
Establishment of a South-Sea Trade., must tend exceedingly to the good 
of all Degrees and Ranks of Men amongst us: The Poor will be more employ'd 
in Manufactures, the Product of the Estates of our landed Men will become 
more valuable., and the Trading part of the Nation will be greatly 
encouragId-30 
29. C King., The British Merchant; or, Canmerce PreservId (3 Vols.. q London3 
1ý21)j iiij 254-25U-; Anon.., A Letter fran a Merchant 1n Amsterdam to a 
Friend in London about the South Sea Trade (Lond n., 1714., P- 13; Anon.., 
An Essay on the South-Sea 21ade (London,, 1712)., pp. 10s 33; J. Pullen, 
Memoirs of the Maritime Affairs of Great-Britain (London,, 1732)., pp. 
1 15; Stanhope to Bubb., 29 December 1715., BM, Eg. 2170" f. 368 
30. The contract was supported by a variety of eccentrics. One Samuel Weale3 
while confined in Fleet prison., proposed a scheme to raise Z20,000,000 
based on the value of real estate in England. The asiento trade which would 
be financed by this fund would help to spread the gospel and sanehow make 
sufficient profit to discharge the public debt. Another gentleman suggested 
that it was only just that England was granted the asiento in carpensation 
for the loss of lives and funds she had sustained by assisting Spain in 
previous wars. T. S. Ashton, An Economic History of England: The 18th 
Century (London, 1955), P. 91; Anon., A True Account, pp. 19., 20; Anon., 
A Letter to a Member of Parliament on the Settl a Trade to the South-Sea 
of America (London -17-7-5; Anon., A Proposall for the Rals =0 171 , PP. Twenty Millions Sterling for the Carying on, and T)roTmting of the Tracle 
to the South Seas... wl. D 808; Anon. - Remarks upon tne 
', 
n. d., Bodleian, Ra 
.9 -_ - act nono Anne R. for carrying on a trade to the South Seas, n. d.., BM2 
Harley 6393, . 20. 
24 
Spain's reliance on contracts with private entrepreneurs and foreign 
coTnpanies to supply slaves to her American colonies was a serious flaw in her 
trading monopoly, yet the need for labour was so great that slaves were the 
only conmdity a1lowed to pass through the Casa de Contrataci6n without 
registration or taxation. 
31 The asiento privilege carried the inherent 
potential of destroying Spain's mercantile system. 
31. Walker . 
"Galeones__ and Flotaz pp - -18-20. 
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Chapter II 
Derivations of Spanish Economic Reform in the Eighteenth Century 
The failure of Spain to supply the basic needs of its colonies in America., 
and the resulting increase in contraband by the French., Dutch and Englishy 
contributed to a crisis in the transatlantic trade in the middle of the 
seventeenth century. 
1 The lack of industrialization in SPain was not the only 
cause of her failure to control the trade to the Indies. Other reasons were the 
shift of demand in the colonies, the decline of mining Output, and the absorption 
of imperial profits by defence costs. Moreover the decline of Spanish merchant 
shipping increased the opportunities for foreign traders. Finally, the theory 
that trade to the colonies must be in the hands of a few monopolists in Seville 
and Cadiz., and conducted for the benefit of the metropolis., was also at fault. 
When England acquired the asiento contract Spain was basically an 
agricultural country that failed to supply its own industrial needs., let alone 
those of its colonies. 
2 It has been estimated that by the end of the seventeenth 
century Spain supplied only 5% of the merchandise that was sent on the fleets 
1. The Casa de Contrataci6n was established in 1503 to oversee trade between 
8pai-n and her American colonies. It controlled the issuance of licenses to 
, privateers., regulated departures, controlled tonnage, inspected cargoes2 
collected duties and attended to other legal matters. Trade was limited to 
two fleets annually; the flota which left for Vera Cruz in April, and-the 
galleons., which departed for Cartagena and Portobelo in August. Trade was. 
centralized in America by the board6 of merchants who met at the beginning 
of each fair and regulated the prices with the fleet merchants to adjust 
the available bullion to the stock. However by the seventeenth century the. 
fleet trade had become disorganized and was highly irregular. A fleet 
sailed to tierra firme in 1695, and then during the War of the Spanish 
Succession only five merchant fleets sailed: in 1706,1708,1710,1712 and 
1715. Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein,, The Colonial Heritage of Latin 
America (New York., 1570), pp. 48-49; Sergio Villalbbos R.., Comercio y 
contrabando en el Rio de la Plata y Chile 1ZOO-1811 
' 
(Buenos Aires, 1965),, 
pp. 9., M; -Henry Kamen., The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-15 (London3 
1969), pp. 177-178. 
2. During the seventeenth century agricultural output had decreased through 
natural causes as well as heavy taxation. This in turn led to food 
shortages which was one of the causes of Spain's population decline; the 
other reasons were epidemics., wars., taxation and the problems of maintaining 
the overseas colonies. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession., 
Spain's population was approximately 7., 500., 000: the same as it had been 
175 years earlier. Stein, op. cit.,, P. 13; Kamen., op. cit. 2 pp. 28-29. 
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to America., with the remaining 95% of the cargo consisting of European 
manufactured goods and luxury items from the Far East. In effect she had become 
an intermediary between the raw materials and bullion from her colonies in 
America and the export trade of the rest of Europe. This situation was 
aggravated by the War of the Spanish Succession., when America was particularly 
vulnerable to illicit trade. However contraband trade was not limited to 
foreigners. Exorbitant duties on merchandise imported to or exported from 
America., in addition to taxes for the maintenance of convoys to protect the 
merchant fleets, created a climate leading also to smuggling by Spanish merchants. 
The Canary Islands were a centre for the trade because of their ideal location., 
but it was endemic throughout America. The Spanish historian., Jaime Vicens 
Vives, suggests that by 1686 at least two-thirds of all colonial trade was 
In contraband. By the second half of the seventeenth century it was estimated 
to have reached 10,000., 000 pesos annually on the fleets, in spite of numerous 
regulations to control it. Cargoes were falsely measured., tonnage misrepresented, 
and invoices distorted, to mention only a few of the many ingenious methods 
developed to defraud, the royal treasury of duties. 
3 
Particularly vulnerable to incursions of illicit traders was the Spanish 
Main, -. extending from the Isthmus of Panama to the Orinoco. In fact, it was 
suggested that contraband in the provinces of New Granada and Cartagena was 
greater than in any other place in America because of the numerous rivers., bays 
and inlets which provided convenient hiding places for traders. Contraband 
3. Patifto to Corobarrutia y Z15pide, 22 July 1722., AGI., Mexico 857; John Lynch, 
Spain Under the HEsburgs (Oxford, 1969), p. 193; Mclachlan., Trade and 
Peace., p. 9; Walker,, "Galeones and Flotas'l., pp. 26,41,107; Clarence 
Haring, Trade and Navigation between S2ain and the Indies (Harvard,, 1918)., 
p. 62; jairm Vicens Vives, An Econanic History of Spain (Princeton,, 1969)., 
pp. 405-407; Vicenta Cortes Alonso., "Una memoria de los mercaderes de 
Cadiz del siglo XVIIIII, reprint from Revista de Archivos Bibliotecas Y 
Museos., lxx (1962). p. 24; Manuel Nufles Dias., "Venezuela en las refomes 
estructurales del sistema colonial espaftolall., in Memoria del PrImer 
Congreso Venezolano de Historia,., ii (Caracas, 197-2'7-, p. 120; ValentIn 
Vazquez de Prada., "Las rutas comerciales entre Espafla y wrica, en el siglo 
XVIIIII, in Las Rutas del Atl6ntico (Sevilla, 1969), pp. 63 211,214. 
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through Buenos Aires was also extensive and equally difficult to control because 
of the proximity of the Portuguese colony of Sacramento. The behaviour of 
Spanish colonial officials did little to impede the trade, and many of them 
participated in it. Merchandise in considerable quantities was also introduce 
by Spanish officials on the register and aviso ships, and even on the azosues. 
Mis relaxed attitude caused the viceroy of Peru., the Marquis of Castelfuertej 
to suggest that viceroys be given an inducement to stop the trade. But it w&E 
almost impossible to curtail this trade., according to the governor of the 
consejol, the Bishop of Sig-aenza, because of the ingenuity of foreign merchants 
and the susceptibility to bribery of Spanish colonial officials. 
4 
When the first fleet sailed after the War of the Spanish Succession the 
result was disastrous for Spanish merchants. During the war merchants in Mexico 
had been supplied Ipw cost merchandise by French., Dutch and English traders 
based in the Caribbean., and by an increasing trade frora the Far East through 
Acapulco; they were not anxious to pay the higher prices of the flotistas. 
In fact in 1713 the Mexican merchants had suggested that the fleet system be 
suspended on the spurious grounds that they had been eliminated from a share 
in the trade because provincial merchants purchased goods directly from the 
f'iotistas to avoid the costs of a middle-q=. When the suggestion was ignored 
and a flota was sent under Manuel L6pez Pintado in 1715 they employed another 
tactic. They forced the flotistas to cut prices, sometimes to below cost2 by 
refusing to make purchases until they did so. Spanish merchants also suffered 
a loss of trade at the fairs on tierra firme. 
5 
The economic development of the Spanish American colonies at the beginning 
Sigtlenza to Guerra, 18 June 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Hoyo to Montijo, 27 
November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Castelfuerte to Philip V, 18 October 
17223 AGI, Lim 411; Anon. letter about illicit trade, n. d., c. 1722, 
AGI, Santa F6 374; Castelfuerte to Philip V, 4 June 1732., AGI, Uma 414; 
Baloco Leygrave to Philip V, 30 MaY 1721.9 AGI., Santa F6 374; Note., 2 June 
1722., AGI, Contrataclon 5144; Resumen de los acuerdos de los canercios de 
Sevilla y C6diz, n. d., c. 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726. 
Walker, op. cit., pp. 106,1083 110,137; Eduardo Arcila Farfas, Economfa 
colonial de Venezuela (M6xico, 1946), p. 166. 
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of the eighteenth century was extremely limited. Growth of industry had been 
hampered,, although not stifled, by the mercantile theory and the accompanying 
restrictive legislation, by the accessibility of contraband merchandise at 
competitive prices, and by the absence of any industrial tradition. Capital 
and labour also presented obstacles to its growth. Although it was reported 
that mining increased after 1740, and that considerable silver had been available 
earlier in the century., most of it was spent on foreign goods or hoarded., rather 
than being used for capital investment. One contemporary observer., Andrea del 
Hoyo., wrote in 1734 that the lack of silver through insufficient production., 
hoarding, or remittance abroad was the main cause of economic problems in Peru. 
Although there was some investment in industry, particularly ceramics in Mexico 
and consmer goods such as textiles for the lower class domestic market and 
hides throughout the colonies, the main products America had to offer for export 
aside from precious metals and stones were tropical agricultural crops such as 
cacao, tobacco, sugar, various hard and dye woods, indigo and sarsaparilla, 
which were harvested by servile Indian or slave labour. As a result only a 
small group of landowners., miners, merchants, crown officials and clergymen 
were in a position to accumulate capital or generate economic growth. This small 
group also formed the bulk of the consumer market for goods imported on the 
fleets and by contraband merchants. The great mass of labourers produced their 
own subsistence needs and remained basically outside the colonial market. This 
is well illustrated by the economy, of New Granada prior to its beccming a 
viceroyalty in 1739. The main comercial activities were mining and agriculture, 
both of which were dependent on slave labour because of the depletion of the 
mative population. Except for some basic staples., most of the consumer supplies 
at the mines and plantations had to be delivered by merchants. If the mines 
ceased to produce., which was often a danger because of the high prices of slaves 
and merchandise, then the entire market economy could collapse. In other words3 
the restrictions placed on colonial economic activities by the mercantile 
theory were Only part of the problem. The structure of production and the 
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concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, while most labourers remained 
marginally self-sufficient were basic obstacles to colonial economic development. 
In addition the labour shortage was aggravated by epidemics among the native 
population (such as the terrible plague in Peru in 1719)., the inability to 
conquer sane Indian tribes, and the return of Spaniards to Europe after they 
became wealthy. 
In spite of these handicaps a small inter-colonial trade had developed, 
although most of the goods produced were exchanged for foreign or Spanish 
merchandise. A sunnary of colonial products and trading patterns was made by 
an anonymous merchant in the first part of the eighteenth century and included 
the following items: 
Table I 
Estimated Amual. 
Region Production Area of Trade 
Buenos Aires 50-60,000 skins Unspecified, mainly foreign 
Trinidad 600,000 pounds cacao Foreign 
12,500 pounds tobacco 
Margarit a and 
Cumana pearls, hides., tobacco., Foreign 
La Guaira 1,6oo., ooo to 2_, 000,000 New spain and Holland 
pounds cacao, 6-8,000 
hides, 2-3,000 petacas 
tobacco 
Santa Marta and 











4,8oo, ooo to 6,400,000 
pounds of tobacco, 6-8,000 
hides 
4-500,000 pounds Brazilwood, 
3-4., ooo hides 
2,500,000 pounds logwood 
Tobacco, sugar, hides 
8-10., 000 hides, 800,000 pounds 
tobacco 
5., 000 hides., 400., 000 pounds 
cacao 
Fair 
New Spain, foreign 
mainly foreign 
About 1/5 to Havana., the 
ranainder foreign 





Another estimate of trade 13 unds written 
in 1731, suggested that 7.920 000 po Of 
cacao., 150,000 pounds of tobacco and 1-2., 000 hides and some silver were exported 
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from Caracas annually. Approximately 385,000 pounds of cacao (4.86% of the 
total, went to the South Sea Conpany., the remainder to New Spain., the metropolis 
and foreign parts. 
6 Although the figures above are probably far from accurate2 
they do indicate generally the volume and direction of trade, and the pervasive 
nature of the illicit foreign involvement. 
Spain felt the impact of colonial ýepression in two respects. First,, 
public and private remittances from the colonies to the metropolis remained low. 
Second, econanic stagnation in the colonies resulted in a chronic deficiency of 
funds available for public works. Fortifications were badly in need of repair, 
garrisons were unpaid and under supplied., arms and ammunition were lacking, and 
g! 4ýcostas were scarce; those defenses necessary to combat contraband trade 
and prevent foreign intrusions were hindered. In July 1720 Governor Badillo of 
Panama reported that he was unable to comply with orders to repair the forts 
or to resist enemy forces because of the lack of funds in the local treasury 
and in that of Peru. In Venezuela, La Guaira was the only fortified port in 
the early 1720s., and it was in such a bad state of repair as to be virtually 
worthless. 
7 
6.1ýpez Pintado to Duran, 15 February 1716ý AGI, Mexico 854; Hoyo to Montijo., 
27 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Castelfuerte to the crown., 13 November 
1724., AGI., Lim 411; Olavarriaga, to Patifto., 28 October 1731., AGI., Caracas 
56; Aldo Ferrer., The Argentine Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles., 1967)., 
p. 20; Robert C. West, Colonial Placer nLiý in Colombia (Baton Rouge., 1952)3 
pp. 1123 122-123; Norman A. Meiklejohn., "The Implementation of Slave 
Legislation in Eighteenth-Century New Granada"., in Robert Brent Toplin,, 
ed., Slave and Race Relations in Latin America (Westport., 1974),, pp. 180-181; 
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"A Preliminary Inquiry into Money., Prices and Wages in Rio de Janeiro., 
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Badillo to Philip V,, 30 July 1720., AGI., Panama 128; Santo Bueno to Philip 
V, 30 January 17171 AGI, Lima 410; Testimony of Gomez Triegeso, 27 January 
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Pedro Josd de Olavarriaga toured the province of Venezuela in 1720 and 
1721 and reported to the'viceroy of New Granada, Jorge de Villalonga., that 
many more ports in the province should be fortified., that merchants who 
traded in contraband be sentenced to death., and that corsairs be amed to 
fight the introduction of foreign goods. All the decrees issued in Madrid 
forbidding residents to trade with foreigners., he said,, were useless. They 
were ignored by goverment officials and residents alike because that was 
the only way to acquire needed supplies. Pedro Jos6 de Olavarriaga., 
Instrucci6n general y particular del estado presente de la provincia de 
v ene zue-La en j-os anos cie L (eu y -L-(2--L (Caracas., 19 65) --. 217-219 9 300 9 325-326. 
pp 
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These problem led to a series of reform initiated by the Bourbon 
ministers. They sought to enhance Spain's political and military might and to 
improve the nation's econonV by acquiring greater profit from enpire. Socially, 
they euphasized a liberation from conformism., inertia,, ignorance and 
superstition. Within the framework of mercantilism emphasis was placed on 
modernizing the fleet system, improving the labour force., increasing capital 
investment in industry and commerce., and impeding contraband. 
A major thrust to diminish the economic dependence of Spain and its colonies 
on the rest of Europe came just after the war of 1718. Perhaps the minister 
mst responsible for initiating these reform was Joseph Patifio, a Galician born 
in Milan. Patifto became president of the Casa de Contratac16n in Cddiz., with 
jurisdiction over all camTerce and navigation in the Indies., then minister of 
Marina, Indias y Hacienda., and finally, in 1734, first minister. With the 
intention of reforming the entire fleet system and restoring Spanish commerce 
to its former glory he published his "Proyecto para Galeones y Flotas del Per<1 
y Nueva Espaha., y para Navfos de R6gistros y Avisos" on 5 April 1720. It 
regulated the sailings of the fleets. The ftotas were to depart for New Spain 
on 1 June stopping for a maximum of six days in Puerto Rico for water, remaining 
for 15 days at Vera Cruz for the fair, and stopping for 15 days in Havana On 
the return voyage before sailing directly to Cadiz. The departure of the 
galeones was scheduled for 1 September, stopping either in Cartagena for 50 
days or in Portobelo for 60 days for the fair. On the return trip they were to 
remain in Havana 15 days. These regulations simply modified the existing 
structure., and neither solved the question of foreign and Spanish contrabands 
nor increased profits from the fairs. Spanish merchants in the colonies still 
had no inexpensive, regular and legal source of merchandise. More fundamental 
reforms were still needed. 
8 
8. Diccionario, de Historia de*Espaýla (2 vols.., Madrid, 1952)., 11., 779; Walker, 
OT). 9T; 'Va'ýuez de Prada, cit..,, p. 216; Nufles Dias, OP. cit-i 
popp. 12U. -127., 144; Marcelo Bitar Letayf, Economistas espaholes del siglo 
XVIII (Madrid, 1968), p. 44; Vicens Vi . op. cit.,, pp. 473ý 542. 
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The revision of the fleet system was accompanied by steps to improve the 
defence of the colonies. In June 1720 all foreign trade in America was 
forbidden and any goods belonging to foreign merchants were to be confiscated. 
Six months later Philip V ordered that all foreigners be expelled frcm the 
viceroyalty of Peru unless they had special licenses permitting them to remain. 
Restrictions against foreigners trading or residing in the Indies were 
strengthened in March 1721.9 
The most serious efforts to protect Spanish conmerce on the Spanish Main 
revolved around plans to establish a monopoly company such as those which had 
been so successful in England, France and Holland. When Philip V first became 
king he received proposals to establish commercial companies. The first such 
request came from the French., who in 1703 proposed the formation of a joint 
Franco-Spanish company to trade to the Indies. While the proposal was supported 
by the king., the Council of the Indies refused to agree to its formation. Not 
only were*they concerned about French influence, they had traditionally opposed 
opening the American market to foreigners., or for that matter., to anyone except 
a small clique of merchants. Several years later., in 1707., Diego Murga,, the 
Marquis of Montesacro., proposed the formation of a company to trade with Caracas 
and Honduras. While it, too., was opposed by the Council., he did actually form. 
the company in 1714. It was received with hostility by American officials who 
considered it illegal and lasted only three years. The first commercial conpany 
to be formed with a solid basis was the Real Compaftfa Guipuscoana de Caracas 
(the Caracas Company). On 25 September 1728 it was authorized to send two 
ships of 40 to 50 guns to Caracas annually with no restrictions on the taxable 
cargo carried from Spain, and to use its vessels as guardacostas along the 
windward coast. Foreign vessels that they seized between the Orinoco and the 
Rfo de la Hacha were to be sold, with the proceeds divided two-thirds to the 
9. Baloco Leygrave to Philip V., 24 August 1721, AGI, Santa F6 374; Vera Cruz 
royal officials to Philip V, 30 November 1721., AGI., m4xico 858; Santa Fe 
royal officials and governor to Philip V., 27 June 1722, AGI, Santa F6 297. 
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Canpany and one-third to the officers and crew. Captured crews were to be sent 
to Spain. Spaniards were not eager to invest in such a commercial guardacosta, 
enterprise, thus the crown turned to foreign capital to stimulate interest. It 
was not until late July 1730 that sufficient capital had been accumlated to 
begin trade. 
The activities of the Caracas Conpany were resented by Venezuelan merchants 
who accused them of bribery,, inefficiency, cruelty, price controlling, hindering 
trade, inadequately supplying the region., and creating artificial shortages of 
Venezuelan cacao and tobacco. Sane of these criticisms were justified, but 
the Company did help to create a general improvement in economic conditions 
in Venezuela, and was partially successful against contraband trade. 
10 During 
the War of Jenkins' Ear the Coapany loaned money to the goverrmient and outfitted 
eight warships. 
11 
At the time the Caracas Company began operations the state of the trade 
in Venezuela was suTrwized as follows: 
Table II 
Cacao production 
in fanegas (Of 
approximately 
116 Poun Market 
12,000 ConsuTed internally 
15-16, ooo New Spain 
5-63000 Canary Islands 
33000 South Sea Company and other British 
ships 
1., 000 Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico 
19-20,000 Spain 
The province absorbed approximately two ship-loads of foreign merchandise 
annually valued at around 600,000.,, according to Arcila Farias. 
12 
10. It has been argued that the Caracas Company was not resented because it 
hindered contraband trade., but because the concession was granted without 
consulting the cabildo of Caracas. Arcila Farias., Econanla colonials p. 188. 
11. Roland Hussey, The Caracas CqMany (Carrbridge., 1934), pp. 60-66,74., 77., 
89-90., 99; Výzquez de Prada., op. cit , p. 212; Bitar Letayf., op. -cit.., P. 71; Eduardo Arcila Farias., Reformas econ6nicas, del siglo )ffl! I-I en 
Nueva Espafia (2 vols.., Caracýs., 1955)3 1., -29-31. 
12. Arcila Farias, Economfa colonial, pp. 195-196. 1 
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These were sorne of the main innovations made during the period when the 
South Sea Canpany had the asiento contract. They were part of the existing 
general climate of refonn., and were accanpanied by a variety of suggestions for 
inproving Spain's econon7. These cam fran private individuals., merchants 
trading to America., military and naval personnel, diplomats., economists and 
historians. Reform proposals made by three individuals are of particular 
interest: those by Guillermo Eon, because he was Philip V's envoy to the South 
Sea Coapany; those by Bernardo WQod, because of their hunanitarian errphasis; 
and those by Jeronimo de Uztariz., because of the influence he had on later 
refo=. Eon believed that the behaviour of Spanish officials in America 
made contraband introductions possible. 
13 Governors and royal officials should 
be made personally accountable for illicit imports, he said, and their salaries 
and promotions made dependent on their ability to curb them. Their activities 
should be checked secretly by deputies on the fleets,, and one religious and 
one secular official appointed at each port to assist them. Secret agents 
should be employed in Jamaica and Curagao to report on the activities of resident 
merchants, and the number of guardacostas in service should be increased. 
While Eon's suggestions were not implemented, his references to the 
susceptibility of Spanish officials to bribery was echoed by subsequent critics 
14 
Bernardo WQvd postulated that the American colonies should be entitled to 
the same benefits of growth and development as Spain. While upholding the 
mercantile theory that colonial production and consumption should be primarily 
for the benefit of the metropolis,, he resolved these contradictory concepts by 
envisaging a colonial development that was complementary to rather than 
competitive with Spain's. He contended that the development of Spain was 
13. This was the view postulated by many British in Justifying their own 
illegal activities. In discussing the possible future involvements of 
the British in the slave trade to the Spanish colonies in the 1740s, 
Malachy Postlethwayt cormented that only the Spanish could effectively 
control foreign contraband. Malachy Postlethwayt, Considerations on a 
future Treaty of HLvieation and Commerce with Sp ý.... (London, 1746), 'P. 5. 
14. Guillemo Eon proposal, 7 February 1726., AGS3 Estado 6832. 
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dependent on three essential items which were not being used effectively: labour., 
land and capital. In countries such as England and Holland., he argued., there 
was no unemployment, no unused land, and no uninvested capital. In many ways 
the question of man-power was responsible for the other two problems. The work 
force was depleted by the social structure. Land and its management was the 
only acceptable vocation open to the first born of most land-owing and 
aristocratic families. And young men out of the line of inheritance considered 
it beneath their social position to engage in the trades or ccmmerce; they had 
few career alternatives except perhaps emigration and service in the colonies,, 
and particularly the Church. This not only took many able men out of the 
work force., it limited population by taking many women out of the marriage 
market, thereby inflicting a considerable financial burden on society. 
With the difficult economic situation in Spain in the eighteenth century., 
and the declining nunber of privileges granted to noblemen., the crown initiated 
a program to increase the economic role of the aristocracy in society. It was 
a difficult task. Most aristocrats had their capital invested in land, and 
the safe consistent returns on the investment made them loath to divert their 
capital. Those who did yield to state pressure invested mainly in mining, 
armaments, munitionsý paper and glass industries and sane maritime and wholesale 
camerce, but the investrmnts were never as much as hoped. Efforts were also 
initiated to reduce the number of people dependent on charity. Before the 
established patterns could be changed in favour of a better work ethic, 
however, the entire social structure would have had to be revised. And this 
took time. It was not until March 1783 that major changes occurred after 
Charles III signed a law allowing traders and craftsmen the privileges of 
holding public offices and acquiring the rights of nobleren., thus withdrawing 
the stigma of inferiority from the trades. 
As mentioned above the question of labour was a-1so acute in the colonies. 
To solve labour shortages Ward suggested that the Indians should be mobilized 
and organized. Arguing against numerous critics who opined that the Indians 
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were stupid and lazy, Ward felt that they were the capable descendents of 
advanced societies who should be encouraged. One way to accomplish this., he 
said., was to distribute land equitably. Moreover if the Indian population were 
allowed to develop their natural talents the need for the "cruel" slave trade 
would be eliminated and the contraband tradeýconsiderably reduced. 
15 
On the question of capital Ward stressed the desirability of improving the 
mining industry. In 1747 a visitador to the mines at Potosi reported that 
mining methods there were antiquated, being based on a book written in 1637 
by the cura, of Potosi, Alvaro Alonso Barba. Technical development of the past 
century in the fields of mechanics, hydraulics and chemistry were unknown. 
Furthermore, the mining directors were inept, in some cases even unable to 
read or write. More than 20 years earlier the poor production record of the 
mines in Parrplona., Margarita and Muso were blamed on the labour problem., not 
on the depletion of gold,, silver or emeralds. Other mining areas had similar 
problems. In New Granada slaves became the predcminant labour force in the 
seventeenth century and fran then on the mines were plagued by labour shortages. 
To encourage trade Ward suggested that the fleet system be dissolved., 
taxes reduced, fortifications reconstructed and guardacosta patrols intensified 
in America. While granting that the fleets might be necessary in wartime., he 
said that otherwise they served only as an unsuccessful goverment monopoly 
with the added disadvantage of alerting foreign traders of the activities of 
Spanish merchants. 
16 
15. Ward did not analyse in detail the question of whether slave or Indian 
labour was more profitable. In the case of Mexico in the 1740s it has 
been suggested that the impoverished mulattos and mestizos provided a 
cheaper labour force than slaves. Gonzalo Aguirre Beltr9n., T-a poplaci6n 
negra, de M6xico (M6xico, 1972), p. 85. 
16. Bernardo Ward, Proyecto Econ6mica (Madrid, 1754)., pp. xvi, 227-228, 
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The critic who probably had the greatest influence on economic reform in 
the early part of the eighteenth century was Jeronimo Uztariz. The depletion 
of the nation's bullion reserves--and therefore the failure of the mercantile 
theory., he argued., could only be rectified by improving Spain's economy so 
that her merchants could sell more than foreigners in America. Improving 
fortifications and increasing coastal surveillance were only temporary measures 
that failed to alter the source of the problem: the inadequacy of Spanish 
industry, Spain lost about 15,000,000 pesos a year, Uztariz calculated, through 
the purchase of foreign merchandise., mainly luxury items such as fine cloths., 
watches,, rugs, furniture and porcelain. But before a native industry could be 
developed the labour force had to be expanded and its health improved. Because 
of exorbitant prices on meats., oils., wines and other nutritious foods., and the 
low income of the working class'. most people lived off little more than bread 
and water., and therefore did not have the energy to increase their work output. 
Duties., he argued., must be reduced to lead to the improved diet of the people 
and thereby stimulate their production. 
Uztariz also stressed the need to study the camiercial techniques of the 
most successful trading nations: England, Holland and France. Academies should 
be established to study navigation., cosmography., astronomy and related fields; 
shipping and port facilities should be improved; and Spanish commercial agents 
stationed all over Europe to manage trade and report on local commercial 
developments-17 
The question of shipping was crucial. There had been a deplorable decline 
in the ship-building industry in Spain in the seventeenth century. Contracts 
to build ships were seldan fulfilled, and the industry itself was disorganized. 
At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession Spain had just 28 galleys 
in the Mediterranean, and only 20 ships in the Caribbean and Atlantic. She 
17. Geronymo de. Uztariz3 The6rica, y prActica, de comercio, v de marina 
(Madrid,, 1742)3 PP 5,9.9 18., 22-23,89-9 108-ý10'9.174.2'Rl. 2 
263-264, v 268,271,299,320,4o4; Bitar Letauf., 22, cit, pp. 80-81. 
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was a negligible naval force and completely dependent on French protection. 
The commercial traffic was so scarce that in many parts of Spanish America the 
only available merchandise was contraband. The average yearly tonnage frcrn 
Spain to Amrica in 1600 was 19,800; by 1680 it had dropped to around 4,650. 
By the 1720s Buenos Aires was visited only once every. four years by register 
ships; Venezuela received only one register and one Canary ship a year at about 
the same time. 
The first tentative steps to improve the shipping industry and reorganize 
the navy were taken in 1710. Several years later., in February 1714, Philip V 
unified the naval officers' corps and abolished all the old titles; it is 
unknown how effective these early reforms were. The real changes began under 
the guidance of Joseph Patifto, who greatly increased the amount of money spent 
on the navy. Much of it was in ship construction. Between 1705 and 1707 the 
total. naval expenditure was 52,876 pesos 2ý2- reales; it rose to 2,733,146 pesos 
232- reales (a 52 fold increase) for 1717-1718.18 
In summ-j., the economic reforms proposed during the early years of the 
eighteenth century did not seriously dispute the viability of mercantilism; 
rather they were designed to prop up the existing structure., and to this extent 
they were inadequate. Those reforms which were implemented ezphasized the 
regularity of commercial supplies and the control of contraband. Improvements 
in mining techniques, expansion of labour and capital., and the development of 
industry, while strongly recommended., were changes that occurred mainly in 
the decades after the War of Jenkins' Ear when the South Sea Company had ceased 
trading. Therefore the effect of Spanish reform on the British asiento and 
on contraband trade in general was negligable. In April 1735 the royal officials 
in Havana complained that reforms that had been initiated were ineffective. 9 and 
that the local economy was in ruins. The fleets did not sail regularly., and 
18. Kamen, op. cit., pp. 30,58-59., 140,229,379-380; olavarriaga, op. cit., 
p. 141; Manuel Jos6 de Lavarden., Nuevo aspecto del emercio en el r1o de 
la plata (Buems Aires, 1955), P. 15. 
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when they did cane the merchants did not purchase sufficient quantities of 
sugar and tobacco to support the econa*ny. Consequently local plantation 
owners were forced to sell to foreign merchants,, although it was an outlet that 
had been greatly curtailed by increased guardacosta, activity. Thus the relatively 
successful Spanish campaign against illicit imports in knerica., which was not 
accompanied by improved trading conditions, led paradoxically to depression in 
the colonies. Royal officials in Panama pleaded with goverment either to send 
ships to trade or to allow inter-colonial trade. Although Spain was evolving 
towards a more liberal interpretation of the mercantile theory., the merchants 
guilds opposed granting wider participation in the colonial economy. They had 
no desire to lose their monopolistic control over the colonial society. 
19 
As Uztariz Pointed out, and as events proved., measures aimed at controlling 
contraband failed to change the economic dependence of Spain and her colonies 
on the industry and commerce of northern Europe., and thus failed to improve., 
or even change, economic conditions in America. Thus the same conditions that 
allowed England to acquire the asiento de negros in 1713,, and so challenge the 
effectiveness of the mercantile theory as it had developed in Spain., were 




Havana royal officials to Philip V., 28 April 1738, AGI, Santo Dcmingo 488; 
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Chapter III 
The First Trading Period, 1714-1718 
The South Sea Company was a joint stock ccopany organized in a 
fashion similar to govemnent licensed monopolies in the seventeenth century. 
It consisted of a governor (an honorary office held by the British monarch); 
sub and deputy governors who directed Company activities with a court of 
directors (a majority of whcm were members of Parliament); a secretary and 
an accountant; and stockholders who were known as proprietors. The asiento 
trade and that of the licensed and annual ships were regulated and monitored 
by six camiittees composed of Company directors. The committees and their 
responsibilities were 1) Buying and Warehouses: the purchase of merchandise 
for the licensed and annual ships and provisions for the factories; 2) 
Shipping: the acquisition and transport of slaves and the transport of the 
license., annual and provision ships; 3) Treasury: the provision of funds for 
the trade; 4) Accounts: which kept factory records and calculated duties owed 
to the Spanish; 5) Correspondence: which sent intructions and corresponded 
generally with Conpany agents; and 6) House and Servants: which hired 
employees* 
1 
The procedures developed by the Company to deliver slaves to Spanish 
colonies varied little from the beginning of the contract in 1713 to its 
effective demise at the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739. After 
studying the techniques enployed by previous asentistas and obtaining advice 
from British merchants who had traded to the West Indies,, the directors 
established six branch offices or factories. In the viceroyalty of Peru they 
were located in Buenos Aires., which was to supply slaves to the Rio de la. 
Plata, Chile and Potosi; in Cartagena, for the mining areas of northern 
South America; and in Panama and Portobelo (which were considered as one 
Minutes court of directors, 14 and 28 November 1711, BM, Add. 25,494., 
ff. 34,37; Arthur Aiton., "The Assiento Treaty as reflected in the Papers 
of Lord Shelburne". The-'Hispanic American Historical- Review., 1728., 
pp. 169-170. 
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factory., primarily for the Lima market. In New Spain they were established 
in Vera Cruz for the Mexican market and in Havana and Santiago de Cuba., where 
there was a demand for slaves on the sugar and tobacco plantations. Company 
entrepots were established in Jamaica and Barbados., where slaves were rested 
and sorted after the long I! middle passage" from Africa. Agents there 
supervised the distribution of slaves to all factories except Buenos Aires. 
The latter received them directly from Africa because of the cost of 
establishing an entrepOt for a single factory., and because no practical site 
was available. 
Fran agency warehouses slaves could be supplied to factories to coincide 
with the harvest periods of products which the Company wished to acquire either 
by barter or frcim the proceeds of sales. Furthermore, slaves inappropriate 
for the Spanish market could be sold to local buyers. Although contracts 
between the Company and those who supplied their slaves stipulated that the 
slaves be young., of those delivered to Jamaica about one-third were old or 
crippled or had other physical defects such as tribal scars and filed teeth. 
The Spanish were reluctant to buy such slaves; the "Beauty and Skin of the 
Slave... [was] much regarded"., especially in wcmen. Interest in attractive 
black women was noted in numerous seventeenth century reports from Peru, and 
the South Sea Company sale results indicate the same. 
2 
The agency in Jamaica was always the most iriportant entrepOt because 
comnunication was easier with the factories, and the local demand for slaves 
was greater than in Baxbados. However Barbados gained in importance during 
disputes between the Company and the Jamaica assembly over duties imposed 
locally on slaves, and it was inportant in its own right for private British 
traders who had licenses frm the Company to supply slaves to Santo Domingo 
2. Anon . 'The 'Trade Grant6d't6'the *S6uth-; S6a'CýMýBY: 'Considered with 
'Relation to 'Jamaica (London, 1714), pp. 10-114; , 11'rederick Bowser., 
The African Slave in Colonial Peru, L5.24-1650 (Stanford, 1974), p. 80. 
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and along the coast between Caracas and the Rfo de la, Hacha. 
The depot in Jamaica normally had two or three agents; that in Barbados 
one or two. They were chosen by a ballot of the directors. Candidates were 
recruited through newspaper advertiseinents and by names supplied by the 
directors themselves. They were supposed to be Protestant and honest., men 
who would not engage in illicit trade or otherwise abuse the Conpany's trust. 
But a personal recaTmendation from a director was the fundamental factor in 
the selection process. For example,, one Richard Rigby was chosen as an agent 
for Jamaica although the -directors had been warned to be on their "Guard against 
the Danger of having anything to do with Such a wolf in Sheep's Cloathing as 
this oily tongued Gentleman is very well known to be. " 
Agents were unsalaried but received a carmission of 4% on the sale of 
slaves and on the sale of return cargoes., as well as on debts they collected 
for the Conpany. Their duties were -1) to verIfy that slaves delivered from 
Africa conformd to Coapany specifications; 2) to arrange for the hire of 
sloops to transport slaves to the factories; 3) to confim that the money 
and products remitted from the factories corresponded to the amount received 
for the sale of slaves; and 4) to prevent private trade by factors and by 
the crews of hired vessels. It was originally suggested that sloops hired by 
the canpany carry supercargoes responsible for the sale of cargoes and the 
return of proceeds. Unfortunately the idea was not implemented; it would 
a3most certainly have reduced the endemic illicit activities and frauds. 
4 
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4. Minutes court of directors., 22 January 1713., BM., Add. 25., 495., ff. 121-122; 
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Woodbridge, 26 January 1714., Elizabeth Doman., Documents 
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3 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 201; Anon.., Trade Granted to the 
South-Sea Company., p. 17; Unsigned letter frcm G4rýrawayls coffee House to 
Th-e South Sea Corrpany., n-d.., Bodleianq Rawl. D908., ff. 88-89. 
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The number of factors who served at each post varied as needs changed, 
although technically each factory was to have six (selected in the same fashion 
as the agents). except Havana and Santiago, which were to have only three each 
They were the president., secretary., accountant, warehouse keeper., surgeon., 
and slave supervisor. In Havana and Santiago these responsibilities were 
shared by the three employees. The president was responsible for the general 
well-being of the factorys the transmission of accounts biannually to London., 
and the petty cash records; the accountant for keeping cash and "want" bookss 
a journal and a ledger; and the warehouse keeper for merchandise and 
provisions brought by license., annual and supply ships. The latter kept 
records of the sale of merchandise and slaves., including the method of sale., 
dates, quantities and prices., and of goods purchased with the proceeds of negro 
sales. The secretary recorded the minutes of council meetings and kept 
factory correspondence up to date., and sent copies of all documents to London. 
The slave supervisor registered the details of arriving cargoes and organized 
the sale of slaves. The surgeon attended to the health of the slaves and 
factors., and remitted regular accounts of his practice to London. The factors 
met once a week in council, except for the surgeon., who could only attend if 
a quexum of three was wanting. All decisions relating to the sale of slaves 
and acquisition of return cargoes were made by a majority vote of the council., 
with the president having the tie-breaking vote. 
Initially factors received salaries rather than conmdssions; salaries 
varied considerably from factory to factory and did not necessarily depend 
on the relative importance of each factory. While the president of the Panama 
factory was the highest paid factor., those at the almost equally important 
ones in Portobelos Vera Cruz and Buenos Aires were the lowest paid. The 
explanation for the variation in salaries can only be conjectured. They may 
have reflected differences in the cost of livings since factors received 
nothing towards their expenses except house rent., or have been the result 
either of contractual negotiations or personal influence with the directors. 
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The salaries, which totalled 57., 300 pesos (912,892/lo at 54 pence to a peso) 
at all the factories at the beginning of trade, were as follows: 
Table I 
Panama Cartagena 
head factor 5., 000 pesos 
second 2,500 
third 1., 666 2/3 
fourth, fifth 13250 each 
sixth 1,000 
Total: 12,666 2/3 
Havana and Santiago 
head factor 2,500 pesos 
second 1,, 250 
third 833 1/3 
Total: 4583 1/3 
head factor 4,000 pesos 
second 23000 
third 1., 333 1/3 
fourth,, fifth 1., 000 each 
sixth 800 
Total: 10,133 2/3 













Each factor was required to post a security to the Conpany but was given an 
advance on his salary prior to leaving England because of the expense involved 
in preparing for the Journey. 
5 
On the arrival of a slave ship the factors were to accompany Spanish 
officials--usually including the president., fiscal. 9 escribano de camara and 
others--during the health inspection and measurement of the slaves. 
6 
They had orders frm the Coupany 
to Obtain as Much Indulgence of the Royal Officers in the Measurern: t 
of our Negros as you Can, the Usual Measuran: t is 3 for 4 But we Would 
not here be Understood that you Should buy their Favour, beleiving it 
will not Answer to the Company., For We Doubt the Introduction each 
Year of even 4000 Negros in to the Spanish West Indies, & until We 
Exceed that Nunter it cannot be of any Advantage to the Coupany. 
Nevertheless the factors were instructed "to Ingratiate" themselves with 
5. Minutes court of directors., 28 October 1713., BM, Add. 25., 595., ff. 95-96; 
Bubb to directors., 3 June 1716., BM., Eg. 2172., f. 43; Minutes court of 
directors., 7 August 17173 BM., Add. 25,497, f. 58; Directors' instructions 
to Vera Cruz factors3 c. 12 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,9563., ff. 55-59. 
6. Slaves were measured in groups rather than individually during this 
official *visita by a tape divided into seven quarter varas. A vara 
is equal to about 33 inches, so a quarter vara is M5 -inches. Seven 
quarters, which is equal to one pieza de indias., is 57.75 inches,, or just 418". Auto in Guatemala, 6 February 1732. - AGII Ind. Gen. 2811; Jorge 
Palaci6-s- 
., 
T,, a de Indias (Tunja., 1973)., P. 375. 
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royal officials so that "in Case of any violence or Injustice Done us [they 
could obtain and] Transmit the proper Notarial proofs to Enable us to get 
redress at the Court of Madrid". 
When the visita was concluded the slaves were to be sold as quickly as 
practicable., and for gold or silver if possible., although local products 
which could be sold for a profit in Europe were acceptable. Credit was to be 
extended only to merchants of proven probity. Despite these regulations the 
nature of local economies was such that factors often had no choice but to 
barter slaves for produce,, regardless of its quality or desirability. At 
the three factories where the annual and two licensed ships were to arrive, 
Cartagena, Portobelo and Vera Cruz., the factors were also to assist in the 
sale of their merchandise. 
Instructions to the factors included a guide to the conduct of their 
private lives. They were forbidden to convert to Catholicism or to marry 
Spanish women. The latter was a precaution intended to avoid legal disputes 
over property which might be used as an excuse to seize Company property in 
case of hostilities between the crowns. They were also advised to learn 
Spanish and not to antagonize local inhabitants. 
7 
The Company and the Spanish government each appointed agents to 
represent their interests in Spain and England respectively. The first 
Company appointee., Thomas Bowles, was directed to keep the Company informed 
of Spanish policy as it might effect trade., and to represent them in any 
dispute that might arise over the asiento treaty. He was given a salary of 
3,000 pesos a year, with an additional 12000 pesos for expenses. Bowles was 
well thought of by the Spanish. The Marquis of Monteledn, the Spanish 
ambassador in London, said that he was "an esteemed man of unsullied 
reputation". 
7. Directors to Panixna factors., 22 February 1716, BMj Add. 25,563, f. 20; 
Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, BMp Add. 25,563s f-7. 
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Spain's first agent., an Englishman by the name of Arthur Moor, was 
appointed on 17 April 1714. The appointment was made for several reasons. 
The Company had begun to purchase merchandise for the licensed ships and 
the directors had expressed surprise that no Spanish representative was present 
to examine the purchases, or to discuss other questions such as the payment 
of negro duties and other money owed to Philip V. Also., someone was needed 
to restrict the Company from putting more capital than was absolutely 
necessary into the trade on the account of the Spanish king. An advance of 
one million pesos had already been made by the Company on the King's behalf 
as his quarter share in the trade at an annual rate of 8% interest; and the 
interest payments were likely to eat up much or even all of Philip V's profits. 
Monteleon, who recam)ended Moor, pointed out that he was honest and experienced 
in questions of trade-and intimate with Queen Anne and. several ministers. 
Furthermore., he agreed to work for a commission based on Philip V's profits 
fran the trade, and would therefore be interested personally to see that there 
was a maxinum return. 
8 
Moor was not Spain's representative to the South Sea Corrpany for long., 
probably because of a scheme, in which he was involved only indirectly, to 
send contraband goods on the Anglesea. when it took the first factors to 
Cartagena. 3 Panama and Portobelo. Shortly after his appointment Moor called 
on Robert Johnson., captain of the Anglesea, to discuss the voyage, and 
supposedly to insure that no contraband would be taken. This visit was 
followed by a meeting at Moor's home during Which one John Decosta. suggested 
8. Moor was given duties in addition to-those involved with the asiento 
trade. 'Together with Patricio, Laules and Monasses Gilligan he negotiated 
the purchase of ten English ships for Philip V. A similar conrdssion was 
given to the Marquis of Monteledn later. He negotiated the purchase of 
six war ships from the proceeds of the asiento trade. However the best 
of these belonged to the crown., and British ministers refused to sell 
them. The only other available ships belonged to the East India Company., 
and Monteleon rejected them as inappropriate in size and condition. 
Monteleon to Alberoni, 27 September 1717, AGS, Estado 6839. 
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that 60 tons of contraband merchandise worth between Z12., 000 and E15., 000 be 
shipped on the Anglesea. Decosta. offered to finance half the cargo if Johnson 
and Moor would take the other half. The goods would be entered in the custom's 
books as intended for sale in Holland., sent to the Downs and loaded on the 
Anglesea. just prior to sailing. 
Somehow the directors learned of this scheme and held an investigation. 
Johnson and Decosta, admitted their involvement but agreed that Moor had not 
been involved., although he had arranged the meeting at Decostals request. 
Moor was "guilty". though., of calling the directors at this time "insolent 
Fellowes" with "no Scheme or any thing". 
The enquiry was inconclusive., but Johnson was actually declared innocent 
of any scheme to defraud the Company and reinstated as captain of the Anglesea. 
Arthur Moor had no further official business with the Company as Philip V's 
representative, the Spanish rescinding his appointment soon afterwards. 
9 
The first Spaniard to serve as agent to the Company,, Guillermo Eon, did 
not arrive in London until 22 September 1717., thus having left the asiento 
without any Spanish supervisor there during its formative years. When he 
finally did arrive it was discovered that he spoke no English. Broadly, Eon's 
instructions were to see that the provisions of the treaty were enforced. He 
was to attend all meetings of the Company directors and to transmit accounts 
of the trade to Spain., to measure and to supervise the loading of cargoes on 
the annual ships and to insure that no contraband goods were sent to or 
9. 
appointment, 17 April 1714, AQI, Ind. Gen. 2769. 
Laules to Grimaldo., 5 and 17 July 1713,, AGS,, Estado 6825; Memoire touchant 
les interests du Roy, 17 July 1713$ AGS., Estado 6825; Minutes court or ýl ctors " 29 July 1714, BM, Add. 25.3,495s ff. 175-178; Minutes court of directors "1 July 17149 BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 180-182; Johnson to Bateman$ 22 June 1714, EM, Add. 25,562, f. 12; Minutes court of directors,, 22 
Septerrber 1714, BM., Add. 25., 495., f. 206; Minutes court of directorss 17 
June 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 167-168; Fran Robert Johnson', 15 June 1714, 
BK3 Add. 25j562$ f. 11. 
When the Anglesea returned from America Captain Johnson was given 
the exorbitant sun of t500 as a gratuity. Another E254 was distributed 
am 
' 
ng his officers and crew. Minutes court of directors, 22 December 1715., 
EM., Add. 25,495,, f. 90. - 
Montele6n to Grinaldo., 15 December 1714, AGS, Estado 6827; Minute 
court of directors., 22 Septen-ber 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, r. 206; Moor's 
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remitted fnn America by Ccupany personnel. He was also instructed to report 
if any Spanish subjects., or money and effects belonging to them, were 
transported in Courpany ships. This was prohibited by article xxvi of the 
asiento treaty., and it was intended to prevent Spaniards from avoiding the 
payment of taxes and duties. Nevertheless many Spaniards remitted money and 
goods to England from America and travelled in Canpany ships. 
Philip V did occasionally permit Spanish officials to travel on Conpany 
vessels3 but then only as passengers when no Spanish ship was available., and 
with stringent orders to carry nothing but personal belongings. 
10 The 
Prince of Santa Bueno, viceroy of Peru., and the Marqufs of Villarocha) 
president of the audiencia of Tierra Firme., sailed on the Anglesea. Villarocha 
was permitted to take only two servants and eight coffers of clothing and 
books., all of which had to be registered in Cadiz as a precaution against, the 
tenptations of illicit trade. Company ships also regularly carried Spanish 
mail and even official government documents because Spanish ships often were 
unavailable. 
11 
The governors'and royal officials of ports where the Company had factories 
or sent licensed slave ships had the greatest responsibility for controlling 
illegal activities by Company employees. They carried out fondeos (anchorage 
inspections on Company vessels to insure that they carried no contraband), and 
10. Spanish officials also travelled in private British merchant ships. One 
unfortunate case concerned the Marquis of Navarrez, a provincial governor., 
who sailed to Santa Marta on the Lark, Captain John Lewis,, and was robbed 
of a considerable amount of money by th crew. The Conpany urged the 
British goverrment to punish the offenders and to return the money in 
order to "perserve the Hon: r of the Nation & the Interest of this Canp. a. 
in the Spa Wt Indies". Directors to Stanhope., 28 October 1715, BM, 
Add. 25., 555, f. 33. 
Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 28 August 1721.,, AGS., Estado 6849; Portales Meneses 
to Philip V, 16 July 1726.,, AGI., Caracas 63; Consejo pleno de Indiass 
23 Ju-1Y 17143 AGI., Panama 111; Garcia Ros to' Philip V., 31 KV 1715s AGI., 
Charcas 213; License of Joseph de la Rocha Carranzao, 6 May 1714., AGI3 
Panama 115; Minutes court of directors., 20 May 1714, EM, Add. 25., 495,, 
f- 159; Pyra to Montele6n, 28 October 1714, AGS., Estado 6827; Real orden., 
29 July 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Instructions to Guillermo Eon, 19 July 
1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; The Daily Courant, 10 October 1717. 
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visitas de sanidad. Only then could slaves be disembarked and measuredý a 
function also performed by royal officials. Annual ships were inspected for 
contraband goods in London before departure by Spanish agents there., and in 
knerica by royal officials and the camanders of the galleons and flotas. 
A number of Spaniards were legally on the Company's payroll in knerica 
and Madrid. The most important at each factory was the juez conservador$ who 
the Company intended to be its protector, although the post normally went to 
the highest ranking member of the audiencia. He resolved disputes between the 
factors., royal officials and local merchants, and advised the factors on 
other aspects of the trade. If he could not resolve questions relating to 
Company activities he referred them to the junta delasiento de negros in 
Madrid., who were the last arbiter before the king in asiento affairs. 
Spanish lawyers, counselors., scribes., surgeons, and guards were also employed. 
Royal officials were not officially paid by the Company,, although they often 
received money to expedite the landing of both legal and illegal cargoes., 
and for other illegal transactions. Spaniards employed by the Campany during 
the first trading period included the following: 
Table II 
Salary per year 
Madrid (in pesos) 
An assistant agent 2,000 
President of the Council of the Indies 2,000 
(as protector of the asiento) 
Three councillors to the fiscal and three to the secretary., @600 each 3)600 
(The fiscal and the secretary were in the junta del asiento. ) 
A fiscal 100 
(vih-o dispatched all law suits relating to the Company) 
Chief clerk of the secretary's office 300 
(who arranged to send all c6dulas and despatches) 
The president's secretary 100 
Total: 8, $loo 
Vera Cruz Santiago 
juez conservador 1,500 Juez conservador. (governor) 800 
surgeon 80 
slave attendant 100 
Total: 1,, 500 Total: 980 
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Buenos Aires 










master of errbarcations, 
house servant 
Myorda*ao of the storehouse 
Cartagena 
juez conservador (governor) 2,000 
lawyer 300 
500 porter 365 
400 mayordano 730 
144 notary public 300 
96 second porter 100 

















Panam and Portobelo 
2., 000 juez conservador (president) 3., 000 
councillor of the audiencia, 12000 
500 lawyer boo 
300 notary public 600 
500 barber-surgeon 300 
250 guard 600 
500 juez conservador (governor) 12000 
notary public 700 
surgeon 600 
Total: 4,050 Total: 8.6oo 
Thus total salaries paid to Spanish officials to assist in the trade amounted 
to 31,285 pesos per year. 
12 
The South Sea Ccrnpany acquired slaves from the Royal African Ccupany, 
from private merchants, and by their own ships throughout the period of the 
British asiento contract. None of these methods proved entirely satisfactory. 
The Ccnpany contracted with the Royal African Coapany to supply it with slaves 
even before the signing of the asiento treaty. By the terms of the contract 
all slaves were to be purchased in Africa; 1,900 in Whidah., 1., 500 from the 
Cape coast and adjacent areas., 500 from the windward coast., 700 frorn Gambia., 
12. Minutes cormdttee of corTespondence, 13 June 1716, BM., Add. 25,, 550., ff. 
53-54; Philip V to Serrano, 24 may 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Minutes 
carrdttee of correspondence, 5 September 1721., BM., Add. 25., 551., ff. 51-52; 
Cartagena royal officials to Philip V., 31 March 1719, AGI, Santa Fe 451; 
James King,, "Description Data on Negro Slaves in Spanish Importation 
Records and Bills of Sale", The Journal of NeE22 History 1943., PP. 
208-212; Aiton, The Asiento Treaty., p. 11f. - 
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and 200 from Sierra Leone. Of the total 3,200 were to be males and 1,600 
females., all between 10 and 40 years old. All ships used in the trade were 
to be owned or hired by the South Sea Canpany., which would also supply all 
provisions for the slaves except corn,, palm oil and malaguetta grain. The 
Royal African Ca*npany was responsible for the selection of ships' officers 
and crews, and for financing the trade, although it received an advance of 
520,000 pesos (about E10,000) from the South Sea Coripany to cover the expenses 
of opening the trade. The money was to be deducted from the amount owed to 
the Royal African Company for the slaves delivered to America (Z6 for each 
slave under 16 years of age., and Z10 for those between 16 and 40). 
Canpany ships carried cargoes of English and Dutch merchandise to exchange 
for slaves in Africa., and sufficient provisions to last crews and-slaves until 
their arrival in America. For example the Windsor left Whidah for America 
with 201 slaves and the following provisions for them: 
Table III 
2 large baskets of potatoes 
2 casks of salt 
2 half hogsheads of palm oil 
1 parcel each of pepper and wild rice 
32 chests of com 
Any merchandise remaining after the purchase of the slaves was normally 
invested in gold and "elephant's teeth"., which was returned to Europe. However 
some goods were passed to the factors in knerica and sold illegally. 
Upon arriving at one of the Royal African Con-pany forts in Africa a ship 
captain bought necessary supplies and was required to purchase his cargo of 
slaves within 70 days., Sundays excepted. Slaves were registered by age and 
sex when loaded aboard ship. During the voyage roll calls were held 
fortnightly to record births and deaths. Ships were overloaded, but efforts 
were made to maintain primitive sanitary conditions. Decks were washed 
regularly and swabbed with vinegar. Captain's journals were kept for each 
voyage and private trade by crew members banned. Crews were cautioned against 
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embezzling slaves' provisions, an indication that their own provisions were 
insufficient. 
The successful voyage of a slave ship depended primarily on the price 
and availability of slaves, their management on board ship., keeping as many 
alive and healthy as possible., and-according to one contemporary source., 
a slave merchant-"in dranming well with English Spirits., and conforming to 
the Humours of the Negroes". Negroes were acquired in various ways in Africa. 
Most were prisoners of war or taken in slave raiding expeditions by other 
negroes or Arabs., while smie were debtors or law breakers lacking money to 
pay their fines. Children were often purchased from parents. The captives 
were usually told why they had been purchased prior to their departure for 
America to calm their nerves., because many of them feared that they were to 
be eaten. They were given instructions on how to act on board ship,, and 
warned that they would be punished if they created disturbances or struck 
any white men. However if they were mistreated they were told to conplain 
to the ship's linguist. Adult male slaves were shackled prior to departure 
but released afterwards., with men., wcmen and children allowed to roam freely 
together during the day., although they slept separately. They were fed twice 
a day and given pipes of tobacco once a week. Ships stopped as often as 
possible during the trip for water and provisions. 
13 
13. John Atkins, A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies (London., 
1737)3 Pp. 156-157; Pery to Ury, 11 January 1715, PRO, T. 70/3d; 
Instructions to Nathaniel SmAth., 17 January 1723., EM., Add. 25., 567,9 
ff. 2-4; Standing orders,, 30 April 1724., BM, Add. 253581, f. 14; 
Pery proposal to the South Sea Company, 1 July 1713., PIRO, T. 70/38; 
PyTn to Pery., 8 July 1711, PRO., T. 70/38; Batchelor, The South Sea 
Conpany, p. 129; William Snelgrave, A New Account of Parts of 
Guinea and the Slave-trade.., pp. 1073 150., lb2., 164. 
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The South Sea Company had second thoughts about their contract with 
the Royal African Company even before the first ship sailed. They insisted 
that the number of slaves to be supplied be reduced to 2., 370 annually,, and 
decided to purchase the other 2,430 fran private merchants., or acquire them 
on their own. The directors altered the contract probably because they 
believed that they could acquire slaves cheaper then-selves or from private 
mrchants; it was generally believed at this time that the Royal African 
Ccnipany was spending large sums of money unnecessarily on salaries and to 
maintain their forts in Africa. Officers of the Royal African Ccupany said 
that they agreed,, although reluctantly., to alter the contract for the benefit 
of British trade in general., but protested that it was disadvantageous to 
them. 
14 
Coapany directors were even more concerned at this time., as they had 
been during negotiations leading to the asiento contract., with the question 
of the termination of the activities of the French Guinea Company. By the 
terms of the treaty the French canpany was given frcrn 1 May 1713 (the date 
14. Pyrn to Pery, 14 April 1714, PRO, T. 70/38; Directors to Robert., Earl of 
Oxford., 23 September 1713, B% King's 73., ff. 96-97; Minutes court of 
assistants., Royal African Canpany, 11 September 1713, PRO, T. 70/38; 
Minutes court of directors, 3 and 9 September 1713, EM, Add. 25s4953 
ff - 80,83; K. G. Davies, The Royal African CarpMy (London., 1957)., P- 121. 
54 
of the signing of the English asiento, contract) to 1 May 1716 to pay bills,, 
collect debts, sell property and remit proceeds. No slaves could be introduced 
during this period. 
Secretary of State Lord Bolingbroke anticipated numerous problems under 
this arrangement. The French company, he said., could not be expected to send 
empty ships to the Indies to collect their effects. Undoubtedly merchandise 
or slaves would be sent out to pay for voyages. Tb prevent this, he suggested 
that the French., British and Spanish governments jointly pay the French company 
a sun equal to the value of its property and effects in the Indies. 
15 
Bolingbroke's suggestion was not taken, nor was any other easy solution found. 
As feared., the French Guinea Company did continue trading. Sme slave 
ships were already en route to America when the English asiento contract was 
signed, whiles others sailed afterwards. In June 1713 the Conte de 
Pontchartrain asked that a Company ship en mute to Vera Cruz and Havana be 
allowed to sell its cargo without hindrance. Permission was denied by Philip V. 9 
who suggested that they arrange this question with the British. He then 
effectively opened the door to continued illicit entry of French slaves by 
instructing royal officials to allow French asiento ships to enter, and for 
their cargoes to be sold., if the British factors had not yet arrived, the 
proceeds to be distributed later "according to the arrangement between the 
, two companies". 
In fact no such arrangement was ever made,, and while many 
of their slaves were seized by royal officials for the benefit of the new 
I- -- 16 asen-ca. s-uas, even mre were an-urociucea successiuLly 0 
Since the demand for slaves did not automatically cease with the 
conclusion of the French contract,, and because the South Sea Conpany did not 
15. Gilbert Parke, Letters and Correspondence_, Public and Private, of the 
Righý Honourabl7e H St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke (4 vols., 
London, 179d), 1113 4bl-4U; Ueneral order,, 15 April 1713., AGI., Ind. Gen. 
2769. 
16. Real c6dula to royal officials of Vera Cruz and Havana, 8 October 1713, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Pontchartrain to Bonal,, 26 June 1713., AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2784. 
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begin to trade immediately, Spanish merchants and colonists were willing to 
purchase slaves from any available source. Concern developed in Madrid that 
it would become impossible to stop the illicit introduction of slaves by the 
French coupany if the British long delayed in beginning to trade. The first 
British slaves did not arrive until long after the contract was signed., and 
introductions in considerable numbers did not begin until 1715.17 
The French Guinea Company introduced 148 slaves (113 1/3 piezas de indias 
at Buenos Aires in 1713 and 1714,570 (419 piezas into Havana between 
May 1713 and October 1717, and unknown numbers at other factories. To stop 
these introductions the South Sea Company initiated legal proceedings, 
demanding that the slaves be seized and turned over to them. As a result the 
French agent'in Havana., Jean Jonchee, was imprisoned and 16,000 pesos in 
proceeds from, the sale of negroes confiscated. This represented about 10% 
of the total received there from the illegal sale of negroes. At Buenos Aires 
a cargo of merchandise and slaves of unknown value were seized from one ship, 
while seizures of goods worth 16,141 pesos were made in Cartagena, and 76,158 
at Panama and Portobelo, making a total. of 108,299 pesos known to have been 
seized. 
Based on the likelihood that only 10% of the total illegal French 
introductions at Havana were seized,, then the French company would have 
received over one million pesos from the sale of slaves there between May 
1713 and the end of 1717. At 250 pesos per slave this represents the 
introduction of 4,000 slaves during that period. And yet even that figure 
may be conservative. In 1717 the French ambassador in Madrid., the Duque de 
St. Aignaný said that the French company made handsome profits indeed during 
1713 and 1714., perhaps as much as two million pounds sterling. This would 
17. Uzardi to BoUngbroke., 10 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 17; 
Scelle,, La trait4 n6gri6re, vol. ii, pp. 1693 663; Consejo de las Indias 
to Philip V,, 31 MaY 1714, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Garcia Ros to Phillp V, 
5 October 1715, AGI., Charcas 213. 
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seem to suggest that the French company continued its business with the 
approval of Spanish royal officials. 
The French contested the South Sea Company's right to the money seized 
in Havana. Further sums belonging to them were also placed in the royal 
treasuries in Havana and Santo Domingo, and for years afterwards South Sea 
Company officials petitioned Philip V for this money. The French appointed 
Guillemo Eon's secretary., Robert Shea., to negotiate with the English on their 
behalf for the release of the money to them. However the Company could not 
have satisfied the French even if they had wanted to do so; the seizure was 
made by royal officials on the orders of the governor of Havana., and the 
disposal of the money was entirely up to the Spanish. 
18 
On 15 May 1718 Philip issued a real c6dula in which he said that there 
were still French factors of the French Guinea Company in America "under the 
pretext of recovering company effects while introducing negroes fraudulently". 
He ordered that these men all be ejected from Spanish colonies. Curiously, 
one Frangois Beloquin, who was empowered by the French company to represent 
it3 remained in Cuba even after the termination of the British asiento under 
the pretence that he was closing the accounts of the Company. Nevertheless 
the c6dula of 15 May 1718 effectively ended the trade of the French Guinea 
Company. 19 
The South Sea Conparror received none of the money embargoed from the 
18. Petition to Spanish goverment, C. 3 February 1715, AGI, Ind Gen. 2784; 
State of French asiento by ConseJo de Indias., 25 February 1717,, AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2784; Directors to French Guinea Company directors., 9 April 1718.9 BM, 
Add. 253563, ff. 152-3; Scelle, op. cit., p. 664; ConseJo de Indias to 
Philip Vi 31 May 1714, An. Ind. Gen. 2784; Camdttee of correspondence 
to Bowles,, 3 October 1717., BM., Add. 25., 563, f. 68; Nicholson petition to 
Philip V, 21 July 1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; An Account of what Remains 
Due from His Cathol ic Majesty to the., South Sea Company., 20 February 1727., 
BM., Add. 25,56o, f. 69. 
19. Auto from GUemes y Horcasitas., 2 September 1735,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2850; Junta del asiento paper on the background of the French agent in Havana., 
Frangois Bel; TiHiT, 16 November 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Real c4dula., 
15 May 17183 AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2769. For a discussion of the7negotiations between the French Guinea CaTpany and the Spanish over the final accounts 
of the company, see Scelle, La trait6 n6griýre, vol. ii, pp. 648-681. 
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French Guinea Company. When they requested their agent in Madrid, Thomas 
Bowles, to ask for it as compensation for the damages done to their trade by 
the French company, the junta del asiento de neE2s denied the request., 
explaining that the money was for slaves introduced prior to the first 
introduction of slaves by the English company. Because the South Sea Company 
was exempted from paying duties prior to May 1714., the junta argued that they 
had thus lost all claims that might have been made for 1713. The Company 
later claimed., but again unsuccessfully., the 108., 299 pesos as compensation 
for the represalia of 1718. They did not press the claim, however. It was 
included primarily to inflate their total claim rather than from any serious 
hope of obtaining the money. 
20 
The South Sea Company had numerous expenses to consider other than 
those for the acquisiton and transportation of slaves to America. By treaty 
it paid a tax to the Spanish monarch for each slave introduced into the 
Indies. Unexpectedly it was also charged a tax by the Jamaica assembly. The 
assembly had tapped-this im-nense source of revenue as early as 1681 when they 
levied an export duty of Z5 per slave. Although the tax was subsequently 
reduced to Z1 because of complaints by plantation owners who said that this 
regulation caused the export of the best slaves leaving only those of inferior 
quality on the island., the assembly doubled this amount for South Sea Company 
slaves when the Company acquired the asiento contract. Private traders had to 
pay only 20 Jamaican shillings (less than El sterling). The assembly argued 
20. Junta del asierito, 11 May 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774; Grimaldo to Stanhopes 
7 August 1723, PRO,, S. P. 94/233; Fiscal opinion, 4 May 1718., AGI., Ind. 
Gen. 2801; Account of what Remains due fran His Catholic Majesty to the 
South Sea Coupany, 20 February 1727., BM. Add. 25., 56o,, f. 69. 
21. Jamaica agents to directors., 19 October 1717, PRO., C. O. 137/12 part 113 
f. 331; Bateman and Shepheard to Stanhope., 28 February 1715., PR09 C. O. 
137/11; R. B. Le Page, Jamaican Creole (London., 1960), p. 60; Anon., 
'Sane Observations'on the Assiento Trade, As it has been Exerciý_ýLýZ 
the South-Sea CqMýmýy (London, 1726)., p. 17; Lillian Penson, "The West 
Indies and the Spanish-Pmerican Trade., 1713-174811., The CaTrbrigEe HistarZ 
of the British Drpire vol. i., P. 337. 
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that the higher duty imposed on the Company was fair because they received 
better prices for their slaves and passed the cost on to the Spanish. 
21 
Company and private traders all protested vociferously against these 
duties. The Company called it a crippling burden on a trade that was 
unprofitable in any fom. They threatened to deprive Jamaica of the profits 
of their agency there by removing it to another island,, or by carrying slaves 
directly to the Spanish colonies from Africa. The threat made little impression 
on the assembly; if the trade was unprofitable that was no reason for them 
to subsidize it. 
22 
The Conpany petitioned the Lords Conrdssioners for Trade and Plantations 
to revoke this tax on the grounds that most of the slaves were in transit and 
would be reexported after recuperating from the voyage, and were thus not 
liable for taxation. The can-aissioners agreed., and repealed the duty, but 
the Jamiaicans inposed a new duty and resolved to do so each time London 
repealed the old. Nonetheless the Corrpany obtained an order from the Board 
of Trade to be reimbursed by the Jamaica assembly for Z1,000 already paid 
in taxes. 23 
The Ccrnpany also took steps to avoid paying similar taxes in the future. 
They moved their depot to Barbados for a brief period, but found it 
unsatisfactory because the prevailing winds made it more difficult to transport 
slaves not shipped to the Spanish.. The ConVany also tried sending slave ships 
directly to the factories, but that too failed for the same reasons that moved 
22. Bateman and Shepheard to Stanhope., 28 February 1715., PFDj C. O. 137/11; 
Francis March et al to Lords CCRraiSsioners for Trade and Plantations, 8 March 1715, PRO, C. O. 137/11; Directors to Thanpson., Pratter and 
Hazelwood, 6 February 1716., BM, Add. 25., 563., f. 6; Anon.., An Answer 
to a Calum-iy (London., 1728). pp. 29,31; Anon., Sme Observations on the 
Asiento Trade pp. 18-19. 
23. Case of the South Sea Canpany concerning duties in Jamaica, October., 
17273 PROs S. P. 36/33 Part ii, f. 176; Minute Lords of the Privy Council., 
9 January 1718, PRO, C. O. 137/12, part iii, f. 488; Thompson et al to 
directors, 20 August 1717., PF09 C. O. 137/12, part ii, f. 316. 
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them initially to establish an agency in Jamaica. A more successful technique 
was to land slaves on the cays off Jamaica. The Jamaica agents sent 1,, 597 
slaves to Spanish commmities during the year ending in October 1717; of these 
1., 248 were from. the cays and only 349 fran Jamaica. 
24 
The duty that was reimposed in Jamaica prior to the end of the first 
trading period was 10 shillings on negroes imported for sale there, and 20 
shillings for those exported to other British or Spanish colonies. Negroes 
landed for recuperation were exempted. The average price of a slave in Jamaica 
rose after the South Sea Company began trading there., reaching E35-40 (156-178 
pesos) by 1720. The duty was thus about lkl. on slaves sold there., and 3% on 
those exported. While the duty was hardly excessive, private traders believed 
that it raised the retail price of slaves sufficiently to harm their export 
trade., and local planters insisted that the tax made it uneconanical for them 
to buy slaves. Both groups felt themselves to be at a disadvantage to the 
Company, which could recover the duty by raising the price to the Spanish. 
The Company was hardly effected by the new tax., which it paid only on slaves 
sold in Jamaica and on those purchased on the island fran private Guinea 
traders. 25 
Documentation on the actual operation of the British asiento trade during 
the first period (1714-1718) is somewhat fragmentary. One of the most thorough 
accounts available (concerning the licensed slave trade) was compiled by 
Dudley Woodbridge', the agent in Barbados. It was at Woodbridge's suggestion 
24. Extract., Thompson et al to directors., 7 February 1717., PRO, C. O. 137/12., 
part ii, f. 315; Undated account enclosed in Wescomb's letter of 15 
November 1717., PRO., C. O. 137/12., part ii., f. 317; Directors to Grimes et 
al. 2 January 1718, BM, Add. 25,, 563, f. 96; Elizabeth Doman., "The Early 
Days of the South Sea Corrpany., 1711-1718", Journal of Economic and 
Business History (May, 1930), p. 442. 
25. Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations., 6 December 17193 
PRO, C. O. 137/133 Part is f. 190; Harriss to Poppel., 20 March 1725.9 
PRO, C. O. 137/16, ff. 34-35; Directors to Jamaica agents, 26 February 
1718s BM, Add. 25,5633 f. 125; Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade 
and Plantations., 13 November 1720,, PRO., CO 137/13, part ii., f. 289; 
Horsfall, "British Relations". P. 77. 
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that private merchants were granted Cwpany licenses to supply the windward 
coast of South America and the Caribbean islands with Company slaves fran 
Barbados. Licenses were issued for single voyages. Licensees paid the 
Conpany 110. pesos per pieza de indias for each slave they sold in the Spanish 
colonies., based on an indulto., or privilege first granted in 17o4 to the French 
Guinea Company. They were required to pay for the slaves in advance or provide 
a security in exchange for the license. All slaves were to be marked With 
the Company ts brand; licensees were fined 0 10 for each unmarked slave 
discovered in their possession. Slaves who died before shipment to the Spanish 
Main were replaced by the Company free of charge. Those imported in this 
manner were measured by the royal officials in the saw way as at the factories. 
The accounts were presented to the Company agents in Barbados as a check 
against the fraudulent introduction of slaves., and so that duties owed to the 
Spanish king could be calculated. 
The financial return to the Company was less than that from direct trade., 
but by granting -licenses they eliminated certain financial risks such as the 
responsibility for purchasing slaves and for maintaining factories in ports 
where the volune of sales was low. The licensees gained even more., besides 
the profits from the sale of slaves., including legal protection for their 
trade and the opportunity to introduce contraband merchandise and provisions. 
Woodbridge advised the Coupany to use this method of trade because of 
the poverty of Spanish colonies served by the agency in Barbados. When he 
was the agent there he sent 521 slaves to the windward coast over a period 
of 19 months and sold only 166. This was a region on the economic margin of 
the Spanish empire. Spanish inhabitants between Oz=a and the Rfo Oronoco 
were too poor to buy slaves., while the inhabitants of Trinidad could only 
afford to buy children or adolescents; their maxim= purchase was only five 
or six piezas de i=as a year (two to four Young slaves). He saw little 
prospect for selling slaves in the Isla de las Margaritas or Puerto Rico; 
the inhabitants had nothing to barter, he said., because they were too lazy 
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to work. Sales were also poor in Hispaniola., but mainly because the market 
was glutted with contraband French merchandise. 
26 
British merchants had traded with the Spanish colonies for 200 years. 
Sane of this traffic was a re-export trade from Spain itself: British goods 
imported legally into Spain were often consigned to the Indies fleets by 
Spanish camiission agents. Alternatively British merchants had practised 
direct contraband trade with Spanish America; in this case they landed their 
goods directly in Spanish American ports--in alimst every case illegally. 
Each method carried some risks., the former from, confiscation of returns., 
the latter from confiscation of goods. With the acquisition of the asiento 
contract the South Sea Company and its employees were given a virtual "license 
to smuggle". CaTpany personnel were guilty of innumerable breaches of the 
asiento contract, and as often abused the trust of the Conpany., despite the 
directors I dogmatic statement that "We are Resolved not to Suffer the Ccrrrpany 
to be Abused by their Factors either by Neglect Dishonesty or Want of Skin 
in the Managem. t of our Affairs It . 
27 
A special privilege granted to the Carrpany by article 37 of the asiento 
treaty,, and confirmed by a c6dula on 9 October 1717., was the right to indult 
slaves illegally introduced into Spanish colonies on the payment of 3-10 pesos 
per pieza. deindias to the owner of the illicitly introduced slave, and 33 1/3 
pesos per pieza in duties to the royal treasury. The privilege was to offer 
numerous temptations to Company employees to engage in illicit activities. 
One such seizure during the last trading period helps to explain how 
the indulto functioned. In April 1732., Wargent Nicholson, Company factor in 
26. Minutes canmittee of correspondence., 17 22 and 29 October 1717., EM, 
Add. 25,550, ff. 85-89., 92. 
27. Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 Februax-j 17163 BM) Add. 25,563.1 f. 12; 
Rudolph Robert., Chartered Corrpanies (London., 1969)., p. 120; J. H. Parry., 
Trade and DominioF (London., 1971), P. 103; Allan Cristolow, "Contraband 
Trade Between Jamaica and the Spanish Main., and the Free Port Act of 
176611, His2anic American Historical Review (May, 1942)., P. 312. 
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Havana, informed Governor Martinez de la Vega that a negro boy named Sebastian 
Casta Congo had been acquired illegally by the convent of Our Lady of Bethlehem 
in Havana. Nicholson seized the child on behalf of the Coupany and measured 
him to determine the duty owed to the Spanish crown. The seizure was contested 
by the convent's solicitor, who said that the boy was purchased legally and 
branded in 1729. He made the unlikely claim that the mark must have been 
erased with the passage of time. Govemor Martinez submitted the case to the 
junta del asiento in Madrid for a verdict. In February 1736 the junta ruled 
in favour of the Canpany. The boy or an equivalent value was to be given to 
the Canpany., which in turn would pay 110 pesos to the convent and 33 1/3 in 
duties. 
28 
The mst interesting incident during the first trading period concerning 
the indulto occurred in Florida. A Ccupany factor in Havana, Richard Farrels 
authorized one Manuel Fernandez del Canpo to travel to Florida to indult 
slaves illegally introduced there since the beginning of the asiento contract. 
However the governor of Florida, Juan de Ayala Escoban, refused to permit the 
indulto because he said that it threatened the security of the province. Most 
of the slaves in question had been seized from English colonists in Carolina 
by_Indians who sold sane of them and gave others away on whim. If these 
Indians were forced to sell their slaves., Ayala forecast terribly repercussions. 
At worst the Indians would withdraw their support from the Spanish and ally 
themselves with the French settlers in Mobile. The Company petitioned the 
junta de asiento to have the governor's decision rescinded, but not wishing 
to disturb Spain's fragile control of the province, the request was denied. 
29 
28. Autos., 22 April 1732,, AGI., Escribanfa de C6mara, 60A; junta del asientoj 
21 February 1736, AGI, Escribanfa, de C&wa 60A; Minutes juntq del asiento. 9 
30 September 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2773; Real c6dula, 9 October 1717, AGIs 
Ind. Gen. 2776; Real c6dula, December 1717., Ind. Gen. 2800; general 
c6dula, 14 January 1718., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2769. 
29. Juan de Ayala Escoban to Philip V., 19 January 1718, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2801; 
Fiscal opinion, 11 Septeaber 1718., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2801; Power from Farrel 
to Fem&ndez del Carrpo., 20 November 1717., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2801. 
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Throughout the asiento contract the indulto concession caused 
difficulties; it was disliked and abused by English and Spanish alike. 
Contraband slave traders bribed royal. officials to avoid seizure of their 
cargoes by Company factors; some slaves illegally introduced were confiscated 
by royal officials who then sold them in their own interest, instead of giving 
them to the Company. Some factors., on the other hand., introduced slaves 
illegally, seized their own slaves., and then paid themselves the indulted 
price of 110 pesos, sold the slaves for the CaiTpany., and then earned both 
the coardssion and sale price. 
30 
The factors used a variety of other means to introduce illicit 
merchandise. They sold large quantities of flour to local merchants on the 
windward coast of South America under the pretext that it was for factory 
consumption. One ship, the Royal George,, made trips frm Curagao to Caracas 
in September and October 1716, importing 42 and 690 barrels of flour. Local 
Spanish officials remarked that this seemed an excessive amount of flour to 
feed the only Company factor there., Jonathan Sisson, and a few slaves-who 
were, in any case., fed com. The flour was seized and sold by royal officials. 
31 
In Buenos Aires the factors obtained a promise from the governor to inform 
them before orders were issued to seize suspected contraband goods. However 
the agreement dissolved when the governor turned "Judas like" and betrayed the 
factors by confiscating contraband goods belonging to them without prior 
notification. The factors said that the arrival in September 1718 of some Spanish 
register ships, whose illegal merchandise competed with theirs, explained the 
30. Directors to Vera Cruz factors., 12 July 1717., EM., Add. 25,563,, ff. 45-46. 
The suggestion by some historians that "There were no illicit sales 
of negroes" during the British asiento "because this would have meant 
taking a lower price. .. (Sperling., The South Sea Canpany p. 20)., is 
obviously incorrect. 
31. Betancourt to Philip V, 30 August 1718., AGI., Santo Domingo 698; Fran 
Jonathan Sisson, 30 October 1716, AGI, Caracas 63; Petition from 
Sisson, 30 October 1716, AGI, Caracas 63; Betancourt to Philip Vs 7 
February 1717, AGI, Caracas 63. 
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change in the governorts attitude. 
32 
In any case they advised the directors that "this clandestine trade makes 
our lives burthensome". This is the only known example during the period of 
the British asiento where Company employees seemed diffident about participating 
in illicit trade, and their complaints concerned the method of operating., not 
the morality of the activity. 
33 
An effort to eliminate the illicit trade of private merchants competing 
against the Company was made by the factors in Panama, and Portobelo. On the 
basis of a real c4dula of 15 April 1713 they claimed the right to inspect 
every ship arriving on the Spanish Main which they suspected might be carrying 
illegal slaves. Gilbert Grimes., president of the factory in Panama., issued a 
license to Francisco Laya-which was approved by the viceroy of Peru--authorizing 
him to inspect ships in Callao on the Company's behalf. On 15 February 1716 
Laya published an indulto on all slaves introduced since 16 May 1713. The 
indulto and inspe ction. privileges were almost 
117" 
immediately suspended by royal 
officials before any slaves had been seized, pending the arrival of the new 
viceroyq the Prince of Santo Bueno. On the grounds that inspection of 
arriving vessels would duplicate the work of the royal officials who inspected 
every ship for contraband on arrival and departure., the Company was never 
permitted to inspect ships separately. 
34 
Evidence and rumours of the extensive participation in contraband trade 
by Con-pany personnel, from the lowest factor to the directors., made the 
Spanish suspicious of all aspects of the trade. Disputes over ambiguous or 
ill-defined stipulations of the asiento treaty developed soon after its 
32. Even the officers of Spanish'azogues were involved in illicit trade. 
There is evidence that the'azoEue Guadalupe, commnded by Lieutenant 
General Fernando Chac6n, carried unregistbred pepper, silk, rm and 
other merchandise in 1722. From Madrid, 2 June 1722, AGI, Contrataci6n 
5144. 
33. Buenos Aires factors to directors., 2 July and 21 September 1718, AGS, 
Estado 7017; La Quadra to Montigo., 10 MaY 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1602. 
34. Fran the audiencia of Lima, 6 November 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807. 
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ratification. The three most serious controversies during the first trading 
period involved the 200,, 000 pesos in "anticipation money" the Company had 
agreed to pay Philip V within four months after the signing of the teaty., 
the payment of duties on slaves, and the annual ships. The Company refused to 
pay anything to the king until they received permits to send the two licensed 
ships to America which Philip V had given to Queen Anne as a gift., and which 
she in turn had given to the Company. The C<npany badly needed this permission; 
the cargoes for the two ships had long since been purchased and were in danger 
of rotting. 
The c6dulas, were granted., but the Company still refused to pay the 
200,000 pesos., hoping to gain even further concessions. Lord Bolingbroke had 
assured them that they would not need to pay the money., even that they could 
keep it as compensation for not having received the quarter investment in the 
trade which Philip V was supposed to have paid. The Company then claimed 
that no duties were due on the slave trade for 1713; they said that no slaves 
had been introduced that year because the treaty of peace was not published 
until 1 March 1714, and its publication was a prerequisite to trade. Some 
Company slaves did in fact arrive in America in 1713; a few were refused 
permission to land because the peace had not yet been published, but others 
were landed and sold during this period without hindrance from local officials. 
Lastly., the Company wanted a guarantee that the annual ships could sail to 
America and their cargoes sold even in years when no fair was held. 
The Spanish considered these demands, particular the ones concerning 
the annual ships, "extravageant, unjust and prejudicial"; if carried out it 
was feared that they could destroy Spain's economy. Montele6n reportedly 
said that the directors were intransigeant and that if the issues were not 
soon resolved the Company might give up the asiento, or England even go to 
war. In Februaxy 1715 Monteleo'n recommended that the Spanish accept any 
proposal fýrom the English that might lead to the relinquishment of the asiento. 
Thirty years.,, he said., was a long time to allow a foreign power to send ships 
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annually to Spanish colonies in America loaded with inexpensive British 
merchandise; furthermore, the inevitable problems arising from such a privilege 
could seriously disturb the good relations between the two crowns. He suggested 
that Spain offer 125,000 pesos to the Company to relinquish the asiento 
contract. Monteleon's suggestion was not heeded, but the question was discussed 
frequently in the years that followed. After viewing the trade as the king's 
representative in London to the South Sea Campany., 
ýOe` 
arrived at a conclusion 
very similar to Monteleon's. He proposed that the Company be given money in 
return for the relinquishnent of the annual ship contract. The Spanish 




between Philip V and-the Company were, supposed to be negotiated 
in 1715 when the new British ambassador., Paul Methuen., arrived at his post in 
Madrid. But Methuen was taken ill shortly after his arrival and ordered hcmp.. 
His replacement, George Bubb, was instructed by William Stanhope to try to 
satisfy Canpany demands; Company directors offered their assistance by 
authorizing him "to employ two or three., or even four thousand Pistoles for 
this End". Stanhope reminded Bubb that the Spanish 
cannot be ignorant what a nuTber of Persons a Ccmpany must consist of 
which has Ten Millions Stock. It will become the Interest of all these 
Proprietors., when once the assiento is Setled., to be Advocates., & 
Sollicitors for the Interest of Spain,, one would therefore hope they 
[the Spanish] can not be So blind as wantonly to lose the hold they 
have upon England by this Contract. 
Bubb was concerned that England would never benefit frcrn this contract. 
He-called it "one of the worst I ever saw,, & the most effectually calculated 
for Captiousness & Chicane". Although he remarked that "The Assiento Business 
puts me entirely beyond all Tenper'13 he negotiated and signed a treaty with 
35. Monteleon to Grimaldo., 29 Noverrber 1714, AGS, Estado 6827; From Montele6n) 
received January 1715, AGS., Estado 6827; Montele6n to Grimaldo, 7 March 
1715, AGS, Estado 6827; Fýmm Montele6n., 11 April 1715, AGS, Estado 6829; 
Eon to Alberoni, 4 April 1718, AGS., Estado 684o; Th Montele6n, 25 May 
1716, AGS, Estado 6829; Monteleon to Grimaldo., 14 and 21 February 1715) 
AGS., Estado 6827; Fran Montele6n, 19 September 1715., AGS, Estado 6830; 
Th Grimaldo, 6 October 1715, AGS, Estado 6830. 
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Spanish negotiators on 26 may 1716 which amended the asiento treaty of 1713. 
The convention absolved the Canpany from paying duties on slaves during the 
first year of the contract., and guaranteed regular sailings of the annual ships., 
and permission to sell their cargoes if the fleets failed to arrive within 
four months after they did. 
36 
After the Treaty of 1716 was signed the Carrpany still refused to pay 
negro duties for slaves introduced in 1714, and in 1715 as well. Their excuse 
now was the seizure of one of their license ships, the Bedford,, by royal 
in Cartagena (See below P. 79). This reluctance to pay these duties was 
seriously damaging their relations with the Spanish crown. If they had no 
intention of paying the duties, Bubb said, they should not have remitted any 
profits from sales in the Indies in the first place; they should not engage 
in the trade without fulfilling all legal comdtments. Furthermore., he added 
that the affair of the Bedford had nothing to do with the asiento trade. 
Several of Philip V's ambassadors' salaries were paid frCm duties 
collected from the asiento trade; some of them were experiencing acute 
financial embarrassment and urged the king to remedy the situation. Montele6n 
was unpaid for eighteen months during Con-pany-Spanish negotiations. The 
ambassadors were eventually paid, but then another problem surfaced. The 
Company paid the salaries according to the exchange rate that was given for 
the dobl6n and rea. 1 in London., and not according to the "Just" value of the 
36. On concluding the treaty Bubb carrnented sarcastically to the directors. 
III hope you will not like it worse., because it cost nothing". Monteleon 
reported that it was indeed well received in England. 
for more details of the treaty. 
Montele6n to Grimaldo., 25 June 1716., AGS., Estado 6834; Bubb to Bateman 
and Shepheard., 2 June 1716, BM., Eg. 2172., f. 1; Stanhope to Bubb., 2 
February 1716, BMI Eg. 21713 f. 89; Fran Montele6h., 18 April, 13 and 27 
June 1715, AGS, Estado 6829; Methuen to Stanhope, 15 July 1715., PRO., 
S. P. 94/84; Wood, "The Annual Ships") pp. 92-93; Montele6n to directors., 
26 November 1714., PRO., S. P. 35/1, - Part 
ii) f. 235; Montele6n to Grimaldoj 
31 October 1715, AGS, Estado 6831; Bubb to Stanhope., 10 February and 20 
April 1716, EM,, Eg. 2171s ff. 101., 292; Bateman and Shepheard to Stanhope., 
28 September 1715, BM, Add. 25,559., f. 54; Stanhope to Bubb, 29 Decenber 
17153 BM., Eg. 21703 ff. 368-370. 
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money in Spain. Montele6n calculated that he would lose E300 a year in this 
fashion. The issue of exchange rates was not resolved and menaced relations 
between the Conpany and the Spanish crown throughout the contract. 
37 
Other salaries and payments assigned to the king's proceeds from the 
asiento trade included the following: 
Table IV 
Juan Manasses GilliE; an, from 17 July 1713 500 pesos per year 
Prince of Chelamar (Paris)- 5,250 
Luys de Nurabal (Holland) 3,880 
Thobias de el Burgo (Harnburg) 2., o6o 
Marquis of Villamayor, from 1 April 1715 3,750 
Gabriel Ponce, fxxn 6 January 1716 2,000 
Montele6n's son, from 13 October 1715 125 
Anabal Scoti 500 
In addition to these regular payments there were numerous individual grants. 
38 
Anglo-Spanish relations also deteriorated at this time. Each country 
accused the other of seizing ships on the high seas and of breaking commercial 
treaties. Spanish guardacosta activity increased steadily during 1716., 
effectively stopping the clandestine trade of Jamaican merchants to the Main. 
In retaliation Governor Sir Archibald Hamilton issued letters of reprisal to 
those who had received injury frorn the Spanish. The situation became even 
more strained when the galleons were wrecked in the Bahama channel., and much 
of the cargo was plundered by Jamaican merchants who had received reprisal 
commissions to suppress piracy. The demands of the South Sea Company further 
increased the tension in the West Indies. Suspecting that war was about to 
erupt., Company directors ordered their agents in Jamaica and Barbados to stop 
37. Montele6n to Grimaldo3 2 and 16 july 1716, AGS., Estado 6835; Monteleon to 
Grimaldo, 9 MaY 1715, AGS., Estado 6829; To Grimaldo, 6 June 1715, AGS, 
Estado 6824; From Montele6n, 22 August and 19 September 1715, AGS., Estado 6830; Bateman and Shepheard to Stanhope,, 28 September 17153 EM., Add. 
253559, f. 54; Bubb to Methuen3 9 November 1716,, EMs Eg. 2173., f. 114; 
Bubb to directors., 21 September 1716, EM, Eg. 2172, f. 352. 
38. Memoria de lo consiEnado, y librado en el asiento de negros, c. 1715, 
AGS, Estado 68ýý. 
39. The dispute in Europe between Spain and the Emperor over Italyj the formation and involvement of the Quadruple Alliance., and the relationship between Spain and Britain in the West Indies is analysed by Horsfall, 
02- cit.., PP. 76,80,90-136. 
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shipping slaves to the factories and to sell the ones in their possession 
to British planters. Although the treaty stipulated that the Conpany had 
eighteen months to rezdt its effects without penalty in case of war, the 
factors were instructed to send imediately all money and effects to British 
territory. 
40 
The Company also asked England's ambassador to Spain to bring their books 
and records to London if war should break out., but war had been declared in 
September 1718, and he left Spain prior to the receipt of the Company's letter. 
The Canpany agent there., Thanas Bowles., gave the books to another Company 
employee, Juan Bautista Hardi Uzardi, for safekeeping, but they were seized 
by Spanish officials. 
41 
Upon learning of the Spanish declaration of war the British empounded 
Guillermo Eon's papers and personal effects and denied him permission to leave 
the country. He and his family were held hostage until goverment should learn 
of Thomas Bowles' fate. When it was learned that Bowles had sailed for England, 
they departed for France., followed soon afterwards by knbassador Montele6n 
when Britain declared war. 
42 
40. Committee of correspondence to Cartagena factors, 30 July 1718, BM, Add. 
25,563) ff. 202-203; Directors to Woodbridge,, 25 September 1718, EMs 
Add. 25,563.9 f. -212; Thomas to Duke of Mar, 12 September 1718, Calendar Stuart Papers, vol. vii., p. 276. 
41. Extract Bowles to Directors., 22 November 1717., BMI Add. 25,555, f. 79; 
Bateman and Shepheard to Addison, 5 December 171T, BM, Add. 25,, 5552 ff. 
78-79; Cam-dttee of correspondence to Bowles, 4 September and 6 Novenber 
1718, BM, Add. 253563, ff. 208,214; Minutes camdttee of correspondence, 
16 April 1719, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 28; Craggs to Montele6n, 4 September 
1718., Historical Register.,, 1718, vol. iii., P. 308. 
Thomas Bowles was seriously ill at this time., and dreaded the possible 
outbreak of war. If he died, 
"contrary to all the Priviledges the English formerly enjoyed, an 
alcaldi the corte will enter my house, Seize all the goods as well 
belonging to the Company as to me., and turn my Poor Family and 
Servants into the Streets upon Pretence there is no Legal Heir of 
their Religion Present. " 
The only Protestants exempted from the "HarPys" of the Inquisition3 he 
said., were government officials. Extract Bowles to Directors, 22 November 
1717, cited above. 
42. Montele6n to Grimaido, 10 October 1718., AGS., Estado 6841. 
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Chapter IV 
The Licensed Ships 
During the first trading period the South Sea Canpany sent to the Spanish 
colonies in America two licensed merchant ships with cargoes that by agreement 
could not be less than 500 tons nor more than 600. The privilege had been 
granted to Queen Anne by Philip V in 1711, and then assigned by Anne to the 
Coapany. The licensed ships offered a legitimate outlet for British 
manufactured goods in the Spanish colonies., where previously they could only 
be introduced on the fleets or illegally as contraband by West Indian merchants. 
Two large British men-of-war of approximately 1., 000 tons each., the Bedford 
and the Elizabeth3were loaned to the Company for this purpose. Lord 
'Bolingbroke 
explained that providing these ships was 
a precedent not to be follow'd but necessary to be made the first time 
that nothing may be wanting which can contribute to Countenance and 
Encourage the Opening of so beneficial a Mrade. 
Furthermore it was uncertain if the Ccnpany could find ships capable of 
carx7ing 600 tons of cargo because the construction of merchant ships in 
England had been neglected during the War of the Spanish Succession. The 
British goverrfwnt feared that the licenses might be lost to Britain if the 
ships were not made available. 
Initially., in August 1712., the Corrpany was informed tha, H. M. S. Anglesea 
and H. M. S. Warwick had been selected em because but the directors rejected th 
they were of insufficient burthen. The Anglesea (Captain Robert Johnson) and 
the Warwick (Captain Henry Partington) were consigned to the lesser task of 
transporting Ccapany factors to the Indies, the first to Panama and Cartagena 
and the second to Buenos Aires. Factors assigned to Vera Cruz were to travel 
on the Elizabeth. The crews of all four ships were to be under the authority 
of the Coupany rather than the Admiralty; It was also decided that goven-ment 
minute court of directors, 15 August 1712, BM,, King's 73, f. 6; Minute 
court of directors 1 29 September 1714., EM., Add. 25,495., f. 208; Extract directors to Monteledn, 16 December 1714, PRO, S. P. 35/1, part 11.9 f. 69; 
(continued on next page) 
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would fit out, supply, man and convoy the -four ships (Originally the Carpany 
was to have been responsible for paying the wages of the men and for their 
victuals. ) 
because ye Expence., Would go a great way towards eating out the Proffits 
and that wbich Her Majesty designs as a Favour and Encouragement to Her 
Subjects would in this Manner prove of little or no advantage 
Philipe V granted permits on 17 January 1713 for the Elizabeth to sail 
to Vera Cruz and the Bedford_. to Portobelo or Cartagena. On the same day he 
informed Spanish officials in the Indies of the termination of the French 
Guinea Company's asiento contract., and of its acquisition by the British. 
The Ccupany acquired cargoes for both ships (purchased with money acquired 
from the issuance of bonds)., and prepared a smaller storeship, to accompany 
the license ships and their convoys to Jamaica. 
1 
The Admiralty was not informed until July 1713 that the men-of-war and 
convoys should be prepared for their new duty., but the ships were ready to 
sail by later sumer that year. However Anne did not confirm these 
'sigInents until 15 April 1714., and the ships did not sail until late in 1715. 
In the meantime interest accrued on the original investment., and some of the 
goods deteriorated. These were problems that plagued the Company throughout 
the tem of the asiento contract. There were several reasons for the delay. % 
the most important being a dispute between Anne and the Company over the terms 
of the latterts acquisition of the asiento contract and of the licensed ships. 
The directors did not officially accept the contract and the two license ships 
until 17 February 1714, in spite of having made extensive preparations for 
the voyages of the ships and for the establishment of the slave trade. 
2 
1. (continued from. previous page) 
Ame's decree to Admiralty., 15 April 1714., Bm., King's 73., f. 112-113; To 
the Count of Frigiliana,, 14 Januax-j 1715., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2772. 
2. Minute court of directors, 22 July 1713., BM,, Add. 25.1495, f. 69; Bolingbroke. 
to Bateman., 5 February 1714., BM, King's 73,, f. 108; Directors to Robert., 
Earl of Oxford., 2 December 1713, EM, King's 73., f. 105; Minute court of 
directorss 17 February 1714., BM, Add. 25,495., ff. 130-131; Decree by Queen 
Anne to the Ac1miralty., 15 April 1714., BM., King's 73., ff. 112-113. 
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The Company's. plan to send a store. 9hip with the license ships also 
caused a long delay while the Spanish considered--and eventually denied--their 
request to do so. The Spanish were also concerned that because of their great 
size and cargo capacity the licensed ships would result in considerable 
contraband and hurt Spanish trade. Nevertheless the two huge men-of-war were 
granted permission to sail., and efforts that might have been effective in 
controlling contraband, such as the careful inspection of the ships in England 
and again in the Indies, were slipshod., not made at all., or suppressed, such 
as in the case of the Bedford. (See below,, P. 79 )A further delay was 
occasioned by an investigation into the scheme by Captain Johnson and others 
to send 60 tons of contraband merchandise on the Anglesea. Although guilty of 
the charges, Johnson was exonerated and the ship allowed to sail. (For further 
details of this case see above, p. 46 ). 
3 
Because Anne furnished the ships and crews, the Coupany had few expenses 
other than the purchase., packaging and loading of cargoes to and from America., 
and the hire of vessels to help carry produce home. However they did prepare 
200 tons of negro provisions, clothing., medicines., furniture for the factories., 
and gifts for Spanish officials in the Indies. The viceroy of Mexico was to 
receive a gift worth Z200; the governor and royal officials of Vera Cruz ones 
worth a total of E150; those in Panama and Cartagena Z120; and in Buenos Aires 
E100. 
The Elizabeth (Captain Samuel Vincent) finally sailed in August 1715 and 
the Bedford (Captain Thomas Lyell) the following November. Neither ship was 
required to sail with the flotas or galleons., nor did their merchandise have 
to be sold at the fairs., as was the case with the annual ships., although the 
3. Monteleon to Grimaldo, 3 January 1715 , AGS,, Estado 6827; Extract directors to Monteleon, 16 December 1714, PRO, S. P. 35/1, part ii, f. 69; Petition 
council and merchants of Seville, 14 July 1715, PRO., C. O. 388/20; Stanhope 
to MetheUn, 22 March 1715., PRO, S. P. 104/35, f. 135; Translation of a 
letter fran the president of Panama to Montele6n, 28 October 1715., BM-, 
Add. 25,5623 f. 28; Minute court of directors., 17 June 1714., BM., Add. 
25,495P f. 167; Fran Robert Johnson., 15 June 17143 BM3 Add. 2535623 f. 11. 
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goods on the Elizabeth were in fact sold during that year's fair in New 
Spain. 
4 
The cargoes of both ships were very sindlar,, consisting of good quality 
consumer goods that the CaiTpany hoped would be sold for bullion - TheY 
included various textiles, including stockings., hats., ribbons, towels., buttons 
and thread; candles., glassware and mirrors; paper, toys, and objects of pewter, 
tin and iron such as scales and arms; and more exotic items like cinnamon, 
believed 
cloves and nutmeg from the East Indies. Merchandise that the Canpany/would do 
well in the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, but which were unavailable in 
England,, was acquired on the Continent, especially in France and Holland. The 
directors were entirely unaware of the actual market conditions on the coast 
or in the interior of Spanish America, and gambled their investment on reputed 
rather than known factors. Simply,,, they were eager to acquire a share in the 
legendary wealth of Spain's American mines through their licensed and annual 
shJ-ps, ) as well as through the slave trade., but in practice they often had to 
settle for local produce because gold and silver were unavailable. These 
Products were resold in England and Europe, and to a lesser extent in the 
West Indies and in Britain's North American colonies., and consisted mainly of 
sugar. 9 tobacco, flax., indigo, cochineal., logwood, hides and sarsaparilla. 
5 
Merchandise on the Elizabeth was consigned to the newly appointed factors 
for Vera Cruz: Catlin Thorowgood,, chief factor; Thomas Bedell., accountant; 
Daivd Patton., surgeon; and William Clarke., John Newton and John Strode. The 
4. The flota that year cormmded by Manuel 1.6pez Pintado carried 1,797 2/7 
tons of cargo., while that of the Elizabeth officially weighed about 600 
tons, Just over 25% of all introduced at the fair. Royal officials to 
Philip V., 22 May 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800; Walker, Galeones y Flotas3 
p. 106. 
On the other hand the Bedford introduced merchandise at Cartagena almost 
equal in tonnage to that introduced at the fair in Vera Cruz. See below3 
P. 79. 
5. Account of goods on the Bedford., 22 August 1716., EMI Fg. 2172, f. 302; 
Minute court of directors, 1 December 1714,, BM., Add. 25., 495, f. 235; Minute 
court of directors., 5 June and 22 July 1713,, BM., Add. 25 495j ff. 58,69; 
Minute court of directors, 10 April 1712., BM., Add. 25,494, f. 77; Anon.., A True Account of the Design., p. 24. 
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factors Invested personally in the voyage. They hired a sloop, the'Catherine 
(Captain Josiah Nixon), to "pilot" the Elizabeth to Vera Cruz from Jainaical 
but which carried-at Coupany expense-their own goods and slaves. 
6 
The accounts of the Elizabeth were not compiled until 1728 by the Company's 
accountant, John Read, and not in detail until 1733, when they were reviewed 
and analysed by Spain's representative to the Company in London., Thomas 
Geraldino. Several account books relating to the sale of the cargo were lost 
or destroyed during the first represalia, so it is impossible to obtain an 
exact account of the voyage. Furthermore there are important discrepancies 
between Read's accounts of 1728 and 1733. Although the earlier ones are less 
complete they are more accurate; those of 1733 reflect the exigencies of 
Company directors wishing to present accounts most favourable to the Company. 
Obviously the official accounts do not indicate the extent of the private and 
clandestine trade carried on3 although strangely enough they do indicate some 
Of it. (See below., p. 75, n10) 
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6. Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, EM, Add. 25,1563., f. 7; 
To the Count of Frigiliana., 14 January 1715., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2772. 
7. All figures are based on an exchange rate of 54 pence (4/6) per peso. 
s. These are the costs for cleaning, drying, folding, pressing, packing and 
labeling, as well as for various documents and sellos dorados-. 
9. The MoneY refunded to the Company frcm British customs represents duties 
paid on foreign goods introduced into England, but which were reexported 
on the Elizabeth, and were thus., in effect., in transit. Factura, de 
generos ... del navio de guerra, Yzabel, 15 June 1715, AGI, Contadurfa 266. 
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Table I (cont. ) 
Gratuities and miscellaneous 
Translations 





Gratuity to Captain Vincent 
Brokerage fee for silver shipped to London 
Paid to the owners of the London for freight charges 
Freight charges for logwood 
Expenses for shipping silver on the*. 
Elizabeth 
London 
Expenses for shipping flax and indigo 
Insurance and camAssion (1V. ) 
Interest at 5% on the cost of the cargo for the 
































Money received for damage sustained by merchandise 
Duties refunded on flax 
Merchandise Unaccounted )r by the Returns 
Consigned for sale by individuals but for which results 
are unknown 11 
Seized and sent to Mexico in the Mresalia 
Unsold or otherwise unaccounted for 
Thtal bullion and produce returned to 













. E34. s772/3/6 15,821/6/6 
139,076/l/5 
zl893669/11/5 
E523., 464/1 1 
12 
10. The factors are known to have received 1,086,447 pesos k real 
(E244,450/11/5) in cash for merchandise sold. The difference between 
that and the figure below possibly represents some of the money 
unaccounted for., although it could just as likely be a figure 
inflated by the factors to claim higher comnissions. 
The accounts-for sales in Vera Cruz show goods not included in 
the original bill of lading which sold for 205., 281 pesos 2 reales 
(continued on next page) 
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The total sale of goods returned on this original investment was either 
9349,, 519/19/2 or E357,732/6/10, depending on whether the 1728 or 1733 accounts 
are used. Based on these figures the net profit from the sale, therefore, was 
either E42,431/6/10 (13.8%) or E50,643/14/6 (16.5%); costs being Z307,9088/12/4. 
These figures do not include goods sent to Mexico., consigned to various 
individuals and remaining unsold and unaccounted for. If the value of these 
6 
goods were considered as part of the profit the net profit for the voyage would 
have been as high as 78% on the investment. Unfortunately it is unknown exactly 
how much was returned to the CoTVany. It is also unknown how much was paid to 
Philip V for his share of the profit. 
Privately owned money and goods in addition to Company property were 
returned on the Elizabeth. Catlin Thorowgood carried a valuable personal cargo 
on the vessel which was tied up in litigation with the Company for years. A 
considerable amount of effects belonging to the governor of Vera Cruz was also 
returned. The Company was quite willing to carry Spanish passengers and cargo 
(A Company director said that they would "on al. 1 Occasions be very ready to 
10. (continued fran previous page) 
U46,188/5/7). Almost certainly these goods were introduced 
illicitly; they were included in the accounts either by mistake., 
or with the knowledge that they would not be checked by Spanish 
officials. 
11. Most of the Elizabeth's cargo was sold prior to the first rý2resalia, 
although some of the returns of the sale were never received by the 
Company and became part of a much larger sum in dispute between the 
two nations throughout the period of the asiento contract. 
The account prepared by David Patton of goods from the Elizabeth 
which were seized in 1718, shows a value of E15,821/6/6. In comparison 
with prices received prior to the represalia Patton overvalued every 
item on the list. Based on the known values of earlier sales the 
figure should have been Z10,968/19/6. Furthermore., he included 
mediocre goods with better quality ones at the higher price. From 
David Patton et al., 13 January 1721., AGI., Contadur: ra 266; Account of 
sales made in Vera Cruz to 19 November 1717., compiled by John Read, 
14 October 1733, AGI, Contadurrfa, 266; Bill of lading of the Elizabeth,, 
15 June 1715, AGI, Contadurfa 266. 
12. Account of the Elizabeth, 1715, AGII ContadurrIa 266; Trade for the 
first five years to 30 April 1722., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 652; Viaje a la Vera Cruz por la Yzabel., Capt. Vincent., 1715., AGI., 
Contadurfa 266. 
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do any Service that Lyes in their Power to the Spaniards". )., although it was 
contrary to the terms of the asiento treaty. 
13 
When Thams Geraldino analysed the Elizabeth's accounts he said that the 
gross returns from, the trip should not include the amount seized (He did not 
mention the amounts unsold or consigned. ), and argued that Philip V's profit 
from the trip should be 10% of the difference between the Z331,795/6/8 return 
value and the original purchase price (with costs) of the cargo., 9226., 45: L/17/9. 
That would have given a gross profit of E107,343/8/11, with 10% of that due to 
the king. It does not appear,, however., that Philip V ever received this money., 
and this issue also blended into the general debate over the settlement of 
the final accounts at the termination of the trade. 
14 
The presence of the Elizabeth in Vera Cruz. * where it arrived on 2 Noverrber 
1715, was a mixed blessing to the Spanish. Of particular advantage was the 
availability of good British and European merchandise at prices as much as 
30% less than those charged by merchants on the fleet. (The Company paid very 
little in taxes or duties on goods introduced or on returns. ) On the other 
hand numerous Spanish merchants3 including those on the fleets., stored their 
goods in Coupany warehouses to avoid the payment of inport duties., and then 
later sold them in league with Company en-Ployees to avoid the payment of the 
alcabala. As noted elsewhere., Spaniards often placed their retums on Company 
ships to avoid paying export duties and higher shipping charges. 
Mexican merchants had ambiguous feelings about the South Sea Company's 
license and annual ships., because goods from these ships were usually sold 
at the fairs, where traditionally high prices prevailed. In 1713 they announced 
their opposition to the revival of the flotas. 'During the war of the Spanish 
Succession they had grown accustcmed to a certain independence, and to the 
13. Ury to Vera Cruz factors, 11 February 1716, BM, Add. 25j563) f. 23. 
14. Account of the Elizabeth's trip to Vera Cruz by Captain Vincent, made 
up in London by John Read on 14 October 1733, AGI, Contadurfa 266; "Observations on the accounts of the annual ship [sic] Elizabeth by Thomas Geraldino", c. 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790. 
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lower prices for goods on the Manila galleons and fY%n contraband traders. 
However they soon discovered the advantages offered by dealing with the ConpanY. 
What was a blessing to many Spanish merchants and private citizens was 
prejudicial to the comercio of Cadiz and to the crown's revenue, particularly 
as represented by the alcabala, "the principal rent that I have in those vast 
dominions", Philip V said in 1722. The factors who arrived on the Elizabeth 
claimed that their license authorized them to sell Company goods duty free in 
the interior, just as on the coast. The consulado of Mexico rejected this 
contention., and ruled that Company merchandise "interned" was liable to the 
payment of the alcabala. Otherwise the income of the viceroyalty would be 
lowered dramatically., with the added danger that it would be further reduced 
because Spanish merchants would combine their goods with those of the Coupany 
(which did happen, as noted above) to avoid the tax. Although the principal 
purpose of the decision was to maintain the royal incame., it also had the 
function of combating unfair conVetition by raising the price of Corrpany 
goods., and of protecting the trade of certain Mexican merchants and royal 
officials. 
15 
The factors paid the tax and the dispute was referred to Spain; on 22 
January 1717 the junta del asiento de negros ruled in favour of the consulado. 
The Company later claimed a refund., though without success. This issue was 
revived later when the Company requested permits for their annual ships to 
sail to New Spain. 
16 
The financial accounts of the Bedford's voyage must be coupiled from a 
variety of general accounts dating., for the most part., fran the 1730s. The 
15. Walker., "Galeones and Flotas'l., pp. 1297130,137; Real c6dula., 28 November 
17222 AGI', Ind. Gen. 276ý; L6ýez Pintado, to-Durki-, 77FEEFEý- 1716, 
AGI, M6xico 854. 
16. Bateman and Shepheard to the crown., 24 September 1718, BM, Add. 25,555., 
ff. 91-92; Anon.., Farther Considerations on the Present State of Affairs) 
at Home and Abroad, as affected by the Late Convention, in a Letter to the Minister..... London., c. 1718),, P. 53; Walker., op. cit., pp. 1131 11Y-11F 
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original invoice shows the cost of the cargo as E143,525/15/9, considerably 
less than for the cargo of the Elizabeth; an additional E4., 459/16/- was spent 
on miscellaneous expenses., including a gratuity of E2,080/10/- paid to the 
officers of the Elizabeth, Bedford and Warwick. 
17 
The difficulties and delays experienced in the departures of the two 
license ships were nothing in comparison to the contretemps suffered by the 
Bedford after its arrival in Cartagena early in 1716. The ship was no exception 
to the general rule that Company vessels were invariably involved in legal 
disputes over their cargoes on their arrival at Spanish ports in the West 
Indies. When the royal officials proceeded to the Bedford's visita, they 
noticed immediately that it was so heavily loaded that pipas of 2Fuardiente 
weighing nine tons had to be stored on deck because there was no room in the 
bodega. (That the vessel was carrying aguardiente is proof that it had stopped 
somewhere en route from England to take on additional cargo. ) Using the 
regulations for measuring vessels as fixed by the Casa de Contratacift, they 
found the cargo to weigh an amazing 2,117 1/3 tons., far in excess of the 
allowable 600,, and confiscated 1., 517 1/3 tons., including 545 tons of iron 
which the factors claimed was intended for sale in Jamaica. Next they collected 
a bond from the factors on the remaining 600 tons while they awaited Philip V's 
decision on whether or not that should also be confiscated., and informed the 
king that they planned to sell the confiscated goods on the royal account; 
after deducting royal duties they intended to give 2/3 to the real c6mara 
because there was no denunciador and 1/3 to the judges. The factors stopped 
the sale., but only by the timely appointment of a pliable Spaniard friendly to 
the Company as juez conservador, and., according to the directors., by paying 
"an Excessive sLm of money" that was extorted from them to short measure the 
Bedford's cargo. The sum was an incredible 75,000 pesos (Z26,875) in money 
17. Minute court of directors., 31 July 1717., BM, Add. 25,497, f. 55; Receipts 
and Payments on account of the asiento trade to 30 July 1722, C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 644; General cash account of receipts and payments On account on the Company's trade from. the beginning to 1 May 1736., C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 11. 
8o 
and gifts, which is a fim indication that there was indeed an excessive 
amount of cargo. 
18 
Walker suggests that the bribe was given by the Company because the 
seizure had become a diplomatic issue with Spain. Yet at this time Philip V 
was making every effort to please the Company. The bribe was, in fact, a local 
matter between royal officials and the factors, although it was perhaps given 
with the approval of the directors. During negotiations in Soissons-'in 1728 
Company representatives said that the Company had lost 74,000 pesos in the 
sale of the Bedford's cargo. But there was no such loss on the books; the 
Company was merely trying to recoup the money spent on the bribe. 
19 
When the directors learned of the seizure they told the Spanish minister 
in London, the Marquis of Monteleon., that there was not a vessel afloat that 
could carry 2,000 tons of cargo., and offered documents to support their claim 
that the ship weighed 1,073 62Z94 tons., but that it was only carrying 538 tons 
of merchandise. They also ordered their agent in Madrid., Thomas Bowles., to 
withhold money owed to the Spanish from asiento business unrelated to the 
license ships until the question was resolved. This infuriated the British 
airbassador., George Bubb, who pointed out that the two license ships were not 
even part of the asiento treaty., and that the royal officials involved had acted 
on their own volition without the knowledge of the Spanish court. The delay 
in making these payments., he added., was making many powerful enemies in Spain. 
20 
The directors asked the British goven-fnent to intervene in their behalf 
18. Phil IpV to Serrano., 31 May 1717, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2776; Ccmnittee, of 
correspondence to Cartagena factors, 6 June 1717, EM, Add. 25,563., f. 32; 
Bateman and Shepheard to the crown, 24 September 1718, BM, Add. 25,5551 
f. 91; Cadiz merchant to London merchant., 10 March 1729., PRO., S. P. 36/103 
Part ii, f. 136; Walker, op. cit-3 P. 115. 
19. Plowes to Barranechea, 30 September 1728, AGS, Estado 6876; Walker, 
op. cit. 
20. Bubb to MethoDn. 21 September 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 354; Bubb to Methgm., 
12 October 1716, BM3 Eg. 2173.1 f. 53; Monteleon to governor of Cartagena,, 6 Septerrber 1716, EM, Add. 25,562., f. 63; Charles Wager et al certificate$ 24 August 1716., AGi., Ind. Gen. 2800; Carudttee of correspondence to Bubb., 28 March 1717, BM., Eg. 21743 f. 87. 
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before the textiles on the Bedford were destroyed by moths and rot. They 
also enlisted Monteleonts support; the wnbassador wrote to the governor of 
Cartagena to suggest that an error must have been made and enclosed the 
measurement of the ship and cargo as it was prior to its departure. The result., 
he said., could be most harmful to relations between the two crowns. 
Representations were made to Philip V, and the sale of the excess cargo was 
suspended while the dispute was investigated., although the factors were allowed 
to sell the goods under bond. Between 21 March 1716 and 31 March 1717 they 
received 174,754 pesos (approximately L62,620) in sales. 
In a c6dula dated 12 November 1716 the king reprimanded the royal officials 
of Cartagena for making the factors pay a security, and ordered them to release 
the ship and to remeasure its cargo on the basis of 22; 1 quintales per ton for 
iron and 16 for mixed goods., which in fact did not conform to the stipulations 
of the Treaty of 1716., although it was only slightly unfavourable to the 
company. Several months later., on 24 May 1717., he also ordered the commander 
of the flota. 3 Antonio Serrano, to rezneasure the ship. One of the reasons the 
king acted so promptly in the Company's interest was that it was also in his 
own. He rebuked the royal officials., saying that they "had done great mischief., 
not least of all to the [South Sea] Company in which I am a 10% partner". 
The seizure of the Bedford's cargo was actually lega. 13 and based on 
existing intructions on the visitas of arriving ships., both Spanish and foreign. 
However as one Spanish minister remarked., they had "proceeded without 
intelligence". 21 
21. Bubb to Methelb., 9 November 1716., BM., Eg. 2173., f- 114; Real orden to 
Serrano, 24 May 1717., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2769; Real c6dula to Cartagena royal 
officials., 12 Noverrber 1716., AGi., Ind. Gen. 277ý; Directors to Methe'L-M., 
31 August 1716, BM, Add. 25,555P f. 53; Monteleon to governor of Cartagena2 
6 Septerrber 1716, BKj Eg. 2170, f. 306; Directors to Bubb, 7 Septerrber 
1716., BM. 9 Eg. 2172., ff. 274-278; Metheun to Bubb., 10 SepteTrber 1716, PRO, S. P. 104/136; Estimate of damages caused by Spanish officials, n. d., 
17353 AGS, Estado, 7017; Brown, "The South Sea Corrpany", p. 668; Walker, 
op. cit., pp. 114-116; True declaration by Matthew Plowes, 18 March 1729J 
AGS, Estado 7017; C&dz merchant to London merchant, 10 March 1729., 
PRO$ S-P. 36/lo, part ii., f. 137; Pes to Grimaldo, 9 August 1721, AGS) 
Estado 6851. 
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One of the principal causes of long-term controversy between the South 
Sea COITPanY and Spain was over the measurement of the licensed and annual ships 
The directors managed to insert an article into the asiento treaty of 1716 
(negotiated by George Bubb , see above p. 
67 ) that defined a ton as equal to 
two Malaga pipas., and the weight of 20 quintales (technically 2., 000 pounds). 
They wanted the cargoes of their merchant vessels measured by weight rather 
than volume., since the goods,, mainly textiles., were light. 
Bubb was disturbed by the article. While a ton of 2,, 000 pounds was 
conimnly used both in England and Spain, it did not conform to regulations 
adopted by the Casa de Contrataci6n in Seville for measuring Spanish merchant 
ships. Furthermore he noted that there were two types of Malaga pipas with a 
difference between them of about 20% in weight. 
The treatywas ratified by both crowns., in spite of the article. Bubb said 
that it had passed unnoticed mainly because of his 
having the good Luck to keep it out of the way of any Body the least 
versed in the Canmerce of the Indies; Otherwise it would not only 
have been difficult but impracticable; being directly contrary to the 
known Laws of Spain: .... 
Bubb knew that there were bound to be problems. The Casa de Contratac16n 
determined the rules, he said, "nor do I believe the officers of this Crown 
in the Indies., know., or are capable of going by any other Rule.... I wish 
with all my Heart when it comes to be tryed, it may prove otherwise. 1122 
The Council of the Indies resolved on 31 October 1716 that the entire cargo 
22. Montele6n to Grimaldo, 2 July 1716, AGS, Estado 6835; Discussion of 
license ships, n. d., unsigned, AGS, Estado 6829; Bubb to Stanhope, 18 July 
1716, PRo. s. P. 94/85, f. 200; Bubb to directors, 4 August 1716, BM, 
Eg. 2172., f. 177. 
Another reason for controversy in weighing the cargoes of Company 
ships was the use of different units of measurement by the British and 
the Spanish. For exanple a common unit of measurement in Spain was the 
Xýýa, 48 Spanish inches but only 321-2 English; the codo, a basic unit for 
measuring ships there., equalled 22 93166/loooo Enýj-sý inches. Another 
common unit, the palmo,, equalled 831 English inches. Consequently ships' 
measurements had to be translated from feet and inches to codos and 
Spanish inches. Furthermore., measuring ships itself was extremely intricate., 
whether in Spain or England., with the ship's length., keel., breadth., depth 
of hold., beam, poop and prow all being measured in the process, the results forming the component parts of complex mathematical formulas. 
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of the Bedford should be restored to the Canpany. Surprisingly., the offer 
was refused by Bubb,,, who said that the cargo ought to be remeasured, and any 
tonnage in excess of 600 confiscated. He explained his unusual action: "This 
I did both because I am sure, that there is no Excess of that Measure, & if 
we begin by cheating & robbing these People we shall never settle anything here 
that will last . 11 
23 
In July 1717 the Canpany directors learned that the Bedford's cargo had 
been released, but they were unaware that permission had not yet been given to 
transport it to Portobelo. The Coripany's intention had been to sell part of 
the cargo in Cartagena and the bulk of it in Portobelo, Royal officials in 
Cartagena., however., insisted that the entire cargo be sold there, contending-- 
correctly--that the ship's license allowed it to visit Cartagena or Portobelo., 
but not both. The directors realized that they had misinterpreted the license., 
but they continued to press for permission to send the cargo to Portobelo. 
24 
In fact, the governor of Panama had already given that permission to the 
factors in Cartagena. He also consented to their increasing the tonnage of 
the Bedford's cargo to 600 tons; when the cargo was remeasured in Cartagena it 
was found to have dwindled to only 444 3/4 tons! Another c6dula., dated 7 
December 1717) gave permission to sell the remaining cargo in Portobelo, ý although 
it was not until 28 June 1718 that H. M. S. Diarmnd arrived in Cartagena to 
escort the London there with the cargo. 
25 
The long delay proved to be unfortunate for the Conpany. War broke out 
23. Monteleon to governor of Cartagena., 12 September 1716, EM, Add. 25,562., 
f. 64; Bubb to Stair, 19 November 1716, BM2 Fg. 2173, f. 142. 
24. Directors to Uzardi, 31 July 1717., EM, Add. 25,563, f. 66; Directors 
to Jamaica agents., 12 July 1717., BM,, Add. 25,563., f. 54. 
25. The Diamond's captain refused to allow his ship to be inspected on arrival., 
an almost certain sign that it was carrying contraband. 
Real 
I 
o6dula, to Cartagena royal officials, 7 December 1717, AGI., Ind. 
Gen. 2769--, *Royal officials to Philip V, 31 March 1719., AGI., Santa Fe 451; 
Directors to Lords Comnissions for Lord High Admiral., 14 February 1717, 
EM3 Add. 253555, f. 83; Cam*dttee of correspondence to Bowles, 3 October 
1717, BM, Add. 25,563., f. 69. 
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on 13 Deceirber 1718 and all CaTipany goods, including cargo from the Bedford 
worth 408,435 pesos 2: -1? reales (991,897/18/10)' were seized in the represalia. 
in Panama. 26 
The Bedford's cargo was sold over a period of severa. 1 years and returns 
were made on several ships. The accounts of the voyage were not settled until 
1727; the sparse records available then were incomplete and unbalanced and., 
according to Company directors., no journal had been kept for the cargo. Existing 
records were not analysed until years later. Also., as much as 1,672 7/12 tons 
(l., 517 1/3 brought in excess to Cartagena., plus 155 3/12 tons allowed by the 
president of Panam to bring the cargo up to the "allowable" 600) of merchandise 
were sold illegally., and for this no accounts are available. However if the 
ratio of sale prices is the same between the legal and illegal sales., the 
13517 1/3 tons should have brought 2,418,558 pesos U544,176). 
27 
Table III 




Gratuities to the crew of the Bedford 
Thomas Lyell (captain) 
Tb the ship's officers 
To the ship's sailors (approximately 16 each) Freight., insurance., comadssion at lVo 
Expenses of transporting remaining cargo to Portobelo, 
on the London 
Interest for three years to December 1718 at 5% 
Duty on iron shipped from Cartagena to London (75 tons 
plus 69 barrels and 16 boxes of iron ornaments) 
Freight and labour charges 
Table IV 
Sale Returns 
Sale of goods in Cartagena (537,282 pesos Tj reales),. 
At Cartagena by supercargoes of Royal George 
(10,592 pesos 2 reales) 
Miscellaneous sales (271 pesos 7 reales) 
Reprisaledgoods sold in Panama (408,435 pesos 2; ý reales) Reprisaledgoods retumed to factors in Panama 
















E24o., 063/14/4; 1 
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Thus counting reprisaledgoods returned to the factors in Panama after 
the war., the legal profit on the voyage of the Bedford was r42,691/10/6; ý 
(21.6%). However Philip V was paid only f 3,695/16/4, sanewhat less than the 
10% due to him as his share of the profit. He was probably charged interest 
as was done at other factories. 
30 
The two special license ships sent to America by the South Sea Ccrrpany 
were not annual ships as defined by the asiento treaty., but for all practical 
purposes their effect on the West Indies trade was the same. (See chapter 
IX,, "The Annual Ships") They were instruments for the massive introduction 
of legal and contraband goods. Procedures were developed for the introduction 
of goods from the annual ships, and relations established with Spanish 
merchants and officials that proved to be profitable for those directly involved 
in the Company's trade-if perhaps not for the Company's stockholders or for 
the Spanish crown. Pressure by Company directors for privileged treatment 
for the two license ships was matched by a permissive attitude on the part of 
the crown., especially notable in the lax handling of the question of the excess 
cargo on the Bedford. 
It is impossible to say exactly what effect the trade of the COTvany's 
license ships had on other British and foreign merchants in the West Indies. 
26. For details of this., the first., represalij, see chapter V. Badillo, to 
Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Contaduria 1486. 
27. Directors to Rigby and Johnson, 6 September 1728., EM, Add. 25,566, f. 75; 
Smith to Geraldino,, 13 January 1733, AGS, Estado, 7010; General cash 
account of receipts and payments on trade from its beginning to 1 May 
1736, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 11; Undated accounts, C. L., Shel. Vol. 43, f. 15. 
28. From Thorrpson., Pratter and Haselwood, 5 October 1716, AGI, Contadurýa 
266; Account signed by John Read., 27 October 1733., for June 1717, AGI., 
Contadurla, 266; Account of the Bedford conpiled by John Read,, 1 August 
1728ý, AGS3 Estado 7017; From Thomas Geraldino, 21 November 1733, AGI, 
Contýdurfa 266. 
29. These figures do not include expenses at Portobelo. 
30. General account of the asiento trade from its beginning to 1 November 1739, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 497. 
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However the cries of anguish from Jamaica traders are eloquent testimony 
to their fear of such competition., and probably of the damage actually caused 
to their trading activities. The market for goods in Spanish America was 
more limited than anyone imagined., and easily glutted., in spite of long periods 
of shortage caused by war and by Spain's archaic econanic policy, thus the 
considerable merchandise carried by the two license ships almost certainly 
hurt Spanish and private British merchants alike. 
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Chapter V 
The First Represal-ia, '1718 
Spanish officials in America were advised by a real orden of 14 September 
1718 of the outbreak of war with Britain, and instructed to seize all effects 
belonging to the South Sea Company and to other British subjects. Consequently 
Conpany books relating to the trade were seized, as were ships, unsold slaves, 
supplies, promissory notes, food and furniture., and even the factors' personal 
effects. Inventories of embargoed goods were made by the CGEaLs and signed 
by, the factors, but the originals of most of these have been lost. For 
example no books were ever found for the period November 1717 - November 1722 
at Vera Cruz. However in several cases the factors had been forwarned of the 
pending war and had sent their account books to Jamaica. Other factors hid 
their books or left them with Spanish friends or sympathetic local merchants 
during the war. It was to their advantage., and even more so to their customers, 
to hide the accounts from royal officials because they included sales of 
contraband goods and contracts with Spanish merchants which had been kept 
secret to avoid the payment of taxes. The extent of these frauds can be 
surrdsed by the care taken by the factors to keep their books out of Spanish 
hands. 
Incomplete though this data is, it is valuable in helping to provide a 
q ative estimate of the British stake in Spanish America at this time. 
It represents minimum, figures only on the asiento trade. And remembering that 
there was a considerable unrecorded contraband., and the reexport trade via 
Cadiz, the data suggests the extent of the British presence in the supposedly 
impenetrable Spanish empire. 
At the time of the seizure the factors were given the choice of being 
sent inland (so that they could have no contact with British ships) or to 
Spain. It is unknown what choice most of them made., although a number of them 
were actually sent to Jamaica,, and at least, one factor in panama and Portobelo 
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escaped custody and returned to England. 
1 
Most Canpany effects seized during the first represalia, were either sold 
by royal officials in the Indies or remitted to Spain and sold there. The 
confiscated property, was used to help satisfy the basic needs of enpire., 
although much of it was used to maintain the factors and unsold slaves,, and to 
pay various legal fees and expenses. Governor Geronimo Badillo., on the advice 
2 reales 
of the junta deguerra in Panamaspent 726,702 pesos/seized at the factory to 
repair the dilapidated fortifications, purchase ammzdtion and other supplies, 
and to feed the troops, who had been "dying of hunger. " Badillo had orders to 
repair the forts to defend against a possible enemy invasion, and the only 
money available was that seized frorn the South Sea Company. (For details of 
the, represalia in Portobelo and Panama see below, p. q 2- ) Had the British 
attacked Portobelo at the beginning of the war., according to the junta, they 
would have met no resistance whatsoever. 
2 
Several of the original inventories of the goods seized in the represalia 
of 1718 are missing or lost, making it difficult to arrive at the truth 
concerning the widely varied inventories presented later by the Spanish and 
the Conpany. To add to the confusion., Coupany effects were restored in 
installments and from different places after the war. Nonetheless accurate 
figures are available for several factories. At Santo Domingo the Industry. 
a 170 ton ship camianded by Captain Chaiýles Bayes., was seized. The vessel 
was under contract to agents in Barbados to deliver slaves to various ports., 
including Santa Marta. It had visited several prior to arriving in Santo 
Dcmingo . and so was not fully loaded. Royal officials seized and sold 17 
1. Memo frcm Burrell., n. d., C. L... Shel. vol. 43, f. 1; Real orden to all royal 
officials in the West Indies, 14 September 1718., AGI, Contaduria 14bb; 
Directors to Craggs, 20 March 1719,, BM., -Add. 25., 555., f. 107; Lizeaga to 
Philip V., 6 May 1719,, AGI, Contadýiýa 895; Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 
1720, AGIj Contadurfa 1486; de Studer, La Trata, p. 205. 
2. Badillo to Philip V., 30 July 1720., AGI., Panama 128; Panama junta de gufýMa-ý 
14 Decenber 1718, AGI, Panama 128; Panama junta de hacienda, 15 December 
17183 AGI3 Panama 128; Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Contaduzrfa 
1486. 
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slaves,, 90 baxTels of flour and 20 of butter, as well as the ship., its 
fittings and supplies. They brought 5,980 pesos 1 real, with 383 pesos 
2 reales of that going for expenses. 
3 
Ten thousand pesos were seized in Santa Marta. It is uncertain if this 
represents cash seized or money acquired from the sale of effects. However 
there was no factory there., suggesting that a Company ship and its cargo were 
4 
seized and then sold . 
Royal officials in Santiago de Cuba seized 50., 591 pesos 3 reales in goods 
and pra*aissory, notes, of which 1,457 pesos 4 reales went to expenses. The 
items seized probably included slaves., factory furniture and supplies and 
tobacco,, which was the main produce exported by the Company from Cuba. 
5 
Very few Coapany effects were confiscated at the other Cuban factory., 
in Havana. The head factor., Richard Farrell., remitted the books and as much 
money and effects as possible to Jamaica after receiving orders from the Coupany 
to do so in case of war. The*value of items seized there was only 24,612 pesos 




Money owed to the factory recovered from Spanish merchants 8., 313-311 
1. , 
493 arrobas of snuff at 15 reales each, and 1.541 at 
16 reales each 5)881-3 
3113,2 varas of leaf tobacco at 3 geales per vara 116-6; ý 
256 slaves (206 Piezas e india) 10.200 
24., 611-5 
3. Dudley WoodbricIge license, 26 July 1718., AGI3 Contadurfa, 1068; Testimony,, 
1 January 1719., AGI, Contýdurfa 1068; Errbargoed goods frcm Santo Domingo 
factor7., 24 July 1727., AGI., Estado 9., ramo 1. 
Pesos rather than pounds sterling are used in this section because almost 
all correspondence and dealings were in pesos. The exchange rate3 however3 
can be considered to have been 4/6 (54 pence) per peso. 
4. Account of the first represalias n. d., AGI, Contadurfa 1507. 
5. An Account of What Remains Due from the king of Spain to the Corrpanyj 
20 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,5603 f. 70. 
6. The low valuation on the slaves (about 40 pesos 2 reales each) was undoubtedly arrived at to keep as low as possible the amount to be returned after the war. 
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The cost of the seizure and maintaining the factors during the war was 
10., 233 pesos 1 real., leaving a net of 14,480 pesos 23ý reales. The Coupany 
made additional claims after the war., but they were either unrelated to the 
represalia or cannot be substantiated. They include 16,000 pesos which royal 
officials had entargoed in 1715 from the French Guinea Coripany in the name of 
the South Sea Ccapany. 7 




Various Company papers and doc=ents 
Effects and negroes sold (including 5., 000 pesos received 
from the sale of 20 negroes seized in Puerto Rico) 
Merchandise sold to Spanish merchants 
Collected fran merchants indebted to the Company 
Fine cloth and miscellaneous textiles sold 
Pesos 










A Company boat was also seized in Cartagena., but it is unknown if it was 
sold. An unspecified amount of additional effects were seized during the war, 
or sold later than the effects described above, with the amount being restored 
to the Ccapany after the war being greater than that shown in the accounts of 
the initial represalia. This probably consisted primarily 
of further debts collected from Spanish merchants. Of the amount seized, royal 
officials spent 28,057 pesos 6k reales on the garrison in Cartagena. The 
Carrpany claimed later that this sua was never repaid. 
7. General Account of the Represalia., 1718., AGI., Contadurýa 266; State of 
the Represalia., 1718-1719., C. L., Shel. vol. 43,, f. 695; An Account of what Remains Due from the king of Spain to the Company., 20 February 1727., EM., 
Add. 25,56o, f. 70; Guarzo Calderon to Philip Vs 20 February 1719, AGI2 
Contaduýfa 1170. 
That Company claims were inaccurate is well demonstrated by their demand 
made after the war that 4., 549 pesos worth of tobacco be returned. This is 1,448 pesos 11-2 reales less than Spanish records indicate. Account of 
seizures, n. d., unsigned., AGS., Estado 6850. 
91 
The Ccapany said that goods and debts worth either 240,918 or 244,370 
pesos (depending on which account is consulted) were seized in Cartagena. 
They claimed this and a further 16,141 pesos taken fran the French Guinea 
Canpany, 5,000 pesos seized and sold in Puerto Rico, and an extraordinary 
113,394 pesos for miscellaneous expenses and "sundries". This gives a total 
of either 375,453 or 378,905 pesos. The sun is excessive, particularly the 
claim for expenses., for which the Canpany furnished no vouchers or proof. 
8 
The represalia, in Buenos Aires was haphazard. The original inventory 
omitted many details on quantities., weights., sizes and value., resulting in 
predictable difficulties later. Effects and promissory notes seized., and 




Negroes sold 6o., o88 
Household furniture and provisions 6o.,, ooo 
Negroes and effects sold in Santiago de Chile and 
Potosi 56,920 
Hides (The price of hides at this time was about 
12 reales each,, making the number seized about 
10,400 15,575 
Debts collected from Spanish merchants 13., 100 
Silver 98 
2053781 
Two Carpany ships were also seized., one measuring 15-20 tons and the other 
200. The smaller was probably a launch kept for factory use; the larger was 
a Guinea ship,, the Arabella., which was sent to Cadiz in 1721. with a cargo of 
5,000 hides., the proceeds from the sale of its cargo of slaves. The king 
decreed that the cargo and ship belonged to him. It was sold and an unspecified 
amount applied to the royal treasury. 
After the war, when the Conpany tried to determine what had been seized 
8. Cartagena governor and royal officials to Philip V, 20 July 1719., AGI 
Contadurla. 1437; State of the First Represalia, 
., 
C. L., Shel. vol. 43. f. 659; An Account of What Remains due f"ran the king of Spain to the Company, 20 February 1727, PRO, S. P. 36/5., part ii; Bertodanb to Duran, 
25 October 1719, AGI, Contadurria, 1086; TO governor of Cartagena., 28 August 17233 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Testimony by Diego Ruiz de Villegas3 18 March 17213 AGI, Contratacion 5144. 
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in Buenos Aires they did not have reference to the Spanish inventory. 
Consequently-and this was typical at several factories-they claimed only 
155,482 pesos, 24.4% less than the Spanish figure of 205., 781 pesos! However 
the Conipany greatly exaggerated peripheral demands. They claimed 95,849 pesos 
for factory expenses during the war., 7., 320 pesos for damage to hides which had 
remained in the hold of a Conpany ship throughout the war,, and 10,000 pesos in 
coupensation for fýrm land which should have been, but was not, assigned to 
the factory by the terms of article ix, of the asiento contract. Added to the 
155,482 pesos., - tbis-gives_a, total, Ccnpany claim of 268,551 pesos. 
9 
The represalia at Panama and Portobelo., which occurred in December 1718 
as it did at most other factories., was by far the most important in quantity 
of effects seized. It is also the only factory for which we have a complete 
10 
inventory of the goods eribargoed. ) All Corrpany effects . 
except weapons, amunition and other items which could be used in the presidios, 




Merchandise (mainly textiles), about half from, the 
license ship Bedford 
42 slaves seized in Panama and sold for 325 pesos each 
160 ton ship with eight cannons seized at Portobelo 










Governor Badillo spent 726,702 pesos 2 reales (67.5% of the total seized) 
of this., primarily on defence., as follows: 
Table V 
Year Item 
1718 For n-dscellaneous expenses 
1719 For the infantry., repair of the walls,, and 
on a candle factory 
1720 General defence expenses 
1721 General defence expenses 





.. 125,107 11 95., 598-ý 
586., 727-2 
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An- , gain the Company accounts for the Eýpresalia are less accurate than the 
Spanish, because they lacked access to the Spanish inventory. They claimed only 
781,879 pesos for goods and pranissory notes, although they brought the total 
figure to 999,158 pesos 3 reales by making various other claims, mostly 




Expenses incurred relating to the seizure 42,850 
Money lost or embezzled during the war 43., 000 
Claims against the French Guinea Ccupany 76., 158 
110 slaves introduced by a: -Spanish merchant during 
the 
war who were seized and sold by royal officials 30., 000 
Sundry items delivered to royal officials 8,951-6; 1 
80 Company slaves sold by royal officials 16,318 - -12 217,, 278-6; ý 
Orders to seize the factory goods reached Vera Cruz on 3 January 1719. 
They included instructions to make a detailed inventory (in the presence of a 
Company factor) of everything seized., and to place Conpany employees under guard, 
with provisions-taken fran those embargoed-distributed to them on the basis 
of rank. However the factors' request for six pipas of rum and six of wine 
brought to Vera Cruz on the Herbert (See next page. ), and for provisions 
9. Fran Stanhope, 24 April 1721., AGS., Estado 6851; Gonzalo Machado and Gonzalo 
Vaquedano to Pes, 18 April 1721., AGI., Contaduria 1880; An Account of What 
Remains due from the king of Spain to the Conpany., 20 February 1728., 
BM, Add. 25,56o, f. 69. 
10. Upon making the seizure Governor Badillo issued an edict warning all Spanish subjects that they had two days in which to turn in any goods 
the Company factors might have hidden with them before war broke out. The penalty for not doing so was a fine of 2., 000 pesos. 
11. Many soldiers did not receive their pay., which led to an unsuccessful 
mutiny when it was reported that they had been. Týpez Molero to Morzillop 
26 September 1722., AGI., Panama 127. 
12. Badillo to Philip Vj 30 July 1720, AGI. 2 Contadurýa 1486; Philip V to governor of Panama., 30 November 1719, AGI., Contadurla. 1486; Badillo and 
royal officials to Philip V., 19 October 1723, AGI., Panama 143; Account 
of reprisaled goods at Panama and Portobelo., n. d. 3 AGI . Contadar-la, 1507; Uamas to Philip V, 21 December 1718., AGI., Contadurfa 1486; An Account of 
what Remains due fýmm the king of Spain to the Company., 20 FebrUarY 1728., EM,, Add. 25,56o, f 70; State of the first Represalia, n. d., C. L.. 2 Shel. vol. 43., f. 
ý59- 
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brought by the Neptune was denied. Although a guard was placed promptly on 
the factory and on the two Company ships in port, few Company books or papers 
were found. The factors, who were imprisoned for a short time because they 
refused to surrender the keys to the Company warehouses., claimed they were 
sent to England on the annual ship Royal Prince after they had learned of 
hostilities between the two crowns. The royal officials doubted their story 
and kept pressing for the accounts., even threatening the factors with scme 
unnamed punishment. They eventually discovered that Company books and effects 
had been hidden by one Pedro Primo de Rivera, but a search of his house 
revealed nothing. However a considerable amount of Company effects were 
seized in Jesuit and Franciscan warehouses. 
Company property seized in Vera Cruz and Mexico included slaves,, 
considerable merchandise fran the annual ship Elizabeth and two other ships., 
the Neptune (Captain Alexander Gordon)., which brought 30 slaves and supplies 
from Jamaica, and the "canary" ship Herbert (Captain David Grenhill) with 
wine and run from the Canary Islands. 
13 Article xxxvi of the asiento, contract 
granted to the Company the privilege of sending aN 300 ton ship to the Canary 
Islands one time only for a cargo of run and wine. 
14 
The Herbert had a cargo 
of 300 pipas of run and 150 of wine. If these pipas were standard malaga, pipas 
(two to the ton), then the ship was carrying 225 tons. However the tem 
covers a wide variety of sizes., so it is uncertain how much the Herbert was 
actually carrying. The value of the cargo was estimated by royal officials 
at 87,000 pesos (on which by the terms of the treaty a duty of 12%. or 10., 440 
pesos., was due). Thus the value of each pipa, was 193 pesos 29ý reales, which 
corresponds to the value of a pipa of run seized frorn the Company ship Royal 
George in August 1720., which sold for 192 pesos 4 reales. This suggests that 
13. The Herbert arrived in Vera Cruz only two Months before the arrival of 
the order to seize British goods. WhY the ship was sent so late is inexplicable. 
14. The sam privilege was granted to Portuguese asentistas in 1697. 
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a pipa of unifonn size was used by the Conpany. 




Goods delivered to J. M. Carter and Pedro de Rivera 
to sell., probably in Oaxaca 
Goods taken from. the store of Juan de las Puentes 
Rum and wine on the Herbert 
For seizures at Campeche 
Goods contracted with Matheo Gonzales de Casio to sell 
Goods contracted with Martin de Gaycoechea to sell 
Unknown nuTber of slaves 
41 slaves at 250 each (These men were probably taken for 
work on military installations. ) 
Two boats 
Tackle, rigging, ropes, canvasses and litters 
Goods in Conpany warehouses15 
In addition to the above items a large quantity 















of money, flax and indigo 
shipped to Cadiz on two fleets (after the war had already 
ended): the one camianded by Balthazar de Guevara in August 1719., and another 
following canmanded by Femando Chacon. 
Table VIII 
Quantity Valuation 




Flax 59j765 2 oz. 
183s368-6-113-2 
Indigo (tinta flor) 76., 707 16 
Indigo (tinta sobresaliente) 3462111 8 oz. 4952436-4-n 
Indigo (tinta corte) 179,164 8 oz. 
678,805-2-19 
The cost of shipping the above items to Spain was 56,671 pesos 1 real 
2 maravedis, or 11% of the value of the cargo., and was calculated as follows: 
15. The effects in the storehouses consisted mainly of unsold woolens from 
the annual-ship Elizabeth. It was estimated that these goods would be 
worth 80,000 - 100., 000 pesos more if there were no flota in 1719.1 and 
if they were sold before being destroyed by weather and poor storage 
conditions. 
16. r1bis is the valuation made by Spanish officials when they restored the 




Item (in pesos) 
Freight charges 19., 8o6-4 
Insurance at 7% 352476-4-31 
Unloading, transport to warehouses and miscellaneous 
expenses lj387-7-9 
The total valuation of effects seized in Vera Cruz and Mexico was 
1,262,931 pesos 6 reales 28 maravedis. This does not include the 183,368 pesos 
6 reales 111-2 maravedis shipped on the two fleets., which was probably money 
received from the sale of embargoed goods, although it may have been money in 
factory safes. 
Slightly over half of the Coupany goods seized in Mexico and Vera Cruz 
were sold at public auction, bringing 396,139 pesos 4 reales 5 maravedis, 
with a camnission paid of 6,516 pesos 2 reales 4 maravedis. UAs includes 
170,328 pesos 7 reales 16 maravedis worth of unspecified goods to merchants, 
152,331 pesos 2 reales 7 maravedis worth of goods sent to Mexico and sold therej 
and 74,479 pesos 1 real 6 maravedis received from individuals who owed the 
Company money. The two ships were placed in Spanish service,, the Herbert 
probably as a guardacosta, and the Neptune with the armada de barlovento. The 
South Sea Coupany paid the owners of the Herbert E5., 000 for their loss and 
later demanded slightly more than this sun from the Spanish in repayment. 
17 
A dispute erupted over the sale of Company effects seized in Vera Cruz. 
17. Account of Company goods sold by royal officials, 15 June 1722, AGI, 
Escribania de C&nara 198A; Unsigned paper on Vera Cruz seizure., n. d.,, 
AGS, Estado 6851; To Pozobueno, 3 February 1721, AGS, Estado 6849; Lizeaga. 
to Philip V, 6,15 and 18 May 1719 and 20 August 1720,, AGI., Contadurfa 
895; Lizeaga and Messia to Philip V, 6 May 1719, AGI, Contadurfa 895; 
Real c6dula to the Marquis of Valero,, 23 October 1722., AGI., Ind. Gen. 
1601; Stanhope to Craggs,, 20 January 1721, BM3 Add. 22,520, f. 12; Duran 
to Valero, 23 September 1718, AGI., Contadurfa 812; Fran Charles Read3 16 
and 17 January 1719., AGI, Contadurfa 812; Account of goods seized in a 
Jesuit warehouse., 7 January 1719., AGI. 3, Contadurfa 812; Decretos by royal officials., 17 and 19 January 1719., AGI., Contadurfa 812; From Company 
factors, c. 15 January 1719., AGI, Contadurfa 812; A Particular of Sundry 
Effects Seiz1d under the two Represalias, n. d., PRO, S. P. 94/2473 f. 318; 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V., 16 and 31 August 1720, AGI., MkicO 
857; Real c6dula,, 21 May 1718., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2769; Measurement of the 
Herbert, 16 May 1718., AGI., Contadurfa 895; Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V3 21 and 30 Apr-11 and 6 may 1721, AGI 3 Wkico 683; Grenhill to Stanhope, 31 December 1720, AGS, Estado 6851. 
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It was the king's intention that they be auctioned where the seizures occurred. 
However the viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis of Valero, ordered them to be 
shipped to Mexico for sale there and in Puebla., explaining the order by saYing 
that the proceeds would be greater. The auditor in Vera Cruz., Andres de 
Lizeaga, expressed strong disapproval of the plan, citing the high cost of 
transport which included a 200 man escort., the damage that would occur to the 
goods en route,, and the poor seasonal weather. Lizeaga had no choice but to 
send the goods., although the Council of the Indies later berated Valero for 
having made a foolish decision and for having ignored the king's original 
orders. 
18 
The indigo that was sent to Spain was given to the king's creditors in 
lieu of cash at an inflated valuation; according to Stanhope about 20% above 
the price the Company could have received in the colonies. The creditors 
accepted this rate, he said, because they feared that they would remain unpaid 
otherwise. On the other hand, the price of indigo was usually higher in the 
metropolis because it was only available in the new world. The valuation 
given to it by the Spanish when they returned it to the Ccaparly almost certainly 
was not the inflated sale price., because the Company's own valuation was 
considerably less. 
19 
After the seizure the head factor in Vera Cruz, Charles Read., rwiained 
there to assist royal officials in making inventories of goods seized. Most 
other Conpany eiTployees., and the crews of the Herbert and Neptune., were sent 
to Mexico_, where they remained for the duration of the war. 
20 Read and another 
factor., John Newton., died during the war. Their personal effects were sold 
18. Fran the Marquis of Valero, 16 August 1720., AGI., Contadurfa 812; Fran the 
Consejo de Indias,., 11 March 1721., AGI., Contadui-la 812. 
19. Stanhope to Craggs, 5 February 1721, BM,, Add. 22., 520., f. 26. It is 
uncertain if the restored items were money or indigo of ccuparable 
quality. 
20. The Spanish spent 1,032 pesos to acquire 63 mules to transport the men 
and their provisions, personal effects, servants and guards. 
98 
at auction and the money returned to Spain with Fernando Chacon. 
21 
After the war the Company claimed that between 229., 237 and 243,793 pesos 
in money and effects were seized in Vera Cruz, and that the purchase price of 
flax and indigo was 8619634 pesos, making a total of between 1,090,871 and 
1,105,427 pesos. Again, because of a lack of documentation to support their 
claim., it seems reasonable to assune that the Spanish figures., which in any 
case are higher., are more accurate. 
22 
Based on the above figures, the value of South Sea Company effects., slaves 
and promissory notes seized during the first Mresalia was 2., 822., 524 pesos 
real-. Rds agrees very closely with the figure of 2 853.021 pesos given in 
a separate general account which has no breakdown by factor7.23 
A contemporary observer gave warning prior to the war that the Company 
would be "undone" if there was a war and Company effects seized in America,, 
because confidence in the Company had been diminishing and stock prices 
falling. However the form this undoing took was unexpected. The first 
represalia, occurred Just prior to the launching of the scheme that came to be 
known as the "South Sea Bubble"., and which led to the ruin of many prominent 
English families. The schem was initiated during the lull in trade caused 
by the War of 1718 when the Company was reduced to little mre than a powerful 
but inexperienced financial institution. Its experienced sub and deputy 
directors died early in the war., Bateman in November 1718 and Shepheard the 
following February., and the Company became even more exposed to financial 
manipulators who had played a large part in its management from the beginning., 
particularly one John Blunt., a Company director and a self-made., unscrupulous 
man. 
21. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V., 2 April 1721., AGI., Contadurfa, 895; 
Grenhill to Stanhope., 31 December 1720., AGS., Estado 6851. 
22. State of the first represalla, n. d.., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 659; Cuenta 
corriente de Vera Cruz y M6xico., n. d.., AGI., Contadurla 266. 
23. Raz6n de los que irrporta la represalia de los bienes de los ingleses 
hecha en Per<1 y Nueva Espalia., n. d.., AGI) COntadurfa 1507. 
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Inspired by John Law's financial exploits in France, particularly his 
scheme to take over the national debt (a scheme borrowed originally frcm the 
South Sea Corrpany's own assurrption of part of the government debt at its 
founding), Blunt concocted a plan to assme the entire British national debt 
of approximately L50,, 000., 000 (Z30., 000., 000 borrowed from the public at large 
and f20,, 000,000 from the East India CoTrpany and the Bank of England). Blunt 
saw the chance to make millions for the Company and fortunes for private 
investors like himself. Par value of Corripany stock was Z100; he wanted 
Parliament to authorize the Corrpany to issue E100 of new stock for every E100 
of annuity offered to them for conversion. Market value was then E128., but 
if, for exauple., it rose to Z300, and an individual holding E300 in government 
securities wanted to convert them into South Sea Coupany stock, the Company 
could issue three shares of Z100 each. But it would only have to give the 
creditor one of them, thus leaving two surplus shares which could be sold by 
the Conpany for f300 each. Of course everything depended on the stock value 
rising. 
The other directors were excited by Bluntts plan. More irrportant., it 
received the support of two influential men in government., Charles Spencer 0a 
Sunderland., First Lord of the Tý? eazury., and John Aislabie., the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer (both of whom received expensive bribes for their support). 
The proposal was altered to make it less objectionable to the Bank of England 
and to the East India Company., with Blunt now proposing that the Company convert 
only the E30,000., 000 that the goverment owed the public. The Bank still 
opposed the scheme., and presented a counter proposal to Parliament. After 
bitter debates (and the distribution by the Coapany of tl, 250., 000 in "rewards" 
to members of Parliament and others, including individuals very close to the 
Royal Family)., the Corrpany plan was incorporated in an Act of Parliament early 
in the Spring of 1720. In exchange for E7,500,000 to acquire the privilegei 
the South Sea Coripany would convert E30., 000,000 of the national debt., while the 
exchequer would pay the Company 5% interest on the new stock. This would be 
100 
reduceý to 4% In 1724. 
Ccmpany stock rose very quickly as soon as the public realized that 
Parliament would probably pass such a bill. Th propagandize the scheme rumours 
were spread that the asiento trade was to be restored and enlarged, that the 
king of Spain was willing to cede four ports in Peru in exchange for Gibraltar 
and Port Mahon, and that the South Sea Company were negotiating for trading 
rights in Africa. Hugh profits made by early investors needed no publicity. 
The boom, which started in March 1720., lasted for six months. Speculation 
became a national craze., with everyone wanting a part of the action. Investment 
was easy and there was great scope for gambling because shares were sold on 
credit, a concept almost unknown at the time. Furthermore., the entire venture 
had respectability because it had the support of the goverment, Parliament and 
king. 
The directors pushed Company shares to over F-1,, 000 by offering a series 
of attractive subscriptions to the holders of goverment securities, most of 
whan converted them into Coupany stock,, and to private investors. 
24 The boan 
a1so effected other joint stock companies., and dozens of new, mostly illegal, 
"bubble" ccapanies were established and stock jobbing schemes initiated which 
angered the directors because money was thus diverted that might be invested 
in the Caupany. (Even so, by this time the Canpany had taken in E8,500,, 000 in 
cash, and was owed a further P-60., 000., 000., although there may not have been 
that much money in all of Britain. It had still made no provision to pay the 
Z7,500,000 owed to governmeent. ) In June the Corrpany induced the House of 
Commons to pass a bill to prosecute joint stock companies that did not hold 
crown charters. Nevertheless money still flowed in considerable sums to 
irrportant chartered firms. So the directors saw to it that several firm with 
charters were closed. The stock in these outlawed fi rms dropped to almost 
nothing, and since many people who held South Sea Company stock also held stock 
24. The king made Z86,500 profit at this time by selling shares that he held; in appreciation he awarded Blunt with a baronetcy. 
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in these other ccnpanies., they were forced to sell Ccmpany stock to meet their 
obligations. On 17 August the Company stock was at Z900; by 28 September it 
had fallen to 9190. The bubble had burst. 
Abuse was heaped upon the king., who many believed was one of the architects 
of the scheme, and Parliament for having approved of it., but especially on the 
directors of the South Sea Company., the most obvious scapegoats under the 
circumstances. The House of Camons treated the directors roughly after 
Parliament convened in Decerdber., but at least they rejected a proposal to have 
them all executed. The four House members who were Corrpany directors were 
expelled from Commons, the directors were all forbidden to serve on the board 
of any major ca*npany., and those who held positions under the crown were dismissed. 
Furthermore the major portion of their estates were confiscated. John Blunt 
was left only Z5,000 of his f-185,, 349 estate., sub-governor Sir John Fellows 
z10,000 of E243,096, and deputy governor Charles Joye E5., 000 of E40,105. John 
Aislabie was expelled from the House and Charles Spencer Sunderland had to 
relinquish his post., although he was acquitted of charges of corruption. 
Sir Robert Walpole became both First Lord of the Tieasury and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. He had invested in South Sea Company shares, and had even 
urged others to do so., but he had opposed the scheme initially in Parliament,, 
and was the only minister looked upon as capable of restoring public confidence. 
Thus the tasks of cleaning up the mess fell primarily on him. Fortunately 
the panic had subsided,, Britain's foreign trade was sound, and the war with 
Spain was over. A plan was adopted in 1722 with the cooperation of the Bank 
of England to redistribute the Ccupany's surplus stock (which amounted to 
z83ooo,, ooo plus the E2., 000., 000 taken from the directors) among the stockholders 
on the basis of E33 for every Z100 of capital stock held. Shares were fixed 
at Z400. People who had borrowed money from the Ccmpany on the security of 
their stock could free themselves of obligations by paying 10% of what they 
owed., and by forfeiting their holdings. The plan was unpopular with the 
stockholders involved3 but the situation returned to normal and the COrITPanY 
I: - 
102 
turned its interest back to trade . 
25 
Partly because of their recent great personal losses., it was inportant 
after the war that the Canpany goods seized, or an equivalent value., be restored. 
Their losses also helps to explain the inclusion in their inventory of 
padded sums for items only peripherally related-or even unrelated-to 
26 the represalia, as well as an increased involvement in illicit trade. 
The war-ended officially on 13 June 1721 with the signing of the Treaty 
of Madrid; by a real c6dula dated 16 August Spanish officials in the Indies were 
ordered to return all goods seized from the South Sea Company. In the case of 
British effects sold during the war a sun equivalent to their value at the time 
of the seizure was to be given. 
27 Implementing these orders completely was 
inpossible because of the inaccuracy or sparcity of records. Proceeds from 
the sale of Company effects had been used in a variety of ways by royal officials 
in the Indies, or remitted to Spain where they were used to pay off crown 
debts and in other unspecified ways. Many unsold effects were damaged or 
spoiled, slaves aged and dead or ill, and promissory notes uncollectable. 
Money and goods dribbled back to the Company for the next 17 years,, but were 
never completely restored. 
Records relating to the restoration of Company goods are no more complete 
than those for the represalia. There are no records to indicate what was 
restored at Santa Marta, Santo Domingo or Puerto Rico, although records for the 
latter are almost certainly included in those for Cartagena, as they were for 
25. John Carswell,, The South Sea Bubble (London, 1960), PP. 76,89-90,103., 
153,239; Basil William,, 'The WhiE SRrermcy -176o (oxford, 1962). _T714 PP. 176-178; Virginia Cowles., The Great-Swindle: The StoEy of the South 
Sea Bubble (New York, 1960), ppe 82-83,86 893-9 92.1 94-95.9 119-120., 12b., 
128,135:: 1-32,138,141,151-1523 162-164,31723 175. 
26. Docunent concerning the estate of a South Sea Conpany director transferred 
to his brother and heirs., c. October 1720.9 Bodleian., Rawl. C. 4411 f. 118; 
Thams to the Duke of Mar., 12 September 1718,, HMC Calendar of Stuart 
Papers, vol. vii, p. 276. 
27. Real c6dula., 16 August 1721., AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Badillo to Philip V3 
28 February 1722., AGI, Contadurfa 1486; Aguire to Castelar., 2 October 
1721, AGI, Caracas 891; Fes to Grimaldo, 5 September, AGS, Estado 6851. 
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the seizure. 
By Spanish accounts 36,665 pesos were returned at Santiago, leaving 
14,926 pesos still owed, in canparison to the Company's claim for a further 
23,685 pesos. Similar discrepancies exist for all factories, and are explained 
by the difference in estimates of amounts seized, by Corrpany demands for 
payment for expenses and interest, and by the inclusion of sums unrelated or 
only indirectly related to the represalia. 
Of the amount seized in Havana a considerable sun., 10., 233 pesos 1 real, 
was allotted to factory maintenance. After the war royal officials restored 
9,864 pesos 61ý reales, of which 5., 264 pesos 5 reales were in cash., 1., 663 pesos 
7 reales in effects., and 2,060 pesos 5 reales in factory debts paid by the 
officials. However the Spanish and the Company agreed that only 14,413 pesos 
331 reales were seized originally. This suggests that the 256 slaves seized 
there were returned after the war., and explains the high cost of factory 
maintenance. All but 4., 548 pesos 5 reales were accounted for, according to 
Spanish records., and all but 5,424 pesos 231 reales according to the British. 
28 
At Cartagena 208., 420 pesos were restored or accounted for as follows: 
Table X 
kmunt 
'Item (in pesos) 
Cash paid to the factors for maintenance during 
the war 6,414-5 
Company debts paid by royal officials 6jO62-2 
For negroes indulted during the war 2., 266-5; 2- 
Cash restored 193,, 678-6k 
The amount restored is 28,, 000 pesos more than that originally seized., or 
23)000 if the 5,000 for the slaves seized in Puerto Rico are included. Either 
further seizures were made during the war., or when the effects were sold they 
brought more than anticipated. The Spanish said that they repaid all that 
was owed to the Company; the Company claimed that 35., 131 pesos 5 reales 3 
28. State of the first re2resalia 'I 
C. L., Shel. Vol. 43, f. 659; Part of a 
general account of the r22 salia, n. d.., AGI., Contadurfa 266; Governor of 
Havana to Philip V, 20 March 1722, AGI, Santo Daningo 379. 
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maravedis were still owed. 






Cash released fran Potosi 50,660 
Cash fran royal officials in Buenos Aires 39,411 
Fran the sale of hides 28 9 394-51-2 
Cash released fran Santiago de Chile 26,639-49ý 
Maintenance and various expenses related to the seizure 
paid to the factors 3,035-5 
By this account 57,642 pesos were still owed to the Ccrnpany. As usual the 
Company accounts differ. Originally they claimed that 268,651 pesos had been 
seized in Buenos Aires, but they later reduced this to 148,219 pesos, almst 
exactly what the Spanish returned. The vast differences in the Company figures 
indicates the unreliability of their_accounts. 
Company accounts for the seizure at Panam and Portobelo were equally 
confused. They originally said that effects worth 999,158 pesos had been 
seized, but later reduced this to 679,765 pesos 4; 2- reales. The Spanish 
inventory placed the figure at 1,175,527 pesos. The amount they said they 
restored was valued at 158., 241 pesos 6 reales. 
Table XII 
knount 
Item (in peso 
Cash 822422-4 
Salaries of clerks and sundry costs of the re 26., 670 j2resalia 
Paid to maintain the factors during the war 22,031-4 
Charges to transport seized goods to a warehouse in Panama 20,878 
Paid to maintain unsold slaves 39239-6 
Commission of ; e. on 600., 000 (reference unclear) 3,000 
Thus according to the revised Company claim 521., 523 pesos 41ý reales were still 
owed., against a staggering 917., 285 pesos 2 reales by Spanish accounts. Most of 
the money acquired in the sale of Company effects was spent on the kingdcmvs 
defenses. In January 1722 Governor Badillo was ordered 
to restore this money. Badillo replied that Panama's treasury was empty., but 
he promised to pay when the money was received fran Lima. 29 
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It is difficult to detenrdne how much of the amount seized in Vera Cruz 
was returned to the Ccapany, primarily because of the indigo that was shiPPed 
to Cadiz. However the indigo that was restored was valued at 495., 436 pesos 
4 reales 712maravedis, less the shipping costs of 56,671 pesos 1 real 2 
maravedis. The remaining amount due, therefore, should have been 767,494 
pesos. The Company claimed 820,589 pesos., but they included the shipping costs 
of the indigo and 22,222 pesos as their valuation of the Herbert. The Spanish 
said that they still owed only 501,341 pesos. Because of the lack of supporting 
documentation it is impossible to explain the discrepancy between the Company 
claim,, the Spanish claim., and the 767,494 pesos which would have been owed if 
the indigo was returned. The Marquis of Casafuerte was ordered to pay to the 
South Sea Company the value of the amount sent to Spain., but he replied in 
November 1723 that the treasury did not have enough money. Consequently the 
Canpany turned to Spain for payment. 
30 
The Spanish accounts for the first represalia state that 1., 361,641 pesos 
of 2,862,383 pesos seized were restored., leaving a balance of 1., 495,, 742 owed 
when trade ended in 1739; the British accounts give 1., 479,961 pesos restored, 
but are imprecise on the amount seized. However if the Spanish figure for 
seized goods is used then the balance was 1., 382,, 422 pesos. What emerges in 
reviewing the two accounts is that the Spanish were generally very thorough 
and accurate in making inventories of effects seized', but that they were 
extremely reluctant to furnish copies of these inventories to the British. 
29. Philip V to governor of Panama, 10 January 1722, AGI, Panama 116; Panwa 
royal officials to Philip V. $ 22 February 1722., AGI, Contadurfa 1486; Badillo to Philip V, 31 August 1722, AGI, Panama 129; Philip V to Panama 
royal officials., 21 June 17263 AGi., Panama, 116; A State of What Remains 
due to the South Sea Company from Philip V, n. d-3 PRO, S. P. 94/247,9 f. 316; 
State of the first M resalia, n. d., C. L., Shel. vol 43, f. 659; Memoir, 
Wescorrb to Pozobueno3 25 March 1725., AGS., Estado 689L 
30. Real c6dula to the viceroy of New Spain., 23 October 17223 AGI., Ind. Gen. 
1601; A State of What Remains,, cited above; Account presented by the 
sub-governor to the House of Camons on 5 March 1738, C. L.,, Shel. Vol. 
43, f- 545; South Sea Company to Pozobueno 25 March 1725, AGS . Estado 6896; Marquis of Casafuerte to Philip V., 24 May 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597. 
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On the other hand Conpany factors at the time of the represalia showed a 
pronounced lack of interest in the proceedings, never demanding copies of 
the inventories and seldom requesting thern, leading to troubles throughout 
the period of the British asiento contract. 
Table XIII 
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The Second Trading Period, 1722-1728 
When William Stanhope went to Madrid in 1720 to represent England in 
peace negotiations with Spain, he also carried instructions to renew the 
asiento contract previously held by the South Sea Company, and to discuss 
the restoration of Company effects seized during the war. As they had done 
previously with George Bubb, the directors offered Stanhope El., 000 in Company 
stock to ensure that their demands were well represented. During the 
negotiations the Spanish tried to use the asiento contract as a lever to 
secure the restitution of Gibraltar. In August 1720, nearly a year before a 
treaty was signed., the Spanish ambassador in London., Jacinto de Pozobueno., 
was authorized to give the Ccmpany permission to resum the asiento trade 
as it was prior to the war--if the British government would give up Gibraltar. 
Otherwise the Spanish threatened not to honour the Treaty of 1716; thus the 
liberal concessions conceded to the annual ships would be withdrawn, and the 
Company could lo, se considerable revenue. Stanhope encouraged the Spanish to 
believe that Gibraltar might be returned., but as a gift rather than as a 
negotiated concession. Previous treaties obliged Spain to permit the resumption 
of the slave trade and the traffic of the annual ships, and to honour the 
concessions granted in 1716. 
In fact the British had no intention of relinquishing Gibraltar. And 
eventually the Spanish negotiators abandoned hope of reacquiring the stronghold3, 
although they still refused to allow the asiento trade to begin until orders 
were issued for the release of Spanish ships seized by the British in Sicily 
in August 1718. They promised in turn to release British ships seized at 
Cadiz at about the same time. 
Orders to allow the resumption of trade had actually been issued on 12 
July 1720,9 but were not given to the British until a year later when Pozobueno 
received the British orders for the release of the Spanish ships. 
It is likely that the Spanish delayed the resumption of the trade partly 
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because they wished to see what, if any, repercussions the bursting of the 
South Sea "Bubble" in 1720 had on the trading capacities of the Conpany. 
Spanish agents in London reported every detail of news conceming this collapse 
of Conpany stock., and suggested that it rdght have serious consequences for 
British conmerce and credit. However the danger seemed to have dissipated by 
August 1721. News of the arrival in England of the first annual ship,, the 
Royal Prince which had been seized in 1718, and of its very profitable voyage,, 
calmed British nerves. Even more iinportant,,, the House of Canmons had 
exhausted its vengeance on Company directors after the crash,, and new directors 
had been elected to assume its management. 
1 
On 13 June 1721 British and Spanish negotiators signed a peace treaty; 
article two confirmed the asiento contract and the Treaty of 1716; article 
three provided for the restoration of all Con-pany property seized during the 
represalia, of 1718 or an equivalent amount based on values at the time of the 
seizure. This property included the Bedford and other ships., money., 
merchandise and slaves. Spanish officials in America were advised of the 
resunption of trade and ordered not to obstruct it. Francis Stratford 
replaced 1homas Bowles as the South Sea Company representative to the Spanish 
court., while Guillermo Eon returned to London as the Spanish representative 
to the Conpany. 
2 
1. Stanhope to Carterets 22 March 1724, BM, Add. 32,, 738., f. 136; Monteleon 
to Grimaldo, 25 July 1720, AGSs Estado 6843; Tb Pozdbueno, 12 August 1720) 
AGS, Estado 6844; From Antonio de la Rosa, 6 October 1720, AGS, Estado 
6828; From an unnamed correspondent., 11 August 1721., AGS, Estado 6846; 
From Pozobuenos 10 July 1721., AGS., Estado 6849; Grimaldo to Stanhope., 13 
June 1721, AGS, Estado 6844; From Pozobueno, 20 February 1721, AGS., Estado 
6847; Pozobuem to Grinuldo, 21 Noventer 1720, AGS, Estado 6844. 
2. Philip V considered the assigrrent of Robert Shee, anMiglisinan with 
strong Spanish loyalties., as a second agent in London. However it was 
ultimately decided that a second one was unnecessary. Minute court of 
directors., 27 July 17219 BM, Add. 25j500s f. 81; Philip V to Eons 8 August 
1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; Tb Pozobuenos n. d., c- July 1721 AGSs Estado 6828; Pozobueno to Grdmaldo, 28 August 1721, AGS3 Estado 6849; Tratado 
Particulars 13 June 1721., AGIs Ind. Gen. 2802; Real c6liLlia., 16 August 1721, AGI, Mdxico 863. 
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After royal. officials in Peru and New Spain were notified of the 
resumption of the asiento trade, the Coripany reopened factories in Havanaj 
Santiago de Cuba, Buenos Aires, Panama and Portobelo, Cartagena and Vera 
Cruz., and submitted a proposal-at Eon's request-to open a new factory in 
either Caracas or Maracaibo to supply the windward coast of South America. 
This was a response., perhaps, to the growing economic importance of Venezuela 
and to the labour need of its expanding plantations. But because the directors 
believed that the sale of slaves alone would be insufficient to pay the 
expenses of maintaining a factory there, they requested permission to introduce 
certain goods such as naval stores and flour to supplement the factory's 
income. Fearing an increase in the already extensive illicit trade along 
that coast,, the Spanish denied the request. Thus trade there remained in the 
hands of occasional Spanish register ships, contrabandistas, and the Company's 
licensed ships (not to be confused with the two special license ships, the 
Elizabeth and the Bedford., that sailed during the first trading period). 
Preparations in London to resume trade began with the hasty purchase of 
a cargo for the next annual ship. The galleons had sailed for knerica about 
a month before the treaty was signed, and the Company was anxious that their 
ship join thern in Portobelo for that year's fair. 
3 
Although relations between the South Sea and Royal African companies 
had never been entirely satisfactory., on 15 March 1721 they renewed their 
contract on the provision of slaves. At the beginning of the second trading 
period the Royal African Corpany were to deliver 3., 000 "Good, Sound, healthy 
& Merchantable Negroes., that want neither Liub nor Eye, nor have any 
Dangerous Distemper., Sore or Wound., Nor be Lame, Sick, Meagre., or Refuse"; 
2,400 were to come fran the Gold Coast., Whydah and Jacquin at E22 each, and 
3. Minute cam-dttee of correspondence., 11 JanuarY 1722, EM, Add. 25,9551) 
f. 66; Wescanb to Carteret, 27 July 1721, PROs S. P. 35/273 Part iij f- 88; Stanhope to Carteret., 14 June 1721,, BM3 Add. 22s520, f. 134; Real orden,, 12 July 1720, AGI, Ind. Gen. -2785. 
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600 from Angola at F-18/10.4 The remaining 1,800 slaves needed to fulfil 
the South Sea Company's contractual arrangement with the Spanish were to 
be purchased from private Guinea traders. Males were to comprise 2/3 of 
the total., females 1/3; 6/7 of the total were to be between 16 and 30 years 
of age, and 1/7 between 10 and 16--but half of these younger slaves were to 
be girls. 
5 
Shortly after signing their new agreement the South Sea Canpany accused 
the Royal African Company of failing to reach its quota of slaves. There 
was a shortage caused by an inadequate supply of slaves at their outposts 
in Africa,, competition frm private Guinea merchants., and piracy. However 
the Royal African Company justified their actions. If there was a shortagej 
they argued., it was created artificially by South Sea Company agents in 
Jamaica to increase their own commissions. These agents claimed that many 
of the slaves purchased from the Royal African Company were unsuitable for 
the Spanish market., and consequently sold them locally,, using the proceeds 
to buy other slaves from private merchants. Since they received a commission 
of 25 Jamaica shillings on each negro purchased in the Company's name., they 
were thus able to inflate greatly their income. 
Shortages were also felt in Buenos Aires., but for different reasons. 
Pirates attacked some Guinea ships, and the normal vagaries of transportation 
to the South Atlantic made it impossible to coordinate supply with demand. 
At other factories the scarcity was coupounded by an "over Nicety" in the 
4. There is a great deal of contenporary literature on the quality of slaves 
from various parts of Africa. The general opinion 
, 
in the first half of 
the eighteenth century seems to be that the best slaves came from Whydah 
and the Gold Coast. For a summary of this literature see Donald D. Wax, 
"Preferences for Slaves in Colonial Americall., The Journal of Negro History 
lviii (October 1973), P. 389-395. 
5. The actual duration of the contract between the two ecapanies was not 
specified, although the relationship did not last long because of the 
poor relations between them. Wescomb to Lym, 23 February 1721, Doman, 
Documents 11., 256; Agreement between the South Sea Corrpany and Roval 
African Kýany, 15 March 1721, BMs Add. 25,575, ff. 75-77. 
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selection of slaves. The directors suspected that the main cause of the 
shortage was collusion between their agents., contraband traders and Spanish 
officia. 1s. They concluded that the factors were guilty because so few negroes 
were seized by either the factors or Spanish officials for illegal entry. 
"Some of You are in Correspondence with the Private Traders, at the Expence and 
Ruin of the Conpany". the factors were told,, Ifor else You are Guilty of very 
Great Ignorance and Folly. " However some factors also complained of illicit 
trade, and accused British men-of-war of convoying these merchants to the 
Spanish Main. As a result of the supply problem the CorrParly received permission 
from the East India Corrpany to send ships to Madagascar to tap that source. 
6 
The Company calculated that they needed to purchase about 7., 000 slaves 
annually (1,800 for Buenos Aires and 5., 200 for the other factories) to meet 
the required 4,800 after losses through suicide, illness, shipwrecks and 
piracy. The schedule developed to fulfil these requirements was as follows: 
Table I 







4 quarterly 500 
6 bi-monthly 250 
2 bi-annually 200 
2 bi-amually 200 






Buenos Aires 1., 800 
Madagascar (details of - scheduled sailings to Madagascar are unknown) 
The records are incarplete, but they do show that this plan was not followed 
rigidly; buying depended principally on the availability of slaves. If a 
ship found no slaves in one part of Africa it moved on to others until a cargo 
was acquired. 
6. Directors to Rigby. and Pratter, 21 April 1725s BM2 Add. 25,564, f. lo6; 
Directors to Panama and Portobelo factors., 12 December 1723., BM, Add. 
25.. 564., f. 17; Directors to Cartagena factors., 12 December 1723., EM., Add. 
25)5643 f. 7; Agreement between the South Sea Company and Rigby and Pratter, 10 August 1722, BM, Add. 25,575, f. 79; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 31 March 1724,, BM., Add. 25. s564, f. 43; Directors to Carteretý 20 February 1723., Donnan,, Documents, 11,297; Batchelor,, "The South Sea 
Company", P. 185; Anon.,, A Defence of the Observations on the Assiento Trade., pp. 23-24; Anon.., An Answer Uu a Calumz-XV, PP. 34-35-. - - 
quarterly 450 
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or Buenos Aires 
Once the Guinea trader landed his slaves in Jamaica/his contractual 
arrangement with the Company was usually ended. The Company ordinarily hired 
small private sloops of between 50 and 100 tons to transport slaves from that 
depot to the factories on the Main and Cuba and to return the money and goods 
realized from their sale. A sloop could normally make a round trip voyage 
frcm. Jamaica to Cartagena in just over a fortnight., to Portobelo in three 
weeks., to Havana in a month and to Vera Cruz in just over a month. Frequent 
inspections were made by the agents and factors to insure that no private 
trade was shipped on these vessels. However this regulation was flagrantly 
ignored. 
The crews were granted the following monthly salaries: 
Table II 
First mate and doctor 
Carpenter 








Sloop captains had instructions to keep daily logs with inventories of 
effects delivered to and from the factories, salary payments., and accounts 
of provisions. As on the Guinea ships the health of the slaves was given 
considerable attentions although economic rather than hunanitarian motivations 
guided CoiTany policy in this sphere. Water was to be fresh, the ship cleans 
and provisions ample and unadulterated. Crews even had instructions to amuse 
the negroes during the voyage. If a slave died a death certificate witnessed 
by the captain and chief mate was prepared by the surgeon indicating the cause 
of death. 
The life of a slave was in far less jeopardy on the relatively short 
voyage between Jamaica and the factories than on the horrific "middle passage" 
across the Atlantic. While the weakest perished on that voyage, the survivors 
were rested to regain their strength in Jamaica before the final stage of 
their trip. There were fewer deaths from illness, and psychologically he was 
much better prepared for the second voyage after surviving the first. While 
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suicides plagued the Guinea trader, incredibly not one was recorded on the 
sloops. 
7 
The Company encountered the same legislative problems in Jamaica over 
the payment of duties on slaves irrported and exported during the second trading 
period as during the first. In 1726 the law was revised so that effectively 
the Company was taxed on negroes in transit. The new law declared that the 
entire cargo of slaves was taxable if any part of it was landed for sale. 
Flour imported by the Conpany was also taxed. Governor Portland, never 
sympathetic to the Company, and suspicious of their agents,, defended the 
passage of the act. 
I must Own that the Welfare of this Island., Answers their Objection, 
& Absolutely requires the diminution or restriction of that Latitude., 
for they Ustd to land all their Negroes brought in here for refreshnent., 
which Infected the Inhabitants,, with all their Malignant Fevers., Small 
Pox & other dangerous distempers., besides other inconveniences & dangers 
it expos'd the Towns to,, Common Prudence requirld that Effectuall Care 
shold be taken to prevent this.... 
Company officials failed, to obstruct the passage of the bill in Jamaica. 
They then petitioned the Board of Trade and Plantations, arguing that the tax 
was illegal and that similar ones had been annulled previously, and requesting 
that duties already collected be refunded. Between January 1721 and September 
1725 Company agents had paid E10,176 in Jamaican currency in taxes on slaves. 
Of this sum Z174/10/- (2% of the total) was paid on 419 slaves landed for 
refreshment only. The Board of Trade was less sympathetic to the Company than 
during the first trading period. The Corrpany had raised the price of slaves 
in Jamaica beyond the budget of most local plantation owners because of their 
policy of buying locally from private Guinea traders. This resulted in a 
labour shortage, and further damaged the sugar trade which was facing increasing 
coupetition from other islands. The Board therefore upheld the new tax with 
7. Directors to Toft, 5 March 1724, BM, Add. 25)567) ff. 23-25; Calculation 
of slaves needed, 20 May 1724, AGS 7017; Anon., The Trade Granted to the 
South-Sea Company, p. 18; Minute court of directors, 24 3t 1721) BM3 
Add. 25,500P f. 93. 
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one modification: slaves landed for refresIment only were to be duty free. 
8 Duties already collected from the Coripany need not be refunded. 
This did not end the dispute between the Company and the Jamaica assembly. 
In January 1731 another bill was passed levying a duty on the importer of 
10 shillings on each slave introduced, and 20 shillings on each slave exported. 
Like the earlier law, it stipulated that a cargo landed for refresh-nent only 
was still subject to an export duty if any part of the cargo was sold in 
Jamaica. The law was repealed in London, but the issue rose again in 1734 when 
a new governor., Heruy Cunningham, asked permission to tax all slaves brought 
to the island to raise funds to met government expenses until revenue could 
be raised by some other means. Before ruling on the law the Board of Trade 
asked private Guinea traders and the directors of the South Sea Company for 
their opinion. Their reason for objecting to the law unanimously was simple: 
they could not afford the tax. Government., however,, was -concerned that 
Jamaica's revenue was insufficient to meet the island's growing expenses; 
they feared an exodus of the white population if sane source of revenue was 
not found to expand internal and external defenses there. The question was 
whether the necessary money should be raised locally or come from. British 
subjects generally. They eventually decided on the former. Governor 
Cunningham was authorized to collect from purchasers a reasonable duty on all 
imported slaves., thus eliminating any destinction between private and Company 
slave traders. The decision to raise funds locally was made because England 
already maintained six companies of troops and a squadron of men-of-war in 
Jamica, and assisted in the maintenance of Royal African Company forts. The 
8. Certificate of slave duties, 27 September 1725, PRO, C. O. 137/162 ff. 
279-280; Portland to Newcastle, 8 February 1725, PRO, C. O. 137/52, f. 115; 
Hunter to Lords Cam-dssioners for Trade and Plantations, 16 May 1728, 
PRO, C. O. 137/173 f. 50; ChetWnd to the king, 7 November 1727) PRO2 
C. O. 138/17., f. 121; Case of the South Sea Canpany's duties in Jamaica, 
October 1727, PRO2 S. P. 36/3, part ii, ff. 177-178; Westmorland et al to the king., 31 MaY 1727., PRO., C. O. 138/17, ff. 71-73; Wescanb to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 6 October 1726, PRO, C. O. 137/16, f. 378. 
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remained 
tax on slaves/in force for the remainder of the period that the ConpaM held 
the asiento contract., and was not again contested by the Coupany. 
9 
The organization and management of the factories and the methods used 
in acquiring and selling slaves and merchandise changed little during the 
three trading periods. Wartime lulls in trade afforded the directors time in 
which they might have evaluated the factors I diaries,, journals and financial 
records with a view to improving the administration of the trade. Yet there 
is no evidence that they did so. Throughout the asiento the same basic 
courdttees hired and instructed CoTrpany servants., purchased merchandise and 
arranged for shipping, audited accounts and supervised miscellaneous financial 
transactions. Nevertheless sane changes did occur. While the CoTrpany 
reestablished its agency in Jamaica to receive and transmit slaves and to 
return cargoes., the agency in Barbados was abandoned as a depot, although two 
men were deputized to collect debts and settle Company accounts there. A new 
agency was established in Cadiz., with two resident British merchants., Nathaniel 
Herne and Samuel Pitt., appointed as agents there. Heme and Pitt were to 
manage the sale of Conpany goods sent to Spain rather than to England as 
proceeds from the asiento trade, and to negotiate the return of goods seized 
from the Corrpany during the war, such as cochineal and indigo., or for the 
receipt of money received in their sale. The choice of agents was poor. The 
two men were negligent in their duties and corrupt in their private business 
practices. They failed to request the return of the seized goods until 
Noverrber 1721., by which time most of the merchandise had been sold or destroyed., 
and the initial desire of the Spanish to accommodate the Conpany had been 
dissipated by the resumption of contraband trade and other practices contrary 
9. Fitzwater et al to the Lords of the king's Privy Council, 5 June 1735, 
PRO, C. O. 138/18, f. 9; Doaninique et al to the Lords of the king's Privy Council., 12 Decenter 1734, PRO, C. O. 138/18, ff. 3-7; Docrrdnique 
et al to the king, 2 August 1732, PRO, C. O. 138/173 ff. 184-186; Smith 
to the Lords Comdssioners for Trade and Plantations 2 PRO, C. O. 137/203 ff. 14-15. .9 
27 June 1732. 
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to the asiento contract. William Stanhope interposed to assist Herne and 
Pitt and got errbroiled in a peripheral dispute. The Spanish insisted that the 
Coupany was responsible for the freight costs of shipping the seized goods to 
Cadiz, and that these expenses would be deducted from the amount owed. To 
demand that the Conpany pay for the shipment of its own errbargoed goods was 
not only insulting, but expensive. However if the Coapany refused to pay the 
freight charges., the Spanish threatened to return the goods to their original 
place of seizure for collection there. 
10 
To avoid the general inconvenience and attendant costs of such a step., 
Stanhope proposed that the cargo be delivered to the Coupany innediately and 
promised to settle amicably the disputed freight charges later. His proposal 
was rejected. In March 1722 Philip ordered that 2,535 bails of indigo be 
returned to the Canpany,, but only upon paymnt of the shipping and insurance 
charges. Money remitted and the sale value of goods already sold in Spain 
were to be paid to the Cornpany from royal treasuries in Mexico and Vera Cruz 
because the armunt owed had already been spent and the Spanish treasury was 
in straightened circumstances. 
11 
Late in 1721 the Coripany came under the direction of a dynamic new 
sub-governor., Sir John Eyles. Eyles introduced financial reforms and was a 
proponent of energetic expansion, although his enemies said that he only 
succeeded in initiating unchecked corruption. Factors were paid camAssions 
rather than salaries, and allowances for medical expenses and the maintenance 
10. Cormle-rcial. treaties between England and Spain did in fact stipulate that 
effects or ships seized during a war were to be returned to the place 
of seizure-after the cessation of hostilities. This regulation adversely 
effected many private British merchants trading in the West Indies. 
Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763 (London, 1963),, 
pp. 26-28. -- 
11. Pes to Grimaldo, 24 April 1722,, AGS., Estado 6851; Frm Stanhope., 15 April 
17222 AGS., Estado 6851; Stanhope to Carteret., 24 Noverrber 1721,, EM, Add. 
2225203 f. 334; Stanhope to Carteret, 23 and 30 March 1722, PRO, S. P. 
94/91; Deputation of Herne and Pitt., 9 November 1721., EM, Add. 253575) 
f. 68; Power of attorney to Messrs. Withers and Mackeleur, 27 September 
1722, BM, Add. 25,575, f- 81; Standing orders,, 29 March 1721, BM, Add. 
25s581, f-1; Wescomb to Lynn, 4 April 1722, EM, Add. 25,556, f. 28. 
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of the slaves were established. These carrdssions and allowances (which are 
only known for three factories) were as follows: 
Table III 
Vera Cruz and Cartagena 
Com, nission Allowance 
5% on negro sales 1 real per day per slave for maintenance 
5% on returns 2 pesos per slave for medical expenses 
(This money paid for the surgeon's salary and 
for medical supplies. ) 
Panama and Portobelo 
Comnission Allowance 
5% on negro sales 2 reales per day per slave for maintenance 
2V. on returns 2 pesos per slave for medical expenses 
The smaller commission on returns at Panama and Portobelo, was probably due 
to the greater volume of trade there. Comnissions and allowances were 
undoubtedly similar at the other factories. Outstanding services rendered to 
the Company was rewarded separately. David Patton., for example., received a 
bonus of El,, 000 for looking after the factory in Vera Cruz during the war 
of 1718-1719.12 
While the method of payment was new., the selection and responsibilities 
of the factors did not change noticeably during the second trading period. 
No slaves were to be purchased fran private traders; paymant for Cmipany slaves 
was to be collected upon delivery whenever possible, preferably in bullions 
although sales by credit or in kind remained very common. Indultos were to be 
Specially restrained to Negroes Introductd before Our Assientos or 
during the Time of the late Rupture., it has a Great Tendency to 
Encourage the Private, and Destroy our Own Trade.... 
This last order seems to have been generally ignored by the factors. 
One indulto of particular interest was opened in Cuba in 1724 by Governor 
12. Directors to Rigby and Pratter., 21 April 1725, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 110; 
Minute conmittee of correspondence., 22 September 1721, EM, Add. 253551., 
f. 54; Minute court of directors, 20 June 1723., EM, Add. 25.5013 f. 70; 
Minute cornmittee of correspondence., 18 June 1723, BM., Add. 25)551, f. 75; 
Batchelor, op. cit., p. 166. 
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Carlos de Sucre at the request of the factors in Santiago. Over 700 slaves 
had been seized when the captain general of Havana, at the urgent request of 
the factors there, ordered the indulto halted. Governor Sucre said that 
they would have seized more than 3., 000 slaves if they had not been stopped. 
The factors in Havana made the request not because of the directors I orders., 
but rather because they were excluded fra-a the profits. 
13 
The management of most factories during the second trading period was 
inept and corrupt,, characterized by fraudulent practices and personal disputes. 
Conpany directors exclaimed that the factors' letters 
contain nothing else, but Railing and Accusations One against another 
of Great Abuses and Irregularitys., Committed and still Carrying on 
very much to the prejudice and Dishonour of the Conpany.... 
The factors at Panama and Portobelo, for example., presented bills for new 
furniture purchased at outrageous prices in Jamaica., house rent at a rate 
much higher than before the war., for repairs to the "Negrory" in Portobelo, 
and for other extravagant expenditures. They also couirdtted more serious 
frauds., even outright thefts. While "Settling his Cash" one factor "cryed 
out" when he found some money missing; but "he knew where to go and make it 
up,, and went presently after into the Mreasury roan [to help himself to] 
-Hankerchiefs full" of money. When accounts of such misconduct filtered back 
to London,, the directors instructed supercargoes about to depart for America 
on the annual ship Royal George to investigate the complaints. Their report 
indicated that many allegations were true. 
The factors cheated the Spanish govenmient out of revenues., breached 
the asiento contract in various ways., and defrauded the Company for personal 
gain. They shipped unmarked silver in violation of Spanish law., bribed 
Spanish officials,, and embezzled Company funds. About 12,000 pesos of unmarked 
13. Sucre to Arana, 4 July 1724,, AGI., Santo Domingo 359; Fiscal's opinion., 
28 May 1726, AGI, Santo Domingo 359; Standing orders, 29 March 17213 BM3 
Add. 25,581, f. 2; Varas y Vald4s to the Marquis de la Paz, 21 Decenter 
17253 AGS, Estado 684o; Minute court Of directors, 7 Noverrber 17231 BM., 
Add. 25,501, f. 123; Directors to Cartagena factors, 12 Decerrber 1723., 
BM, Add. 25,5642 f. 7. 
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silver was shipped frm Portobelo to Fana*aa in 1724; when royal officials 
seized it the factors explained lamely that it could not be marked where 
they purchased it., and then accused the officials of seizing it illegally. 
A similar event occurred in May 1725 when Company money was seized by 
royal officials between Mexico and Vera Cruz. Nevertheless the Spanish did 
relatively little to discourage the practice. Punishment meted out was seldcm 
harsh. Once when a mixed cargo of virgin silver and marked gold and silver 
was seized in Panama, rather than punish the factors the junta del asiento 
ordered that the marked metal be returned to them., and asked the directors 
to instruct their agents to refrain frcm such illegal remissions in the 
14 future. 
The indulto was also used fraudulently by the factors in Panama. They 
opened one after receiving a bribe from sane Spanish merchants in collusion 
with royal officials. The factors and officials then purchased jointly about 
100 slaves who were branded and sold in the Company's name., but for their 
own profit. 
New factors were quickly introduced into these activities-or bribed to 
keep quiet. One factor was away during the indulto in Panama., but given a 
share of the profits on his return to keep him quiet. He later denied any 
complicity in the plot, claiming 
That he was Ignorant of the Fact Itil it was out of his power to prevent 
it, and that he could not discover it when done without great 
Inconvenience to himself, and to the Conpany by Exposing the Officers 
concerned. 
Presu-nably he meant that it would benefit no one to report it-least of 
all himself-and that it might damage the prestige of sane direCtorS in 
London who were reported,, although without substantiation., to have been 
involved in the deal. Furthermore., bY remaining quiet the plot might never 
14. Sopefla to Grimaldo, 6 October 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Wescanb to Eon., 
29 October 1725, EM., Add. 25,566, ff. 73-74; Minute camlittee of 
correspondence, 25 September 1724., EM., Add. 25., 551, ff. 90-91; Directors to Bumpstead et al, 21 April 1725., BM2 Add. 25s5642 f. 102. 
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be discovered and everyone involved enriched., without apparent harm to anyone. 
Considering the difficulty of acquiring these posts and the initial heavy 
expenses, the contenporary mores and religious prejudices, and particularly 
the dangers to health posed by travel., disease and war, it is not surprising 
that most factors placed personal enriclinent above all other considerations. 
Of course these attributes were not limited to South Sea Conpany enployees. 
This mentality permeated private trade and government alike., and illegal 
business practices were nearly universal. Private merchants of many 
nationalities traded to Spanish colonies in the West Indies and South America., 
usually with the approval., and often with the support., of their own governments. 
nearly 
And yet/every dealing they had with Spanish merchants and officials was illegal 
under Spanish law. 
15 
When Jonathan Dermiss arrived in Panama he im-aediately discovered how 
profitable his new post might be when he was offered 1,000 pesos to keep the 
various illegal transactions there confidential. 
16 Denniss brought his family 
to the factory against regulations., and at Company expense. He received 
numerous gifts for his assistance in illegal activities, including a diamond 
ring from the governor of Portobelo for opening an indulto there. He explained 
that the indulto, was opened for the benefit of the Company, and that the 
little gift was merely a token of an old friendship. Later., at the request 
of the governor and royal officials, Denniss falsified accounts of the sale of 
negroes. He was eventually dismissed by the CoTrpany for foraing a partnership 
15. Directors to Panama and Portobelo, factors, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 
25,564ý ff. 14-23; Minute committee of correspondence and factories,, 
24 July and 9 August 1728,, BM., Add. 25,552., ff. 29., 32-33. 
16. Denniss was one of the most audacious of Company factors. He had once 
been a corsair., and then after becoming a factor became involved in a 
religious scandal. (See below., P-198 ) He was also the author of a plan 
to establish a British colony between Cartagena and Portobelo with the 
assistance of the Mosquito Indians of Nicaragua and Honduras. Fran Joseph Blanco., 18 April 1727., AGS3 Estado 6874. 
121 
with a merchant f! rom Jamaica to trade privately in jewels, toys and slaves 
on the Main. 
The directors, who acted in the same fashion on a higher plane (the 
South Sea Bubble, as the supreme example) , and thus understood the motives 
behind Denniss" acts, exonerated him of his numerous transgressions. They 
ccmmented that he could not have gained personally by falsifying factory 
accounts. On his denial of guilt they also dismissed charges that he took 
bribes in gem stones, jewellery and expensive clothes. The directors even 
expressed their "Opinion that Mr Denniss has not been So blameable in his 
Conduct,, but that he may deserve the Courts Favour in being Employd again 
in the Comp: s Service when there shall be Occasion. " As his assignment in 
Cuba was to prove later (See below, p. 193 ) this was an unfortunate decision. 
17 
Royal officials and Company directors alike seemed unusually receptive 
to believing the most unbelievable excuses and protestations of innocence of 
illegal activities by the factors. One factor,, Thams Blechynden., defended 
himself by exclaiming to the directors 
that my Youth., want of experience., and the powerful Exanple of my 
Representers to you., carried me into those Measures I am now ashamed 
of, more than any natural Inclination to Dishonesty or wronging the 
Conpany. 
The supercargoes also were reluctant to make accusations against the factors 
for fear of exposing their own crimes and those of high ranking British and 
Spanish officials. One supercargo., Catlin Thorowgood., told the directors 
"that should he mention Names and particular Sums to whom given abroad., it would 
be of very ill Consequence to the Company's future Affairs". 
The directors concluded that these factors had caused "great Prejudice 
to the Con4panyll,, and that they had not "learned the Art of ingratiating with 
the Spaniards"., but they let most illegal activities go unpunished. In fact 
the directors stretched the credibility of even the most willing Ccmpany 
17. Minute camdttee of correspondence and factories., 9 October 1728, EM, 
Add. 25,552, ff. 42-43; Minute comrdttee Of correspondence, 25 Septefter 
1724, EM, Add. 25,551, f. 92. 
122 
proprietor. For example they brought no charges against one chief factor 
in Panama., a Mr. Darrock., who had married a Spanish woman against regulationss 
and then embezzled 20,000 pesos and other property from the Company. Another 
factor, Richard Farrell, married a Spanish woman in Cuba and continued to trade 
there in slaves and merchandise when his employment with the Company terminated. 
The Spanish government was particularly concerned about marriages between British 
factors and "rich Spanish women". They considered it a threat to Catholicism 
and were worried that it was a ruse to learn the location of mines., trading 
patterns, population distribution and defense secrets. Because of their 
unwillingness to take action against infractions of the asiento contract,, the 
directors were suspected of profiting by these illegal actions, but evidence 
was almst impossible to collect because they were., in effect, their own 
judges. 
18 
Similar predicaments. and several unique problems- plagued the factory 
in Buenos Aires. By article 9 of the asiento treaty., it was to have received 
a plot of land close to the factory and suitable for cultivation or grazing 
cattle. However during the first trading period the royal officials claimed 
that there was no goverment owned land available. Consequently the factors 
purchased private land3 although they did not receive compensation from the 
Spanish until midway in the second trading period. Another problem which was 
also resolved, albeit with sane difficulty, concerned the 800 slaves that by 
article 9 could be sold to residents of provinces outside of Buenos Aires if 
within six months after landing they could not be sold to city residents, but 
for which the sales had to be made in the city. This restriction was lifted 
because merchants from the surrounding provinces were unwilling to make the 
18. Vara y Valdes to Orendayn., 28 February 1725, AGS., Estado 6866; Royal 
officials of Santo Domingo to Philip V, 29 June 1721, AGI, Santo Domingo 
410; Minute com-nittee of correspondence and factories., 17 July 1728, 
BM, Add. 25,5523 f. 28; Minute comdttee of correspondence and factories2 
25 September 1724., BM, Add. 25., 551., ff. 91-92; Directors to Bumpsted et 
al., 19 Novenber 1724., BM., Add. 25., 564., f. 78; Anon.., An Enquiry into the 
Misconduct and frauds pp. 10,53; D. TeMplernan., ýTLhEe Secr"etstor 
L735 1 of the Late Directors of the South -Sea Co any 
Undlon, 
IHMT5- 2 
c sro -e Lsr 'o 
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arduous, expensive and time-consuning journey to Buenos Aires. The factors 
were allowed to accompany the slaves inland., but not to take up residence 
or establish factories there. Each trip was limited to twelve months from 
the time of departure to the return to Buenos Aires. 
19 
Contraband trade was the most persistent problem in Buenos Aires. The 
Rio de la Plata was a traditional contraband route for trade to the lucrative 
markets of Upper Peru and beyond. Now the legal British presence in Buenos 
Aires gave a new stimulus to this trade. Foreign merchants and Coripany factors 
introduced illicit goods and slaves there for sale in Peru and Chile. Merchandise 
which had been purchased to barter for slaves in Africa and was not used entered 
Buenos Aires on the Guinea ships and was sold. Goods were also secreted on the 
150 ton provision ships during their regular visits to the colony. 
Aware of the possibilities of contraband,, the directors took several 
ineffective measures to curtail it. They ordered that the unused portion of 
the Guinea ship cargoes be locked in Spanish custom houses while the ships 
were in port and then returned to England. Ship captains were required to keep 
a log of the journey and given a bonus of f50 to see that none of the cargo 
was stolen, or that there was no illicit trade. This payment was given in 
lieu of the primage or an allowance for private trade. Crew members of the 
Guinea ships caught participating in illicit trade would be dismissed 
innediately from Company service. However the only effective checks against 
contraband were cargo inspections before leaving England and on landing in 
Buenos Aires. These inspections were also eluded by the falsification of 
certificates and the bribery of officials; large quantities of merchandise 
entered the colonies in this fashion. 
20 
19. Cornpany meznorial, 6 September 1722., PRO., S. P. 104/139; Grimaldo to 
Pozbbueno3 25 June 1725., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2804; Real c6dula, 5 August 
17253 AGS, Estado 6865; Directors to Buenos Ai7res factors., 15 January 
1724) BM3 Add. 25,564, f. 88. 
20. Instructions to Pease., 15 November 1723., BM., Add. 25,567, f. 1; Minute 
court of directors. 7 November 1723., BM2 Add. 253501, f- 122; Directors 
to Buenos Aires factors., 23 Januax-j 1723., BMj Add. 25., 564, f-3. 
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Crews of the provision ships were as successful as those on the Guinea 
ships in introducing illicit merchandise. More ships were sent out than the 
requirements of the factory demanded, their inventories including items which 
could neither be considered naval stores nor provisions. The case of the 
Tendrin was typical. The ship carried mirrors,, watches, books and other items., 
some of which were given as gifts to expedite sales. Royal officials in Buenos 
Aires were well aware of the various ruses used to carry on contraband trade 
and managed to limit somewhat these introductions. Company ships were 
thoroughly searched during the second trading period. In fact, the frequent 
seizures of contraband caused the factors to complain that the royal officials 
were overzealous and had seized some legitimate cargo. However their zeal 
was not misplaced. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that not one 
Coapany ship entered Buenos Aires without saw contraband on board. 
21 
Similar elaborate frauds were employed at the other four factories. 
Slaves., merchandise and provisions such as flour were smuggled into all 
factories for sale. Smuggling was easy for the II censed traders who were 
supplying slaves in the Bay of Honduras., the Campeche coast., the Rfo Magdalena 
and the Pdo de la Hacha. They were so successful., in fact, that supplying 
slaves became a secondary consideration to them. One licensee,, a Mr. Sissons., 
"Proceeded so far as to Settle a Factory at Puerto Rico in the Corrpanys Name 
ever Since the Year 1718". Another did the same thing in Caracas. In April 
1723 Sissons imported 48,825 pounds of flour, 765 flasks of run and 400 pounds 
of butter at la Guaira alone. later that year he received another shipment of 
2_, 800 pounds of flour., 50 barrels of salted meat., twenty of butter, four of 
cheese and three small boxes of candles. 
Curtailing the activities of these self-seeking Company servants was not 
21. Sopefia to Orendayn, 22 February 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Fiscal's report., 
23 July 1724.9 AGi3 Ind. Gen. 2803; Directors to Stratfor-d-3 If-February 
1724, BM., Add. 25,5643 f. 99; Directors to Buenos Aires factors., 14 
Decerrber 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Junta del asiento, 11 Septerrber 
1728, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774; Alzayban to FOzObueno, 3 July 17253 AGS) 
Estado 6864; de Studer, La-Trata de Ne Eno-S3 Pp. 208-209. 
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always supported by local Spanish officia. 1s. When the Company attorneys in 
Barbados asked the governor of Puerto Rico to help suppress the illicit trade, 
he seemed "Resolved to favour the Interest of these Imposters rather than the 
Company". It was difficult to stop Sissons and men like him because they often 
performed valuable services to the notoriously under-supplied Spanish coloniess 
and the profits made it worth the risk. 
22 
It is outside the scope of this paper to document all the litigation 
concerning contraband trade. Needless to say the problem often preoccupied the 
thinking of the junta del asiento. As noted above., while considerable illicit 
activity was overlooked or participated in., the Spanish did take steps to control 
it. Several examples are described in this paper. Note particularly the 
efforts by the Marquis of Castelfuerte., viceroy of Peru. In January 1723 
Castelfuerte ordered that no goods from the annual ships could be introduced 
into the viceroyalty until a decision on the subject was received frcm. Philip 
V. In response, on 3 December 1724 Philip V took the most effective measures 
yet against contraband trade. He expanded Castelfuerte's order by denying to 
all Company employees the right to journey inland to sell slaves or goods frcm. 
the annual ships. He confined the factors in Cartagena., Portobelo and Vera 
Cruz to their port residences,, ordered the factories in Panama and Mexico 
closed, and limited the number of factors at each post to six. 
The directors complained vociferously, and accused Louis I, who succeeded 
Philip V for a brief period of eight months,, of secretly annulling every real 
c6dula which had amplified the privileges granted to the Company by the asiento 
contract and the Treaty of 1716. Although there is no proof to substantiate 
this accusation., the directors were so insensed by the various obstacles 
hindering their trade3 including the failure to return effects seized during 
the last war, that they used Louis' death in 1724 as an excuse to stop paying 
22. Miguel Acosta Saignes., Vida de los esclavos nggms en Venezuela (Caracas, 
n. d. )., P. 34; Directors to Stratford., 1 Octobtý, r IY24, BM, Add. 2535643 
f. 63. 
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Spanish ministers and ambassadors (whose salaries came out of the king's 
asiento receipts) until their appointments were confimed by Philip when he 
resumed the throne. 
The serious difficulties between the Company and Spain led to the 
appointment of two Spanish commissioners to meet with Stanhope and Company 
representatives to discuss the disputes. The British hinted that they would 
be pleased to have the Marquis of Monteleon represent Spanish interests in 
these discussions., even if he was considered to be "a very indiscreet., hot & 
Chimerical Gentleman". No conference was actually held., but the Spanish 
acquiesced in Company demands, possibly because knbassador Pozobueno had 
learned through a generous outlay of spirits that if Company complaints were 
not satisfied that England might invade Cuba or attenpt to seize the galleons. 
The non-payment of salaries may also have influenced the Spanish decision., 
as might also have the desire to demonstrate the good will of the new., if 
familiar, king. 
Pozobueno informed the directors in June 1725 that the factories in 
Mexico and Panama could be reopened, and that factors could again sell slaves 
inland. Supereargoes were permitted to sail on the annual ships., which in 
practice lifted the restriction of only six men per factory,, and royal officials 
were told that the returns made by the Company from the sale of slaves could be 
in bull-ion or local products. At the same time the disputes over the quota of 
slaves to be sold in Buenos Aires., and the property question there,, were 
resolved. With this capitulation to Company demands, the efforts to stem the 
flow of contraband goods were largely negated during the second trading period. 
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23. Real c6dula., 10 Decerrber 1725., AGS., Estado 6865; Grimaldo, to Pozobueno., 
-- 25 June -1725i AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; Memorial signed by Wescorrb to Pozobueno., 
25 March 1725., AGS, Estado 
" 
6896; Po'zobueno to Grimaldo, 7 December 1724, 
AGS . Estado- 6P60; - Newcastle'to Stanhope, 25 March 1725s PRO, S. P. 94/96. % --f----17;, Stanhop6 to-Grimaldo., 4. -February 
1725, AGS, Estado 6865; Mansos to 
Louisý, 12 July 1724.,, 'AGI., 'Santa Fe 299; Real c6dula, 3 December 1724ý AGIA 
Ind. 'Gen . 2769; 'Real c6dLtla, 28' July - 
1723., AGI , 
-IRZ. Gen. --2805; Vara Y Vald&ýto Orendayn3--2&-Februar-y-F-1725., -AGS, Estado 6866; To Valero, 3 
---AGS, Ind. 'Gen'. 2785; Panama ro C -Deciýýber. 1724, yal offi ials, to Philip V3 10-ft 1725., 'AGI, Panama 144; Lwnbert to Marbais, 24 September 17243 AGS3 
Estado 6861; Pozobueno to Grima1do., 5 October 1724, AGS., Estado 6861; Orendayn to Grimaldo,, 8 December 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Pozobueno to 
Riperda, 18 April and 27 June 1726., AGS$ Estado 6867; Avero de Baff0s to Paz, 23 September 1726, AGS, Estado 6870. 
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A dispute between Spain and the South Sea Coupany that began early in 
the second trading period became a serious threat to the asiento trade. In 
Septenter 1722 Conpany factors in Cartagena were informd by royal officials 
that slaves introduced there must come directly from Africa. MAs decision 
was based on a strict interpretation of article 12 of the asiento treaty which 
stipulated vaguely that the slaves could be, introduced from Africa to any 
Atlantic or Caribbean port which had royal officials. The Cartagena officials 
made this move because some of the Company slaves coming from Jamaica were 
conpetent marksmený which had led to several deaths and consternation among 
potential buyers., and others were Protestant converts. 
24 Conversion to 
Catholicism was mandatory for all slaves in the Spanish colonies., and the 
priests were canplaining about the difficulties of converting these Protestant 
slaves., who were themselves proselytizing other slaves. Initially the junt 
del asiento approved of the ruling., which the king confimed on 18 May 1724. 
Immediately the directors protested that this was "equal to., if not worse 
than, an abolition of the Treaty". Unless it was abrogated they threatened 
to withhold the payment of all negro duties. They argued that slaves arrived 
frcm Africa ailing or exhausted and needed a period of rest and recuperation 
before being shipped to the Main. The Spanish accepted the justice of the 
Company position and lifted the restriction., although they stipulated that 
the rest period in Jamaica must not exceed 20 days., and that no ladinos be 
mixed with African slaves. 
Neither of these requirements were enforceable by the Spanish., and they 
had little effect on the Company's operations. Whenever there was a shortage 
of slaves ladinos, were purchased and sold by the Company. The governor of 
Havana complained about this practice in August 1725, and also said that the 
24. A similar situation existed in the British mainland colonies. British 
colonists preferred not to purchase the "seasoned" slaves who had been 
resident for some time in the West Indies3 believing that they were 
undesirable labourers. They had the reputation of being rejects: agedý 
physically handicapped., belligerent., refractory', and even violent and 
criminally inclined. Wax, "Preferences for Slaves"., P. 374. 
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Carpany regularly imported Protestant English-speaking slaves. 
The position taken by the Spanish had been, in fact, ur'nNeealistic., although 
understandable. The modus operandi of the Company had always been to use a 
depot for the cure., convalescence and recuperation of slaves after the "middle 
passage". Any other method of operation would have made the supply even more 
erratic than it already was., caused a reduction in revenue for the Company and 
Spanish crown alike., and encouraged illicit trade in Spanish colonial ports 
during the long intervals between the arrival of Guinea ships. 
25 
After war again broke out in 1727 the question of heresy awng slaves 
was revived. One Dr. Burnett testified that Coapany agents regularly mixed 
iTnpressionable slaves fran Africa with long time residents of Jamaica,, making 
conversion extremely difficult, 
26 
The records of this period give an interesting insight into the 
personalities of Company servants overseas. It is not a pleasant portrait 
They were poorly qualified, eccentric, indolent, quarrelsome and dishonest. 
Their dishonesty has been described elsewhere. That the factors in Buenos 
Aires at one time kept 76 personal servants well illustrates their indolence. 
The method of selection., the nature of the work., and the inherent dangers of 
life in the tropics all had negative effects on the factors,, most of wha-a 
were young and inexperienced. 
Contracts were normally signed for five year periods; frequent vacancies 
demonstrate that many factors were unable to fulfil their obligations. The 
main occupational hazard was disease. After an arduous and enfeebling voyage 
the factors discovered an almost equally hostile climate., poor sanitary 
25. Royal officials to Philip V, 18 September 1722, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2802; 
Junta del asientO3 23 December 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Orendayn to 
Marquis of Lede., 18 May 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Varas y Vald4s to Paz, 4 August 1725, AGS., Estado 6840; Fiscal's opinion., 13 Decerrber 1723, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Directors to Stratford., 17 June 1725, EM, Add. 
25. s564, ff. 113-114; Real c6dula " 28 July 17253 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Wescanb to Newcastle 17 June 1725., PRO3 S. P. 94/96, f. 108; Newcastle 
draft to Stanhope, 24 June 1725, PRO, S. P. 94/963 f. lo4. 
26. Burnett testimony on Canpany transgressions., 15 Februar-i 1729., AGS3 Estado 1717. 
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conditions and an unfamiliar diet. Malaria, yellow fever, dysentery., cholera 
and other diseases all took their toll. The directors seemed oblivious to 
these problems., taking no steps to alleviate them either through the process 
of selecting factors or the irnprovement of diet or sanitary conditions. 
27 
An interesting account of the psychology and behaviour of Company 
servants was written by James Houstoun., the surgeon in Cartagena during the 
second trading period. Houstoun 
did not find any of our Factors with the least Tincture of a Gentleman 
in him., except one., and he was over-born (or, as I may rather say, 
over-laid) by a termagante, Billingsgate Woman. 
Their backgrounds were varied. 
You'll find a Bacallao Merchant amongst the principal Factors,, because 
he can talk a little Spanish; --a mere Tarr., bred before the Mast, 
because he has a Friend in the Court of Directors., that makes a bawling 
Noise in it, and will be heard; --a broken Tradesman because he is 
represented as an Object of Charity., and must be provided for out of 
Compassion; --a young Gentleman., who has been at the Academy. and learnt 
to ride the Great-horse, dance., &c. because he is recommended from Court; 
with Etceteras in abundance! 
Their manners., particularly repellant during meals, and vocabulary, of "very 
low Expressions; which they temed Freedom and IAberty of Conversation", were 
equally disturbing to Houstoun. He also remarked on the animosity they 
harboured towards each other and their relaxed business practices. "I was 
under no Restraint or Subjection., " he said., "farther than to mind my Business". 
Consequently he spent much of his time in local Spanish society, especially 
with the women, for whom he wrote plays satirizing his fellow factors. He was 
fond of the "cunning., subtile., and sagacious" Spaniards., especially the 
28 governors who were "generally Men of good Sense and Penetration" . 
27. Directors to Panama and Portobelo factors., 18 June 1724, EM, Add. 25, %564.1 f. 55; Minute conraittee of correspondence., 24 April 1724, EM, Add. 25,551., 
ff. 88-89; Directors to Buenos Aires factors., 23 January 1723, EM, Add. 
25,5643 f. 3. 
28. Dr. Houstoun's Memoirs of his own Life-Time (London, 1747). Pp. 157-1593 
173-174. When war broke out in 1727 Houstoun and the other factors were 
detained as prisoners for several months before being sent to Jamaica. 3 where he remained for 12 months prior to sailing for England. During 
this time he received his salary from the COTVany and supplemented it by trading illegally to the Main. Ibid., pp. 172-173. 
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The Conpany, which was greeted with hostility from. Jamaica merchants 
during the first trading period., did not find their reception greatly improved 
in the second. During the war of 1718 merchants in Jamaica and elsewhere took 
advantage of the South Sea Company's inactivity to deliver merchandise and 
slaves to the Spanish colonies wherever it was possible to elude the guardacostas. 
Houstoun,, who was involved in this trade during all three wars which interrupted 
the asiento trade (1718., 1727 and 1739)., described this method of illicit 
commerce. Five or six sma-11 vessels belonging to different traders were 
convoyed to the Main by a British man-of-war in exchange for 12vo of the 
profit on the sales. The merchants attempted 
to under-sell and undermine one another., at any dirty, low Rate., or even 
by Tricking, and the cunning Spaniard all this while slips no Opportunity 
to improve that Strife to his own Advantage; so that the Price of every 
Thing were reduced.... 
These merchants were "a Burlesque., a synonimous, Tem for Pedlars'l., and as for 
the Jews., who "have a larger Share of Trade than the Christians in Proportion 
to their Nurrber", they 
were the worst Set of Rogues that ever I knew., in the whole Course of 
my Life; a Set of meer low-life Thieves, (as bad as the Negroes themselves) 
who are all naturally Thieves7 the meaner-Part of whom held a strict 
Correspondence with allIthieving Negroes., from whom they received ... stolen Goods. 
on the other hand, Houstoun, greatly respected the Jesuits: the "greatest 
Traders in the whole Spanish West-Indies". In fact when he was a factor in 
Cartagena he "always made use of the Colle e of Jesuits to deposit what 
contraband Goods I introduced". 
Any expectations the private British merchants had for a substantial 
increase in the volume of their illicit trade were disappointed for several 
reasons: there was a voluminous stock of unsold merchandise introduced by the 
annual ships in warehouses on the Main., Dutch and French traders offered strong 
conpetition3 and the Spanish market was never as large as anticipated. British 
merchants trading to the West Indies from Cadiz and Seville also suffered 
during the war. The fleets did not sail so their stocks remained unsoldý 
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incurring interest and storage costs as well as damage, pilfering and 
spoilation. 
29 
Governor Sir Nicholas Lawes of Jamaica feared that once the war ended 
many unemployed sailors and disgruntled merchants would turn to piracy if sane 
legal. employment could not be found for them. Since there was little work 
available locally, he recommended that they be employed as logwood cutters in 
Campeche and in the Bay of Honduras-a suggestion that would not have been 
popular with the Spanish and which was never sanctioned officially,, although 
many men did become involved in this trade., and in which the South Sea Company 
played a minor role 
ýO (See below, p. 210) 
Harmony between the Company and Jamaica was eroded by an odd incident 
involving the French schooner Esperance, owned and mastered by Captain James 
de Neunaine. The ship was hired by the Havana factors,, Messrs. Nicholson and 
Calder, to transport a cargo of snuff . hides and tallow to Mississippi for sale 
there. In December 1722 the Esperance arrived in Mississippi where it remained 
for three weeks without making any sales,, then sailed to Hispaniola to try to 
dispose of the cargo there. En route it was seized by a Spanish guardacosta 
and taken to Puerto Principe in Cuba; the crew were incarcerated and the cargo 
partially plundered. About three weeks later the ship, crew and remaining 
cargo were released through the efforts of the factors. An English captain 
and crew were hired to replace the French., and the ship sailed to Jamaica 
with its cargo now consigned to the Company agents there. This time the 
vessel was seized by H. M. S. Winchelsea on the charge that it violated the 
navigation acts. The ship and cargo were embargoed. The attorney general in 
29. Houstoun's MemoLrs3 pp. 198,2183 223-224,2273 315; Stanhope to Townshend, 
17 March 17213 BM., Add. 22,520, f. 50; Gisas de Calderon to Philip V, 
25 January 1720, AGI3 Santo Domingo 378. 
30. Lawes to Lords Comnissioners for Trade and Plantations, 6 December 17193 
PRO3 C. O. 137/133 Part 13 f. 190; Lawes to Lords Comnissioners for Trade 
and Plantations, 24 August 1720., PRO3 00 137/13, part ii, f. 265; I-awes to Lords ConTrdssioners for Trade and Plantations, 28 August 17213 PROý 
C. O. 137/143 f. 63. 
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Jamaica ruled that the navigation acts had indeed been violated; the vessel 
was foreign and therefore not permitted to use British ports. On the basis 
of this opinion the vice-admiralty high court condemned the goods., and ordered 
them sold at public auction, the proceeds to be distributed equally between 
King George I., the Duke of Portland (governor of Jamaica), and John Manley,, 
seizer and informer. 
31 
At about the same time the Chandos, a Royal African Company slave-ship, 
was also seized and condemned in Jamaica. The owners of both vessels appealed 
the decisions of the vice-admiralty court., and a bitter feud broke out between 
the Duke of Portland, whose hostility to the Company was legend and who was 
determined to uphold the court ruling, and the owners., who attempted to 
mobilize public opinion against the decision. 
32 Portland accused the South 
Sea Corrpany agents and factors of using the Esperance to carry on a clandestine 
trade for their own personal gain. To support this claim he cited the case 
of Mr. Dalzell, the factor who had arranged for the English crew to man the 
Esperance. Dalzell had arrived in Jamaica the year before under similar 
circumstances and had persuaded Portland to permit the sale of goods which 
belonged to him because of financial hardship. He then landed and sold for 
a substantial profit a great deal more merchandise in contravention of the 
navigation acts. 
33 
After the cargo of the Esperance was condemned,, the Campany agents 
requested that their appeal be heard before the proceeds were distributed. 
The judge of the vice-admiralty court in Jamaica refused to grant a delay, but 
he was equally reluctant to distribute the proceeds of the sale when Portland 
31. Sworn statement by Captain de Neunaine enclosed in Portland's of 13 July 
1724, PRO. c. o. 137/15, f. 13; Rigby and Pratter to Portland., 22 February 
1723s PROs C. O. 137/15s f. 6; Opinion of Attorney General William Monch., 
18 March 1723., PRO, C. O. 137/15, f. 15; Court proceedings, 1 March 1724., 
PRO., C. O. 137/15., ff. 87-88,91. 
32. Portland was ruined financially by the collapse of South Sea Cornpany 
stock. 
33. Portland to Lords Comnissioners for Trade and Plantations . 13 JulY 1724, PRO, C. O. 137/15, f. 2. 
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asked for his share. Consequently he was discharged on the grounds that 
he was under the influence of Conpany agents and replaced by a more pliable 
judge. However when the new judge ordered that the payment be made, the 
officers of the court (a provost marshall and a register) refused. Portland 
had them arrested, exclaiming that they had "attempted upon Encouragement to 
ridicule his proceedings., to execute the decrees According to their own 
Judgements., as far as would best serve their private purpose and no further". 
They were released soon afterwards when they promised to pay the money. 
So ended "a very strange Scene". The "Seizure and Condemnation of these two 
Ships has raised a greater Combustion in the said Island., than any incident 
that has happened there for a long time .... 11 
Shortly afterwards., on 4 July 1726., the Duke of Portland died., and was 
succeeded by Major-General Robert Hunter., who viewed the Company with greater 
tolerance. Portland was overzealous in pursuing the Company agents through 
the courts, and in refusing to hear an appeal on the decision. Unquestionably 
his erudty can be traced to the bursting of the "Bubble" in 1720 and his 
subsequent "exile" to Jamaica. 
34 
Grievances between the Courpany and the Spanish disturbed their relations 
throughout the second trading period. Many of these., such as illicit trade, 
administrative complaints., fraud., bribery and various contraventions of the 
aziento treaty were camionplace., as were incidents involving the illegal 
transport of Spanish passengers and funds to Europe,, the latter were so 
numerous., according to one official, that they threatened to destroy Spanish 
34. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, 
-'P. 
195; An Answer to 
some Complaints insinuated against the Duke of Portland , RO., ., c. 
1725, P 
C. O. 137/52, ff. 290-291; Ayscough to Lords Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations., 14 July 1726,, PRo, c. o. 137/16, f. 275; Portland to Lords 
Cam-dssioners for Trade and Plantations., 12 April 1725., PRO2 C. O. 137/16., 
f. 90; General Account of the Behaviour of the Duke of Portland, C. 17259 
PRO, C. O. 137/522 ff. 208-232. 
Hunter assumed his duties in 1727. During the interim the goverment 
was presided over by John Ayscough, president of the Jamaica colincil. 
Joseph Haydn,, The Book of Dignities.... (London, 1851), p. 275. 
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trade. A typical example of the conveyance of Spanish passengers occurred 
in 1725. Captain Williams of the Syria was convicted and fined 6,000 pesos by 
royal officials for boarding Spaniards in Buenos Aires (although he claimed 
that they were Portuguese subjects who had embarked in Brazil). 
Another case., concerning the shipment of money., involved two British 
men-of-war., the Mermaid and the Nonsuch. A Spanish merchant conspired with 
Coupany factors to ship 168,657 pesos to England in order to avoid taxes. 
When the Spanish learned of the incident they demanded that the money be 
confiscated., and that everyone involved be punished. However evidence was 
never easy to obtain under these circumstances., and the Canpany denied that the 
incident had occurred. 
Coupany factors and ships' crews were obviously unwilling to provide 
evidence about their own or others illegal activities. Spanish merchants who 
remitted goods or money to England did so secretly as did Spanish passengers 
who traveled on Canpany ships. Spanish officials could do little about it 
after the departure of the ships., because the British were unwilling to turn 
them over to the Spanish since no English law had been broken and the business 
was profitable. There is no indication that the Conpany ever seized any 
money or effects remitted in this way., or that the English government ever 
deported foreigners travelling on Company ships. 
The Company assisted colonial Spanish merchants in avoiding taxes in a way 
that was even more damaging to Spain's mercantile policy. They established 
throughout Spanish colonies in America a network of about 100 small banks 
through which they issued letters of exchange at 8%,, promising to pay the 
customer his money in Spain within 90 days. They accepted virgin, or unmarkeds 
silver_, which meant 5% savings i: =Lediately in duties to Spanish merchants., 
who also saved approximately another 15% because of the heavy taxes levied 
on money and bullion shipped on the fleets. It was suggested that there was 
not a Spaniard in the Indies with relatives in the metropolis who would not 
have taken advantage of remitting money in this fashion, since the risk of 
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getting caught was so small. Although no proof was discovered,, it was said 
that the merchants of Cadiz and Seville were also involved. They supposedly 
issued secret orders to their agents in knerica to remit the major part of 
their returns on Con-pany ships to England., where it would be invested or 
smuggled into Spain. 
35 
The tension that had developed between the Company and Spain by 1726 was 
combined with a growing tension between the two crowns. mainly as a result 
of Company and private trading practices in America. In March Philip V ordered 
his governors in America to make reprisals against British merchants there 
if they continued to break the law by trading on the Main. A year later., on 
27 March 1727, war was declared; Company effects were seized and employees 
arrested., just as had happened in 1718.36 
35. Consulado of C6diz to Arafta, 16 November 1723s AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Junta 
del asiento, 15 Decefter 1722s AGS, Estado 6858; Varas y Vald6s to OrendaYns 
29 February 1725, AG3., Estado 6866; Anon. letter, 20 January 1725, AGSs 
Estado, 6862; Balzar to Orendayns 19 October 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; 
Resumen de los acuerdos de los comercios de Sevilla y Ckiz., c. 1722, 
AGIs Ind. Gen. 2726; Blanco to Corobarrutia, 19 September 1726s AGI, 
Ind. Gen. 2804; Cartagena royal officials to Philip Vs 20 July 1729s 
AGIs Santa F6 450; Vera Cruz royal officials to the crowns 11 August 
17243 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804,; Blanco to Corobarrutia, 12 October 1724, AGIs 
Ind. Gen. 2803; Sopefia to Grimaldo, 6 October 1725, AGS, Estado, 686o; 
Rudge and Eyles to Newcastle., 10 December 1724s BMs Add. 25,556, f. 59; 
Grimaldo to Stanhope, 21 Noverrber 1724., BMs Add. 32,7413 f. 292; Wescomb 
to Eon, 6 October 1726, BMs Add. 253556, f. 92. 
36. Stratford to Paz, 20 March 1727s AGS., Estado, 6873; Real c6dula,,, 29 March 
1726s AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597. 
The causes of the war in 1727 in Europe and the West Indies have been 
well studied by several authors, which is Why no further detail is 
provided here. See particularly Horsfalls "British Relations"s pp. 134-158. 
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Chapter VII 
The Second Represalia, 1727 
The order of 27 March 1727 to seize all South Sea Company and other British 
property in the Spanish colonies was similar to the one issued for the first 
represalia in 1718: All Company factors were to be placed under house arrest 
and then expelled from America after a detailed inventory of confiscated 
Coupany property was compiled in the presence of Company representatives. 
British and Irish Catholics were exempted from the represalia. Company factors 
had standing intructions from the directors to obtain copies of inventories made 
by the royal officials in case of seizure so that the infomation would be 
available for negotiations over their restoration. However few such copies 
were acquired. The factors in Cartagena claimed that the royal officials there 
refused to give them copies of the inventories. The directors were further 
handicapped in making claims for seized goods by sketchy or lost accounts. The 
books for Panama. and Portobelo for 1723-1727 were incomplete, and several 
were lost during the seizure., as happened also in Buenos Aires. 
1 
What was substantially different about the second represalia. was the 
experience gained from the first. Upon hearing the first rLzmurs of hostilities 
many factors sent their account books and effects to Jamaica or secreted them 
with sympathetic Spaniards. Royal officials were aware of the tactics used by 
the factors in the first represalia to avoid confiscation, and took their own 
precautions to impede them. On receiving the reprisal orders., in July 1727., 
the viceroy of New Spain., the Marquis of Casafuerte., issued an edict, offering 
a reward of 10% of the value of any goods or money discovered which belonged 
to the Company or to other British subjects. Persons concealing British goods 
were liable to confiscation of their property, 10 years imprisonment,, and 
banisbment from the kingdom. 
1. Real c4dula., 27 March 1727, AGI., Ind. Gen. 1597; Unsigned memo., probably by 
Burrell, n. d.., C. L.., Shel. vol. 43s f. 1; Minute com-nittee of correspondence) 12 Decenber 1728., EM2 Add. 25,552, f. 49. 
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Captain Williams of the annual ship Prince Frederick., who was himself 
arrested., commented that Spaniards were rushing to their priests for advice. 
He told the Conpany directors that the priests 
encourage them to discover all things; So that what with Excamwnication 
and Confiscation,, I fear most Persons will be frighted into a Corpliance 
and to forsake their Confianzas; so that in my Opinion your Affairs will 
fare but indifferently amng them. 2 
The severity of the represalia varied from place to place., and was 
dependent to sow extent on the personal relations between the factors and 
royal officials. However the threats of excommunication and imprisonment were 
effective. The Company's financial loss almost equalled that of the first 
seizure. 
3 
In view of the early knowledge the directors had of the diplomatic crisis 
prior to the war, it is difficult to understand why they did not order all 
factors to clear merchandise and slaves as, quickly as possible and remit all 
money and remaining effects. Even considering the slowness of communications 
they had sufficient time to do so; the two nations were on the verge of war 
for a year before its outbreak. 
The reprisal orders reached all ports in America by late July or August, 
except Buenos Aires., where it arrived in September. The seizures began 
immediately. Amounts seized were sizeable at established factories,, but small 
or nonexistent at ports visited by ships under license from Company agents in 
Jamaica and Barbados. Royal officials found only 20 barrels of Coripany flour 
in Puerto Rico, worth 320 pesos. Two ships were seized at Santo Domingoj the 
Loyal Thomas,., Captain Thomas Sommers,, and the Maria, Captain Samuel Spefor., 
and several items from the ships, including six cannons., eight barrels of r=, 
2. Extract Williams to directors, 9 August 1727, PRO, S. P. 36/2, ff. 129-130; 
Proclwnation of Marquis of Casafuerte,, 28 July 1727., PRO., S. P. 36/6, part 
13 f. 8; Wescanb to Rigby and Pratter, 9 February 1728,, BM, Add. 25)566, 
f. 14. 
3. Because of the great losses suffered due to the represalia, the directors 
decided in February 1728 to limit the dividend paid to Ccapany shareholders 
for 1727 to 2%. Anon. letter, 9 February 1728, AGS, Estado 6877. 
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five pistols and 16 rifles., and several hundred barrels of flour. Ninety slaves 
were seized.,, plus a number of things from the house of the Company factor, 
Robert Galbraith, including clothing, furniture, 177 hides., some hams., a horse 
and a burro and the Company's correspondence and sale book. Of the items seized 
439 barrels of flour were sold for 7,850 pesos 3 reales 12 maravedis (an average 
of 135 pesos 7 reales each). 
4 
The Marta. a Ccrmany ship from Curagao, was seized at Maracaibo. Besides 
provisions, its cargo, acquired from the sale of 50 slaves, included: 
Table I 
Estimated value 
Item (in pesos) 
22., 000 pounds of Brazil-wood 
419 hides 628 
2 975 pounds of tobacco 223 
24 millares of cacao (between 84 and 96 pounds) 
1 caldero of copper 
This cargo was sold by the Spanish for a net price of 1,496 pesos 7 reales 
4 maravedis., less than 30 pesos a slave. IIhe low proceeds might be explained 
in several ways. Royal officials might have received "kickbacks" from buyers 
which were unrecorded, or perhaps there was money on the ship that was seized 
and not recorded,, or which was hidden successfully by the crew. One can reject 
the possibility that the slaves were of such poor quality as to warrent the 
extreinely low price. The 50 slaves represented only 24 2/3 piezas de indiasi 
yet their sale price would still have been 130 or 140 pesos each. 
5 
The sale of confiscated Corrpany effects in Caracas brought 8,560 pesos 











Public sale of 22 slaves 
71 rmles and one horse sold 
Two pair oxen and 140 head of cattle 
Collected fran three debtors to the Canpany 
From the sale of 791 pounds of lead 
From Joseph de la Plaza 
4. Francisco de la, Rocha. Ferrer to Philip V. 3,3 August 1727., AGS, Contadurfa, 1068; M6ndez to Philip V3 26 June 1727., AGS., Contadurfa 1086; Frm Rocha 
Ferrer., 22 April 1729., AGI . -Estado 9, ramo 1; List of embargoed goods at Santo Dcmingo., 24 July 1727, AGI., Estado 9., ramo 1; Certificate from Santo 
Daningo royal officia. 1s., 29 July 1727., Estado 9, ramo 1. 
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Effects confiscated from the household of the chief factor,, Sarmel Colet., and 
his assistant, included: 52 slaves., 344 hides., 35 sheep., 37 litres of seeding 
corn, 75,800 pounds of Brazil-wood., 11 mules, 2 iron hoops., 3 spades, 2 pruning 
hooks., 2 axes, 3 casks of wine., and 27 barrels of gunpowder. None of the items 
taken from the factors was included in the represal-ia inventory, and it is 
unknown what became of them. 
6 
After the seizure at Cartagena the factors were sent to Jamaica., and 
then ordered by the Conpany to take to London all books and accounts they had 
of the factory's transactions. As elsewhere royal officials in Cartagena refused 
to give them copies of the reprisal inventories. Furthemore the original 
Spanish inventory also seems to be missing. In 1735 the British reconstructed 
a list of goods seized from notes and letters f'rm the factors. Its accuracy 
is open to considerable doubt., yet experience shows that the figures may err 






Money seized between October 1726 and June 1727 1523220-69ý 
109,197 Vý Uncollected promissory notes 
22 slaves valued by royal officials at an average of 
166 pesos 63ýý reales each 3,670 
Eight slaves taken frm the Queen oL_§2ain, valued by 
the factors at 250 pesos each 2ý000 
The Company ship Queen of Spain 41285 
Goods seized frcm the Queen of Spain 2., 727-2% 
Miscellaneous effects, such as factory furniture, 
provisions and personal effects 30., 122-; 4 
Silver 353 
Total: 304,575-4; 1 
The second represalia occurred at Cartagena in October 1726., long before 
the receipt of the c6dula of 27 March 1727. Earay seizures such as this were 
probably the result of the c6dula, of 29 March 1726 which instructed royal 
5. Govemor and royal officials of Maracaibo , 
to Philip V, 10 August 17272 AGIj 
Ind. Gen. 2805; Manuel Gonzalo de la Casa to Philip V2 24 Decenber 17273 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
6. Cartagena royal officials to Philip V3 5 November 1728, AGI,, Contadurfa 
1633A. 
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officials in the Indies to seize British effects if they were insulted by 
British vessels. Another question is more easily answered: why was there such 
a tremendous difference in the valuation of seized slaves by factors and by 
royal officials? Conpany estimates tended to be higher and Spanish estimates 
lower than actual values. No doubt both parties were considering the post-war 
restoration of Canpany effects,, and established estimates that would be 
favourable to their respective cases. 
7 
The Spanish used almost all of the money seized in Cartagena to repair 
galleons (80,000 pesos) and for local defence (70jOOO pesos). 
8 
In Santiago de Cuba seized money, debts and effects were worth as much 
as in the first represalia. They amounted to 15., 705 pesos 4 reales., but do not 
include debts that royal officials were unable to collect. Administrative costs 
were 1., 550 pesos 4 reales 25 maravedis!, and 4,451 pesos 5 reales were spent 
9 to maintain the factors during their detention. 
The Only British account of the ezbargo of Company goods in Havana was 
made years later, and the directors did not have reference to the original 
Spanish inventories of the represalia, or of the sale of these effects. A 
Company ship., the Don Lewis [sic]., Captain Gibson, was seized., as were sane 
slaves and a considerable amount of tobacco. It is unknown if the ship and 
its cargo were sold, or if the value of goods seized according to the Company 
records, 51,495 pesos 7 reales, includes them. The pesos were partially 
7. Real c6dula, 29 March 1726., AGI., Ind. Gen. 1597; Wescon-b to Newcastle., 4 
December 1730, PRO, S. P. 36/21, part i. f. 112; Wescanb to Newcastle3 
20 July 1727, EM3 Add. 25,556, f. 114; su mag. cat6lica por cuenta, de la 
segunda, represalia en Cartagena, n. d., AGI,, Contadurfa 266; Governor and 
royal officials of Cartagena to Philip V., 14 March 1729., AGI, Contadurfa 
1437; Directors to Thanpson et al,, 18 January 1728., BM., Add. 25j5663 f. 12. 
8. Royal officials to Philip Vj 1 October 1727, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2785; Patifto 
to royal officials of Cartagena., 1 February 1728., BM, Add. 32)7793 f. 295. 
9. Account of the second represalia., n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 569; su 
Mag. cat6lica por cuenta de la segunda represalia, en Santiago de Cuba, 
n. d... AGI, Contadurla 266; Certificate of Company goods embargoed at Santiago 
de Cuba., 21 August 1729., AGI., Contadurfa, 268. 
141 
accounted for as follows: 
Table IV 
Amount 
Item (in i2esos) 
23 slaves sold at an average of 148 pesos 6 reales each 3,422-2 
346,854 pounds of snuff and 64,518 pounds of leaf 
tobacco., total value estimated to be 24., ooo 
The tobacco was sent to Spain for sale., the money going into the royal 
treasury. 10 
The last seizure was made in Buenos Aires, on 1.1 September 1727., with 
money, goods and debts worth 185., 137 pesos 512- reales being confiscated. 




Item (in pesos) 
Goods and debts seized in Santiago de Chile 80,628-5 
Fran the sale at public auction of an unknown number of 
slaves brought to Buenos Aires on the St. Michael 16., ooo 
Fran the sale at public auction of an unknown number of 
slaves brought to Buenos Aires on the Seahorse 6., ooo 
The Spanish also seized at least four and possibly six Company ships at Buenos 
Aires., including the Essex, Syria., Booth and Prince William. The CoTany 
included the Bristow and the Duke of CambriýEe on the list of ships seized., 
although this was denied by the Spanish. The Bristow left London in September 
1726 with supplies for the factory and was never heard from again. The cargoes 
of the other ships are unknown. 
The cost of maintaining many factors., dependents and sailors in Buenos 
Aires during the war was very high. Four hundred pesos were spent monthly 
factors., 
between 11 September 1727 and 11 March 1730 to keep the, / and another 1,514 
pesos 2 reales were needed for repairs at the factory. The amount spent on the 
ships' crews is unknown. 
10. Wescomb to Newcastle., 20 July 1727, BM., Add. 25556, f. 114; Account of the second represalia, n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568; Account of tobacco seized from the'English, conpiled by Martin de IOynas., 18 November 1732ý AGI2 Contadurfa, 266. 
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Sane of the money acquired in the seizure at Buenos Aires was probably 
included in the 600,000 pesos remitted by the viceroy of Peru to Spain in 
October 1728. This stzn included bull-ion from Mexico, money received frcm the 
sale of tobacco, and 141,246 pesos 19ý reales reprisaled fýnm South Sea ConTpany 
factories. There is no indication what percentage of this came from the Buenos 
Aires factory., but the factors there said that 200,000 pesos eTrbargoed in 
Santiago de Chile and Potosi had been sent to Spain. There is no evidence to 
support this., but it is likely that whatever was seized there was remitted to 
Spain. " 
The Company later claimed that goods and mney worth 282., 469 pesos 11-2 
reales were seized in Buenos-Aires, 97,331 pesos more than the Spanish figure. 
Again., the difference was probably due primarily to the tendency of each side 
to arrive at figures favouring them. However part of the difference might be 
32., 000 hides belonging to the Conpany that the cabildo of Buenos Aires sent to 
Spain. At an average price of 12 reales per hide the value of this seizure 
, 12 
would be 48,000 pesos. 
Effects embargoed in Panama and Portobelo, according to Spanish recordss 
were markedly less than in 1718. 
Table VI 
, knount Item (in pesos 
Money received from Canpany debts enbargoed in Lima 1533191-l'-2 
For 26 slaves sold at an average price of 161-538 pesos 4., 200 
For 14 slaves acquired by royal officials for work on 
the fortifications at an average price of 274.2 pesos 3., 84o 
For 14 slaves acquired by royal officials at 
an average price of 250 pesos 1,500 
Money seized in Portobelo 2,940 
Money received from various debtors 840 
Equipment., provisions and a small boat 718 
For medicine sold 138 
169,, 367-l'-2 
11. Lima royal officials to Diaz Roman., 29 October 1728,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813; 
Wescont to Newcastle., 11 September 1730., PRO sS -P - 36/20, part i. f- 159; Buenos Aires royal officials to Philip V., 31-October 1729., AGI., Ind. Gen. 
2807; Represalia account for Buenos Aires fýrom 11 September 1729, Bodleian, 
Rawl. D 580; R22resalia account for Buenos Aires., n. d.., AGI.,, Contadurfa 
1921B; Su Mag. Cat. por cuenta de la segunda represalia, n. d.., Buenos Aires., AGI3 Contadurla 266. 
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The expenses of the seizure were 6,486 pesos 21-2 reales, of which 1,787 pesos 
31-2 reales were spent in Peru and 4., 698 pesos 7 reales in Lima to collect 
debts, leaving net proceeds of 162,881 pesos. 
The Coripany claimed that a much larger sum, 409,21-1 pesos 3; ý reales was 
seized, including 16,176 pesos 4 reales in cash and goods and 393., 034 pesos 
'F-2 reales enbargoed in Lima. This sun is not as disparate from the Spanish 
claim as it would first appear. 'Ihe Company admitted that 236,645 pesos 5 
reales had been "disembargoed" after the resunption of trade from the debts 
seized in Lima. Subtracting this sum from the amount seized there., according 
to Conpany records., the remainder is 156,389 pesos., only 3., 198 pesos more than 
the Spanish said were seized in Lima. The "diseribargoed" amount may represent 
debts that royal officials were unable to collect and therefore returned to 
the factors in the form of IOU's. Some of this amount may have been in 
promissory notes hidden by the factors at the time of the represalia. In any 
case, if these documents were returned to the Conpany the difference in amounts 
claimed was insignificant. 
One reason why such a relatively small sum was seized at this factory was 
because the factors left some effects and invoices of money owed to the Conpany 
with friends in Panama. When they were sent to Jamaica soon afterwards they 
spirited out most of their account books and a letter listing individual 
debtors and amounts that they owed to the Conpany. Items left with Joseph de 
Ochoa in Panama included an unknown sum of money, 1., 300 serones of cacao,, and 
promissory notes worth 111., 710 frcm Nicholas Cavallero Tejido, Domingo Savejer) 
Angel Calderon and Estevan de Recobar. The factors sent to Panama after the 
war were instructed to collect these debts,, but how much they collected is 
unknown. 
13 
12. Wescomb to Newcastle, 20 July 1727, BM3 Add. 25 556s f. 114; Account of 
the second represalia, n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 4i, f. 568; Minute cmmittee 
of correspondence and factories., 14 March 1727, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 8. 
13. Account of the second represalia, cited above; Su Mag. Cat. por cuenta, de la, segunda, Represalia., cited above; Instructions of the first secret 
camdttee to Rigby et al. 30 April 1729, AGS3 Estado 7008; Directors to Blechynden et al., 18 January 17283 BM3 Add. 25j566, f. 13. 
144 
Very little was seized in the re2resalia in Vera Cruz. It began at 
8 PM on 30 JU1Y 1727 when a guard was placed on the factory and an unsuccessful 
search made for the Corrpany books. The factors claimed that they had been 
sent to Havana on a Spanish vessel. Unfortunately., most of the surviving 
Spanish documentation on the seizure was badly damaged in a fire in the Archives 
of the Indies in Seville in 1924. As a result the accounts are sparse for 
Mexico., Puebla, Oaxaca and other cities in New Spain. At Vera Cruz the embargoed 
items consisted of: 
Table VII 
Amount 
Item (in pesos) 
Money deposited by the supercargoes of the Prince 
Frederick with royal officials for the value of 
the Don Luis and St. George 8sl29-2 
Money collected from Miguel de Belarroa 7,194-1 
Money collected from Francisco Xavier de Luna 560 
Goods carried by the Conpany slave ship Samuel to 
Guinea,, but which remained unsold and subsequently 
brought to Vera Cruz, where they were seized and sold 
by'the royal officials ls935 
For the sale of six male slaves at 300 pesos each 1S800 
Miscellaneous 287 
Total: 20,570-1 
Five Company ships were also seized at Vera Cruz: the annual ship Prince 
Frederick (which became a major subject of Anglo--Spanish diplomacy; see below 
p. 146); one guinea ship, the Samuel; and three snows, the St. George, the Don 
Carlos and the Don Luis (alias Prince of Asturias). The Prince Frederick and 
the Don Luis were renamed the San_Felipe and San Fernando, and fitted out to 
carry a treasure to Havana to meet the galleons for the return voyage to Spain. 
The Samuel sank when an anchor pierced her keel; the St. George remained in 
port and the Don Carlos., which was "already old"., was used to transport 184 
British officers and crew members to Jamaica. 
More than half of the amount seized at Vera Cruz was consumed in maintaining 





Item (in pesos) 
Tb maintain the factors between 1 October 1727 and 
1728 (at an average of 1,008 pesos per 1 ýUýlj 
month) lo., o8o 
To pay the costs of transporting 184 men to Jamaica 1,575-5 
Maintenance of the 184 men prior to departure 14o 
Total: ll., 795-5 
The seizure in Mexico City was much more substantial and included much 
of the cargo of the annual ship Royal Prince, which had remained unsold when 
it returned to England in 1723., and most of the cargo of the Prince Frederick. 
The original inventory of goods seized in Mexico., including effects fran Vera 




























391,, 894-; 4 
609., 718-3 
6789294-5 
102 .7 Q-; 2317P-14 3 
207,843-, '1 
13992,691-6 3/4 
Another account of the seizure indicates that 372,, 669 of the 839,948 pesos 
5 3/4 reales owed were collected, which suggests that much of it was collected 
by royal officials. In any case the value of goods seized in New Spain was 
much greater than at any of the other factories . 
16 
14. Only 400 pesos were spent monthly in Buenos Aires, although the Company 
had more employees there. 
15. Cuenta de la segunda represalia en Vera Cruz, n. d.., AGI., Contadurfa 266; 
Extract frxn Upton to directors, 15 September 1727, PRO, S. P. 36/3, Part 
i, f. 84; Extract flxxn Bowles and Williams to directors., 8 August 1727., 
PRO, S. P. 36/2, f. 127; Extract fxxn Vera Cruz factors, 17 November 172T, 
PRO, S. P. 36/6, part i. f. 10; Petition from Samuel Lock, et al., 31 JulY 
1727s AGI, Contadurfa 812; From. Castelfuerte., 10 August 1727., AGI., 
Contadurfa 812. 
16. Account of second represalia., n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 567; Relation 
of goods seized, c. 1728., AGI3 Contadur-la 812; From Marquis of Casafuerte, 7 December 1727, AGI, Contadur-la 812. 
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Royal officialo appointed to enforce the M2resalia in Mexico, the 
oidores Pedro Malo de Vil Ia Visiencia and Juan de Olivan Robolledo., were 
zealous in their duties. They declared that everyone who had purchased goods 
from the South Sea Conpany since the arrival of the Prince Frederick had to 
furnish witnesses to each sale. Furthemore the witnesses had to be men 
approved by them. As one factor observed: 
This has put all those who had to doe with the Supra Cargoes [of the 
Prince Frederick , under the greatest difficultys., for they are Orderld 
again to lay down the Sums,, that they cannot prove to be paid before 
Witnesses... . or to guarantee their Value; And all and proper and 
methodical Sales with the Supra, Cargoes Receipts., for the ATmunt of 
them Avouched by Entrys in the Spaniards own Books., Stand them in no 
manner of Stead. 17 
Of the money seized in Mexico., 14,000 pesos were sent by Viceroy 
Casafuerte to the Casa de Contratac16n in Cadiz and used to pay the salaries 
of the junta del asiento,, which were in arrears. 
18 
In view of the value of their property in Spain's American colonies, 
just before the war Company directors requested assistance from the British 
government in securing their release if necessary. Prior to this request, 
in June 1726, Vice-Admira. 1 James Hosier,, commander of the West Indies fleet., 
had been ordered to blockade Portobelo and Cartagena to prevent the return of 
the galleons to Spain. The object was to prevent Philip V from replenishing 
his treasury, and thus to force him to curtail war expenditures in Europe. It 
was also a retaliatory measure against Spanish guardacostas which had begun 
to attack British merchantmen with increasing ferocity. The blockade was 
successful, but it had a harmful effect on commercial activities generally. 
Merchants on the galleons were forced to travel to Lima to sell their goods. 
There was almost no trade in Vera Cruz after the represalia. In 1727 
there were shortages of cinnamon., wax., oil and wine in New Spain. Wine cost 
17. Frcm. Vera Cruz factors., 17 November 1727., PRO, S. P. 36/6, part i. f. 10. 
18. Casafuerte to Corobarrutia y Zupide., 27 November 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 
2807; Raz6n de la forma en que se hizo el repartimiento de Jos 14,000 
pesos, n. d., 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807. 
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between 110 and 120 pesos a barrel - The English also suffered during the 
seige. Vice-Admiral Hosier and niznerous officers died in an epidemic that 
killed 4., 000 men on the British fleet. 
19 
No sooner had the war begun, bringing interruption to trade in the Indies, 
and inconvenience to British merchants, than peace negotiations began in 
Europe. The Corrpany directors tried to induce Horace Walpole, one of the 
British negotiators, to take a firm stand with Spanish negotiators. 
If you were to tell them plainly, that 'till the two Anual Ships, have 
been allowed the benefitt of Selling their Goods., and gathering in their 
Effects according to the Priviledges allow'd by Treatys, and that., what 
ought so long Since to have been restored to the Coupany., be perfom'd, 
and paid in New Spain.,... and that 'till the said Annual Ships are first 
Saild away,, and the Company have had full Satisfaction., Neither the 
Galleons nor Flota., shall be Sufferld to go out of Port., and that if in 
the mean time any Seizure or other Molestation be offered to the Conpany 
or any His MajestýB Subjects Exercising lawfull Trade, they must take 
the Consequences. 
Their request was heeded. After the preliminary articles of peace were 
signed in Parris in May 1727, and in Vienna in June, the Duke of Newcastle 
ordered Hosier to lift the blockade of Spanish ports, to restore seized 
Spanish goods (but only after all British goods, ships and subjects were 
released), and to convoy the Prince Frederick to England, leaving only as 
many ships in the West Indies as was usual during peacetime to protect British 
trading interests there. 
21 
The preliminary articles of peace provided that Anglo-Spanish relations 
19. Instructions to Hosier, 28 March 1726, BM, Add. 33,028, f- 52; John 
Burnett's testimony on hostilities, 15 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017; 
Vera Lee Brown, "The South Sea Canpany and Contraband Trade". The 
American Historical Review, xxxi., no. 4 (1926), p. 675; Fran Vera Cruz 
factors., 17 November 1727., PRO, S. P. 36/6, part J, f. 11. 
20. Eyles and Rudge to Walpole, 16 April 1726,, Bm,, Add. 25j556, f. 95. 
21. Newcastle to Hosier, n. d., November 1727, BM, Add. 32s753i f. 24; Newcastle 
to Hosier, 1 June 1727, BM., Add. 32ý687, f. 210; Newcastle to Walpole, 
21 September 1727, BM, Add. 32,752, ff. 76-77; Richard Pares,, War and 
Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763 (London,, 1963), P. 14; Lucy Francis 
Horsfall., "British Relations with the Spanish Colonies in the Caribbean 
1713-1739", Unpublished M. A. dissertation, 1935, London University3 
Institute of Historical. Research, pp. 157-158. 
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return to the same status as established by treaty prior to 1725. As applied 
to the South Sea Company, all its property seized during the war was to be 
restored. Suspicions that the Spanish signed the preliminaries only to raise 
the blockade on the galleons., and that afterwards they would resume hostilities, 
proved untrue. In any case the galleons only carried 2l., 000., 000 pesos., with 
the king's share not above 6., 000,000. Of this 1/3 was owed to the Brnperor., 
and once the arnF. household., and civil -lists were taken care of "there will 
not be a penny left for a War". 
22 
The Conpany directors learned after these orders were dispatched that most 
of the Prince Frederick's cargo was unsold. They asked Newcastle to obtain 
permission from the Spanish for the ship to remain in the West Indies until 
everything was sold. Newcastle informed Horace Walpole., who was then 
negotiating the definitive treaty in Madrid., of the Conpany's request, and 
on Newcastle's advice Walpole decided not to ask for a convoy hame for the 
ship,, to make it appear to be a concession to the Spanish., who were unaware that 
the cargo had not been sold, and considered the Prince Frederick to be their 
main bargaining counter. Benjamin Keene, the British minister to the Spanish 
court., was ordered to: 
make a merit of it., and in discoursing with Count Rottembourg you may 
let him know that to avoid all disputes, which may arise between England 
& Spain as to the pretention. of honour whether the Prince Frederick should 
be actually restored to ac1niral Hozier before he leaves the West Indies, 
or whether he should first leave the Indies depending upon the proper 
orders., given by Spain for the restitution of that Ship,, His Majesty is 
willing to consent that upon Spain's giving clear and explicit orders for 
taking off the Imbargo or seizure of the Prince Frederick,, and other 
Effects belonging to the South Sea Company., and for opening their trade 
upon the foot it was carried on by virtue of the Assiento Treaty confon-flablY 
to the third article of the Preliminaries, the orders for Admiral Hozier 
will be framed in such a manner as that he shall immediately se the 
blockade of the Gallions., and return home with his Squadron. 27i 
22. Extract,, Poyntz to Delafaye., 24 March 1729., BM,, Add. 32,76o, f. 270; 
Castelfuerte to Philip V3 1 November 1731., AGI., Santa Fd 1161. 
23. Walpole to Keene, 20 October 1727., BM., Add. 32)752, f. 176; Walpole to 
Newcastle, 4 November 1727, BM, Add. 323752, f. 323; Newcastle to Walpole, 
3 October 1727, BM, Add. 32,752, ff. 146-147. 
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The war was officially ended by a Convention which was signed on 6 March 
1728 at the Pardo. By the terms of the treaty the English agreed to raise 
their blockades in the West Indies and withdraw war-ships from the Mediterranean. 
The Spanish raised the blockade of Gibraltar and agreed to restore the asiento 
trade. Disputes concerning the Prince Frederick., contraband trade., and the 
restitution of prizes taken during the war, were to be decided by a Congress 
in Soissons. Spanish officials in America were advised of the peace and 
ordered to release Company and personal effects, and resume the asiento trade 
on the same basis as before the war. A precise inventory was requested of all 
24 British ships taken as prizes during the war, to use at the Congress. 
The restitution of Company effects was very slow except for the Prince 
Frederick which was mentioned specifically in the orders sent to the viceroy 
of New Spain, The ship was returned on 31 July 1728 to Captain Williams at 
Vera Cruz. However it was in poor condition because it had been used during 
the war; without considerable repair it was incapable of making the voyage to 
England. Captain Williams had neither material with which to make repairs 
nor a crew large enought to man the ship. Consequently the Company requested 
permission to send out a crew with about 300 tons of provisions and necessary 
materials. The Spanish rejected the request, probably on the advice of 
Matthew Plowes (see below p. 157)., who said that it was only an excuse to 
introduce more contraband goods. There were also fears that if the mierchants 
of Cadiz learned that a Company store-ship was going to the West Indies they 
would refuse to invest in the next flota., believing that the ship was carrying 
contraband goods which would ruin the market. As an alternative, Spanish 
ministers offered to sell the Company the necessary stores in the Indies at 
24. Philip V to the viceroy of Mexico, 25 April 1727, PRO, S. P. 94/99; The Act 
for the Execution of the Preliminary Articles sigied at the Pardo, 6 March 
1728, Historical ReEaster-, vol. xiii (1728)., pp. 147-148i'The WeeLl I -Y the'British'Gazetteer, 30 March 1728; The Daily Journal., 
10 MaY 1728; Pr--ojbct by ministers Of England., France and Spain, AG8., Estado 6875. 
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the same price that they would have paid in England. If this was unsatisfactory 
then they could send the necessary supplies from Jamaica to Vera Cruz on the 
slave ships., which by treaty were pennitted to transport supplies to the 
factories. 
Convinced that the Spanish were acting from a legitimate fear, rather 
than from any nefarious effort to avoid executing the treaty., the directors 
agreed to repair the Prince Frederick with supplies sent from England via 
Jamaica. The cost would be considerably greater than buying materials in Vera 
Cruz., but they doubted that the necessary items would be availablb there. 
The ship was subsequently repaired and returned to England. 
25 
As suggested above., the restoration of Company property was so slow as 
to be virtually nonexistant., although orders to that effect ha-d reached AMerica 
in 1728. When the directors realized this they ccnplained to the Spanish 
government. On 14 Deceirber 1729 Philip V repeated his instructions to the 
viceroys of Peru and New Spain to return all Company effects. The following 
September Benjamin Keene complained that these orders had still not been 
received in several places in America. The restoration remained slow and 
rather insignificant in amount. There are several explanations for this. 
First, much of the seized money was remitted to Spain. Tracing it was a 
ccnplicated process, as was the detennination of who was responsible for 
repaying it. Years of investigation and argument failed to resolve this 
question before the expiration of the asiento contract. Secondly, some of the 
money was spent during the war on public works and defences in the Indies. 
When orders were received to repay the money., colonial treasuries were 
25. Wescorrb to Keene, 29 August 1728, BM, Add. 25,566., ff. 30-31; William 
to directors, 1 August 1728, BM, Add. 32., 76o, f. 99; Paz to Keene., 
1 JanuarY 1729.1 BM., Add. 32., 759., ff. 485-486; Keene to Paz, 30 Septeriber 
17283 BM, Add. 32,758., f. 438; Keene to Philip V, 29 July 1728., PRO., S. P. 
94/99; Brown, op. cit.., p. 669; Keene to Newcastle, 15 August 17282 
BM., Add. 32,757, ff. 372-375; Paz to Keene, 12 August 1728, BM, Add. 
32-, 7571 ff. 3793 383; Poyntz to Stanhope and Walpole, 14 July 1728, BMI 
Add. 32s757, f. 82; Newcastle to plenipotentiaries at Soissonss 27 June 
17283 BM, Add. 32,7563 f. 479. 
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invariably found to be einpty or nearly so. Thus funds had to be acquired from 
other treasuries, such as in Lima or Mexico, and then only after endless 
exchanges of correspondence. Even then money might not be forthcoming because 
of a shortage of funds. 
The records d; o not indicate if Conpany goods were returned at Puerto Rico., 
Santo Domingo, Maracaibo or Caracas. However the Carpany made few conplaints 
about restoration in those places., and it is reasonable to assum that the 
effects were restored. 
26 
Reparations at the two Cuban factories was also fairly complete. Everything 
was returned at Santiago. However the orders to restore Company effects in 
Havana arrived on foreign vessels, which led to controversy. The governor 
of Havana claimed that there was a real c6dula in the escribanfa which 
prohibited him from observing c6dulas that arrived by foreign transport. He 
asked for instructions from the Marquis of Casafuerte, but the viceroy told him 
simply to use his own judgment. He decided against restoring the goods., 
mainly tobacco. In May 1732 Philip V ordered that the tobacco which had been 
seized in Havana and sent to Spain be returned to the CaTpany, or an equivalent 
value given. However the Company was apparently not reimbursed. Subtracting 
the value of the tobacco from the total seizure leaves 26,495 pesos, almost 
exactly the amount the royal officials in Havana said that they owed that 
factory when trade ended. The Conpany estimated that 41,000 pesos were still 
owed, but this includes interest and expenses involved in the seizure. Benjamin 
Wooley, a factor there, said that 307,007 pesos 1 3/4 reales were owed to the 
Company., but - his 
_ 
claim was ignored. 27 
26. Real c6dula., 14 December 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Carrillo to Patiflo, 
8 November 1728,, AGI., Contadurfa 1633A; Keene to Paz, 29 September 17301 
PRO, S. P. 94/104. 
27. From-Wooley, n. d.., c. 25 June 1727, AGS., Estado 7006; Casafuerte to 
Philip, V3 22 July 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen., 1601; Particular of Sundry Effects 
Seized'-under", the,, -,, two, -Represaliasj' PRO) S. P. 94/247.1 f. 318; Account Presented by'the, Sub-Governor to the House of Camons., 5 March 1738, C. L., 
shel. vol. 43, f. 245; Account of the second represalia, C. L., Shel. 
vol. 43, ff. 568-569. 
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Governor Zavala of Buenos Aires reestablished the asiento trade there 
on 23 March 1730., and on his orders all Corrpany effects were returned promptly. 
However returning money., promissory notes and other effects eirbargoed in 
Santiago de Chile and Potosi., which were worth 67,656 pesos 5/6 real., -was 
considerably more difficult. At the request of the directors. who were afraid 
that factory accounts would become confused,, on 27 February 1732 Philip V 
ordered the viceroy of Peru to return these notes to the factors in Buenos Aires 
and not to Portobelo as had been conterrplated. However the 67,656 pesos were 
never received by the Conpany, and became part of the money in dispute at the 
conclusion of the asiento trade. 
28 
Royal officials in Cartagena at first ignored orders to return the 
sizeable sums of money embargoed there., proirpting the British government to 
instruct Benjamin Keene to investigate the matter in Madrid. Keene reported 
that 230., 000 pesos seized from the factory had been used to repair the galleons 
and to pay troops. However the governor of Cartagena denied that this was 
Company money, and the Conpany had no way to prove their claim since the 
royal officials had refused the factors access to the accounts of the seizure. 
Nevertheless-., considering the normally destitute state of the treasury theres 
the money in question must have belonged to the Conpany. Keene did,, in fact.,, 
succeed in getting new orders sent out late in 1730 with instructions that the 
money be restored. The Conpany directors were relieved,, but they said that 
"they wish that by a little rigour of his Pen Mr. Patiflo" had censored the 
governor of Cartagena to prevent him "from any future Conduct of the like 
kind. " The new orders had no effect. A British factor in Cartagena., Edward 
Garthwaite, accused the royal officials there of keeping the embargoed goods 
for themselves. The officials retaliated, calling this denunciation a 
"calumnia infuriosall, and accusing Garthwaite (who vAs raised in Cartagena and 
28. Account of the second represalia, n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568; 
Real c4dula to the viceroy of Peru., 27 February 1732., AGI, Ind. Gen. 
1601; A State of what Remains due to the South Sea Company frcm the second 
represalia, n. d., PRO, S. P. 94/2473 f. 316; de Studer, La trat , p. 212. 
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ha, d many friends there) of hiding most of the money and effects belonging to 
the Ccmpany at the time of the reprisal. In March 1733 the king ordered the 
viceroy of Peru, the Marquis of Castelfuerte,, to reimburse the CorrpanY from the 
treasury in Lim. The money was still not paid., and when the asiento contract 
expired the royal officials in Cartagena owed 239., 555 pesos to the Company, 
having refunded only 65,020 pesos. (The Conpany set the figure at 245,032 
pesos. ) 
29 
Only the barest accounts are available on the restoration at Panama and 
Portobelo. All but 7,049 pesos 6 reales of the money seized at the factory 
was returned., but when trade ended a further 90., 810 pesos 1/6 real were still 
owed from promissory notes embargoed in Lima. 
30 
At Vera Cruz 8,713 pesos were returned to the factors. This represents 
the entire sum seized less money spent during the war for the maintenance of 
the factors and for other necessary expenses. This was not contested by the 
Coupany. The destruction of documentation on Mexico makes it inpossible to 
determine what was returned there. 
31 
In conclusion., the value of mney and effects seized from the CorrPany 
in the second represalia was 2,, 745., 511 pesos, only 87., 013 pesos ;I real less 
than that seized in the first. Because the factors had the advantage of 
29. Royal officials of Cartagena to Philip V,, 11 June 1731, AGI, Santa Fe 1009; 
An Account of the second represalia, n. d., C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 567; 
Account presented by the sub-governor to the House of Cammns, 5 March 
1738, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 545; Marquis of Paz to Keene, 14 November 
1730, PRO, S. P. 94/104; Wesccmb to Newcastle, 4 December 1730s PRO, S. P. 
36/21, part i, f. 111; Wescanb to Delafaye., 10 December 1730., PRO., S-P- 
36/21, part ii, f. 136; Royal decree., 26 January 1731., AGI., Ind. Gen. 1597; 
Smith to Geraldino., 2 Decerrber 1732., BM., Add. 32,779, f. 287; Real orden 
to Castelfuerte, 27 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen 2794; Keene to Cartagena 
factors, 30 March 1733, BM, Add. 43,416, f. 268; Cartagena royal officials 
to Philip V, 4 November 1733. and 20 June 1734,, AGI, Santa Fe 116o; Real 
c4dula to viceroys of Peru and New Spain, 14 December 1729., AGI., Ind. Gen. 
279-5-7 
30. A state of what remains due to the South Sea Canpany on the two 
represalias,, n. d.., PRO, S. P. 94/247., f. 316; Account presented by the 
sib-governor to the House of Camwns, cited above; An Account of the second 
represalia, n. d.,, C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568. 
31. Smith to Geraldino,, 12 December 1735,, AGS, Estado 7006; From the junta 
asiento, 7 December 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597. 
154 
experience learned in the first represalia, one would have imagined that a 
smaller percentage of Company goods would have been seized. More than anything 
else,, however, the main determination of amounts seized was the presence or 
absence of goods from the license or annual ships at the time of the seizures. 
32 
The amounts seized do not necessarily reflect the volurm of trade because of 
the great variation in the amount of effects at the various factories at 
different times. For example note that 1., 075., 527 pesos were seized in Panama 
and Portobelo in the first r22resalia_, but only 169,367 pesos 53ý reales in the 
second, and yet the nunber of slaves entered there was greater in the second., 
and in the third., than in the first; in Mexico and Vera Cruz 1., 262., 931 pesos 
1 real were seized in the first, and 2., 013,, 261 pesos 7k reales in the second. 
That the amounts seized in both the first and second represalias was as 
great as it was suggests a massive trade, with probably an absolute minimum 
of 3,000,000 pesos (E675,000) worth of effects (in the form of slaves., bullion,, 
property, merchandise and ships) at the various factories at any time. If an 
accurate figure of total nunber of slaves seized in represalias were available 
it would perhaps be possible to obtain at least a rough estimate of the total 
volume of trade during the British asiento by relating by cross multiplication 
the nunber of slaves seized and the total number introduced to the value of 
all effects seized. 
32. Goods and money worth only 48,179 pesos 7 reales were seized in the third 
r22resalia, reflecting to sane extent experience gained from, the first 
two, but more important demonstrating the great decrease in Coripany trade 
by 1739 caused by increasing tension between the two crowns in the West Indies. 
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The Third Trading Period, 1728-1739: 
Trade, Policies and Problems 
Preliminary articles of peace concluding hostilities involving Great 
Britain., Spain., France., the Netherlands and the RTeror were signed on 31 May 
1727. They provided 1) for the resumption of all trading privileges in Europe 
and the West Indies granted to the English., French and Dutch by several treaties 
prior to 1725,2) for the restoration of effects seized during the recent war., 
3) for the reestablishment of the asiento trade, 4) for Spain to raise the 
blockade of Gibraltar, and 5) for the British to withdraw the fleets cam=ded 
by adnirals, Wager and Hosier from. the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. Although 
the treaty failed to resolve the outstanding questions involving seizures and 
contraband trade prior to the war, the signatory powers agreed to present their 
ccuplaints to the congress held in Soissons, the purpose of which was to draw 
up the final treaty of peace. 
Months passed without the preliminary articles being ratified., or the 
congress convened, primarily because the annual ship Prince Fredericks which 
was seized in Vera Cruz at the outbreak of the recent war (See above P. 144), 
had not been returned to the South Sea Company. However through the adept 
negotiations of the Count of Koningsegs the Austrian eiTperor's representatives 
the ship was finally returned., Admiral Hosier withdrew his ships fra*a 
Portobelos and a declaration confinrdng the preliminary articles was signed 
on 6 March 1728 by the negotiators. The Congress of Soissons was convened 
soon afterwards on 29 May 1728.1 
William Shanhopes Horatio Walpole and Stephen Poyntz were the official 
British plenipotentiaries to the Congress. They were joined by Richard Rigby, 
a Company employee who was sent to advise them., and to present Company complaints 
Rothenburg toýPaz,,. -3 December, 1727. i,, AGS, Estado 6875; Paz to Kordngseg, 4 December 1727, AGS, Estadoý6875; Koningseg to Philip Vt 5 November 1727, 
AGS., Estado 6875; Clive Parry, ed.., The Consolidated Tre2U Series (65 vols.., 
New York, 1969) . xxxii . 439; Horsfý3: 1-; -'17Bri-tiTh-Relations'I 3 pp. 
71-163. 
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against the Spanish, substantiated by written reports from enployees in the 
West Indies. 2, Rigby had two assistants., Claude Crespigny, a clerk, and Matthew 
Plowes., secretary and principal accountant. Plawes betrayed the Ccnpany soon 
after his arrival by giving the Spanish plenipotentiaries more than 40 documents 
which implicated Company servants and Spanish officials in illicit caTmerce., 
and Spanish ministers in bribery. He accused the Marquis of Grimaldo of 
accepting Z8,000 in jewellery and a pension of E3., 000 a year as rewards for 
concluding a peace favourable to the Coupany in 1721,, and Guillemo Eon of 
falsifying the measurements of annual ships in exchange for El., 000 and a pension 
of E800 a year. Plowes blamed the Company for every dispute that had arisen 
over the asiento trade., and commented that Company conplaints against the 
Spanish were nothing more than "a sort of a Miscellany Jargon of words, put 
together., in an harsh ambiguous Stile". 
Benjamin Keene was pained by Plowes? treason. All "that I am vexed at", 
he said, "is., that such prudent and wise Persons as these [Spanish] Ministers 
3 
are., should let themselves be imposed upon by such mean Creatures as this is". 
2. A merchant fxxn Liverpool recommended that merchants who had grievances 
against the Spanish should be allowed to appoint sa-aeone to represent 
their claims during the negotiations. However they had to be satisfied 
with submitting their claim to the Official British negotiators. The 
Daily Journal, 6 May 1728. 
3. Minute committee of correspondence to factories, 12 December 1728, EM, 
Add. 25,552, f. 49; Keene to Waldegr-ave, 21 March 1732, EM, Add. 43,4153 
f. 158; Barranechea to Paz, 31 August 1728, AGS, Estado 7017; From Plowess 
21 November 1728, AGS, Estado 6878; Paz to Patifto., 5 October 1729, AGI3 
Ind. Gen. 2785; Plowes to Barranechea., 30 September 1728, AGS, Estado 6878; 
Directors to Rigby., June 1728, BM, Add. 2535663 f. 22; George H. Nelson, 
"Contraband Trade Under the Asiento., 1730-1739"., The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 51 (1945)3 P. 55. 
In ýeturn for the information he presented., Plowes received t6o in cash3 
a promise of protection, and an annual pension of 500 doblones., which was 
subsequently raised to 21000 pesos per year. When he died in 1750 the 
pension was given to his widow., but reduced by half. 
The CcuPany was also betr-ayed by Dr. John Burnett., a former factor in 
Portobelo,, whose reward was the post of m6dico de c9mara in Madrid. Petition 
from Matthew Plowes' wife, presented for-de-ci-si-on -onl-LT-January 176o s. 
Estado 7019; Directors to BuTpsted et al. 19 November 1724, EM, Add. 
, AG 
2535643 f. 79. 
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When the Congress opened,, British ministers (who were unaware of Plowes 
defection) demanded restitution of all Conpany effects seized during the 
represalia in 1727, couplaining that they had been seized in contravention of 
the asiento treaty., just as they had been in 1718. Anticipating a reluctance 
on the part of the Spanish to restore these goods unless the Ccrnpany paid 
duties that they owed on the sale of slaves., the Duke of Newcastle advised the 
plenipotentiaries to blame the Spanish for the delinquent payments. How could 
the CaTnpany prepare correct accounts--and therefore determine the duties owed,, 
he asked., when their slaves, personal effects., merchandise from the annual 
ships and even account books had been seized? 
Besides demanding the restitution of Corrpany effects., the British 
plenipotentiaries were instructed to request permission to send another annual 
ship, and to obtain confirmation of the c6dula of 7 Septeriber 1721 which had 
allowed the Corrpany to sell merchandise from the annual ships inland,, not just 
at the port of landing. This privilege had been revoked on 11 March 1724., when 
sales were restricted to the sites and times of the fairs. The Canpany also 
hoped to recover the privilege of introducing slaves from Jamaica. (On 20 
4 
October. 1724 they were ordered to irrport slaves directly from Africa. ) 
The Company pressed other claim against the Spanish through different 
chamels. In February 1728 they replaced their agent in Madrid., Thomas 
Stratford, with Benjamin Keene, who was also the British plenipotentiar7 there. 
There were obvious advantages to the Corrpany of having Keene represent them 
(and in fact he was criticized for holding the two posts simultaneously because 
of the possibility of a conflict of interest). He spoke Spanish and F'rench 
fluently., had access to Spanish ministers., and was familiar with British 
goveranent policy. In spite of these advantages it did not appear that the 
4. Draft instructions to Stanhope, Walpole and PoYntz., 30 April 1728., BMS 
Add. 32 3 7563 ff. 63-69; Additional instructions to Stanhope, Walpole and Poyntz, 23 May 1728, BM3 Add. 32j7563 f. 77; Keene to Paz, 6 May 1730, 
PRO., S. P. 94/103; Wescon-b to Newcastle, 5 September 1728, PRO, S. P. 36/83 
part i. f. 111; Extract directors to Keene 20 February 1729., PRO2 S. P. 
36/193 Part 13 f. 30. 
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Coupany would regain the benefits that it had prior to the rupture. Joseph 
Patifto and the Marquis of Paz were more intransigent in their opposition to 
the Coupany than before because of the intelligence gained from Plowes and 
Burnett. Keene complained that Paz had always been a difficult negotiator, 
but that now he had becom excessively cautious and that it was impossible to 
discover his true opinion on anything; as for Patiflo., he was rmre detenTiined 
than ever to destroy British camierce in the Indies and to annul the asientO 
contract. 
6 
News of the signing of the preliminary articles of peace reached the 
Spanish West Indies by July 1728,, but in a form unsatisfactory to Keene and to 
the Conpany. Paz had ordered Spanish officials in America to reestablish the 
asiento trade in the form prescribed by the original treaty of 1713; but he 
rescinded subsequent treaties and c6dulas which modified and improved the 
Coirpany's trading privileges. 
The instructions were interpreted differently throughout America. The 
viceroy of Mexico prorrptly withdrew the guard which had been maintained on 
the Vera Cruz factory during the war., and restored two Ccapany snows, the St. 
George and the Prince of Asturias, and the annual ship Prince Frederick. On 
the advice of the oidores of the audiencia he refused to return other ConpanY 
effects or slaves, explaining that his orders only stipulated the restitution 
of the ships. The governors of Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba prohibited 
Coupany factors from landing after they returned from exile in Jamaica., 
insisting that they had not received COnfimation of the peace,, or orders to 
reestablish trade,, although copies of the necessary orders were delivered by 
5. In addition to his government remuneration and allowancess Keene received 
the swue- privileges and salary (El., 000) as Stratford. Wesccrrb to Keenep 
3 February 1729,, BM., Add. 25., 566, f. 67. 
6. Keene to Walpole and Poyntz, 20 October 1729, BM2 Add. 32,763) ff. 504-505; 
Wescomb to Keene., 15 May 1729., EM., Add. 25., 566, f. 100; Keene to Wescorrb, 
16 may 1728, BM3 Add. 32., 755, f. 445; Directors to Stratford, 29 February 
17283 BM, Add. 253566., f. 16; The Dai2Z Courant. 29 April 1728. 
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a British naval officer to the governor of Caitagena., and probably to Santiago 
as well. 
7 
Eight months after the declaration confinning the preliminar7 articles of 
peace was signed, most factories remained closed., and most Company property 
unrestored. Moreover., British merchants conplained that Spanish incursions 
against them continued. Conpany officials offered several plausible hypotheses 
to explain the delay in the resumption of the asiento trade. They suggested 
that the Spanish were tr7ing "to gain Time 'till the Galleons are come away" 
after the blockade by Hosier in order to replenish the treasur7 in case 
hostilities should continue in Europe. Furthermiore, in sane cases instructions 
to Spanish officials in America announcing the peace., and ordering the 
resunption of the asiento trade., had been delivered by British naval ships; 
Spanish officials in Havana, and almost certainly elsewhere, had orders not to 
obey any c6dulas delivered by foreigners. Company officials frequently complained 
about the instructions sent to Spanish officials in America, and suspected that 
all the injustices from which they suffered emanated fran "Secret Orders sent 
from Spain to the several Governments in the Indies to pay no regard to the 
publick Ones". There is no evidence to support this suspicion. 
8 
When Company representatives complained at Soissons, that the Spanish 
colonial officials refused to obey their orders., the Spanish plenipotentiaries 
claimed that they were equally perplexed. Adamantly insisting that Philip V 
intended to honour the preliminar7 articles of peace., they denied any knowledge 
of continuing hostilities in the Indies., or of a failure to restore trade. 
7. Keene to Newcastle, 17 March 1728., EM Add. 32s754, f. 407; Williams to 
directors., 1 August 1728, BM., Add. 32: 760, f. 99; Extract factors of Vera 
Cruz to directors., 15 August 1728,, BM., Add. 32,687., ff. 256-257; PatifiO 
to viceroy of M4kico,, 25 April 1728, PRO, S. P. 94/99; St. Lo to Burchett) 6 July 1728., PRO., Adm. ], /230; Wescanb to Keene, 10 October 1728, BM, Add. 
2535663 f. 54; Paz to Keene, 5 December 1728, PRO. s. P. 94/99; Farley's 
Exeter Journal3 18 October 1728. 
8. Wescabb to Keene, 24 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 56; Rigby to Poyntz, 6 Noven-ber 1728,, EM., Add. 32j759, f. 87; Wescanb to Delafaye, 7 November 
1728, BK, Add. 323687, f. 241; Wescanb to Newcastle 31 August 17303 PR03 PROs S-P'. 36/lo, part i. ff. 2-3. 
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Newcastle was also piqued by Spanish depredations and their refusal to 
reopen the asiento trade. He ordered the ministers at Soissons to inform their 
Spanish counterparts 
that these Violent & unjustifiable proceedings of the Spaniards in the 
West Indies are come to such a height, that the King's Subjects will be 
under a Necessity of doing themselves Justice & of repelling Force by 
Force3 & that His Maj. ty's Ships in those parts can not in such case refuse 
them their Assistance for the security of their persons & Effects, and the 
protection of their Trade & Navigation, so unwarrantably interrupted by 
the Spaniards: 
The British plenipotentiaries made numerous representations to rectify this 
situation, even soliciting French support. 
Meanwhile., rumours spread that the Spanish had no intention of restoring 
English trade. News of the establisl-nent of the Caracas Conpany bewildered 
negotiators in Soissons, as did reports that some Spanish colonial governors 
had granted -licenses 
to local merchants to supply slaves because of the 
continuing inactivity of the South Sea Company. It looked as if war might break 
out again after the Spanish representatives left the Congress, and word was 
received that the galleons had reached Spain. 
The main problem at Soissons had been the question of British commerce 
in the West Indies. Spain had threatened to place all commercial disputes 
before the Congress unless the British agreed to Spahish demands in Italy. 
The British believed that a general discussion of commerce could ruin their 
predominant position in the West Indies trade. 
9 
Relations between the two crowns began to improve by the summer of 1729; 
in August Philip V ordered royal officials to restore Company effects in Buenos 
Aires; soon afterwards Benjamin Keene was assured that permission would soon 
be given for an annual ship to sail; on 9 November a treaty of peace and 
9. Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 November 1728, BM., Add. 32,759, f. 31; Newcastle to 
British plenipotentiaries, 11 October 1728., BM., Add. 323758., ff. 413-414; 
Walpole to Newcastle., 27 October 1728., BM.,, Add. 32,758., f. 448; Walpole and 
Stanhope to Newcastle, 10 December 1728., EM., Add. 32,759, f. 325; Directors 
to Rigby and Pratter., 14 February 1729,, BMj Add. 25,566, f. 68; Horsfall, 
"British Relations", pp. 161-163. 
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friendship was signed in Paris between Spain_, France and Great Britain. The 
signatory powers agreed to cease all hostilities, and affirmed that French and 
British camerce in Europe and the West Indies would be reestablished on the 
basis of treaties signed prior to 1725. Spain agreed to make reparations for 
damages suffered by the French and English at the hands of Spanish guardacostas 
and officials in the Indies since the preliminary articles of peace were signed 
in 1727. C6dulas to this effect were sent to the viceroys, governors and other 
royal officials in Peru and New Spain, and Keene was informed of the inrdnent 
appointment of an airbassador to England. 
10 
Just before the Treaty of Paris was signed, the South Sea company convened 
a joint camAttee of correspondence and factories to determine the most 
favourable method of reestablishing the asiento trade,, both in term of assuring 
profits to the Conpany and of making a good impression on the Spanish. They 
were determined to avoid the pre-rupture abuses and inefficiencies of the 
factories and ships, including the clandestine trade conducted by the crews Of 
the annual, slave,, license and provision ships. They decided that the best way 
to prevent contraband trade was to permit supercargoes, officers and crews Of 
Company ships to carry privately small amounts of goods under strict control. 
The captain of each ship was required to keep an inventory of all 
provisions and stores taken to the factories, and of the money and goods 
remitted. Before he could receive his wages these books were reviewed by the 
Conpany's comnittee of shipping. The discovery of contraband on a ship was 
grounds for the irrmediate dismissal of the captain. In addition,, the ratio Of 
ships' tonnage to slaves was standardized to prevent the loading of an excessive 
amount of provisions which might be sold illicitly. At Vera Cruz, Cartagena 
10. Real c6dula to governor and royal officials of Buenos Aires, 31 August 
1729., EM, Add. 32,762., f. 301; Keene and Stanhope to Newcastle,, 10 
November 1729., BM, Add. 32., 764, f. 37; Treaty of Peace., Union 
Friendship and Mutual Defence between Great Britain., France and Spain, 
9 Noventer 1729, PRO3 C. O. 388/893 ff. 2-9; Real c6dula to viceroys, 
governors and royal officials of Peru and Ne7-Spa-in-, --J"]T DeceiTber 1729, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Keene to British plenipotentiaries, 1 Septenter 
1729, BM, Add. 323763, f. 155. 
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and Panama and Portobelo the ratio was two tons per slave: thus a 100 ton ship 
had to carry at least 50 slaves. Buenos Aires was exeznpted from this regulation 
because slaves were shipped there directly from Africa. Havana, Santiago de 
Cuba., Caracas and Campeche were also exempted., either because sales were in 
small nunbers., or because a barter system was used in the trade,, which required 
ships larger than was strictly necessary to carry slaves in order to transport 
the return cargoes. Guinea ships destined for Buenos Aires were also subject 
to new regulations. A fine of E20 per slave was imposed on captains who carried 
more slaves than their contracts stipulated., and one of E30 was irrposed for 
each slave sold in Buenos Aires not registered with the Ccupany. The amount 
was to be deducted from the earnings of the offending ship. There is no 
indication how well these new regulations were enforced,, but judging from the 
nune-rous Spanish seizures., they do not appear to have been particularly 
effective. 
11 
The instructions issued to Company agents in Jamaica when trade resumed 
contained only minor innovations from those under which they had previously 
operated. The most ijTportant addition was the right to issue licenses to 
merchants for supplying slaves to Spanish cam=Aties lacking factoriess and to 
nominate them as factors so that they would be protected under the terms of 
the asiento treaty. The Company estimated that this branch of the slave trade 
brought an amual, profit of Z10., 000., but admitted that it offered numerous 
opportunities to introduce contraband merchandise. Therefore when the right 
was revoked by, the Spanish in 1733., mainly because of the contraband., the 
Conpany suffered a considerable loss of revenue. 
Addendum to Guinea Ship contract,, 25 February 1731., EMq Add. 25., 581., f. 25; 
General. order,, 8 November 1734,, Doman., Documents, 11,453; Geraldino to 
Saravia y Antolinez . 10 August 1735., AGI. 1- -Imd-LGen. 2792; Minute committee 
of correspondence and factories., 15 May 1730., EM, Add. 25.553.9 ff. 33-34; 
Directors to captains of Company ships, 10 March 1731, BM, Add. 2535812 
f. 26. 
Sperling claims that the regulations for controlling illicit trade were 
so successful that by 1735 contraband on slave ships was negligible. 
Sper]-ing,, The South Sea Ccapany, p. 43. Although the controls initiated 
by the Company helped to Limit illicit trade., they did not stop it. There 
are records of extensive contraband throughout the last trading period. 
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The agents were authorized to arbitrate disputes between the factors 
and to grant permission to indult slaves which had been introduced illegally 
during the rupture. 
12 They received a corrmission of 1% on all money and 
effects remitted frcm the factories., and had the option of drawing this money 
in sterling bills of exchange., or in pesos because of the instability of 
Jamaican currency. Since no contract was signed with the Royal African Company 
during this, the last,,. trading period, the agents purchased most of the slaves 
for the factories from private Guinea traders, although the Company did send 
some ships to Africa in addition to those destined for Buenos Aires. 
These minor revisions in the agents' instructions were insufficient to 
prevent serious misconduct by them,, mainly because of the unsystematic method 
of selection. Personal relationships with Corrpany directors were still the 
main criteria in most appointments. 
13 
The main modifications in Company procedures were directed at the 
factories. Each factor had to sign a partnership agreement with the Conpany 
I. 
which made him responsible jointly with all other factors for the conduct of 
the factory. The factors received a comnission on sales and returns, in lieu 
of a salary, and their expenses were calculated on a tarif or schedule of 
expenses allowed by the CoiTpany for the maintenance of the negroes prior to 
their sale., and for the salaries of Spanish officials who supervised and 
12. Indultos appear to have been opened at every factory when trade resumed. 
The Company still paid 33 1/3 pesos per pieza, in duties. $ and 110 pesos 
per pieza, to the owners, but the profit was divided differently. One-half 
of the net proceeds went to the factors., the other half to the Company. 
The factors' percentage was divided as follows: 
1/3 to the factor who seized the slaves., and 
2/3 to be divided among the remaining factors according to their 
shares of the commission. 
Instructions of the first secret committee to Panama and Portobelo factors., 
30 April 1729, AGS., Estado 7008. 
13. Wescorrb to Humphrey., 18 June 1731, Doman, Documents, 11,439; Minute 
committee of correspondence and factories., 18 June 1731., EM., Add. 259553., 
ff. 25,553, ff. 40-41; Smith to Keene., 28 May 1736, EM, Add. 32s7913 f. 
198; Minute committee of correspondence, 14 May 1734, EM, Add. 25 554, f. 
95; Geraldino to Patifto., 21 January 1734., Doman,, Documents, 11., 451; 
Geraldino to Patifto., 7 Januax-j 1734, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2790. 
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examined the trade. These tariffs varied slightly from factory to factory. 
At Panama and Fortobelo the tariff included a housekeeping allowance of 7,000 
pesos a year beginning when factors signed their contract and extending for 
two years after their arrival at the factory. Subsequently their conudssion 
(which was now intended to cover housekeeping expenses) was 5% on the sale of 
slaves and 2Vo on returns remitted to England. The convassion at Buenos Aires 
was 5% on both negro sales and returns,, with a further provision that if the 
total camdssion amounted to less than 17., 500 pesos per year then the CoIrpany 
would make up the difference. The division of the camdssion was 1/2 to the 
head factor, 1/3 to the second and 116 to the third. Money advanced to factors 
prior to the voyage to the Indies was to be deducted from their share of the 
ccaudssion. 
14 
Under the new regulations surgeons, bookkeepers and secretaries were 
chosen by the factors., who were also responsible for transporting them to the 
Indies and for paying their salaries. The Company maintained the right to 
approve these appointments and required successful applicants to fumish bonds 
to the Conpany since they were eligible to become factors in the event of a 
superior's death. Subject to slight variations at the different factories., 
bookkeepers received a salary of 1,000 pesos a year, surgeons 666 and 
secretaries 500. While these costs were defrayed from the factors' cam-dssions., 
1/3 of their salaries were kept to cover roan and board. 
15 
While certain procedures for operating the factory were new, $ the factors' 
instructions differed mainly in so much as they reflected the rupture of 1727- 
They were directed to request the return of all confiscated goods or the 
receipts of their sale if they had been sold. Carpany slaves were to be 
14. Minute joint conrnittee of correspondence and factories., 12 November 1729, s BM, Add. 25P553P ff. 9-10; Minute joint ccrmitttee of correspondence and 
factories, 14 and 23 August 1728, EMI Add. 25,552, ff. 35,37. 
15. Minute joint comdttee of correspondence and factories, 18 February 1729, 
EM, Add. 253552, f. 54; Directors to Hutchinson., 11 March 1729., BM2 Add. 
2535663 ff. 84-85; Directors to DlOyle and Davison., 11 March 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 36,88. 
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measured as before., but branded with new marks., the old brands having been 
destroyed in 1727 to prevent their unauthorized use by private traders. 
ExaTrples of the new brands are as follows: 
+ 
Santiago Cartagena Panxna, Portobelo, Vera Cruz Havana 
The slaves were to be sold quickly., for cash if possible., to avoid undue medical 
or burial expenses. No urrnarked gold or silver was to be accepted in payment; 
all books and accounts were to be open to the entire factory; and the recurrent 
evils of illicit trade and offensive behaviour were to be avoided. 
16 
When trade resumed in 1729 the Company had factories in Havana., Santiago 
(under the direction of the Havana factory)., Vera Cruz., Panama and Portobelo, 
Buenos Aires., and Cartagena. Its resumption was inauspicious in spite of the 
preparations made. New personnel were largely unfit., frauds rampant and 
communications inefficient. One ex-factor emphasized that to renew trade in 
this traditional mamer was to destroy it. A Company employee suggested that 
trade could be improved by establishing a factory in Lim to supply the Peruvian 
merchants., thus avoiding the restrictions placed on the export of bullion from 
that viceroyalty. While the Company initially favoured the suggestibn,, they 
eventually dismissed it, believing it to be "a dangerous Experiment to alter the 
Chanel of the Sales of the Negroes, and of Such fatal Consequence as not Easily 
to be retrieved after done. " The fear of change and refom were largely 
responsible for the continuing frauds ccmnitted by Company employees. Moreover., 
even when an infraction of the treaty or fraud against the Corrpany was discovered, 
punitive action was rarely taken., to the despair of Spanish and British officials 
16. In the case of the joint factory at Panama and Portobelo the business 
ledgers were kept in Panama. Transactions in Portobelo were entered in 
cash books and sent weekly across the istInus to be entered in the ledger. 
Directors to Garthwait and Nasrnyth, 11 July 1729, BM., Add. 25j566., ff. 
123-124; Directors to Rigby and Johnson, 6 September 1728., BMq Add. 
25,5662 ff. 38-84; Directors to Denniss et al, 4 July 1729, BM., Add. 
25,566, ff. 105-114. 
167 
and merchants. One person succinctly summarized the feeUngs of many. 
that such Corporations [as the South Sea Company] are not only 
destructive of Trade, dangerous to Liberty, and Rrejudicial to the 
Publick in general; but, by Fi; a-ud and Miýýement, are comonly 
attended with great Losses to the Proprietors Themselves. 
An analysis of the proceedings of the factories during the last trading 
period confim these dire predictions. 
17 
The reestablishment of the Conpany's trade did not stop Spanish guardacostas 
from. continuing to patrol against contraband traders or occasionally to accost 
ships engaged in legal trade. In fact the establishnent of the Caracas Ccapany 
increased this activity., as did a real c4dula. dated 14 June 1730 which advised 
colonial officials to watch for illicit trade on Conpany ships. An asiento 
snow, the St. james. 9 encountered two Spanish men-of-war early in 1730 after 
leaving Portobelo. The Spaniards3 who had reportedly taken over Z100s000 
recently from Dutch vessels trading along the coast., seized "all the private 
Trade, and plunderld her even of Linnen and other things belonging to the 
Officers of the Vessel". Hostilities against Company ships, corrpounded by 
various difficulties in reestablishing trade,, led the Company to protest that 
the 
Assiento Contract is become No More than what his C. M. is pleased frcm 
time to time by his Cedulas to declare it to be., And these very Ced. s 
again Iyable to the Misconstructions of Gov. rs at pleasure., & that with 
irrpunity, provided they be made in rmre disfavour to the Coup. a .... 
18 
The directors made several unusual efforts to gain Spanish cooperation 
or favour. Deputy director John Eyles wrote to one Spanish minister soliciting 
17. The Country Journal or the Craftsman, by Caleb D'Anvers, 13 January 1733) 
PRO, S. P. 36/29.1, f. 15; Minute joint carudttee of correspondence and 
factories,, 8 September 1730., EM., Add. 25,553., f. 49; Directors to Rigby 
and Pratter., 14 February 1729, EM., Add. 25., 566., f. 68; Directors to Rigby 
and Pratter, 18 April 1729., EM., Add. 25., 566., f. 96; Minute joint can-nittee 
of correspondence and factories, 1 May 1729,, EM, Add. 25,, 552., f. 61. 
18. Parza de la Torre to Philip V, 31 May 1731, AGI, Santo Domingo 702; 
Stewart to (probably) Burchett, 10 May 1730, PRO, Adm. 1/231; Directors 
to Keene, 15 May 1730, PRO., S. P. 36/18., part ii, f. 75; Wescorrb to 
Newcastle., 11 Septerrber 1730., PRO., S -P - 36/20, part 13 f. 159; Pares --War and Trade, p. 14. 
168 
better treatment of Canpany employees in return for "favorable results". When 
this veiled bribe offer was ignored they withheld salaries normally paid to 
Spanish ministers from the duties on the slave trade. The Spanish ambassador 
in Venice, the Marquis of Monteleon, remained unpaid for six years and nine 
months. When he appealed to the Corrpany for payment he was told 
to use his Credit and good Offices with the Ministers in Spain for 
removing these difficultys., For till that is done it will not be in 
my power., notwithstanding my Inclination to Serve the Marquis, to 
induce our Court of Directors to make any payments whatsoever on Account 
of the Negro Dutys. 
Although it appears that Montele6n made no effort to intercede with Philip V 
.1 19 
on behalf of the Conpany., he did receive his salary ultimately. 
The Carpany also pressed for redress through more conventional chamelse 
In response to pressure from the directors and private merchants in London., 
Newcastle informed British governors in the West Indies that British subjects 
engaged in lawful trade who were molested by M! 2Edacostas could gain naval 
support in obtaining retribution by furnishing evidence to a vice-admiraltY 
court in Jamaica. The court was authorized to send warships to Spanish ports 
where captured goods were taken to demand their immediate release., and if 
necessary to seize Spanish goods in retaliation. Conpany employees in the 
West Indies considered this an over reaction. They feared that it might result 
in increased guardacosta activity and perhaps even another represalia. 
20 
19. From John Eyles, 17 June 1730, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 391; Eyles to 
Delafaye, 12 March 1729., PRO, S. P. 36/18., part i,, f. 31; Patiflo to Keene 
20 August 1732,, PRO., S. P. 94/114; Directors to Keene, 15 Septenter 1732., 
PRO3 S. P. 36/283 f. 152. 
According to one calculation made in th6 late 1730s., the following 
annual assigrmients were made frm the asiento duties: a private eTnbaSSY 
chapel in London., 2., 000 pesos; the Count of Montijo, 48,000 pesos; Thcmas 
Geraldino., 10,000 pesos; Geraldino's two secretaries, 2,000 pesos; the 
Count of St. Gil3 15,000 pesos; and the Marquis of Capicello,, 8., 000 pesos; 
a total of 110,900 pesos. Duties on 4,000 Conpany slaves were 133,333 1/3 
pesos. Calculation of the distribution of negro duties., n. d.., AGS., Sect. a y sup. a de hacienda 973. 
20. Pratter and Rigby to Stewart, 4 March 1730, PRO,, Adn. 1/231; Newcastle to 
Hunter3 25 Septen-ber 1730, PROs C. O. 5/43 part ii, f. 204. 
The incident that caused these orders to be issued was the seizure of the Mary by Puerto Rican privateers. Read-Admiral Stewart was unable to 
obtain the release of the ship and was proceeding to execute the reprisal 
(continued on next page) 
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The refusal of Spanish officials in America to pennit the resuTption of 
trade, to cease hostilities., or to corrply with other articles of the Treaty of 
1729 were "of so crying a Nature"., Newcastle said., "that the King cannot bring 
himself to conceive that it is possible they should have the Countenance or 
approbation of His Catholic Maj. ty or his Ministers". Unless Spanish ministers 
honoured their engagements, 
it cannot be expected., that His Majesty,, who hitherto has been the most 
forward of any of the Contracting Parties of the Treaty of Seville, to 
perform the Conditions of it., should any longer look upon Himself to be 
under any obligation to execute that Treaty towards Spain.... 
Benjamin Keene., who transmitted his superior's testy complaints., as well as 
the incessant demands of the Company., lamented: "if it be remarked that one of 
my Letters ... is too like another I have nothing to say for myself, but that if 
you strike the same String, You must expect the same Sound". Since the Company 
refused to accede to Spanish demands concerning the payment of duties. 9 salaries 
and the presentation of accounts., it was not surprising that the Spanish remained 
uncooperative. Nonetheless Keene was convinced that the factors would have 
been permitted to resume their duties without trouble had they had the patience 
to await the arrival of advice ships carrying Philip V's orders. Spanish 
ministers were perhaps officious, but they did not purposely obstruct the 
treaty., nor did they send 11contre orders to elude the force of the Cedulas" 
authorizing the resumption of trade., as can be proven by the "different usage" 
the factors met with in different ports. 
21 
An agreement was reached on 8 February 1732 between Benjamin Keene., JOsePh 
Patifio and the Marquis of Paz which was intended to redress complaints by both 
20. (continued from previous page) orders when Corrpany agents asked him to 
refrain frm acting. They feared retaliation against the annual ship 
then in Portobelo,, and argued that the Spanish would undoubtedly issue 
similar orders against all British traders. Steward agreed to their 
request and confined himself to cruising against the guardacostas. Pares 
suggests that this restraining action by the Conpany prevented "the 
situation in the West Indies from developing into what would have 
amounted to a war. " Pares., op. cit.. s P. 15. 
21. Keene to Delafaye, 28 September 1730, PRO3 S. P. 94/104; Newcastle to 
Keene, 28 September 1730, PRO3 S. P. 94/105. 
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parties. They declared that reparations would be made for all seizures made 
by the British and Spanish since the Treaty of Seville (1729). To prevent 
excesses by their guardacostas and privateers in the future the Spanish pranised 
that captains of all ships fitted out for the purpose of coiTbating illicit trade 
would post bonds which would be forfeited if they made illegal seizures. In 
return the British agreed that their warships would not convoy or protect any 
merchant ships carrying on unlawful trade. 
22 
Meanwhile., the commission established by the Treaty of Seville to discuss 
the question of seizures met in Madrid for the first time on 3 March 1732. 
Discussions were to continue for three years. The comnlissioners representing 
the Company and British mierchants were Benjamin Keene., Arthur Stert, and John 
Goddard; Pablo Diaz del Abandero (later replaced by the Marquis of Torrenueva)., 
Francisco Manuel de Herrera and Joseph Quintana represented Spain. Before 
the cam-dssion even began its deliberations . the Spanish delegation said 
that 
they would discuss none of the various outstanding claims until the South Sea 
Company paid all negro duties which had accrued since the signing of the TtreatY 
of Seville. They argued that since the Company had continued to trade they 
could hardly refuse to pay these duties. 
23 
After considerable discussion the cam*dssioners finally agreed that the 
Company was liable to pay duties from 1 January 1731. RAs compromise allowed 
a duty free trading period for the Company., and was intended as compensation 
for the irregular resumption of trade at the different factories. Payment was 
due m1 May 1732,, and the asiento accounts were to be given to Philip by 31 
July 1732. Shortly after this agreemient was reached the Spanish camlissiOners 
22. Paz to Keene, 3 October 1730., PRO2 C. O. 94/104; Joint declaration by Keene3 
Patifto and Paz., 8 February 1732., Bodleian., MS Clarendon Dept. c 468; 
Real c6dula, to Spanish governors in port cities in America, 10 January 
17323 Ibid. 
23. Appointment of comnissioners, 19 January 1732, AGS., Estado 6883; Newcastle 
to Eylest 17 April 1730, PRO, S. P. 36/18., part ii,, f. 55; Keene, Stert and 
Goddard to Newcastle, 14 March 1732., PRO2 S. P. 94/106; Translation of a 
Spanish paper delivered to the British cayrdssioners, 3 March 1732, PRO, 
S. P. 94/106; British conrdssioners to Spanish comdssioners, 13 March 1732, 
PRo. s. P. 94/lo6. 
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expanded their demands., insisting that the Company pay duties on all goods 
sold illicitly--specifically referring to provisions-fran Company ships. The 
Company would not have declared the amount of this contraband even if they knew., 
and denied arg responsibility for it. They contended that most of it was by 
captains of British men-of-war rather than by Company employees. (In fact both 
sold provisions and merchandise illegally. ) In any case the directors refused 
to honour the agreemnt of 1 January 1732 because they were unable to provide 
accounts of the asiento trade. The books,, they said, had been lost or 
destroyed. Furthermore, because of the unfair demands the Spanish conudsbioners 
made on the Company, and the numerous delays, they suggested that the conrdssion 
be dissolved. 24 
Thus negotiations had reached an impasse. Keene blamed the Conpany for 
its obstinancy. Unable to understand why they refused to hand over accounts Of 
the trade., he concluded that 
we must come to some sort of an understanding for it can never be for 
the Interest of a regular Company to let Things run on in a shackled 
manner as they have since the Peace of IL21 always en bon C2ate. 
As long as the Company refused to provide accounts, the Spanish refused 
to discuss British complaints. Eventually both parties agreed that no solution 
could be reached, and the cannission was indeed dissolved, leaving all issues 
unsettled. 
25 
A suggestion that negotiations be transferred to London was rejected; 
thus disputes between the two crowns and their subjects were referred to 
24. Eyles (probably) to Geraldino., 25 August 1732., BM., Add. 32., 778., ff. 
135-136; Spanish to British commissioners, 17 April 1732., Bodleian., MS 
Clarendon Dept. C 468; Agreement between Spanish and British camdssioners3 
27 March 1732., PRO., S. P. 94/106. 
At this time approximately one-forth of the South Sea corrpany's total 
capital investment was divided between the asiento trade and a Greenland 
whale fishing project. The latter was abandoned in December 1732 after 
the Company suffered losses in excess of Z50,000. Anon. letter, 26 
January 1733, AGS, Estado 6897; Anon. letter., 10 November 1732, AGS, 
Estado 6884; Anon. letter, 22 December 1732, AGS, Estado 6884; Gentleman's 
Magazine (1732). 11,5833 721. 
25. Keene to Delafaye, 29 August 1732, PRO, S. P. 94/112; Geraldino to Patiflo, 
18 Febr. =7 1734., AGi. Ind. Gen. 2790; Newcastle to Keene, 24 February 
1735.9 Bm., Add. 323787., f. 71; Fran Stert and Goddard., 5 December 1734, 
no. s. P. 94/106. 
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traditional diplomatic channels. The most auspicious diplomatic development 
was the appointment on 21 April 1732 of Thomas Geraldino as Spain's 
representative in London to the South Sea Company. Geraldino, presented his 
credentials to the Corrpany on 2 June 1732. In Keenets opinion the Spanish could 
not have selected "a more fair or Honest Man". His appointment was interpreted 
by the English as a desire by Patifto to inaugurate a new era of understanding 
and peaceful commerce. 
Their hopes were soon shattered. Geraldino was well-briefed on the South 
Sea Company, and his instructions were more severe than had been anticipated 
by the directors. He was to monitor closely the asiento trade; attend all 
directors' meetings; keep his goverrrnent informed about new factory regulations., 
the schedule of Company ships, the appointment of officials and the number of 
slaves introduced; and to give special attention to the prevention of contraband 
on the annual ships. In addition he was responsible for keeping the newly 
appointed Spanish agents to Conpany factories appr-aised of the situation in 
England as it pertained to the asiento trade. 
26 
The appointment of Spanish factors in America during the third trading 
period was justified on grounds that the Company had not complied with their 
contract. (The only control the Spanish exercised over the Coupany during the 
first two trading periods was through representatives to the court of directors., 
the junta delasiento de negros., and royal officials in the Indies. ) Spanish 
ministers did not know the extent of the trade and therefore had no idea of 
their share in the annual ships, or the amount owed in duties on slaves. 
The primary responsibility of these factors was the same as Geraldino'S: 
26. To compensate Geraldino for the inconvenience of moving to England2 he was 
named Knight of the Order of Santiago, granted the privileges and titles 
of a councillor of Hacienda, and given a salary of 10 000 pesos a year. 
Keene to directors, IT and 26 April 1732., PRO., S. P. 94ý111; Smith to 
Geraldino, 2 June 1732, BM, Add. 25., 557., f. 72. 
At about the same ti: me, the Marquis of Montijo was named ambassador 
and minister plenipotentiary to England. Both man received their salaries 
from asiento duties. R6solution., court of directors, 3 Decerrber 1731, 
PRO, S -P - 36/25, f- 119; Instructions to Thams Geraldino, 1 MaY 1732, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
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to keep a close vigil on the asiento trade. They were to inspect each annual., 
slave,, license and provision ship for illicit goods, participate in the visitas 
see that slaves were properly branded, regulate sales and inspect return cargoes. 
Their accounts and findings were to be transmitted to Geraldino and to Spanish 
ministers in Madrid. In general it was an efficient system. Geraldino and the 
factors could warn of suspected frauds on Company ships., which could then be 
inspected imwdiately upon arrival in the West Indies or in England. 
Spanish representatives were appointed in Havana., Vera Cruz., Campeche., 
Caracas., Cartagena, Panama and Portobelo., and Buenos Aires. In most cases they 
were local residents who had previously held official posts. The factor 
appointed in Havana,, for example,, was the contador de cuentas for the barlovento 
islands at the time of his appointment; the one at Campeche was the sargento 
mayor there. These men received their instructions in late March or early April 
1734o 
27 
While the Company ordered their employees in America to cooperate with 
the Spanish factors, they told Benjamin Keene to protest against their employment 
as an infringement of article xxviii of the asiento treaty, which stipulated 
that the Spanish could only appoint two people to supervise the trade. The 
directors saw the appointments as another obstacle to efficient operations., 
and naturally most Company factors feared a strict supervision of their 
activities. Smuggling would become much more difficult., and complete accounts 
would now be more often available., thereby eliminating an excuse so often used 
in refusing to comply with Spanish demands. 
Although the appointment of these supervisors undoubtedly prevented many 
illegal activities., there were numerous grievances that could not be controlled 
or eliminated in this way. 
28 
27. Factors named to supervise the asiento trade, n. d., c. 17332 AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2851; General instructions to factors, 15 September 1733, AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2785; Philip V to Zentellas, 18 Septa-ter 1733, AGI, Santa Fe 1167; 
Sequeira, to Patifio., 18 April 1734., AGI,, Ind. Gen 2794; Patifto (probably) 
to directors., 31 July and 11 August 1733, AGS) Estado 7009. 
28. Directors to Keene., 14 September 1733, BMI Add. 323782, f. 226; Geraldino 
to Martfnez de la Vega, 12 January 1734, Doman, Documents 11,447. 
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A particularly acrimnious dispute erupted in 1735 over the exchange rate 
to be used in paying negro duties. When the asiento contract was signed in 
1713 the peso escudo de 2Lata, or piece of eight, was Spain's primary unit of 
currency. It was still in use in 1735 and bore the same weight,, stanp and 
standard. Another coin used in Spain and in the Indies in 1713, the real de 
plata., eight of which equalled one peso escudo was recalled in Spain in 1725, t 
but remained current in America. The following year a new coin was introduced 
which was commonly called a provincial., ten equalling one peso escudo. The 
argument between the Conpany and Spain was whether negro duties accrued since 
1726 should be paid in pesos consisting of eight or ten parts, that is whether 
the Conpany should pay in reales de plata or in provinciales. 
The Spanish contended that the duties were to be paid in the coinage used 
in 1713, particularly as the devaluation of 1726 was in Spain and not in 
America,, where the slaves were sold and payment received. Tb further 
substantiate their argument they pointed out that contracts signed between the 
Company and licensees after 1726 specified that the rate of exchange would be 
four shillings and six pence per peso., which was the old exchange rate. If 
this rate was used between the Corrpany and licensees., they argued) why should 
another be used between the Company and Spain? The Conpany replied that the 
value of the peso escudo de plata could only be its current rate in Spain. 
They insisted that their contracts with licensees had nothing to do with the 
issue. Th complicate the issue even more., the current exchange rate fluctuated 
continually. 
29 
When they failed to reach an agreement, the Spanish threatened to order 
American officials not to admit Company slaves until the duties owed were 
29. Hopkins to George 11,15 May 1735, PRO,, S. P. 36/35., ff. 45-46; Fitzgerald 
to Newcastle., n. d., late 1730s, BM, Add. 19,034, f. 82; Geraldino, to 
directors., 26 Noverrber 1734., PRO., S. P. 104/141; Geraldino to directors) 
18 September 1733,, PRO., S. P. 104/140; Directors to Keene, 25 October 1734j 
BM, Add. 32., 786, f. 71; Minute joint caanittee of correspondence, and 
conTrdttee appointed to deal with Geraldino, 18 Noven-ber 1734, PRO, S. P. 
104/141; Treasury cam-dttee report, 12 September 1733, enclosed in Smith to Geraldino., 15 September 1733., PRO., S. P. 104/140. 
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paid-and at a rate of 4/6 per peso. The directors complained to Newcastle, 
who avoided the responsibility by suggesting that discussions be transferred 
to Spain. (A similar tactic was employed when the com*aissioners reached an 
impasse in their debates. ) The change of locale made little difference., and 
served to irritate Patifto, who considered it a delaying tactic. Eventually., 
in May 17373 a compromise was reached and an exchange rate of 4/4 (52 pence)_ 
per peso was se . 
30 
The entire drawn-out debate exasperated Keene., who had been ordered to 
reiterate the same inflexible demands on behalf of the Company. He remarked 
that "This was a simple and unconnected affair., that only concerned the real 
not nominal value of a Peso: a Dispute., which every Merchant in Europe would 
decide against the Assiento.... " It is surprising that a comprcmise was 
reached considering the intransigence on each side, and the actions taken by 
each to enforce their demands. During the two years of discussions the Spanish 
refused to grant permission for any annual ship to sail, and procrastinated 
in restoring Company goods seized during the rupture of 1728.11he Company 
refused to pay any duties, thereby continuing to hold up the salaries of many 
Spanish ministers. 
31 
With the frequency of verbal confrontation over the asiento contract 
and other disputes between the two crowns,, the possibility of an open conflict 
grew. Peter Burrell, Company deputy director in 1736, contended that the 
deteriorating relations between the two countries was exacerbated by Geraldino., 
30. Keene to Newcastle, 28 March 1735., BM., Add. 43,419, f. 150; Petition from 
the directors., 4 July 1734., PRo., S. P. 36/33, f. 111; Smith to Newcastle3 
22 November 1734, BM, Add. 32,786, f. 347; Newcastle to Keenes 24 February 
1735, BM, Add. 32,787, f. 64; Keene to directors., 28 February 173% 
PRO, S. P. 36/34, ff. 90-91. 
31. Geraldino, to Patifio, 2 March 1737., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2792; Burrell to Keene., 
20 August 1736, BM, Add. 32,792, f. 103; Directors to Keene, 23 December 
1736, BM, Add. 32,793, f. 335; Geraldino, to Tbrrenueva, 9 and 30 May 1737., 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Keene to Newcastle., 24 April 1739, PRO, S. P. 94/133i 
To Torrenueva, 23 December 1737, AGS)-, Estado 6902; Geraldino-to Patiflo., 
25 February 1735,, 
', 
AGS,, Estado 6895. 
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who seemed particularly hostile to the Coupany. Burrell accused him of prying 
into CorrVany correspondence, assuming unauthorized authority over Ccupany 
affairs, and maligning the Corrpany to his own govemwnt. Altematively., it 
might be interpreted merely as proof that he was obeying his instructions. In 
any case the directors despaired of reaching any settlement to existing disputes 
as long as Geraldino remained in England. Keene and Newcastle disagreed., even 
greatly valuing Geraldino because of his influence with Philip V. 
32 
Before discussions were renewed important changes occurred in the Spanish 
cabinet which greatly effected the future of Anglo-Spanish relations. Patifto 
died on 3 November 1736 and was replaced by Sebastian de la Quadra; the Marquis 
of Torrenueva, (one of the old commissioners) acquired the portfolios of Finance., 
Marine and of the Indies., the latter ad-interim; the Count of Montijo2 then 
arrbassador to England,, was appointed president of the Council of the Indies 
and thereby became protector of the asiento. Montijo was succeeded by Geraldino 
as ambassador., and Geraldino's post went to Pedro ITyrry., who arrived in London 
on 3 December 1737. 
Tyrry was distrusted by Newcastle, who was suspicious of his Irish 
parentage and suspected him of having once spied against England. 
33 Nevertheless 
it was generally assumed that these changes would be favourable to the CCMPanY. 
Perhaps the directors thought that any change would be for the better. 9 for it 
is difficult to say what other grounds there were for optimism. Patifto had been 
unfriendly to the Company but Montijo held similar views. In fact it was 
reported that he was at least partly responsible for Patiflo's antagonism. 
32. Burrell to Keene., 10 June 1736,, Bm,, Add. 32,791, ff. 225-227; Newcastle 
to Keene, 3 March 1737, BM., Add. 32., 794, f. 175; Keene to Newcastle, 6 
April 1737., BM., Add. 32., 794, f. 283. 
33. r1yrry received the same salary as Geraldino (2,000 pesos per year) and had the saw general instructions (to attend CaTpany meetings3 measure 
annual ships., examine cargoes and transmit financial and sale records). He also had secret instructions to report on British military activities. Philip V to Torrenueva., 23 July 1737., AGS., Estado 6902; Tbrrenueva to 
Geraldino., 11 November 1737., AGS, Estado 7013; Instructions to Pedro 
Týrry,, 24 Septeirber 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; r1brrenueva, to directors, 20 November 173T, AGS., Estado 6902. 
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Torrenueva followed Patifto's policy of delegating consider-able responsibility 
on Carparxy affairs to Quintana (another ex-comrdssioner)., "the most abstract and 
Metaphysical Negotiator upon matters of Commerce that can be imagined", 
according to Keene_, who complained that 
This Country is at present governed by three or four man stubborn People 
of little minds and limited understandings., but full of the Ranantick Ideas 
They have found in old mmorials and Speculative authors who have treated 
of the innense grandeur of the Spanish Monarchy; People who have vanity 
enough to think themselves reserved by Providence to rectify and refom the 
mistakes and abuses of past ministers and Ages., and who have not - 
conprehension enough to perceive the Injury They do to the whole of the 
Government by their precipitate mending and botching up som particular 
Parts of it. 
Despite the initial feeling of optimism in British goverment and Company 
circles, the changes taking place did not augur well for the future. Certainly 
they did not initiate the desired era of benevolence. Quite the contrary; 
Anglo-Spanish relations became even more strained, primarily because of the 
still unsolved financial dispute between the Company and the Spanish crown . 
34 
Although the question of the exchange rate had been resolved, other 
disputed financial issues were not. Money seized by the Spanish in the 
represalias of 1718 and 1727 had still not been returned in fVU. and the 
Carrpany had not paid any duties on slaves introduced during the current trading 
period,, or the kU-Zls share of profits from the last annual ship., the Royal 
Caroline. Until the money seized during the ruptures-as it appeared on royal 
officials' accounts-was returned, the Conpany refused to pay their debts. They 
suggested two methods by which the Spanish might pay the Conpany: either by a 
direct payment., or as a deduction from negro duties. If the latter method were 
adopted, they said, then the asiento contract would have to be extended some 
34. Keene to Newcastle, 6 April 1737, BM, Add. 32,794, f. 284; Keene to 
Newcastle " 13 August 1736, BM., Add. 43,, 421$ f. 280; Keene to Trevor., 6 November 1736, BM, Add. 43,4223 f. 78; Keene to Burrell$ 17 June 1737, 
BM, Add. 32,795, f. 96; Keene to Newcastle, 29 July and 12 September 1737, 
BK, Add. 32s795, ff. 171s 324; Geraldino to Torrenueva, 5 December 17373 
AGI, Ind.. Gen. 2793; Týrry to Torrenueva, 5 Decerrber 1737, AGI., Ind. Gen. 
2793; Keene to Newcastle., 24 April 1739., BM., Add. 32,800, f. 394. 
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30 years to allow time for sufficient duties to be coUected. 
35 
The Conpany made several other demands. They asked for the renewal of 
the privilege to grant licenses to individuals to sell negroes in Spanish ports 
in the Indies where there were no factories., and requested that the accounts 
which they were required to turn in every five years (but which they had not 
done) be accepted in an outline form covering all factories rather than a 
detailed account for each. Me reasons for this last request were twofold: 
first., detailed accounts were unavailable., and second., illicit or extra-legal 
activities by the Conpany could be hidden mre easily in general accounts - 
Perndssion to send another annual ship was also requested., although it seem 
unlikely that the directors actually wanted to send another one. The request 
was probably made as a result of various reports and proposals that were 
submitted to the Company from Spanish merchants. In 1738 several of these 
merchants in America proposed that their ships be employed by the Ccmpany to 
carry goods' to the viceroyalty of Peru. They provided the directors with 
information about the coastline to assist then in this proposed illicit trade. 
Another merchant suggested that a trade in slaves and supplies be conducted 
by Spanish merchants and managed by the Company. While none of these offers 
were accepted2 they demnstrated to the directors th-- continuing demand for 
merchandise. 
36 
In reply to the Canpany's petitions Quadra said that their obligation to 
pay slave duties and a percentage of the profits fran sales made On the Royal 
caroline were unconditional; they could not be made contingent on the satisfaction 
35. Burrell to George 11,30 June 1737., PRO., S. P. 94/132; Geraldino to 
Torrenueva., 25 July 1737., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2793; Minute of a special 
committee,, 13 December 1737., BM,, Add. 25., 583 sf-7; Burrell and Bristol to George 11,21 December 1737, PROj S. P. 94/132; Keene to Newcastlej 15 
September 173T, PRO., S. P. 94/131; Abstract of the South Sea Ccaipany's Demands., with the Spanish Answers and Mr. Keene's Observations Thereupon) 
n. d., PRO, S. P. 131; Company proposal, 23 June and 1 December 1737, AGSj Estado 6907. 
36. Memorandum of the Spanish India trade,, n. d. . c. 17381 C. L. . Shel. vol. 443 ff. 22-23; Burrell to (probably) Keene., 9 February 1738, BM, Add. 
32s797. ) ff. 57-58. 
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of Company claims . Moreover he threatened to suspend the asiento contract if 
they were not paid shortly. Although Newcastle was upset by the threat., he was 
so poorly informed about the details of the long-standing dispute he could give 
Keene only inprecise and vague instructions to support the Company. It now 
looked as if negotiations might break down completely and that Spain might 
abrogate the treaty unilaterally. When Keene became aware of this threat he 
declared that 
A Dispute of this nature with the Company cannot be a Reason for Suspending 
a national Treaty, as That of the Assiento is; There is Not in that 
Treaty, that gives any such Power to the King of Spain ..... 
In addition to these problems a crisis situation bad arisen in the Indies 
over attempts by guardacostas to suppress smuggling by British merchants to 
the Spanish Main. In their zealousness they seized innocent and guilty alike., 
including British merchant ships engaged in inter-colonial and trans-Atlantic 
trade. There were other issues damaging Anglo-Spanish relations, including 
the Georgia boundary question,, logwood., and British settlements on the Mosquito 
Coast., and incursions in Central America., but the dispute over the restitution 
of seized ships and goods was perhaps the major cause of the War of Jenkin's 
Ear., which erupted in 1739. 
The British case against seizures was based on the treaties of 1667 and 
1670. By the terrm of the American Treaty of 1670 trade between England and 
her colonies was to be uninterrupted on condition that England restrain her 
merchants from trading with Spanish colonies. The treaty of 1667 specified 
the'. rights of a ship,, including the question of search. Only a ship's papers 
could be examined, according to the British interpretation of the treaty. 
Cargoes could not be searched indiscriminately., and only goods on Spain's list 
of contraband could be condemned. The Spanish claimed the right to search any 
37. Newcastle to Keene, 8 May 1739, EM, Add. 32,800, f. 374; Quadra. to Keene, 
29 December 1738, PRO3 S. P. 94/133; Newcastle to Keene, 13 Noverrber 1738) 
PRO., SP 94/132; Keene to Newcastle., 13 January 1739, EM., Add-32., 800.9 ff. 
5-10; Ernest Hildner., "The Role of the South Sea Ccupany in the Diplamcy 
Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear., 1729-1739",, Hispanic American Historical 
Review., xviii (1938). P. 329. 
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ship in the Indies because of Spain's sovereignty there., and that they had 
authority to seize contraband goods., even on British territory. The first 
assertion was considered a search on the high seas by the British., and therefore 
illegal. They also refuted the second,, noting that scme merchandise on the 
contraband list was acquired legally. The South Sea Company., for example, often 
acquired such goods frm the proceeds of the slave trade. 
38 
A public outcry in England demanding compensation for seizures made by 
guardcostas prompted British ministers to increase their demands. On 9 August 
1738 the Duke of Newcastle., Sir Robert Walpole., and Lord Harrington agreed 
with Thomas Geraldino that Philip V would pay 05,000 as the balance due to 
British merchants for redress against illegal seizures after similar claims 
from Spanish merchants against the British were deducted. M-lis agreement formed 
the basis of a treaty signed at the Pardo on 14 January 1739 in which Spain 
agreed to pay E95., 000 compensation for seizures on condition that the South Sea 
Company pay z68., 000 due on negro duties and the profits from the Royal Caroline. 
Thus the net balance British merchants were to receive was only E27., 000, far 
less than the original claim for X200,000., which the Spanish had actually 
admitted was due fran guardacosta depredations. A proviso attached to the 
treaty by the Spanish made it impossible for it to succeed; unless the Company 
paid the money they owed Spain, the E95., 000 would not be paid and the asiento 
suspended. 
The treaty did not settle the questions of search., Florida and Georgia 
boundaries, logwood or the Mosquito Coast. Nor did it settle the 
conflicting demands for compensation. Company directors refused to pay the 
t68., 000 unless the Spanish paid the money'awed fm-m the represalias over and 
above the Z95,000, which included claims fran private merchants. Quadra refused 
to submit to this demand in the terms the Company required: either that the 
38. Pares., War and Trade, pp. 28-29., 31., 37,39-40; William Sorsby, "The 
British Su-perintendency of the Mosquito Shore 1749-1787", Unpublished Ph. D. 
cu5z3er-ua: w-on., UnIvers1ty or London, Institute of Historical Research, 
P. 9. 
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viceroys of New Spain and Peru repay the amount seized in 1718 and 1727 in 
regular bi-annual payments or that the asiento contract be extended 30 years. 
Keene suTnwized the reaction in Madrid: "It is not easy for me to express... 
half the wrath They throw ouý against the said Company on this occasion. " 
39 
Meanwhile, to placate angry public opinion in England over continuing 
Spanish depredations., British war ships ccmnanded by Read-Admiral Haddock., 
which had been sent to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet early in 1738,, were 
ordered on 21 March 1739 to remain there. When Quadra and other Spanish 
ministers learned of this, the outbreak of hostilities became certain. Spain 
refused to pay the E95., 000,, and the South Sea Conpany would concede nothing. 
On 19 July 1739 British naval comnanders in the West Indies were ordered to 
attack the Spanish. A fortnight later Keene was summoned home., and a month 
later, on 27 August., Philip V retaliated. He recalled Týrry and GeraldinO 
40 
from London and ordered all South Sea Company effects in America seized. 
41 
The War of Jenkins' Ear brought an end to South Sea Company activities 
in the West Indies and South America. For the third and last time CornPanY 
effects were seized, factors arrested and ships detained. The war was fought 
39. Minutes of a meeting at Lord Harrington's. 9 August 17381 BM., Add. 32., 799., 
f 48;, The Daily Post, 2 March 1739; Keene to Newcastle,, 29 September 
lb8, BM., Add. 32., 799,9 f. 130; Burrell and Bristow to George 11,21 
December 1737., PRO., S. P. 94/132; Newcastle to Keene, 21 August 1738., PRO) 
S. P. 94/132; Directors to Keene, 17 March 1739, BM, Add. 32)800j ff. 206-207; 
Newcastle to Keene., 8 May 1739., BM., Add. 32., 800,1 f. 374; Pares., War and 
Trade., PP. 51., 55; Real c6dula, 13 October 1738,, PRO, S. P. 94/247, f. 310; 
Royal decree signed by Quadra., 10 January 1739, PRO., S. P. 94/133; Quintana 
to Quadra, 27 December 1738., AGS,, Estado 6905; Basil Williams., P-ft-Wh-i. & 
Supremacy 1114-1760 (Oxford., 1962)., p. 209. 
40. Geraldino was ordered to try to find somone to report secretly from 
England during his absence. To Geraldino, 28 August 1739., AGS,, Estado 6909. 
41. Newcastle to Keene, 26 January 1739, PRO, S. P. 94/134; Memorial fýnm the 
directors to Newcastle, 1 June 1739., PRO, S. P. 94/248., f. 54B; Orders to 
governors and royal officials in Spanish American ports,, 27 August 1739., 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Minute junta del asiento, 5 Decerrber 1739., AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2771; Verdes Montenegro to general treasury, 19 Septerber 1740, AGI, 
Ind. Gen. 2786; To Marquis of Salas., 13 July 1739, AGS, Estado 6909. 
For well-docurnented studies on. the causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear 
see Pares, op. cit., Harold Temperley, "Me Causes of the War of Jenkinst 
Ear, 1739". Transactions of the Royal Historical Society., Third series, 
vol. 111 (1909); and McLachlan, Trade aYA ýeace. 
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in a desultory manner., ending in 1748 with the signing of the Treaty of Aix- 
la-Chapelle. Neither side gained a marked victory. The treaty provided that 
the asiento contract be extended for four years., the time remaining to caTplete 
the 30 years of the original treaty. The slave trade was to be renewed on the 
same basis as previously., with an annual ship to sail in each of the last foLT 
years. However the Company was in no position to renew the trade. Despairing 
of prospect of successful trading after so many prior setbacks, they left 
the factories closed. They had already ordered all factors to return to England 
at the beginning of the war. 
42Now., 
in the years immediately after the war the 
directors concentrated their efforts on obtaining compensation for alledged 
losses sustained in the trade during the seizures of 1718., 1727 and 1739* 
43 
Benjamin Keene returned to Spain after the war with renewed instructions 
to pramte Company claims for ccmpensation, this time as part of the 
negotiations for a general. commercial treaty. The Company complicated the 
negotiations for a brief period by insisting on sane indemnification in exchange 
fdr. rel-inquishing the four trading years due to them. But their claims were 
not supported by the British goverment, who were no longer willing to jeopardize 
England's trading position for the dubious benefit of the CaTpanys particularly 
since they feared that coveted trading concessions would go to the French if 
the Spanish became antagonized over Company demands. As Keene expressed it., 
"I am a friend to a friendship with this Country not only for the Advantages 
of ccmmerce which are considerable"., but as "the only means to pare down to 
42. Not all Company employees returned to England. William Leas who had a 
license to supply slaves to Guatemala$ went to Jamaica. In 1741 he 
presented a proposal to the governor for an invasion of Guatemala; the 
plan was rejected after serious consideration. Sorsbys op. cit.., p. 26. 
43. Keene to Carvajal y Lancaster., 21 March 1749., AGS, Estado 6916; Bedford 
to Keene, 12 February 1750, BMI ýdd. 43,4242 f. 39. 
Pares says that the South Sea Company had three kinds of claims against 
Spain: 1) slave duties and the annual shipss 2) private debts to Philip Vs 
which included money lent to him at the beginning of the asiento contracts 
and 3) represalias. All three categories were related to the asiento 
contract. Pares., op. cit., P. 520. 
For a stucV of the development of new tr-ading patterns see Fr-ances 
Armytage., The Free Port System in the British West Indies (Londons 1953). 
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Size our haughty Rival & Neighbourl-the French. 
44 
On 5 October 1750 Spain and England signed a treaty which tertninated the 
asiento contract and ended 36 years of Anglo-Spanish bickering over it. On 
the assurance that they would give up all further claim against Spain, the 
South Sea Company was granted E100., 000 to cover losses sustained during the 
three represalias, because of the infrequent sailings of the annual ships., 
and for the repeated interruptions in the slave trade. The special trading 
privileges granted to England by the treaties of 1667 and 1670 were renewed. 
This treaty brought an end not only to a conflict but also to a controversy: 
it resolved the debate over the monopolistic Company and private traders in 
favour of the latter. 
45 
44. Wall to Carvajal y Lancaster., 23 October and 20 November 1749, AGS, 
Estado 6914; Keene to (probably) Newcastle, 22 March 1750,, BM, Add. 43s424s 
f. 104; Bedford to Keene, 17 August 1749., BM., Add. 43,, 423., ff. 176-177; 
Sperling, The South Sea Canpany, p. 45; Bedford to Keene, 26 October 1749, 
B% Add. 43,424, ff. 244-247. 
45. Bedford to Keene,, 30 August 1750, BM., Add. 43,, 424., ff. 214-215; Convention 
signed by Keene and, Carvajal y Lancaster, 5 October 1750, kim., Estado 2954; 




The Third Trading Period: 
Trade of the Factors 
South Sea Carpany employees in Buenos Aires remained at the factory during 
the rupture of 1728-1729., although they were inactive and nearly penniless. 
During the war money owed to the Company in Potosi and Chile was collected by 
Spanish officials and sent to Spain. Consequently the factors had to borrow 
money to maintain the factory and to support a number of unsold slaves, which 
for sane reason were not seized during the represalia. 
When news of peace arrived the factors continued their duties as before 
(although they were soon replaced). Their first two obligations were to obtain 
the restitution of Cwpany effects seized in the represalia and to reestablish 
the slave trade. The Spanish refused at first to restore embargoed goods or 
to allow the resumption of the trade. The order to release the Prince Frederick 
(See above p. IIAI ), they contended, made no reference to Buenos Aires. The 
Company slave ship Sirene., which had arrived in December 1729 with 48o slaves. 9 
was detained until March, when royal officials finally agreed to restore trade. 
The embargoed effects., including account books, were not released until after 
new factors arrived on 9 October 1730.1 
The management of the factory suffered considerably under the new men,, who 
had. been- split by dissension during the difficult 100 day voyage. The chief 
factor,, -John-Browne, was. a-friend of Sir John Eyles., 
2 
which undoubtedly explains' 
his appointment., because he brought few personal qualifications to the post. 
During the trip he antagonized the captain and his fellow factors, fighting over 
1. Factors to Keene, 18 May 1730, PRO, S. P. 36/20, part i., f. 163; To Varas Y 
Valdds, j 12 December 1729., AGI,, Contrataci6n 5145; Petition from Robert Cross et al, c. 23 March 1730,, and response from, royal officials., 23 March 
17303 AGS, Estado 688o. 
2. Not only did Eyles apparently participate in illicit trade through pliable 
factors., but also through the letting of contracts. Most of the ships the 
Canpany sent to Buenos Aires were owned by his cousin., Joseph Eyles., and his partner., William Chapman. Geraldino's comients on the factors., n. d.., AGS., Estado 7008. 
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matters "too Ridiculous to mention". This discord continued in Buenos Aires 
when Browne refused to met the governor in company with the other factors. 
A more serious controversy arose over the sale of slaves in Buenos Aires. 
The Conpany claimed that sales were so poor there early in the third trading 
period that it was "Impossible to sell 50 Negroes in 6 Months". They blamed 
the problem primarily on the governor for not containing illicit Portuguese 
introductions3 but also on the general poverty of the province., the earthquake 
in Chile which temporarily prevented merchants from travelling to Buenos Aires., 
and the decision by the viceroy of Peru to prohibit the movement of funds to 
the coast except during the fairs. 
Browne decided to improve sales by sending one of the junior factors, 
Robert Hiltoný to Chile with a consigment of slaves. Hilton refused to gop 
because he had instructions fran the Company to remain in Buenos Aires. 
Consequently Browne suspended him and ordered him, expelled from, the colony. 
But the other factors persuaded the governor, as juez interventor, to annul 
the order. 
When the directors learned of this dispute they recalled Hiltoný and 
urged the others to resolve their differences "to avoid the Unfolding the 
Secrets, Instructions and Affairs of the Canpany to the Spanish Goven-ment., 
which Protests against each other lay open & Expose[d] 
Because of Hilton's refusal to take slaves to Chile, Browne contracted 
with one Joseph de Salinas to transport them. to Potosi by way of Chile, and 
directed the Company agent in Potosi, Pedro Navarro, to make the necessary 
arrangements for their sale. With instructions to sell as many slaves as 
possible en mute, and to be wary of bandits., Salinas hired a surgeon and a 
3. Minute carudttee of correspondence and factories, 18 November 1731, BMj 
Add. 25,553, ff. 95-110; Fran John Eyles, 28 November 1734, BM, Add. 
32., 786.9 f. 315; Hilton to Burrell., 12 March 1731., C. L., Shel. vol. 44, 
f. 439; Saville to Burrell, 25 March 1731, C. L., Shel. vol. 44,, ff. 421-423; Saville to Burrell, n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 44., ff. 414-417; Minute 
c=iittee of correspondence and factories, 5 August 1731., BM, Add. 2535533 
ff. 84-85; Zavala to Philip V, 30 March 1731, AGI, Contadurfa 268; de 
Studer., La trata de negros., p. 221. 
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guard for the journey., and prepared a caravan with ample supplies of clothing, 
food and medicine. They departed early in 1731 with 407 slaves. The trip 
was tortuous; 50 slaves died en route and only 10 were sold before their arriva-I 
in Potosi. (Of these 10 three were women who brought an average price of 
416 pesos 6 reales-probably a record price for the Company. ) Wenty more slaves 
died in Potosi but the remainder were sold for 117,714 pesos (an extremely high 
average of 360 pesos per slave)., of which 25., 608 pesos 1 real were in effects 
such as olive oil, aguardiente., cocoa, sugar and chilli. There were 133 
separate sales, the great majority being single sales as was typical in the 
Company Is trade. 
4 
Royal officials in Chile and Peru refused to allow the proceeds of these 
sales to be remitted to Buenos Aires., but when the Company complained the 
decision was overruled in Madrid. This authorization to transfer Conpany money 
and effects fran one factory to another effectively annulled an earlier decision 
by the viceroy of Peru. The export of silver frm Potosi and elsewhere through 
Buenos Aires on Company register and private ships became a major problem 
that was not resolved prior to the War of Jenkins' Ear. 
5 
Spanish officials in Buenos Aires were ordered to assist the CaTpany by 
stopping the illicit introductions of slaves from the nearby "malicious" 
Portuguese colony. They had very little success. Moreover, when contraband 
slaves were seized they were often kept or sold privately rather than turned 
4. Details of slaves sold by Joseph de Salinas between 1 February 1731 and 
20 January 1734, n. d., AGI., Buenos Aires 591; List of slaves; 18 August 
1731., AGI., Buenos Aires 591; Instructions to Salinas and Rodriguez, 14 
August 1731., AGI., Buenos Aires 591; For further details on this trip see 
de Studer, op. cit., pp. 223-225, and Villalobos, El Comercio, pp. 42-43. 
5. Minute coninittee of correspondence and factories., 16 May 1728, BM, Add. 
25,552, f. 14; Philip V to viceroy of Peru, 27 February 1732, AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2769; Keene to Patiflo., 28 March 1732., AGS,, Estado, 6883; Salas Y 
Villela to Philip Vj 28 February 1737, AGI., Lima 414. 
The factors also accused the royal officials of hindering the remittance 
of their salaries to England. If they could not do so, several of thein 
con7nented., "it may without offence be asked, what we came hither for? " 
Extract frm Messrs. Faure and Thoke,, 15 October 1736., AGS, Estado 7009. 
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over to the Carpany as stipulated by treaty. Ill I cit trade through Sacramento 
continued virtually unchecked. Coapany ships were supposed to pick up Spanish 
guards in Montevideo,, but these men were pliable and so captains freely unloaded 
contraband there., and "turned their vessels into public markets". 
When the governor of Buenos Aires, Miguel de Salcedo, complained to the 
Portuguese governor of Sacramento., Antonio Pedro de Vasconcelos., about this 
illegal trade, Vasconcelos said that he could do nothing. Nor would he; the 
British were allies, he said., and he was obliged to be hospitable to them. 
Salcedo claimed that he had no other recourse; the Portuguese were too strong 
to attack,, and his vessels could not approach the British ships because of a 
small fortification they had palced on San Gabriel. 
The factors in Buenos Aires also sold an abundance of contraband goods., 
according to Viceroy Castelfuerte, so much so that when the galleons arrived in 
Portobelo there was not enough silver left to rmke purchasesat the fair. 
6 
Although the real audiencia of Lima considered Buenos Aires to be the 
centre for illicit trade now that guardacostas patrolled more frequently between 
Fortobelo and Cartagena., the factory there was of practical value to local 
inhabitants. The Conpany doctor,, Robert Young, was the only doctor in Buenos 
Aires, and the only source of medical supplies. He freely gave his time to 
the Spaniards and even treated sailors on Spanish warships. 
7 
The asiento trade in Buenos Aires ended on 21 April 1740 when news arrived 
of Anglo-Spanish hostilities and the factors were placed under house arrest. 
The guard was removed in Septenter after the factors gave their word--fortified 
6. Philip V to the governor and royal officials of Buenos Aires, 19 January 
17369 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Spackman and Faure to directors, 9 December 17342 
BM, Add. 323790, f. 331; Faure to Burrell, 12 March 1738, C. L., Shel. vol. 
442 f. 367; Junta del asiento, 20 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2777; 
Quintana to Philip V., 25 November 1737., AGI, Buenos Aires 590; Vasconcelos 
to Salcedo, 4 Januar7 1738., AGI,, Buenos Aires 591; Salcedo to Torrenueva, 
23 February 1738, AGI, Buenos Aires 591; Castelfuerte to Patifto, 4 May 
17313 AGI, Lirm 642. 
7. Quintana to Geraldino., 9 October 1736., AGS., Estado 7006; Herran to 
president of Buenos Aires, 30 Decerrber 1730., AGI3 Contrataci6n 5145; Real 
Audiencia to Philip V., 21 July 1732., AGI., Ltna 414. 
1 
by a bond--that they would not leave the city without permission. Most of them 
left for England early in 1741 on a British ship., the Royal Mercury. CoiTpany 
pr, operty left behind was the subject of debate for many years. 
8 
(See below p. 253) 
The third trading period in Cartagena was successful if masured by the 
nurber of slaves introduced., but as at Buenos Aires., difficult from the point 
of view of the factors. 
9 New factors arrived in June 1728 carrying with them 
copies of the preliminary articles of peace. A British naval officer broadcast 
the news ashore., "and as he gave them the first Notice of the Peace, the Streets 
were Crowded with People Shouting and Rejoycing and Chearfullness Appearld in 
every Body. " 
The governor was far less receptive. The galleons had arrived and he 
thought it unwise for South Sea Ccupany employees to be there at the same time. 
He refused to allow the factors into town, contending that he had not received 
orders from his court. Consequently the factors returned to Jamaica, although 
undoubtedly they would have been permitted to land after the galleons sailed 
on 21 October 1726. (The factors at Caracas were pennitted to land on 1 
November. ) 
10 
These factors did not return to Cartagena, and were replaced in June 1729 
by Edward Garthwaite and Thanas NasnWth, who left for their post after the 
Treaty of Seville was signed in November. They arrived in Cartagena on 5 April 
8. Extract Messrs. Faure and Tooke to directors, 18 May 1742., PRO., S. P. 
94/2483 f. 392C; de Studer, op. cit., p. 228. 
9. The commissions the factors received are unknown., but their tariff of 
expenses is as follows: 
15 reales per slave for medical expenses and treatment 
2 pesos 1 real per slave for port charges 
1 real per slave per day for maintenance 
4 reales per slave for doctors' examinations 
18; -2 reales per slave for rent of negrory and salaries of guards 
Minute cannittee of correspondence and factories., 15 May 1729, BM, Add. 
25)552, f. 62. 
10. St. Lo to Burchett, 24 June, -6 July and 10 November 1728, PRO, AcIm. 1/230; Wescomb to Keene, 10 and 24 October 1728, BM3 Add. 25,566, ff. 543 56; 
Directors to Rigby and Pratter,, 14 February 1729., BMj Add. 25,566, f. 68. 
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1730 on the Don Carlos, which also carried 181 slaves. They were allowed to 
land, but their welcome was unenthusiastic and it appeared that they would have 
difficulty reopening the trade in spite of official documents that they carried. 
A British naval officer remarked: 
The indifferent reception ... and the little regard the Governour shew'd to the Cedulas they carried., gave some Apprehension as if those Cedulas 
were not Sufficient, but that one must come directly fran Spain ... before 
restitution could be made., or pernAssion for the Factors., to Ship 
freely the produce of the Negroes which have of late been carried there. 
After presenting to the captain-general, Antonio de Salas, several petitions 
quoting the relevant c6dulas and orders., the factors received permission to 
sell slavess but as happened at Buenos Aires., in a similar incident they were 
not permitted to remit receipts until instructions were received from Patifto 
late in 1730 or early 1731. After receiving a report on the state of the trade 
from Benjamin Keene., Patiflo ordered Salas to allow the resumption of the asiento 
trade as it was before the war,, and to restore Conpany effects seized in the 
represalia. Before these orders arrived,, however., he constantly thwarted the 
factors. He rejected their petition for the return of slaves seized during the 
war (most had worked on government projects)., and of 230,000 pesos which had 
been confiscated and used to support the local garrison. Salas added a further 
insult when he informed the factors that the Company would be taxed on the 
introduction of slaves because the provincial revenue was so meagre. 
11 
Antonio de Salas was so hostile to the CaTpany that he threatened to drive 
the factors from Cartagena. Houstoun,, the Coapany surgeon during the second 
trading period who returned as a factor with Garthwaite and Nasmyth,, described 
Salas as 
a stubborn, resolute, old Soldier., with little or no Education, and what 
little Understanding he had was purely natural, fýmm whcrn we met with a 
very unmannerly and rude Reception, inscmuch that the Very Inhabitants of 
the Place, our old Friends and Acquaintance, durst not even speak to us in 
the Streets, or invite us to their Houses; but were obliged to come skulking 
to us in the Night-time., with Protestations of their Friendship, though 
they were positively forbid by the Governor to shew us any Manner of 
Countenance. 
Extract from the factors., 24 May 1730., PRO., S. P. 36/18., part ii,, f. 63; 
Garthwaite to Diaz y Muaoz., c. 5 May 1730., AGSý Estado 688o; Patifio to 
(continued on next page) 
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The treatment of Spanish inhabitants in Cartagena was equally cruel. In 
September 1732 the bishop was moved to plead with the king "to liberate [the 
city] from the tyranny it suffers". 
Nonetheless Salas' interference in the Conpany trade was occasionally 
justified. The factors were involved constantly in a wide variety of illegal 
activities. As at most factories they sold provisions that were introduced 
under the pretext that they were for factory use. These goods included flour., 
pepper., cinnamon, ham., cheese, butter,, rum., seeds., clothing and ships' stores. 
Wine and spirits were seized from Corrpany ships whether or not they were for 
factory consumption; wine was scarce., and according to the factors particularly 
sought after by the governor., who had the avid support of other royal officials; 
"for the sake of a Barrel of Wine [the Spanish] would at any Tim detain a 
Vessel of the Corrpany's for a Month". 
12 
Salas also meddled in Company affairs at Santa Marta., a small Ca-npany 
outpost under the jurisdiction of the factors in Cartagena. Spanish merchants 
often preferred to buy slaves there because they were cheaper., and transportation 
was easier. But Salas closed down that office because of the contraband 
introduced, and posted guards along the Rfo Magdalena to prevent Coaparjy ships 
from entering there. As a result local merchants turned to the French) Dutch 
and private British merchants for slaves. There was such a rush of - 
contrabandistas that the market became overstocked with both slaves and 
merchandise. There is evidence that the governor, other royal officials, the 
(continued from previous page) royal officials,, 1 February 1728.1 BM., Add. 
32s779s f. 295; Patifto to Salas., 22 November 1730, PRO, S. P. 94/lo4; 
Wescon-b to Thomas and Butcher., 20 June 1729, BM., Add. 25., 566, f. 101; 
Real c6dula, 14 December 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; Salas to Philip Vj 
13 May 17303 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Royal officials to Philip V3 26 May 
1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Stewart to Burchett., 9 June 1730,, PRO., Adm. 
1/231; Auto., c. 13 April 1730, AGS,, Estado 6880. 
12. Crowe and Ord to directors., 28 April 1735, EM., Add. 32., 788,, f. 250; 
Directors to Keene., 4 July 1735., BM., Add. 32., 788., f. 176; Real c6dula, 
22 February 1734., AGi,, Santa F4 442; Gregorio., Bishop of Cartagena, to 
Philip V., 10 September 1732, AGI, Santa Fd 1009; Houstoun., op. cit.,, 
PP. 1573 183. 
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factors., and officers of Conpany ships actually cooperated occasionally in 
illicit trade., although Salas said that the accusations against him were 
"debased". Far fran "the stores being so filled that it looked as if the galleons 
had arrived",, he said., there was hardly enough cloth available "to make a 
decent suit". 
Salas' action had a prejudicial effect on both the Corrpany's legal,, and 
the factors I illicit, trade. Reports from Salas and other royal officials in 
Cartagena(which were proupted by accusations of illicit trade against them) 
led to a ruling that all unregistered goods arriving in the Indies on Company 
ships be seized, and that all registered goods be placed under three keys., one 
each to be kept by the factors., the royal officials and the mayordorm of the 
storehouse. As suggested above., many merchants were now afraid to have any 
dealings whatsoever with the factors. 
13 
Supplies, particularly flour., were often scarce in Cartagena, which helps 
to explain the demand for illicit goods. In October 1737 Company factors signed 
a contract with the president and oidores of Santa Fe and the new govemor of 
Cartagena, Pedro Joseph Fidalgo, to furnish flour on order, even if war should 
break out. Philip V annulled the contract as soon as he leamed of it; obviously 
it was a license to illicit trade. 
14 
Slaves introduced in Cartagena during the last trading period included a 
number of Catholics from the "Kingdom of the Congo" who the Corrpany branded 
on the chest with a cross. Royal officials complained to the king about the 
practice, suggesting that it was not right that Christians enslaved other 
Christians. However Philip V decided that these slaves could be admitted and 
sold, explaining that it was far better for them to be taken to a Catholic than 
13. Salas'to Philip V., 15 March 1735,, AGI, Santa Fd 1009; Gary to directors, 
7 August 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Junta del asiento 26 March 1733, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Geraldino to Baamonte,, 30 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 
2792; Geraldino to Patifio., 5 July 1736., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Real c6dula, 
22 February 1734,, AGI.. Santa Fe 442. 
14. Philip V to the audiencia. of Santa Fe., 31 August 1739., AGI., Santa Fd 432; 
Philip V to Fidalgo, n. d-.., c. MaY 1739., AGI., Santa Fd 432. 
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to a Protestant country. There was no firm policy regarding the enslavement 
of Christians. On orders fra-a the Inquisition royal officials in Havana once 
f1saved" a Catholic wanan slave fran being sent to a British colony., but later 
the junta del asiento ordered her returned to her Protestant owners. 
15 
As it did elsewhere the Company's trade came to a bizarre end in 
Cartagena. On 20 September 1739 a British warship commanded by one Captain 
Stapleton arrived in Cartagena to inform the factors privately of the outbreak 
of hostilities. (The official declarations of war were not issued by the British 
until 19 October and by the Spanish on 28 November. ) The following day the 
governor sent a pilot out to assist the British ship into port, assuming it to 
ship 
be a negro or provision/ When the pilot boat arrived Stapleton inexplicably 
seized it and made its officers and men captive. The act resulted in the 
immediate closure of the factory,,, the seizure of all Company effects and the 
imprisonment of the factors, who turned in desperation to Governor Trelawny of 
Jamaica for help. The governor had done them marrj favours., they said., one of 
which had been to despatch the pilot boat seized by Stapleton. "English Arm 
can receive no honour from taking a Boat & twenty defenceless Men"., they said., 
"much less any Advantage, and we as well as the other Factors shall pay for 
this who have no blame. 11 
The factors were pernAtted to proceed to Jamaica after official word of 
the outbreak of war reached Cartagena on 31 March 1740. It is presumed that 
the Spanish pilot boat and crew were released beforehand. After gaining their 
freedom the factors announced that no factory debts had been seized because 
they had never sold on credit. However they feared that debts still in 
litigation from, the second reprisal would never be collected. This money was., 
in fact., included as part of the final demands the Company made on Spain. 
16 
15. Real c6dula, 5 October 1736, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2777; Smr=7 of testimony., 
c. 177, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2810. 
16. Real orden,, 27 August 1739., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2771; Ord to Burre'13 20 July 
17, FCU-C. L.., Shel. vol. 44., f. 693; Gray to Trelawny, 30 September 1739, 
PRO, , C. O. 137/56, ff. 275-276; Navarreta, to Quintana, 8 June 174o, An. Santa Fe 1009. 
193 
South Sea Company directors decided at the beginning of the last trading 
period that the asiento trade could support only one factory in Cuba, and 
recalled the factor who had been stationed in Santiago. Soon afterwards they 
changed their minds and reopened the Santiago factory,, placing it under Havanats 
jurisdiction. Then, on 21 April 1730, it was again made independent. Wargent 
Nicholson,, who had spent many years in Havana, and his old crony, Hubert Tassel, 
were reassigned there., and Jonathan Denniss and Leonard Cooke to Santiago. 
A tariff of allowable expenses was promulgated in 1729 by the directors 
based on an annual sale of 550 slaves in Cuba (440 in Havana and 110 in Santiago), 
and increased in 1730 to include expenses in Santiago. Havana was allotted 
14,066 pesos for annual expenses, and Santiago half that. They were to be 




Provisions for slaves (for 12 days) 
Rent of a negrory 
Salaries of a guard., nurse and barber 
Maintenance and clothing for slaves 
House and warehouse rent 
Barges 
Doctor and medicine 




about 230 pesos per ship 
2/3 real per day per slave 
1 peso per slave 
4 reales per slave 
1 real per slave per daY 
unspecified 
2/3 real per day per barge 
2 pesos per slave 
7 pesos each 18 
3 pesos per slave 
The basis for the tariff in Havana was lowered fran 440 to 400 slaves in 1733, 
and again changed in 1735 when it was CoIrputed on actual expenses rather than 
on the number of slaves introduced. In addition the factors received conTdssions 
17. The money allotted for port charges was paid to various Spanish officialsj 
including superior officials, soldiers and guards., physicians., an 
inquisitor, the guardamayor, the secretary to the registry office, and for 
fees such as registration., anchorage, city duties., pilotage., and 
verification of ships' tonnage. 
18. Contingent charges included entertairznent for Spanish officials; expenses 
for "public rejoicing"; ' charges for landing slaves; nursing sick slaves; 
pa, yment for autos, wood,, candles., and a2m on sundry occasions; and for 
information on arriving vessels and illicit slave introductions. 
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of 5% on gross sales and on returns remitted to England. 
19 
Factors in Havana and Santiago feuded with royal officials throughout the 
last trading period. They experienced the same resistance to the reestablishment 
of trade as did the factors in Cartagena. Even though they had copies of the 
necessary c4dulas they were not admitted to their posts until authorization 
arrived directly fran Spain. And even then the hostility of local officials 
had not dissipated. They refused to return Company effects seized in the 
previous represalia, to turn over slaves introduced into the island during the 
recent war.,, or even to allow testimonies to be taken during disputes. When the 
Company complained that these actions were in violation of the asiento treaty, 
they were informed that the treaty had been suspended during the war. 
Nonetheless Denniss and Cocke did open an indulto, to gather the slaves illegally 
introduced during the rupture, although they waited until 1733., partly because 
they were not permitted to open one earlier., and partly as a cover to protect 
an illicit trade in slaves. Their timing angered the directors, who dismAssed 
them., having correctly suspected them of illicit trade. 
20 
A major problem which effected both factories throughout the last trading 
period., and which was probably the main reason for the diminution of slave 
introductions in the last half of the period, was the activity of privateers 
and renegade guardacostas. In 1731 there were reported to be 12 to 14 
guardacostas cruising against foreign merchants along the Cuban coast. Probably 
19. Minute conmittee of correspondence and factories, 8 May 1729., EM., Add. 
25,552, f. 61; Minute conrnittee of corTespondence and factories, 21 April 
1730, BM, Add. 25,553., ff. 19-21; Directors to Denniss et al, 4 July 17293 
BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 102-105; Paper on tariffs., n. d.., c. 1736, C. L., Shel. 
vol. 43, f. 244; Tariffs (in Burrellts hand)., n. d. C. 17363 C. L., Shel. 
vol. 43, f. 243; Directors to Rigby and Pratter,, 14 February 1729, BM., 
Add. 25,566, f. 68 
20. Wescanb to Keene, 10 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 54; Directors to 
Rigby and Pratter., 15 November 1728, BM., Add. 25,566, f. 62; Cocke to 
Hayman and Hynes,, 12 July 1730., Bodleian., MS Clarendon Dept. C 468; 
Casafuerte to Philip V,, 22 July 1730., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 1601; To Benjamin 
Keene, 23 April 1731, AGS, Estado 6882; Smith to Geraldino, 23 January 
17363 AGS, Estado, 7006; Real c6dula, 20 December 1735., AGI, Ind. Gen. 
2777; Minute carmittee of correspTnd nce, 29 November 1733 and 11 Septeirber 1734, BM, Add. 253554, ff. 51-52. 
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because of this Denniss I requests for slaves at Santiago went unheeded by 
Company agents in Jamaica. This situation led to such poor relations between 
the factors and agents that Denniss remarked that "we in particular seem to 
be singled out by the people of Jamaica to be treated with injustice & 
inhunanity. 11 The situation only improved when the governor of Havana seized 
one of the Ea]ýncostas, for piratical activities after receiving numerous 
canplaints fran the factors. 
21 
The relative profit or loss of the asiento trade in Cuba during the last 
trading period is difficult to determine because of the extensive illegal 
activities of almost all the factors at both factories. Introductions of slaves 
far exceeded expectations fran July 1729 through 1732., and the sizeable 
remittances of tobacco., sugar., logwood and silver during that period strongly 
suggests a healthy profit indeed,, although the factors continually underestimated 
it. In fact based on the figures available there appeared to be a loss because 
the factors frequently sold on credit and there were always several outstanding 
debts. 
In 1733 one of the factors, Benjamin Wooley,, said that the amount owed 
to the Company was 307., 097 pesos 1 3/4 reales. Three years later a Company 
accountant estimated that these debts totaled 200,000 pesos., in addition to 
money still owed from the second trading period., but he recoranended no change 
in the operating policy of the Cuban factories. The Spanish asiento inspector, 
Juan Francisco.. Sequeira, gave a figure much closer to the estimated 200., 000 
pesos. He listed debtors to the Company as follows,, and made comments about 
several of them. 
21. Extract., factors to directors, 15 July 1731, PRO, S. P. 36/233 f. 229; 
Denniss and Cocke to Hunter., 1 August 1731., PRO,, Adm. 1/231; Denniss 
to Eyles and Burrell, 1 November 1731., C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 339; 
State of Orders for Reprisals, n. d.., PRO, S. P. 94/101; Denniss and Cocke 
to Hayman and Hines3 10 May 1732., PRO., C. O. 5/12., f. 75; Denniss to 




Debtor (in pesos) 
Juan Thomas de Sayas 974 
Diego de Salazar 67,014 
(This debt would probably be paid off in local products. ) 
Richard Farrell (a former factor) 8. sO74 Gabriel Gonzales del Alamo 7,428 
Juan de la, Barrera, 22,793 
(This debt would probably never be collected. ) 
Constantino Recafto 85. $452 (Recaflo had already paid 14,628 pesos he owed to the Company., but 
in "poor quality tobacco". Sequeira, estimated that the Company 
would be lucky to receive a quarter of the remaining sum owed. 
Such large debts had been accumulated., Sequeira surmised, because the factors 
did not take the proper precautions before extending a loaiý, and because they 
diverted money from the sale of slaves to their own personal accounts "to 
support a licentious life". He accused one factor., Wargent Nicholson., of 
embezzling about 20,000 pesos from the Ccmpany. 
22 
Introductions and returns had begun to fall dramatically late in 17321 
and total sales during the last six years of the trading period (1733-1738) 
were far less than during any one of the first three. There are several reasons 
for this drwmtic diminution in trade - So much snuff and other tobacco products 
had been remitted that European markets were glutted. When the price of tobacco 
fkl the directors ordered the factors to accept only silver for sales., except 
in special cases. Because money was in such short supply in Cuba, howevers 
nearly every case became a special one. If anything., a smaller percentage of 
'silver was returned than before. The increasing privaterring also hurt tradej, 
but not as much as illicit introductions. There is substantial evidence that 
royal officials,, CaTpany factors, officers of Ccnpany ships and private British 
merchants were all involved in contraband trade. In June 1734 Sequeira. claimed 
that British merchants were inundating the island with slaves, although the 
Conpany only introduced 60 slaves that year. Certainly the need for slaves 
22. Sequeira to Torrenueva., 25 June 1737, AGS., Estado 7006; From Benjamin 
Wooley, n. d.., c. 25 June 1737, AGS, Estado 7006; Paper by George Peete, 
n. d., c. 1736, C. L., Shel. vol . 44, f. 913. 
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did not diminish in the latter years of the trading period. Sequeira camiented 
in 1736 that "negroes in Cuba are the very substance and fuel of all haciendas". 
Governor GUemes y Horcasitas of Havana asserted that the real business of the 
Havana factors was the introduction of illicit goods., including slaves, under 
the shadow of the asiento trade. One of the Spanish officials who participated 
in contraband slave trade was the governor of Santiago, who was notorious for 
acquiring slaves for resale from private merchants. 
23 
The main port of entry for illicit slaves was Puerto del Principe. When 
the directors replaced Nicholson and Tassel with Messrs. Hallway and Eden., they 
suggested that they compete with the contraband traders by introducing Company 
slaves there. This seems to have been a veiled authorization for the factors 
to sell contraband slaves on behalf of the Company., but there is no indication 
if the scheme was tried. 
The Corrpany's trade was occasional2y curtailed in other ways. A 
particularly prevalent problem was disease. Not only did great numbers of 
slaves the before arriving in Spanish settlements., but many more died in 
quarentine after they arrived. Because the Spanish held smallpox in "the 
utmost horror"., health inspections were rigidly enforced. 
24 
In spite of the almost certain profit made by the Cuban factories early 
in the third trading period, by the sumier of 1732., the directors had decided 
that the trade there was losing money--probably because of the misconduct Of 
the factors. They contemplated several methods for improving it., including the 
replacement of the factories with a licensed trade,, closing the Santiago factOrY3 
23. Directors to Keene, 4 August 1732, BMý Add. 32,778, f. 40; Minute committee 
of correspondence3 21 March 1733,, BM,, Add. 25,554, f. 21; Denniss and 
Cocke to Hunter., 18 August 1731, PRO., S. P. 36/25., f. 46; Sequeir-a to 
Patifto, 16 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2749; GUemes y Horcasitas to Varas y 
Valdes, 11 November 1732, AGI, Contrataci6n. 5146; Sequeira. to Geraldino., 
29 April 1736, AGS, Estado, 7013. 
24. Minute camiittee of correspondence,, 21 March and 23 May 1733., BM., Add. 
25,554, ff. 21., 20; Merewether to directors., 29 January 1738., C. L., 
Shel. vol. 44, f. 793; Governor of Havana to Philip VO 26 January 1732., 
AGI., Santo Domingo 381. 
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replacing the existing factors with new ones, and selling in Spain by contract 
the tobacco purchased with the proceeds of the slave trade. The plan to license 
the trade was dropped because they feared that the licensees would also lose 
money., and turn to private and illicit trade for coapensation. The Santiago 
factory remained open because there were conflicting reports about its 
profitability, and the Spanish rejected the suggestion that the Coapany export 
tobacco to Spain because it would compete with the trade of Spanish merchants. 
Perhaps the most effective measure would have been to replace the factors, but 
this., too., proved difficult. Early in 1733 Denniss and Cocke were ordered not 
to trade on behalf of the Conpany in Santiago under any circumstances. 
Nevertheless they opened an indulto for which they were dismissed in September 
1734. Still they continued to trade. When Cooke was again informed of his 
dismissal he travelled to Jamaica,, from where he traded privately with Cuba. 
For some reason he was reinstated in his post in the sumier of 1735. 
Denniss continued in Company employment in spite of the first notice of 
dismissal 
ý5 However he was fired later because he had "made himself so obnoxious 
there., that he will certainly be taken up by the Inquisition unless he be 
forthwith recalled". Spanish officials accused him of violating article vii 
of the asiento treaty by denying an English youth who had absented himself from 
a Coupany ship the right to convert to Catholicism. Consequently orders were 
sent to Spanish officials throughout America not to permit Denniss to land 
26 
anywhere,, even if he was on asiento business. Denniss departed from Santiago 
abruptly and was replaced ad interim by John Creagh and William Rogers,, who 
happened to be in Santiago on private business at the time. They demonstrated 
the same flare for contraband., incurring the wrath of local Spanish officials 
25. The directors originally planned to turn the factory's affairs over to 
the Havana factors., but they soon changed their minds., probably because 
of the difficulties of collecting debts in Santiago. Newcastle to Keene., 
3 April 1735., BM., Add. 32., 787 f. 106; Minute caanittee of correspondence, 
11 September 1734., BM., Add. 2j, 554., f. lo8. 
26. The order was rescinded towards the end of the trading period when Dermiss 
was appointed head factor at Panama. See below p. jo(o . 
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as had their predecessors. 
27 
The Company had even greater difficulties at the Havana factory., largely 
because the factors there., led by Wargent Nicholson., were much more entrenched 
in their private trade. With the support of influential Spanish residents and 
private British merchants the factors managed a large contraband trade until 
February 1733 when Nicholson and Tassel-were replaced. Getting them to leave 
Cuba was much more difficult. After learning early in 1735 that the. two men 
were still there., Thanas Geraidino told Governor GfIemes y Horcasitas that they 
must be expelled. However they did not leave until the sumer of 1737, four 
years after they had been dismissed. As GUemes y Horeasitas remarked, ejecting 
them "had offered no small difficulties". 
28 
When Nicholson and Tassel arrived in London the following spring the 
Company informed them that various items in their account were irregular and 
were being disallowed. The main item in question concerned a consign-nent of 
snuff. Upon learning that the price of snuff in England was falling because 
so much had been imported from Cuba, but that it still fetched a good price in 
Spain., in March 1732 the two men had consigned 37,000 pesos' worth on the flota 
to an agent in Cadiz. Unfortunately the flota was badly mauled by a hurricane, 
and although the Company's tobacco was saved., the factors had to pay a salvage 
bill of 11,000 pesos. The directors refused to approve the expense, and billed 
the factors for it. The outcome of this dispute is unknown., but it is bnlikely 
that the factors ever paid. The directors rarely pursued grievances against 
27. Minute comdttee of cor-respondence, 12 February 1733 and 30 January 1734, 
B% Add. 25,554, ff. 21 139; Geraldino to Patiflo, 9 June 1735, AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2791; Newcastle to Hopkins., 17 December 1734, PRO, S. P. 36/33) f. 138; 
Denniss to Montijo,, 8 May 1735., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2791; Petition fra-a 
directors., n. d.., PRO, S. P. 36/33., f. 113; From. Panama royal officialss 
12 October 1735, AGI., Santa Fe 1167; Quintana to Mello, 7 October 1735., 
AGI., Ind. Gen. 2791; Frorn Patiflo., n-d.., April 1736, AGS, Estado 7010. 
28. Petty to Buckworth, 10 December 1734, AGI, Santo Domingo 382; Minute 
ccnrLittee of correspondence., 19 February 1733, BM,, Add. 25., 554., f. 3; 
Geraldino, to GUemes y Horcasitas, 14 February 1735., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2791; 
GfIemes y Horcasitas to Geraldino,, 2 August 1737, AGS., Estado, 7006; To 
Nicholson and Tassel., 25 April 1738,, BM., Add. 25.558, f. 39. 
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eriployees to the point of collecting on bonds posted by them when they went 
into Carrpany errployment. 
29 
The factors who replaced Nicholson and Tassel quickly fell into the habits 
of their predecessors., and even joined forces with them in private trade. They 
were involved in remitting about 10,000 pounds of unregistered cochineal and 
indigo., and several bars of silver to England, and introducing contraband on 
the Company vessel Lion, which arrived in Havana with only 12 young slaves 
but 479 barrels of flour and lard for their maintenance. Needless to say 
Benjamin Wooley., the new head factor, was a poor choice for the post. He 
was not suited to life in Havana., and after several disputes with royal officials 
found himself under house arrest. Then when he was replaced in January 1736 
one of the directors accused him of defrauding the Company of revenue. However 
he too remained unpunished. 
30 
Wooley was replaced by Messrs. Weltden and Lambert, who experienced still 
greater problems. Weltden also became closely associated with Nicholson and 
Tassel, who had still not left the island, and contrary to his instructions 
carried on all Coupany business alones styling himself "Factor Principal" or 
"Factor Actual". LarTbert tried to represent the Company honestly and was 
denounced for bringing "a little Italian" with hira to Cuba. Soon afterwards 
Weltden found himself unopposed and inter-factory feuds at an end when Lambert 
died of the "black vomit,,. 
31 
29. Fran Nicholson and Tassel., n. d. 3 c. 1733., C. L.., Shel. vol. 433 f- 189; Directors to Keene, 4 June 1732., BM., Add. 32., 778, f. 40; State of the 
case of goods shipped on the fiota,, 17333 C. L.,, Shel. vol. 43., ff. 189-194. 
30. Gaemes y Horeasitas to Patiflo., 28 April 1735., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; 
Sequeira, to Patifto., 25 February 1736., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2812; Geraldino to 
Vega., 12 January 1734., Doman,, Documents, 11,447; Sequeira to Patifto) 29 
April 1734., AGI., Ind. Gen. 27947; -GUemes y Horcasitas to Patifio, 16 June 
17343 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Sequeira to Patiho, 12 November 17343 AGIj 
Ind. Gen. 2812; Informe de la. contadurfa, n. d.., c. 1735, AG13 Santo 
Domingo 382; Coope3 A Letter to the ]? rc? prietors, pp. 14-18. 
31. Lambert to Cleland, 27 September 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Iznbert to 
Geraldino3 8 October 1736., AGS,, Estado 7006; Tassel to Burrell, 7 January 
17373 C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 941. 
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During the last few years of the third trading period royal officials in 
Cuba., supported by Juan Francisco Sequeira., began to regulate the introduction 
of Conpany supplies and provisions. Excessive or unregistered goods were 
seized and sold from the Cork and Venture in 1736 and from the A=trong and 
Prince of Asturias in 1737. In fact the inspections became so harsh that 
Geraldino chided them for interfering umecessarily in the Coupany's trade. 
32 
Another reason for ill will between the factors and royal officials 
concerned the seizure of Spanish ships by British privateers and men-of-war. 
The Spanish frequently blamed the Company for these seizures., or at least turned 
to the factors for reparations. Leonard Cocke., who had returned to the Santiago 
factory in 1735, was obliged by the governor on at least five different 
occasions between 1735 and 1737 to pay for Spanish vessels that had been seized. 
He was also coapelled to pay for a nunber of slaves indulted when Denniss was 
factor. Another cause of tension occurred in 1737 when the directors reduced 
the salaries of Spanish officials who assisted the factors., but the full effect 
of this action was never felt. 
33 
Trade at the Cuban factories ended for all practical purposes in January 
1738 when royal officials refused to allow the Sea Horse and several Company 
supply ships to sail because of a report that the English were preparing to 
attack Georgia. Although the Sea Horse was allowed to leave in Aprils an 
enbargo was placed on all other vessels. When word reached Havana the following 
July that war was imminent3 the enbargo, was extended. In November Governor 
GUemes y Horcasitas accused the factors of "violent & scandalous behaviour" and 
32. GUemes y Horcasitas to Torrenueva., 24 June 1737., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815; 
Royal officials to Philip V., 26 June 1737, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2814; Fran 
Thomas Geraldino., 2 August 1737,, AGS, Estado 7008; Weltden to Burrell., 
27 MaY 1738, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 915; Sequeira to Geraldino, 6 August 
1737, AGS, Estado 7006; Instructions to factors, 15 September 17333 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785. 
33. Cocke to directors, 18 April, 18 July and 15 December 1737., C. L., Shel. 
vol. 44, ff. 319., 317,315; Extracts, n. d., 1735 and 1736, AGI, 
Escribania de Mnara 60B; Weltden to directors., 22 April 1738, C. L.., 
Shel. vol. 44, f. 924. 
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detained several more ships. 
The British goven7nent protested to the Spanish goverTgwnt., which adnitted 
in February 1739 that Governor Gilemes y Horcasitas had acted without 
authorization. In spite of Philip V's assurance that Spain wanted peace, 
trade was never reestablished in Cuba., making it the first place where the 
British asiento trade ended; the factory in Havana was closed on 18 September 
1739., and the one in Santiago on 25 October. Weltden and Cocke stayed on until 
early in 1742 to terminate all business and settle Company accounts. 
34 
Company trade at Panama. and Portobelo., which was renewed on 23 October 
1729, experienced difficulties as trying as those in Cuba. The factory was 
torn by the usual internecine feuds., and the factors involved in illicit trade., 
illegal remittance of gold and silver., the bribery of Spanish officials-and 
the exaction of bribes frm Spanish merchants. Factory business was impaired 
by the viceroy of Peru's refusal to allow money to be sent to any coastal city 
from, the interior (see below p. 204 )., by the forced closure of the Panama 
factory by the governor of Panwm., and by the activities of private British 
merchants. 
Most of these problems adversely effected the factors' commissions. At 
the start of the third trading period the new factors were granted a comnission 
of 5% on the gross sale of slaves and 23ý% on the proceeds remitted to England. 
The expenses of maintaining the factory and selling the slaves were paid by 
the Ccupany on the following basis: 
34. Council of the Indies, 6 Decen-ber 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Weltden to 
directors 3 22 April 1738, C. L.., Shel. vol 44 921; Governor of Havana to Trelawny., 29 Novenber 1738, PRO3 C. O. i37/ý6f, off. 170-171; Extract, 
Kestden to directors, 15 October 1738, BM3 Add. 32,, 8oo, f. 87; TrelaWnY 
tP GUemes y Horcasitas, 27 October 1738, PRO, C. O. 137/563 ff. 151-152; 
Newcastle to Keene, 26 January 1739, PRO, S. P. 94/134; To Pedro r[ljrry3 
9 February 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Represalia, de ingleses... 3 18 September 1739 and 12 December 1742., AGI., Contadurfa 1170; Royal officials 
to Philip V. 9 9 January 1740., AGI, Santo Domingo 408; Governor of Santiago to Trelawny., 24 August 174o., PRO., c. o 137/56, f. 393; Weltden to 
directors., 2 May 1742., PRO., S. P. 36/5ý3 f. 282; Smith to Newcastle., 9 June 






For the visita 
Food in Portobelo, 
Expenses for the trip between Portobelo and 
Panama 
I, odging en route to Panama for four nights 
For the hire of each mule (one mule needed 
for every 10 slaves) 
For the hire of one guide (one guide needed 
for every 10 mules) 
Food in Panama 
Medi-cine--and doctor 
Rent of two negrories and guards 
3 reales per slave landed 
2 reales per slave 
2 reales per slave per day 
1 real per slave 
14 pesos 
14 pesos 
1 1/3 pesos per slave 
per day 
1 1/2 pesos per slave 
landed 
3 pesos per slave 
Thus the allowable cost of landing 100 slaves in Portobelo, and transporting 
thein almost immediately to Panama was about 900 pesos. 
35 
On 23 October 1730, exactly one year after the factors had retumed., the 
president of Panama ordered the Panama branch to be closed. The camand was 
based on the real c6dula of 9 December 1726 which stated that the Company must 
close the Panama factory and conduct all business from Portobelo. The c6dula 
was not implemented during the second trading period., however., because of the 
outbreak of war in 1727. Upon learning of the closure the directors protested 
and asked that the order be rescinded. The factory in Panama had always been 
the principal one, they explained, Portobelo serving only as a depot for 
receiving slaves from Jamaica. Furthermore it was an unhealthy place., they 
argued, and if they were forced to conduct all business there the result would 
be great mortality among the negroes and sickness among the factors. They did 
not mention that the Panama factory was considered vital for contact with Peru,, 
especially for the recovery of effects seized during the wars. The factors 
were particularly interested in keeping it open because they received a 
camAssion of 10% on all money sent from Peru to Spain during the represalia., 
and 25% on everything else seized that they were able to recover. The junta 
35. Minute conmittee of correspondence and factories., 28 January 1729., 
BM, Add. 25s552, f. 52. 
204 
del asiento reported favourably on the directors' petition, but the order was 
not rescinded until January 1734.36 
The prohibition by the viceroy of Peru to send money to the coast came 
not long after the Panama factory was closed. Money could thenceforth not be 
taken to Conpany factories for the purchase of slaves or the discharge of debts 
except during the fairs. The irmediate effect was to reduce the cash available 
for the purchase of slaves,, and thus to force the factors to sell on credit. 
And experience had shown that each time war broke out customers who purchased on 
credit used it as an excuse not to pay the Company. Unless this money was 
debts 
released for the payment of- / and the purchase of slaves, the directors 
claimed that it would be in-practical to continue the asiento trade. It was 
unrealistic to expect the Company to "Trust for Their Negroes, So Long and 
Uncertain a Time,, as from Fair to Fair., " especially "when They Purchase Them 
with Ready Money., and pay Dutys half Yearly". In spite of this regulation the 
Company did remit some money from Peru with the assistance of friends in Lima. 
37 
The exaction of bribes from Spanish merchants by factors in Parimna. and 
Fortobelo was perhaps unique to this factory. In 1731 the head factor., Henry 
Johnson., in collusion with two other factors., was demanding a premium of about 
18 pesos per slave. Merchants who agreed to pay the premium in cash were 
allowed to purchase slaves on credit. Thus if the asiento trade was interrupted, 
whether by war or otherwise., the customer possessed a slave with little capital 
outlay,, and the factor made his comnission at the expense of the Companyj and 
with little or no risk. Sane merchants who acquired slaves in this manner resold 
36. Directors to Keene., 2 August 1734., Bm., Add. 32., 785., f. 314; Paz to Keene, 
26 August 1730, PRO, S. P. 94/104; Decrees by the Marquis of Villahermosa, 
23 and 27 October 1730, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 569-571; Tinker to 
Villahermosa, c. January 1732, C. L., Shel vol. 44, f. 578; Directors to 
Newcastle., 16 March 1732, PRO., S. P. 36/26., part i', f. 133; Junta del 
asiento, 7 January 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2777; Minute comrdttee of 
correspondence and factories., 1 July 1731., EM., Add. 25,553, f. 81. 
37. Castelfuerte to Philip V., 14 January 1733, AGI, Lima 414; Directors to 
Newcastle., 16 March 1732., PRO., S. P. 36/26., part i. ff. 133-134; Directors 
to Keene, 2 August 1734., BMj Add. 32., 785, f. 317. 
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them cheaply without ever intending to pay the Company. Because the factors 
received a conrdssion for each slave sold,, whether by cash or on credit., as 
well as the premiun., they were negligent in taking action to collect these 
debts. Moreover it was difficult to collect thern. Most slave merchants were 
owner-captains of small vessels., or supercargoes., and not men of substance. 
It was even more difficult to collect debts from more substantial customers. 
Many debtors died leaving complicated wills., and heirs who were unable or 
unwilling to pay the money owed to the Company. 
38 
The factors were not alone in soliciting bribes. Unless the factors paid 
12 pesos per slave certain royal officials refused to measure them. This was 
in addition to the flat charge of 200 pesos per visita. The officials also 
extracted bribes from Spanish slave merchants. To transport slaves from 
Fortobelo to Panama Peruvian merchants were obliged to pay one peso per slave 
disguised as a type of road tax. When they complained that the road was poor 
and the trip insecure,, the Council of the Indies decreed in 1737 that this 
"tax" was illegal unless the money was used to improve the roads and protect 
the trade. The decision was made too late to have much effect because the 
asiento trade was already declining. 
39 
The Corrpany's trade was further impeded by private British merchants from 
Jamaica who were occasionally aided by the British'navy. In 1736 one sloop 
arrived at Bastimentos convoyed by H. M. S. Kingsale, Captain John Forrester. 
The two vessels sold goods worth an estimated 400,000 pesos., thereby acquiring 
money the factors hoped would be spent on Company slaves. As a consequence of 
this extensive illicit trade., the factors could never be certain when money 
- 
38. PaxrAnter to Geraldino,, 30 September 1735, AGS., Estado 7006; Hutchinson 
to directors, 1 December 1731., C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 531; "Remarks on 
the Negro Trade at Portobelo and Panama", n. d., c. 1734, AGS, Estado 7010. 
39. Council of the Indies, 22 January 1737, AGI., Lima 596; Davison to Burrell 
and Bristow., 25 October 1736, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 517-518; Geraldino, 
to Patifio., 3 August 1735., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Hutchinson to directors, 
1 December 1731, C. L. 3 Shel. vol. 44., ff. 531-540; To the president of Panama, 25 July 1734,, AGI., Panama, 118. 
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would be available. By the time Jonathan Denniss became head factor in 
December 1738 they were reduced to bartering slaves for wool. Poor sales were 
aggravated by the conflagration that destroyed most of Panama that year., and 
the epidemic that swept the city afterwards. No deaths were recorded among the 
factors, but the Company lost a large amount of gold which melted during the 
fire,, destroying the quinto marks. Since the factors could not prove that 
they had paid the quinto they decided to delay rendtting the gold to England. 
It was seized by the Spanish when conflict stopped trade in 1739 for the third 
and last time. 
40 
Throughout the asiento contract the main function of the factory in Vera 
Cruz was to assist in the sale of merchandise introduced on the annual ships. 
However when the Canpany began to send supercargoes on the annual ships (early 
in the second trading period)., the need for a factory was eliminated a3most 
entirely. A licensed trading post, such as in Carrpeche or La Guaira., would have 
been sufficient to handle the 200 slaves sold there annually. Thus in 1732 when 
t-go British merchants., Harry Spencer and Shadrick Bastie., proposed to assune 
much of the responsibility for the slave trade there., the offer was eagerly 
accepted. The directors signed a three year contract with the men that was 
unique in the Conpany's history. It incorporated procedures from both the 
factory and the license trading systems., and gave them a monopoly on the 
introduction of slaves to Mexico. Spencer and Bastie promised to buy annually 
300 piezas de indias (to be branded with the usual factory mark)--later reduced 
to 200-from Conpany agents in Jamaica for 60 pesos per pieza above the purchase 
price paid by the agents. They were responsible for transportion and all 
40. Hurrphreys to Burrell, 28 January 1737, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 303; 
Geraldino to Torrenueva, 23 May 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Davison to 
Burrell, 3 June 1738., C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 473; Denniss to Burrell, 15 
February 1739, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 463-464; Hunphreys to the deputy 
and sub-directors., 15 February 1739, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 459-460; 
Davison and Humphreys to Burrell, 6 March 1739, C. L.., Shel. vol. 44., ff. 
293-294; Castelfuerte to Patifto, 28 February 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; 
Tyrry to Torrenueva., 12 June 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Anon. "Remarks 
on the Slave Trade at Panama and Portobelo",, n. d., c. 1735, $ AGS., Estado 7010; Bazan to president of Panama., 26 March 1739., AGI., Escribania de 
cgmara, 459C. 
207 
expenses including 25% of the salaries of Spanish officials in Vera Cruz who 
assisted and monitored the trade. The Cornpany agreed to pay the other 75% 
because these officials regulated the sale of merchandise from the annual ships. 
The contractors received the sam privileges and protection. as other factors., 
as well as a coffaission of 5% on all debts collected from previous trading 
periods. When an annual ship was in port this conmission was to be shared 
with the supercargoes. 
41 
The two men sailed to Vera Cruz as supercargoes on the Royal Caroline, 
the last annual ship. Soon afterwards Geraldino informed the directors that 
they had no right to farm out any part of the asiento trade. While the directors 
disagreed they decided to annul the contract to show their intention to cooperate 
with the Spanish. In February 1733 Spencer and Bastie were informed that their 
contract was void. Spencer returned to England on the Royal Caroline and Bastie 
remained behind as the principal factor in Vera Cruz until his death in 1735. 
The factory in Vera Cruz was unprofitable. 
42 
To induce errployees to remain 
there the directors raised their ccnrdssion to 6% on all goods remitted to 
England, and promised to pay the difference if this did not yield 10.,, 000 pesos 
in the first two years. This arrangement was also unsatisfactory. Louis Hayes., 
who became head factor after Bastie's death, corrplained in Decerrber 1736 that 
his allowance was insufficient to live decently. Not all factors in Vera Cruz 
were inpoverished. An inventory of Shadrick Bastiets belongings conpiled after 
his death included diamonds., rubies., pearl rings, necklaces, earrings,, silver 
41. Minute camnittee of correspondence and factories, 30 JanuarY 1734.9 BM., Add. 
25ý5543 f. 139; Proposal for purchasing negroes to introduce into New 
Spain., n. d., c. 1732, AGS., Estado 7006; Covenant between the CompanY and 
Spencer and Bastie, 31 August 1732, EM., Add. 25,576, ff. 197-199; Minute 
camittee of correspondence and factories, 4 May 1732, EM, Add. 2535533 
f. 120. 
42. In 1730 it became a disaster for the mayordamo of the Ccupany plantation 
in Vera Cruz, William Booth, who was sentenced to five years inprisoment 
at hard labour in a Spanish fortress in Africa for the mirder of a 
Dominican friar. William Patton., who later became the head factor in 
Caracas, was also arrested but later freed. Confessions by William Booth 
and William Patton, 4 August 1729, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2806; Junta del asiento 
opinion., 28 November 1730., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2776; Geraldino to Patifio,, 12 
January 1736., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2792; Dlaz RaTian and Vara y Vald4s to 
president of the Casa de Contrataci6n, 5 Decerrber 1730,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769. 
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cross and gold and silver bars. 
43 
In 1735 because of the decline in the sale of slaves in Vera Cruz (Only 
16 were sold the previous year. )., the factors were instructed to sell slaves 
by head rather than by pieza de indias. It was hoped that sales would increase 
since the price would be reduced. Ignacio de Frias,, the Spanish interventorý 
was opposed to the new practice because he believed that Philip V's revenue 
would thus be reduced as well. However the order was implemented in 1736,, 
44 
although few slaves were sold in this manner. 
Frias became more antagonistic to the Company because of this incident. 
Later that year he demanded a conplete account of all outstanding debts and 
held a Canpany ship ransom until it was produced. He also refused to perrait 
Hayes to collect his coranission or remit any money to the Company. The factors 
did not have an accurate account of the trade in Vera Cruz., which further 
angered the Spaniards. He accused them of inefficiency and indolence (Each 
factor had a personal slave., and the factory had two cooks., two washing women 
and seven handymen. ), and continued to thwart the trade. He ruled that proceeds 
from the annual ships could be remitted only on annual ships. While potentially 
troublesome this order had no effect on the Company as it was promulgated after 
the last annual ship sailed. More irritating., on hearing that English warships 
had attacked the Pensacola area, Frias ordered shore batteries to fire upon 
and detain a Company sloop,, the Don Carlos. after it had been cleared for 
departure. 
45 
43. Hayes to Burrell, 28 December 1736, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 261-262; Minute 
committee of correspondence, 16 October 1734, EM, Add. 25,554, f. 105; Paper 
on tariffs., n. d.., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 244; Inventory of Bastie's 
belongings, 17 August 1735, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2789; Foral Valdds to Philip V., 
20 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789; Minutes camnittee of correspondence., 
20 and 21 February and 19 March 1732., EM. $ Add. 25., 554, ff. 4.9 9. 
44. Foral Valdes to Philip V, 1 September 1735,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2789; Frias to 
Philip V3 28 December 1738, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2816; Butler and Hayes to Foral 
Vald6s, 19 August 1735., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789; Smith to Geraldino., 3 May 1736, 
AGS, Estado, 7006; From Findlay and Butler., 21 December 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 
2817; Frcrn Ignacio de Frias , 29 November 1736., AGS., Estado, 7006. 
45. Smith to Geraldino, 3 May 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Frias to Geraldino., 24 
January 1737., AGS., Estado 7006. 
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The asiento trade effectively ended at Vera Cruz in July 1738 when a 
cargo of Company slaves delivered there by Diego Rentone was detained. Word 
had just been received of incipient hostilities between Spain and England., and 
the viceroy of Mexico, Juan Antonio Arpo, decided to detain the ship until the 
azoRLes departed to join the squadron in Havana*46 
The Canpany permitted an extensive licensed trade in the last trading 
period, but the records are incorrplete mainly because so much contraband trade 
was concealed under its cover. The conduct of the trade did not vary much from 
the first two trading periods, although the treatment the licensees received., 
and the goods they purchased *ith the proceeds of slave sales varied considerably 
from one location to another. Bullion was scarce so slaves were normally 
exchanged for local products. In the case of Puerto Rico, the country was so 
poor that the governor authorized the exchange of mules and horses for slaveS3 
even though it was against Spanish law. 
47 
Most of the licensed trade was to port cities, but since the beginning of 
the British asiento small Carpany branch offices had been established in various 
inland cities such as Potosi, Lima., Mexico City,, Oaxaca and Guatemala. The 
office in Guatemala was one of the few established inland during the third 
trading period. William Lea arrived there in September 1731 and requested 
pernAssion from the governor to bring 66 Carrpany slaves inland from Gulfo Dulce. 
Perirdssion was granted although Lea did not return with the slaves until early 
June 1733. He opened an office,, purchased furniture and hired employeess but 
a small indiscretion prevented him frcm trading. In partnership with a Spanish 
merchant Lea iuported an excessive aTmunt of supplies that he claimed were for 
"personal and factory use". The entire cargo was seized on the advice of the 
fiscal. Lea's personal property and that belonging to the Conpany was later 
returned., but the merchandise belonging to the Spanish merchant was not. 
46. Arpo to Tbrrenueva, 29 December 1738.,, AGI., Santa Fe 1162. 
47. Junta del asiento., 5 April 1734,, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2785. 
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Although the fiscal said that the Spaniard should have been executed for 
trading with foreigners, he was only expelled from the province; Lea left 
voluntarily, thus ending this ill-fated adventure. 
48 
The Company was more fortunate in their licensed trade to Campeche. Early 
in the third trading period the Company's Jamaican agents licensed Messrs. 
Blackwood and Cathcart to supply slaves there in exchange for logwood. They 
retained the contract until 1733 when the Spanish revoked the Canpany's power 
to grant licenses and withdrew those already issued. Blackwood and Cathcart 
were ejected from Campeche so abruptly that they left behind a number of slaves, 
merchandise., uncollected debts and personal belongings,, sane of which were 
later restored. 
49 
In 1732 an incident occurred in Carrpeche which nearly had serious 
consequences on Anglo-Spanish relations3 and which was probably the reason for 
Blackwood's and Cathcart's expulsion. The Dichosa, a Sipanish register ship 
en route to Tabasco was seized by a British warship and taken to Jamaica. In 
retaliation the governor of Canpeche,, Antonio de Figueroa., detained all British 
ships., embargoed Ccupany effects and money., and solicited the support of the 
governors of Havana and Vera Cruz who took similar steps. If the Dichosa, was 
not returned prouptly Figueroa threatened to take "other procedures against the 
persons and effects of the factors". When the factors replied that they should 
not be held liable for seizures made by British warships, they were told by 
Viceroy Castelfuerte of Mexico that perhaps the British would proceed with 
greater "moderation and reflection" in the future when they found their trade 
48. Fran Pratter and Rigby, 30 July 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Lea to the 
governor of Guatemala., 14 September 1731., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Petition 
from Lea and Gilles., c. 20 June 1733,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811; From the president 
and royal officials of Guatemala., 9 July 1733, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811; Opinion 
of the royal officials, 28 November 1733., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811; Tesorero 
to Philip V2 8 November 1734., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Junta del asiento, 9 
May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811. 
49. The case of Blackwood and Cathcart, n. d., c. 1734, PRO. S. P. 36/333 f. 181; 
Trade papers, 21 August 1735., PRO., C-0.391/44., f. 199; Meeting of the 
carudttee for trade and plantations., 22 August 1735., PRO., C. O. 391/44., 
f. 199; To Geraldino., 23 April 1736, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2851. 
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interrupted. He was right. Newcastle sent orders for the Dichosa's release 
immediately upon learning of its seizure. Soon afterwards, on 4 October, it 
arrived in Campeche. However prior to its release Castelfuerte had lifted the 
restrictions on the Company, explaining that legal steps could always be taken 
to seize British effects. Moreover Company employees had pranised that the 
Dichosa would be returned. 
50 
No CaTpany slaves were sold in Campeche between March 1733 and September 
1734, when Blackwood and Cathcart were allowed to return. At this time a 
growing need for slave labour developed because of the expansion of the logwood 
industry. More slaves were introduced than ever before,, inducing the directors 
to contemplate establishing a factory there. However they decided against it 
when they considered the cost., and discovered that the demand for slaves was 
not stable because of the availability of Indian labour. Moreover, in April 
1735 the Spanish ordered them not to introduce any more slaves at Campeches 
partly because of the Spaniards' general opposition to farmed trade., but perhaps 
even more because of Spain's campaign against the illegal cutting and export of 
logwood along the coast from. Belize to Campeche. The trade was at best tenuous 
from then on until the factors left in October 1738.51 
During the first two trading periods there were no factories on the 
windward coast (the "Spanish Main") of South America. Slaves were supplied by 
licensed traders. In November 1729 Samuel Collet and Jonathan PerTie3 CcMPanY 
licensees there during the second trading period,, were granted a new two year 
50. To Patifio,, 10 June and 24 October 1732., AGI, Mdxico 3162; Castelfuerte to 
Patiflo., 4 November 1732, AGI., Mdxico 3162; Anon. letter., 6 November 17323 
AGS., Estado 6884; Anon. letter, 8 December 1732, AGS, Estado 6884. 
51. Na=Wth to Burrell, 14 July 1736, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43., f. 265; Geraldino 
to Patiflo, 23 August 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; r1b Geraldino., 23 April 
17363 AGi, Ind. Gen. 2851; Tyrry to Torrenueva, 26 February 1736, AGI3 
Ind. Gen. 2851. 
After the War of Jenkins' Ear., Blackwood and Cathcart offered to supply the Spanish in Canpeche with slaves in exchange for logwood "which is of 
no use or value" to Spain. Their proposal was rejected. Council of the Indies., 12 April 1734., AGI., Ind. Gen. 7. 
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license., with an optional provision to renew it annually., to supply 400 piezas 
de indias along the coast between the Orinoco and the Rfo Grande de Magdalena. 
They also introduced slaves in Trinidad., Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and 
Margarita. Their contract also authorized them to collect Company debts. One 
debt that particularly irritated the directors amounted to 10., 000 pesos which 
had been lent to Governor Lopez de Carillo of Venezuela. Although the governor 
had given a bond and the patent for his job as security., the money remained 
uncollected, as frequently happened When the Company loaned Money to Spanish 
officials. 
52 
Soon after receiving their new license Perrie accepted an offer to become 
a factor in Panama. Collet sailed to Caracas. arriving late in October 172 8. He 
limited his trade to this one area., managing it much as if it were a factory. 
It is uncertain if he ever made use of the license as it was originally intended. 
In July 1731 the Company agents in Jamaica, Pr-atter and Rigby., informed royal 
officials in Spanish America that they were the agents for the windward coast., 
including Caracas. Nonetheless Collet remained at his post until May 1732, when 
his license was revoked by the Spanish who accused him of offending Catholicism 
by turning a young Irishman who had recently converted to Catholicism out of his 
home. 
53 
The licensed trade was never a great success, perhaps least of all along 
the windward coast. The area was poor, the demand for slaves relatively small., 
and cor=unications and transportation difficult. The round trip from Barbados 
52. Minute caanittee of correspondence and factories., 13 November 1729, BM, 
Add. 25j553., f. 10; Governor of Caracas to Philip V, 13 October 1738, AGI3 
Santo Domingo 704; Directors to 1,6pez de Carillo., 18 July 1728., BM, Add. 
25)566, f. 27; Directors to Collet and Perrie, 18 July 1728, BM, Add. 
25,5663 f. 28. 
53. Pratter and Rigby to all Spanish royal officials., 30 July 1731" AGI, Ind. 
Gen. 2811; Directors to Keene, 2 August 1734, BM, Add. 32,785, f. 317; 
Collet to directors, 12 September 1734, BMI Add. 323785, f. 456; Madera 
de los Rlos to Philip V., 31 May 1727., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2805; Directors to 
Rigby and Pratter, 14 February 1729., BM. 9 Add. 25., 566, f. 68. 
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to La Guaira took months because of the prevailing winds. Most slaves delivered 
there were exchanged for cacao which was frequently spoiled by bad weather and 
vermin before it reached England. Profits from the legitimate slave trade were 
so small that the only reason licenses were sought after was the greater facility 
they furnished for contraband trade. Collet and Perrie werý adept in this trade., 
but they were not always successful. In July 1729 the governor of Caracas asked 
them to take 99 barrels of flour to Santo Daningo. On arrival the flour was 
seized in spite of the factors' assertion that it was brought as a favour 
to relieve the City from starving,, in which condition we found it, not 
having so much as one Quintal of flower [sic] in it, and most of it's 
Inhabitants Sick of the Small Pox, which has'raged among them twelve 
M. os. 
Collet and Perrie had in fact questioned the right of the governor of Caracas 
to ask this favour., but the opportunity to make a profit was too tempting to 
question the legal complications. In any case they claimed 
that it has been the practice of all the Spanish Gov. s and Comm. er in 
cheif, both by sea and Land in America., to value themselves on Assiento 
Vessels, for Such Provisions., A=mition, and Naval Stores, as they cannot 
be without,, nor procure by other means and that the Audience have no 
right of Inspection in this Affair .... 
ý4 
When the license system was abolished by the Spanish in February 1733 
the Company placed factors at various places along the windward coast to receive 
slaves., and revived the agency in Barbados, appointing three agents there who 
were to divide a commission of 5% on gross sales and 1% on goods remitted. 
Trading procedures did not change. Slaves were still sent to coincide with the 
harvest season so that they could help with the harvest and so that the Company 
would have s=eathing to buy to remit to London. The only difference now was 
that the Corrpany had permanent representatives on the coast to analyse market 
54. Collet and Perrie to Keene, 9 May 1730, PRO., S -P - 36/18, part ii, f- 53; Audiencia of Santo Domingo to Philip V., 28 January 1730., AGI., Ind. Gen. 
2806; TEFutes camdttee of correspondence and factories., 13 Novenber 1729 
and 30 July 1730.9 BM., Add. 25,, 553, ff - 10,48; Olauarriaga. to Patiflo, 10 December 1731, AGI, Caracas 56; Account of the charges attending a cargo 
of negroes from Barbados to La Guaira...., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 123-124; 
Account of vessels necessary to carry on the Caracas trade, n. d.., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 131; Sumiary of a letter (in Burrell's hand), n. d., C. L., shel. vol. 43, f. 181. 
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conditions and to request slaves as needed. One factor was stationed in 
Maracaibo and two in Caracas. This new arrangement was approved by Spanish 
officials, who found it easier to monitor the trade of a resident merchant than 
that of a licensee whose schedule was unpredictable. The new factors arrived 
at their posts early in 1736.55 
As was typical at the larger factories, the sale of slaves in Caracas and 
Maracaibo was fraught with scandals and corruption. The main culprits were 
the Company agents in Barbados,, who defrauded the Company and Spanish in various 
ingenious ways. They replaced "prime Guinea slaves" intended for the Cartagena 
factory with their own sick slaves., charged the Company for the Guinea slaves 
and then sold them privately. The principal agent and chief promoter of these 
crimes, Richard Morecrafts., was a man "of an indifferent Character",, according 
to a former British custom's officer. He treated the slaves abominably., starving 
them and confining them in miserably cramped spaces. Because of this., slaves 
usually arrived in Caracas in much worse condition than those at other factories. 
Several vessels arrived with smallpox raging aboard. Morecrafts had allowed 
them to sail even though he was undoubtedly aware of the disease's presence 
before departure. Eventually royal officials everywhere subjected vessels from 
56 Barbados to 40 days' quarantine. 
Late in the last trading period the Spanish took a series of steps damaging 
to the Company's trade on the Spanish Main. By controlling exports from Caracass 
55. Minute conudttee of correspondence., 6 Noventer 1733, EM, Add. 2595542 f. 
47; Minutes camlittee of correspondence, 20 May and 3 October 1733 and 
7 August 1734, BK, Add. 25,554, ff. 18,42,107; Geraldino to Patiflo, 27 
August 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; Geraldino, to Patifto, 12 Januax7 1736., 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Butcher to Burrell, 30 April 1739., C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 597. 
Slaves' brands used at licensed trading posts were the following: 
Windward Coast . 'Barbados Guatemala 
*A 
56. Somers to Burrell., 29 April 1737, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 647; Butcher to Burrell, 13 April and 22 March 1737, C. L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 649., 659-661; Geraldino to Torr-enueva,, 25 JulY 1737.,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2793. 
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especially cacao., the Caracas Company manipulated the market generally. Early 
in 1738 they flooded Vera Cruz with about 2., 088,, 000 pounds of cacao. Consequently 
the price dropped alarmingly,, with little cash becoming available to purchase 
other goods, such as slaves. According to one factor,, Thomas Butcher, slaves 
could not even be sold on credit. Employees of the Caracas Company also assisted 
royal officials in the registration., bonding and visitas of South Sea Company 
vessels. While Company agents argued that this was the sole responsibility of 
the royal officials,, they had no more success in eliminating the practice than 
Benjamin Keene had in 1732 when he had presented a formal complaint to Patifto 
on the subject. 
In 1738 the escribano de registros in Caracas discovered an old c6dula 
which decreed that the French asentistas must pay a duty of four reales on each 
slave introduced. The escribano informed the South Sea Company factors that 
they must now pay the same duty. About the same time the governor of Caracas 
settled a dispute between the factors and a former governor of Puerto Rico,, 
Francisco Domingo Granados, in favour of the latter. Granados had sent slaves 
from Puerto Rico to La Guaira for sale., and his right to do so had been contested 
by the Company. The governor ruled that they were legal introductions because 
Granados had not imported them originally into the West Indies. On these grounds., 
the factors complained., anyone could buy contraband slaves and then sell them 
elsewhere legally in competition with the Company. Before either question could 
be settled the Company's trade on the Spanish Main ended. Late in 1739 or early 
in 1740 Thomas Butcher and another factor were seized., sent to Spain on a 
Caracas Company ship and imprisoned in San Sebastian. 
57 Thus the British asiento 
ended ignominiously at all factories at the start of the war. It remained 
57. Patton and Butcher to directors., 15 July 1738., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815; Directors 
to'Weyland, 9 January 1741, BM, Add. 253558, f. 47; Butcher to Burrell, 
13 January and 9 June 1738, C. L.., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 619-620,631; Keene 




It is unknown what happened to Butcher and his friend', although they 
probably retumed to England after the War of Jenkins? Ear. 
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to be seen whether or not the South Sea Conpany could revive the trade yet 
again. In fact they did not., nor were they particularly eager to do so. 
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Chapter X 
The Amual Ships 
By the terms of the asiento treaty the South Sea Corrpany introduced legally 
into Spanish colonies in America on I'annual ships" British and other European 
merchandise. The legal introduction was accompanied by a voluminous trade in 
contraband goods which evaded duties and diminished the volume of Spanish trade,, 
denied revenue to the Spanish treasury,, and conpeted with the fleets. As a 
result the Spanish government eventually proposed to abolish the annual ships 
for 2% of the returns of the flotas and galleons. Although the proposal was 
supported by many of the Canpany's proprietors., an agreement was never reached., 
mainly because the directors feared that the Spanish would not make the 
equivalent payments. 
1 
The first annual ship., the Royal Prince , was to have sailed in 1713, but 
there was a long delay in despatching it,, partly for adninistrative reasonss 
but primarily because the Company was suffering numerous delays in outfitting 
the two license ships. 
3 The ship., commanded by Bayharn Raymond,, left London 
in August 1716 for Vera Cruz. Although it did not sail with the flota of 
Antonio Serrano,, it joined the fleet in November for the fair in Vera Cruz. 
Ships of the flota carried 2., 841 tons of merchandise., making it the largest to 
date that century, yet there is sow indirect evidence that the Royal Prince 
1. Proposal. Geraldino to directors., n. d., c. 1734, PRO, S. P. 36/302 ff. 334-335; 
Geraldino to Patiflo 20 January and 17 February 1735, AGI. I .V, nd. Gen. 
2791. 
2. The Royal Prince, 700 tons., and its sister ship the Royal-GeojZe, 630 1/3 
tons, were constructed by the Company. The Royal Prince was finished in 
1716., the Royal GeoMe in March 1718. Including provisions for their first 
voyages., but not for merchandise, crew's wages or other expenses, the Royal 
Prince cost E15., 000 and the Royal GeorSe f-13., 238/11/5. Wood., "Annual Ships', s 
P. ITO; Account of the Royal Prince's 'voyage to Vera Cruz, 1717, AGI, 
Contadurla 266; Directors to Cartagena factors, 30 April 1718, EM., Add. 
25,5633 ff. 159-16o. 
3. Before the departure of the Royal Prince the conditions under which the 
annual ships were to sail were modified by the Treaty of 1716. The most important stipulation of this treaty was that the legal tonnage was raised fran 500 to 650 tons for each ship. 
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and escorting British vessels carried at least 2,000 tons of merchandise. The 
six succeeding annual ships also exceeded their allowed tonnage, and it is 
possible that the amount of goods they introduced nearly equalled that of the 
fleets. 
4 
Aware that the Carrpany or its employees might try to introduce illicit 
goods, the Spanish instructed Serrano to remeazure the Loyal Prince when it 
arrived in Vera Cruz., and to allow the Company to land up to 50 tons over the 
stipulated amount, but which would be deducted from the next annual ship. Any 
further excess waz to be conf'iscated. 
5 
Captain Raymond and his officers were pern-dtted to purchase merchandise to 
be sold privately, one half of which had to be the same kind as that of the 
Company,, and which could not exceed a total of five tons. The value of goods 
allotted to each officer was as follows: 
Table I 
Captain Z1,500 
Chief mate 300 
Second mate 200 
Third mate 150 
Fourth mate 100 
Surgeon., boatswain, gunner, steward., 
carpenter and midshipmen 50 each 
Quartermazter 30 
Fran the proceeds of the sale of this merchandise the officers could purchase 
any produce in ATwrica, except indigo and cochineal, which were undoutedly 
proscribed to avoid competition between the Conpany and their enployees., and 
to prevent glutting the English market. 
The Royal Princets cargo was consigned jointly to the factors in Vera 
Cruz and to the shipst officers to sell., and Captain Raymond was instructed to 
join the factory council during his stay. It was not a happy arrangement. The 
factors refused to cooperate with Raymond or his officers because they were 
4. One Spaniard suggested that the CanPaW had ships constructed to hold a 
larger cargo than other ships of the same dimensions. This would not be 
discovered when the ship was measured because the cargo tomage was 
determined on the basis of the calculated ship measurement. Anon. letter, 
n. d., c. 17303 AGS, Estado 7006. 
5. Walker., "Galeones and Flotas", pp. 125,234. 
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trying to conceal their own illicit activities. They gave the Company a poor 
exchange rate., mixed the cargoes of the II cense ship Elizabeth and the Royal 
Prince to their own advantage, and sold goods at a profit which they listed in 
the accounts as damaged. The officers of the Eaal Prince also swindled the 
Corrpany. They shipped contraband on H. M. S. Diamond, which convoyed the annual 
ship., supposedly to protect it frcm pirates,, and on the Sarah, an acca'npanying 
stbreship. When the Spanish complained of these activities the directors denied 
responsibility and chided the royal officials for their inefficiency in curtailing 
contraband. 
6 
The sale of the Royal Prince's cargo was hanpered by delays and irritations. 
Part of the cargo was seized in the represalia, on 3 January 1719., and 
afterwards the accounts were missing. The factors claimed that the books had 
been sent hme on the Royal Prince, which sailed just prior to the represalia; 
the directors said that they were lost. Thus it is difficult to reconstruct the 
details of the sale. Company accountants had to baze their calculations of 
the voyage on miscellaneous letters., receipts and interviews with the factors 












Sale price of cargo less expenses E3573551/16/10 
Profit on grain purchased in America from the proceeds 
of the cargo, and sold in Europe, less a loss on 
indigo 33872/18/1 
Total: E3613424/14/11 
6. Minute court of directors., 5 June 1717, EM, Add * 25,497, ff. 39-40; Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 12 July 1717,, EM., Add. 25,563., ff. 44,46; Minute 
cormnittee of correspondence., 13 February 1722, BM, Add. 25., 551., f. 71; List 
of goods and merchandise on the Royal Prince 17 July 1717., AGI, Contadurfa 
266; Directors to Bowles, 26. iý ý61; W Ld 
.9 %7 . 
25. %555. % ff. 88-89; Wescorb to Craggs., 27 June 1718, BM, Add 252555, f. 88; Fiscal's report, 16 September 17282 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2601; Walker, pp. cit-. 9 p. 126. 
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Gross profit: E112,041/14137 
Philip V's share E-32,212/l/7 
Corrpany Is share E79,828/18/5 
Philip V never received his share of the ship's profit. The Ccnpary claimed 
that he owed a percentage of interest on the original investment in the cargo 
as well as on the returns remitted from America. He was charged 8% interest for 
his share of the cargo., i. e.., one quarter Plus 5% of the remaining three quarters. 
This reduced his net profit to only F-8,678/4/4; 1.8 
The second annual ship, the Royal George., Captain Davison, was originally 
scheduled to sail in 1718.9 A crew was hired and a cargo worth E264., 964/4/1 
purchased. Before it sailed, however,,, Guillermo Eon informed the directors 
that the departure of the galleons had been delayed. Then in Septerber war 
broke out between the two crowns., and the ship's departure was further postponed. 
The Royal George's crew were not idle while their ship lay an anchor. They 
took East India goods onto the vessel from other ships., and then smiggled them 
ashore to avoid British duties. No evidence linked the crew to the practice, 
however, and when it was discovered the directors did no more than order them to 
refrain from such acts in the future. 
10 
The Canpany carputed the earnings to be 9-111., 730/15/6,, but they subtracted 
the expenses of provisions for the factors. 
8. Lizeaga to Philip V, 6 May 1719., AGI, Contadurfa 895; Vera Cruz factors to 
directors., 7 May 1718, AGI., Contaduzrla 266; Cuenta de la factorfa de la Vera 
Cruz y M6xico., n. d., AGI, Contadurfa 266; Cuenta del viage que hizo a la 
Vera Cruz el navio el prIncipe real, n. d., 1717, AGI, Contadur-la 266; 
Spanish account of the asiento trade from the beginning to 1 November 1739j 
C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, f. 497; Wood, 2p. cit 3 P. 136. 
g. Captain Davison and his officers were given the same allowances for private 
trade as the officers of the Uo al Prince. Minute court of directors, 7 MaY 
17183 EM3 Add. 25,498, f. 32. 
10. Receipts and payments on account of the asiento trade to 30 April 1722j, 
C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 646; Directors to Bowles, 5 June 1718, EM, Add. 
253563, f. 170; Shepheard io the crown, 5 June 1718., EM, Add. 25j555, f. 
86; Minute court of directors, 7 April 1720., EM., Add. 25,499, f. 4; 
Wescamb to Carkess, 7 April 1720., EM., Add. 25., 555., f. 111; Wood., op. cit., 
p. 140.1 
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After the war Philip V issued c6dulas permitting the ship to sail with 
the galleons and for its cargo to be sold inland if necessary. He also ordered 
that the ship be remeasured in the Indies as a precaution against merchandise 
being added to the cargo in Jamaica., and because there was no way of knowing 
whether or not its tonnage had altered since Guillermo Eon had measured it in 
1718. However royal officia. 1s in Cartagena decided not to remeasure the ship 
until it was unloaded because of the difficulty of doing so in its "overloaded" 
condition. 
11 
The cargo of the Royal George was measured officially at 664 tons 30 1/8 
palms, of which 180 tons 44 palms were unloaded at Cartagena 
483 tons 152 4/8 palmos in Portobelo. 
Official Cargo 
Manifest 
Cloth & thread, 5,077 bales 
Cloth & thread., 431 cases 
Osnaburgs., 246 pieces 
Beeswax, 794 cakes 
Sealing wax., 10 cases 
Cinnamon, 60 bales 
Cloves., 12 casks 
Pewter, 26 casks 
Spanish nails., 360 casks 
Spanish iron, 4,738 bars 
Looking glasses, 37 cases 
Jews harps, 2 cases 
Hats., 50 cases 




























and the remaining 
Purchase 













The following items were listed by royal officials as having been unloaded 
in Portobelo., but which were not listed in the cargo manifest given to the 
Spanish. Values were not specified. 
Pepper., 35 bales 
Medicine, 12 boxes 
Gifts, 11 chests 
E2522346/17/3 
Freight costs: 12,617/6/10 
Total cost: E2642964/4/1 
Real c6dula, 27 September 1721., BM., Add. 32,741, f. 166; Grimaldo to 
Stanhope., 10 August 1721, EM., Add. 22., 520, f. 182; Walker, op. Cit.., P. 171; 
Stanhope to Carteret, 22 September 1721, BK3 Add. 2235203 f. 279; Auto de 
diliSencia, 15 January 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726; Pes to Grimaido., 9 August 
17213 AGS, Estado 6851. 
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There were 6,879 numbered items in the cargo of the Royal George (l., 822 
were unloaded at Cartagena), although only 6,541 were measured to determine 
weight. The royal officials in Portobelo suggested that about 416 items., which 
were recently stanped and poorly packaged, were introduced illicitly. 
12 
The most reliable account available indicates that the sale price of the 
cargo was E290., 569/3/9., giving a gross profit of E25,604/19/8. Philip V 
received only t3,398/13/11 as his share, less than half the E7., 366/3/2 he should 
have received under the terms of the contract. The difference was probably 
consumed by interest charges which had accumulated during the long delay between 
the acquisition of the cargo and the sailing of the ship. 
13 
The South Sea Company began preparations late in 1721 to send the Royal 
Prince on its second voyage. William Cleland was selected as captain by a 
ballot of the court of directors, a crew hired and a cargo worth E292,992/11/2 
purchased. The following March the Company was again notified that the fleet's 
departure would be delayed because the Indies were overstocked with European 
goods-principally by French contrabandistas. Consequently Philip V asked the 
Company to postpone the sailing of the annual ship. Although Stanhope pointed 
out that the Company had the legal right to send the ship whether or not the 
fleet sailed., he advised the Company not to do so. But the directors continued 
preparations to send the ship. It was measured at 622 60/100 tons by two 
mathematicians., one representing the Carpany and the other the Spanish. However 
when their request for a c4dula permitting it to sail was ignoredý the directors 
turned to their king for help. Spanish ministers still refused to grant a 
12. Certificate of weight by royal officials in Portobelo., 21 July 1722,, AGIj 
Ind. Gen. 2811; Certificate of the cargo of the Royal George by the Companyj 
2 February 1723,, AGS., Estado 7017. There were 166 3/8 palmos to the ton. 
13. Estimate of damages caused by Spanish officials, n. d., c. 1730, AGS2 
Estado 7017; Spanish general account of the asiento trade from the 
beginning to 1 November 1739, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43., f. 497; Receipts and 
payments by the Coupany, account of the trade to 1 May 1736.9 C. L., Shel. 
vol. 43, f. 5. 
Wood concludes that the net profit of the voyage was -Ell., 850,, based on the percentage paid to Philip V. Wood., pp. cit.., p. 181. 
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license when Stanhope appl I ed for one on behalf of the Carrpany. Grimaldo 
explained that most of the 4,438 5/8 tons of cargo taken to the Indies on the 
f'iota in 1720 remained unsold, and that throughout the recent war illicit 
traders and merchants from the Philippines had supplied the Indies. Even 
Spaniards were now forbidden to send merchandise to America; allowing the annual 
ship to sail would be a grave injustice to them and to Spain's econonv in the 
New World. 
Believing that the Spanish intended no prejudice to Conpany interests., 
Stanhope worked to obtain future concessions for them. In exchange for not 
sending a ship in 1722 the Corrpany received perudssion to send two the next 
year. One was to sail with the flota to Vera Cruz in April 1723., and the other 
to Cartagena in August, whether or not the galleons sailed. The Company received 
other liberal pledges. Their ships were no longer to be measured in the Indies., 
and Conpany merchandise could be sold inland without the payment of duties. The 
latter.,, however., caused such a clamour among Spanish merchants in the Indies., 
who had to pay duties on entry and on sales inland. as well, that it was later 
revoked. 
14 
Early in September 1722 the Ccrnpany bowed to the inevitable and agreed to 
postpone the sailing of the Royal Prince. Shortly afterwards the liberal 
concessions granted in the sunTner of 1722 were rescinded. In November Joseph 
Patifio and the Council of the Indies advised Philip V to restrict the trade of 
the annual ships only to those ports where Spanish merchants could trade, and to 
take measures to offset the advantageous prices of Company merchandise. Since 
it was inpossible to delay the annual ship indefinitely without a new treatYj 
or serious diplomatic consequences, they suggested that it be required to 
travel with the fleet from Cadiz, and its entire cargo to be sold on the coast. 
14. Minute court of directors, 2 November 1721., EM., Add. 25,5001 f. 123; 
Stanhope to Carteret., 23 and 30 March 1722., PRO, S. P. 94/91; Carteret to 
Stanhope., 13 JulY 1722,, PRO., S. P. 104/139; Petition fran the Corrpany 
directors,, 13 July 1722., PRO., S. P. 104/139; Grimaldo to Stanhope,, 30 July 
17222 PRO, S. P. 94/91; Stanhope to Carteret, 6 August 1722, PROs S. P. 
94/91; Grimaldo to Stanhope., 5 August 1722.,, PRO., S. P. 94/91. 
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The privilege of sending merchandise inland for sale duty free should be 
permanently revoked. This concession had been opposed by Mexican merchants 
and royal officials since the arrival of the Elizabeth, in 1715. Royal officials 
there had uncovered a scheme to avoid taxation in which Spanish merchants on 
the fleets placed much of their merchandise in South Sea Company warehouses, and 
then, with the aid of Company factors., transported the goods inland for sale. 
They estimated the consequent loss in royal revenue to be about 360,000 pesos. 
The Canpany claimed that by treaty the cargoes of the annual ships were 
duty free regardless of where they were sold. However on 28 November 1722 
Philip V issued a c4dula which required the CaTrpany to pay the alcabala, on 
"interned" merchandise., even if taken inland as reprisaled goods. It also 
declared that annual ships must be remeasured on arrival in the Indies. Although 
the decision was probably contrary to the intent of the asiento treaty3 its 
imposition reflected a general tightening of controls on the annual ships. 
15 
After these precautions to protect Spanish merchants in the fleet were 
taken, Philip V decided on 15 December 1722 to allow two annual ships to sail 
the following year. In March he granted a license for this purpose to the 
Royal Prince. 
16 
The Canpany made several innovations in the management of the annual ships 
in the second trading period. Instead of selling the cargo through the captain 
and factors., they hired supercargoes to travel with the Ccapany ships to 
oversee the disposal of the merchandise. The purpose was to assure the sale 
of the entire cargo, and to give greater control fýrcm London over the sale of 
cargoes and the acquisition of money and goods for return trips. Four men were 
15. Junta del asiento, 15 Decenber 1722, AGI. Ind. Gen. 2773; Real c6dula 
to the viceroy of Peru, 3 Decerrber 1724, AGi., Ind. Gen. 2785; PhiliP V 'I 
to Castelfuerte., 15 December 1722, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2773; Real c6dula 28 
November 1722., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; R6sum6 of a letter from Patifto to the 
comercio of Cadiz, 7 Noveriber 1722, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2801; Memorial from the 
Company directors, 6 September 1722, PRO, S. p. 1OV139; From the consulado 
of Mdxico., 20 March 1723,, AGI,, Escribania de c&nara 198A. 
16. Real c6dula, 13 March 1723., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2776. 
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selected by ballot; one was to remain in Vera Cruz as the chief factor there,, 
and the other three were to return with the ship. The supercargoes selected 
for the Royal Prince received no concessions for private trade as had been the 
case on the first two annual ships., but were to be paid subsistence for the 
trip and a comnission of 3% on the gross sale price of the cargo to be divided 
among them. Those appointed as supercargoes., with the percentage of conrnission 
each was to receive and the amount of bond money each was to pay was as follows: 
Table IV 
Name Rank Commission Advance 
Catlin Thorowgood First supercargo 1 1/8% Z8,000 
John Pitt Second supercargo 
& cbief factor 
James Dollissee Third supercargo 
William Cleland Fourth supercargo 
& captain 
1% (He received 3., 000 
1/2 and the 
other factors 
1/2 in proportion 
to their salaries) 
3/4% 5jOOO 
1/8% '00017 
The Royal'Prince arrived in Vera Cruz on 8 August 1723., but the 
I 
supercargoes did not begin to sell its cargo until the flota, arrived on 20 
September. A large percentage of the cargo was taken into the interior for sale 
in the rich mining communities. Viceroy Castelfuerte complained on 13 November 
1723 that Company factors were extracting gold and silver from, the mines in 
great quantity., assisted by Spanish merchants desirous of avoiding the payment 
of duties and taxes. The c6dula of 11 March 1724, which greatly restricted 
Company sales., was prompted by Castelfuerte's complaint, corroborated by the 
comercio of Andalucia and by Baltasar de Guevara,, commander of the flota. 
18 
17. Real c6dula, 12 June 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Junta del asiento, 15 
December 1722, AGS, Estado 6858; Minute camnittee of correspondence3 5 
February 1722, EM, Add. 25,551, f. 68; Crosby's Merchant's and Trades man's 
pocket DictionpEy (London, 1810), p. 492; Minute court of directors., 14 
February 1722, BM, Add. 25,501s f. 21; Minute court of directors, 26 April 
1723, BM., Add. 25,5011 f. 57; Fran Philip V, 12 June 1723., AGI., Ind. Gen. 
2769; D. Templeman, The Secret Histor7 of the Late Directors of the South-Sea 
CorMany (London, 173-57-, p. 2; Hatton, The Merchant's Magazine., p. 254; 
Anon.,, An Enquiry into the misconduct and frauds, P. 7. 
18. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 19 NoverTber 1723., AGI, Ind. Gen. 
2803; Philip V to Castelfuerte., 11 March 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Walker, 
22. cit.., pp. 173-175. 
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While the percentage of the Royal Prince's cargo sold inland is unknown., 
Company erployees made every effort to avoid paying the alcabala. In 1725, 
however, a shipment of Company money being transported to Vera Cruz was seized 
under the viceroy's orders on the pretence that it was owed on alcabalas. 
Although the Corrpany carplained, the junta del asiento ruled in August 1726 
that goods taken inland in 1723 were taxable,, and the seized mney was not 
returned even though the factors had given a security for the duty when the ship 
first landed. 19 
Efforts by the Spanish to guard against illicit trade., and the appointment 
of supercargoes by the Company to monitor the sale of merchandise, proved 
equally ineffective. The Royal Prince carried a cargo far exceeding the 
authorized tonnage: perhaps, as much as 2., 000 tons counting accompanying support 
and convoy vessels., or nearly half the tonnage of the entire flota. French and 
Spanish businessmen in Seville and Cadiz instructed their agents in America to 
ship mst of their profits of sales on the fleets in South Sea CaTpany ships to 
England to avoid paying Spanish duties. Some money was sent on the fleet to 
mask the activity3 but Castelfuerte learned of this manoeuvre and published an 
order which threatened the punishment of death to anyone sending gold3 silver 
or other effects on Ccmpany vessels. It did not seem to stop the practice. 
When the Royal Prince left Vera Cruz on 21 May 1724 with the flota it carried., 
according to one report, between 2,000., 000 and 6,000,000 pesos. It is unknown 
how much actually was carried on the Company's account and how much represented 
illicit returns and money taken on letters of credit. 20 
The flota com*nanded by Antonio Serrano returned cash and effects worth 
13,260,941 pesos, of which the crown received only 663., 092 pesos 4 reales; 
gold and silver returned by private individuals was valued at 103952,441 pesos 
19. Junta del asiento, 9 August 1726, AGIs Escribania de C&nara 198A. 
20. Consulado of Cadiz to Arana., 16 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; 
Castelfuerte to Fhilip V, 3 May 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803; Anon. letter,, 
20 January 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Corrobarrutia y Zdpide to Serrano, 
29 August 1724, AGi, Ind. Gen. 2524. 
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73-2 reales. Since no account books were kept on the Ecyal Prince Is voyage by 
the supercargoes., what few accounts survived are contradictory and incomplete. 
The cargo and expenses of the voyage were approximately 9292., 993. While it is 
unknown what profit was made on the voyage., the Spanish king was paid 
Z16,553/131-2 for his share of the net proceeds. 
21 
The Royal George, Captain John Davison., 22 left England on its second voyage 
as an annual ship on 3 February 1724, travelling without a convoy, but well-anned 
and with a privaterring commission in case of attack. Davison had instructions 
to sail directly to Cartagena or Portobelo and to remain in port as long as 
necessary to sell the cargo and the unsold merchandise from the, Bedford 
and the R2yal George., and to acquire a return cargo from the factors or from 
the accorrpanying supercargoes. Regulations governing the voyage were similar 
to previous trips. The Company was still required to wait for the fair or four 
months for the fleet to arrive before they could still their cargo, and the 
ship was to be remeasured on its arrival. Goods which could not be sold at the 
ports of entry,, however., were permitted to be taken inland. Private trade was 
proscribed; to limit the crew's acquisition of merchandise prior to sailing, 
officers were forbidden to advance mre than a quarter of a sailor's wages for 
the trip. Because of previous complaints by the Spanish., Davison was ordered 
not to bring any Spanish passengers or goods away from Awrica. 
23 
21. Returns of the flota camanded by Serrano, n. d..,, c. 1724, AGS, Estado 6878; 
Walker, op. 174; Anon., Relaci6n en orden al-comercio ilfcito... 
que hacen los ingleses, n. d.., AGS, Estado 6866; General cash account of 
receipts and payments on account of trade from the beginning to 1 May 1736j, 
C. L.., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 53 11; Spanish general account of the asiento 
trade from its beginning to 1 Novenber 1739, AGS., Estado 7009. 
22. After his first trip on the Royal George, Captain Davison was accused of 
returning silver to England in private t. but he professed his 
innocense to the satisfaction of the Spanish representative to the Conpany. 
Minute court of directors, 28 march 1723, EM, Add. 25,501, f. 47. 
23. Junta del asiento, 11 May and 30 JulY 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774; Real 
E ýdula, 27 Sept er 1721, BM., Add. 32., 741, f. 166; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 
10 August 1721, BK, Add. 22,520, f. 182; Reales c6dulas, 14 August and 
26 Noven-ber 1723, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2769; Instructions to Davison., 12 Decefter 
17233 EM3 Add. 25,567, ff. 8-10.1 
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The method of paying the supercargoes was altered slightly to their 
disadvantage. The conrdssion was increased to 3Vo of the sale price of the 
cargo., Vo more than on the Royal Prince., but divided into 56 equal parts, 12 
of which were reserved for the Conpany's use. The supercargoes' division of 
the camission,, and money advanced to each for the voyage., was as follows: 
Table V 24 
Name Rank Camission Advance 
William Bumpstead First supercargo 17 parts E1,200 
Joseph Bachelor Second supercargo 11 800 
Thomas Canham. Third supercargo 8 500 
John Tatt Fourth supercargo 8 500 
Before the supercargoes could begin the sale of the ship's cargo the c6dula 
of 11 March arrived. It ordered Spanish officials in the Indies to observe 
rigidly the terms of the asiento as described in the docunents of 26 March 1713 
and 12 June 1716., and to ignore other c6dulas, anplifying these treaties. The 
c6dula of 27 September 1721, which allowed the Campany to send goods inland for 
sale., was expressly annulled. 
25 
The factors were limited to selling merchandise 
only during the fairs, and forbidden to transport Spanish subjects., effects or 
money from the Indies. 
The Spanish attitude was harmful to Anglo-Spanish relations. Newcastle 
instructed Stanhope to canplain to the Spanish government,, wh= he accused of 
deceiving the Canpany into sending merchandise to America by issuing advantageous 
c6dulas., and then revoking them before the goods could be sold. They 'ýMst 
reflect", he said, "that their disobliging so considerable a Body of His Subjects 
as the South Sea Conpany... is not the way of putting His Majesty in a condition 
of being Serviceable to them". 
26 
24. Minute conraittee of correspondence., 19 Noventer 1723., EM., Add. 25,5513 f. 81; 
Instructions to supercargoes, 12 December 1723., BM3 Add. 25,5643 ff. 25-31. 
25. This c4dula was revoked on 27 September 1727. Thus merchandise on the last two annual ships not sold at the port of arrival could be taken inland for 
sale. Real c6dula., 27 September 1727., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769. 
26. Draft,, Newcastle to Stanhope., 9 Noverrber 1724, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 198; Pozobueno to Grimaldo., 20 December 1724., AGS, Estado 6860; Decree of the Marquis of Castelfuerte.,, 16 July 1725, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2805; Royal decree., 11 March 1724., AGi., Ind. Gen. 2769; Wescanb to Newcastle, 3 November 1724, EM, Add. 3227413 f. 159; Extract, Bumpstead to directors, 6 August 1724., BM, Add. 32., 741, f. 169. 
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There was considerable controversy over the sale of the Royal George Is 
cargo . which included the usual 
large amount of contraband goods. Disobeying 
his instructions., Captain Davison stopped at St. Christopher's en route under 
the pretence of taking on necessary supplies, but., in fact, to add several 
hundred bales of merchandise to the cargo, including a large amunt fran the 
Mýg., a British merchantman. The Royal George was heavily overloaded when it 
arrived in Cartagena. Even as it was being unloaded goods were transferred to 
it from. other British vessels. One Spanish official estimated that the total 
cargo must have been worth 3., 000., 000 pesos. 
27 
The stopover in St. Christopher's was just the first in a series of 
extraordinary incidents which occurred 6n the trip. Captain Edward Phillips., 
who had succeeded Captain Davison after the latter's death in Cartagena,, took 
the ship to Jamaica because it was shipping water. After being repaired it 
sprang another leak, and the captain and William Bumpstead agreed that the ship 
was unfit to sail. Another inspection revealed that the damage was slight., 
however., and the ship sailed on 7 November 1726., but only after the entire 
compliment (except Bumpstead) signed a document accepting the risks of the 
voyage. The ship next arrived in Antigua,, where Bumpstead., who seemed to have 
complete sway over Captain Phillips, dismissed 100 men (leaving an insufficient 
crew to man the ship), and condemned the vessel as unfit to sail. His action 
caused a furor in London., where many people believed that the condemnation was 
done with the intention of defrauding the insurers. The directors sent Elias 
Bird and Nicholas Hill to Antigua to investigate the charges, with several 
shipwrights and calkers to repair the ship if possible. 
28 
Bumpstead was ordered 
27. Varas y Vald6s to Orendayn., 28 February 1725., AGS,, Estado 6866; Testimony 
of Edward Phillips., 13 June 1727, AGS, Estado, 7017; Merchant in Cadiz to a 
merchant in London, 10 March 1729, PRO, S. P. 36/10, part ii, f. 138; Burnett 
to the Marquis of Bavenshead, 3 February 1729., AGS, Estado 7017; Minute 
ecriudttee for law suits, 17 November 1736, EM2 Add. 25,570, f. 19. 
28. The Royal George did return to London, but it was not used again on 
Coupany business. The "corps" of the vessel was sold in 1733 for F-465- 
Anon. letter., 26 January 1733., AGS,, Estado 6897. 
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to send the Royal Prince's cargo to London on H. M. S. KIMsale, Captain 
Girlington., a service for which the Conpany had to pay 2; e,, of the value of the 
cargo in freight charges. 
29 
One Captain Griffith testified that the ship was fit to sail but that 
Burrpstead was detennined to condem it., and had induced Girlington to agree to 
the step. It does seem likely that scme fraud was intended by Bmpstead., but 
there is no evidence to support the suspicion. He later received a large reward 
for his services to the Conpany., and then norried the daughter of Sir John 
Eyles., Coirpany sub-governor., which could explain his being rewarded rather than 
punished. However charges were brought against him by the Conpany., and he 
appealed unsuccessfully to the House of Lords in February 1728 to exonerate him. 
In July 1730 the Carrpany agreed to arbitrate its dispute with him, but the 
question was never resolved. 
The voyage of the Royal George was ill-fated in other ways. Captain 
Davison and the second supercargo, Joseph Batchelor., died in Cartagena., and 
John Tutt., the fourth supercargo., died on the return voyage to Jamaica. 
30 
The Canpany spent E264,964/4/1 on the ship's cargo., of which merchandise 
worth z222., 204/6/8 was intended for Portobelo., and E42,759/17/5 for Cartagena. 
It is unknown how much was spent on expenses for the voyage., or what was returned 
to London. One report indicated that the Coapany paid Z6,000 to Captain 
Girlington to transport the return cargo to England. At 23ý, % of the value of 
the cargo, this would have made the value of the returns remitted at about 
29. Testimony by Edward Phillips., 13 June 1727, AGS., Estado 7017; Houstoun) 
Memoirs, p. 169; Directors to Bumpstead, 28 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,5662 
f. 1; Wescanb to Phillips, 23 February 1727, EM., Add. 2535663 f. 3; 
Directors to Bird and Hill., 18 April 1727., BM., Add. 25,566., f. 4; Minute 
caTraittee of correspondence and factories., 5 April 1727, EM, Add. 25,552, 
f. 1. 
30. Templeman, The Secret History, pp. 15-17,9 23; Wescorrb to Bryan, 14 
September 1727, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 11; Fran John Eyles, 4 September 1736, 
BM, Add. 32,792j f. 199; Conudttee for law suits, 10 July 17303 EM, Add. 
25s568, ff. 82-85. - All accounts indicate some confusion between the two sailings of the Royal George. It is extremely unlikely that exactly the same sum was 
spent on both voyages. 
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E240j, 000. If this were true, there was a-net loss for the trip of Z24,964, 
which is confirmed by Philip V having been charged Z10,279/5 for his share of 
the loss. In fact, based on his obligation to pay 25% of the total loss., plus 
5% of the remaining 75%, this would indicate that the total loss on the voyage 
was approximately L35., 736. The proprietors probably did., indeed, lose money on 
the voyage, although the ship's officers, factors and supercargoes., and their 
backers., profited handsamely. 
31 
The sailing of the next annual ship., the Prince Frederick, was opposed by 
factions within the Spanish goverment. In October 1724, Joseph Patifto and the 
consulado and comercio of Cadiz recommended that the flota be suspended until 
1726 to avoid a glut of goods in New Spain, and to limit the introduction of 
Company merchandise. Not only were the Company goods duty free, they came from 
all over Europe, making it almost impossible for Spanish merchants to determine 
what to buy for the fleets. It was even suggested that the Company be denied 
permission to send another annual ship, at least until all their previous accounts 
were settled. However other factions in the Spanish government favoured granting 
the license3 and on the advice of Grinaldo, Pozobueno and Sopefla., the king 
decided late in 1724 that the flota would sail in May., and that the c6dula for 
the Prince Frederick would be given to the British agent in Madrid. It was 
dated 20 October 1724., but had not been delivered because the junta del asiento 
wanted to await the king's decision on the recommendation not to send the. flota 
that year. 
32 
31. Instructions to supercargoes, 12 December 1723, BM3 Add. 25,564, f. 25; 
Ccffdttee for law suits, 10 July 1730, EM3 Add. 25,568, f. 83; Certificate 
of Royal George's cargo., 2 February 1723., AGS., Estado 7017; Spanish 
general account of the asiento from its beginning to 1 Noverrber 1739, AGS3 
Estado 7009; Spanish general account from 1 May 1713 to 30 April 1736, 
C. L., Shel. vol. 43., f. 500. 
32. Patifto to Sopefta, 13 October 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2528; Siguenza to 
Valentin de Guerra, 18 June 1725, AGS_, Estado 6866; Alzayban to Pozobueno., 
3 July 1725ý AGS, Estado 6864; Varas y Vald4s to Orendayn, 28 February 1725, 
AGS, Estado 6866; Grimaldo to Pozobueno., 25 June 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; 
Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 21 December 1724., AGS, Estado 6860; Sopefia to 
Grimaldo., 27 Noveriber 1724., AGS,, Estado 6861. 
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The Prince Frederick, 40 guns and 170 men., Captain Wittington Williams., 
left London for Vera Cruz in August 1725., despite unsettled eircumtances in 
the Indies,, and against the advice of r1lownshend. It arrived at Vera Cruz on 
25 October, 44 days after the flota. Williams carried a letter from Guillermo 
Eon affirming that the ship's cargo measured 645 tons. Antonio Serrano,, 
ca=ander of that yearts flota, remeasured it on its arrival., although he had 
instructions not to do so if it had been measured in London., and found that 
it carried over 689 tons of goods, 39 more than authorized by treaty. 
33 This 
is proof that contraband goods had been added to the cargo., although it is 
no indication of how much was on accoirpanying vessels. 
The Prince Frederick was still at Vera Cruz in the sumer of 1727, when 
news arrived of the diplomatic rupture with England., with instructions to seize 
all British ships and effects. This was the second annual ship to have its 
cargo seized because of war, the, firstlbeing the Uo al Prince in 1717.34 
The accounts of the Prince Frederick are fragmented and contradictory. 
The cost of the cargo was about E290,352., but total sales by Thomas Bowles and 
the other supercargoes,, according to one account., was only E260., 313., indicating 
a net loss of Z30,039. Analyzing the accounts of the ship is conplicated by 
the fact that one of the two principal buyers of the ship's goods., Gabriel 
de la Laguna (the other was Vicente Calderon)., governor of Chiapas, died in 
1737 without having paid the Company 130,000 pesos that he owed them. There 
is no record that the Con-pany received the money from his heirs. According to 
33. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 26 March 1726, -AGI., Ind. Gen. 2805; 
Philip V to royal officials of Vera Cruz, Cartagena and Portobelo, 28 Julýy 
17253 AGI,,, Ind. Gen. 2776; Statement by Messrs. 'Domeley and Scatcliffe, 
16 january 1724, PRO, S. P. 36/14, part i. f. 14; Stanhope to Townshend,, 
6 August 1725, BM, Add. 32,744., f. 23; Real orden, 14 April 1725, AGIS 
Ind. Gen. 2769; Wescanb to Delafaye, 1 June 1725, - EM, Add. 25,556,9 f. 69; 
Walker., op. cit.., p. 234. 
34. Eon to Ripperda, 28 March 1726., AGS, Estado 6840; Visita on the Prince 
Frederick., 26 October 1725, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2805; Cornejo to Alderete, 
9 February 1726., AGI., Panama 134; Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V., 
26 march 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805ý 
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one anonymous correspondent in London, however., the ship returned money and 
produce worth about E300,000., including 360,000 pesos in cash., 1,062 serones 
of cochineal, 211 of indigo and 167 tons of logwood. In any case the Carrpany 
claimed that they lost money on the voyage. They charged Philip f36,905/14 
for his share of the loss., which should have indicated a loss of L128., 365, 
excessive even if interest were included. Understandably the Spanish refused 
to pay., claiming that according to treaties they were to share in the profit 
only., and not in losses. Without further explanation the Company asserted that 
approximately z45,000 was left as an uncollected debt or in funds sent to 
Madrid. 
The voyage was officially a financial failure, but as usual the vessel 
carried considerable illicit cargo. The Spotswood., for example., transferred 
300 tons of merchandise to the Prince Frederick after its arrival in Vera Cruz. 
35 
The Prince William, Captain William Cleland, was the first annual ship to 
sail in the third trading period after the war of 1728., and only the sixth in 
the 17 years of the aziento contract. Its departure was delayed., however., 
during the peace negotiations., and as the months passed and no word was received 
concerning the despatch of the next fleet, the directors became increasingly 
nervous. Sir John Eyles wrote on 15 August 1728 
The Flota & Galleons are certainly to be dispatch'd next year., & Supposing 
We are design'd to be protected in all our Priviledges agreable to the 
Prelftminarys sign'd at the Pardo, If we are kept much longer in doubt., on 
what Conditions and Assurances We are to trade, We shall be too late to 
provide the Cargo, And Spain will on that disappointment obtain their 
desired End,, as much for that Year, as if the Annual Ship was taken away. 
More months passed; in March 1729 Eyles said that if the Spanish would only 
allow them to enjoy their trading privileges,, the Company would make payments 
35. Anon. letter, 17 April 1730., AGS., Estado 6880; Copy of instructions 
regarding debt, n. d., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Hayes and Bowles to Romero, 
N. d., c. May 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Patifto to Keene, 3 April 1736, 
AGS, Estado 7009; Declaration by Plowes, 18 March 1729, AM, Estado 7017; 
Burnett's testimony on annual. ships., 25 February 1729,, AGS., Estado 7017; 
Undated accounts, C. L., Shel. vol. 43, fý 15; Receipts and payments by 
the ConTpany account to 1 May 1736., C. L. ý Shel. vol. 43, ff. 4-5; Spanish 
general account 1 May 1713 to 1 Noveirber 1739, AGS, Estado 7009; Wood, 
M. cit,, p. 257. 
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on money owed to Philip V, but because the delay in reestablishing trade was 
so injurious the directors would not "make any payments whatsoever on Account 
of the Negro Dutys., 
36 
It is uncertain if Eyles' threat influenced the Spaniards, but soon 
afterwards orders to reestablish the asiento trade were sent to Spanish officials 
in America., and the Company began to asemble a cargo for an annual ship., 
although no license for its departure had been received. By early September 
the flota had already sailed from Cadiz., and the Ccapany was frantic that their 
ship would miss the fair unless a c6dula was issued in: mediately. Without it., 
Wescomb said., Itneither can the Canpany nor the Kingdom suppose the Assiento 
reestablished". When the document had still not arrived by late October the 
directors abandoned plans to send a vessel with the flota., and concentrated on 
preparing one to accoupany the galleons. Finally., on 28 January 1730 Philip V 
issued a license for a Conpany ship to visit Cartagena and Portobelo that year 
with the galleons. 
Various disputes and difficulties further postponed the ship's departure. 
The most vexing problem was over the measurement of the Prince William. It 
was customary for the annual ships to be measured in London under the supervision, 
or at least the attendance., of a Spanish official in London. After the recent 
war the arrival of the new representative was delayed through the late winter 
and spring months of 1730 in spite of repeated requests by the Canpany that his 
arrival be expedited. Measuring the vessel without his presence., Company 
officials realized., would probably lead to endless difficulties in America. 
In desperation that the Prince William would now miss this year's fair., however, 
the directors had it measured without a Spanish witness., and asked George II 
to help them acquire a license for it to sail. In consequence Newcastle 
instructed Keene to use strong terms in acquiring the license, and 
even declare to the Court of Spain., that the King will look upon their 
CaTpIlance in this Affair., as a Test of the ancient good Correspondence 
between the Two Crowns being restored by the Treaty of SevilleJ-( 
36. Eyles to Rigby, 15 August 1728., EM., Add. 25,9566., f. 34; Eyles to Delafaye, 
12 March 1729., PRO., S-P- 36/18.,, part i., f- 31. 
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Keene acquired the c6dula on 18 August, and was assured by Patifto that 
the fair would not be held until October, and that the Prince William would 
arrive in time if it left early in September. The galleons had already left 
without informing the Company as they were obliged to do by treaty. 
38 
The Spanish refused to accept the Company's measurement of the Prince 
William., and one Luis Jacob Beaufort waz assigned to represent them during a 
remeasurement, which was done on 16 September 1730. A docunent was issued 
which certified that the vessel was carrying 620 and 707/10,000 Spanish tons 
of merchandise., and exempted it from another measurement in the Indies. Thus 
the ship was finally ready to sail. Company officials were convinced that its 
departure had been delayed purposely,, and that secret orders had been issued to 
hold the fair before its arrival. Consequently they asked that either the fair 
be prolonged until the annual ship arrived, or that they be permitted to sell 
their merchandise in the interior if the ship arrived too late; both requests 
were denied. 
39 
Although Patifto said that the delay was probably due to some "inadvertant 
error"., the Spanish probably did try to delay the sailing of the annual ship. 
Benjamiin Keene thought so., and he was often critical of the Company. If the 
Spaniards did intend the Prince William to miss the fair., they failed. The 
vessel sailed late in 1730, and arrived in Portobelo on 11 February 1731, just 
three days before the arrival of the merchants of Lima., who were carrying more 
37. Directors to governor of Buenos Aires., 3 April 1729, BM, Add. 25,5669 f. 
91; Wescomb to Keene3 14 August and 4 September 1729, BMI Add. 25)566, 
ff. 133,266; Keene to Paz3 29 August 17303 AGS., Estado 6880; Newcastle 
to Stanhope, 9 September 1729, EM., Add. 32,763, f. 184; Wescomb to Keene) 
30 October 17293 BMq Add. 253566., f. 141; Newcastle to Keene3 25 July 
17303 PRO, S. P. 94/105; Real c6dula, 16 August 1730., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; 
Wescorrb to Newcastle., 17 July 1730, PRO, S. P. 36/193 part ii, ff. 185-186. 
38. Patifio to Paz, 10 November 1730 AGS Estado 6880; Keene to directors3 
31 August 1730, PRO3 S. P. 94/104; Paz' to Keene, 16 August 17303 PRO3 
S. P. 94/104; Keene to Newcastle3 5 April 17303 EMs Add. 43,412, f. 111. 
39. Paz to Keene, 2 September 1730, PRO, S. P. 94/104; Certificate of Prince 
William's weight, 21 September 17303 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Company 
memorial to Newcastle., 22 September 1730, PRO., S. P. 36/203 part 113 ff. 231-234; Beaufort certificate,, 25 September 1730, PRO, S. P. 94/lo4. 
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than 12,000,000 registered pesos with which to purchase merchandise. Four 
Spanish merchant vessels arrived frorn Guayaquil still later with considerable 
cacao and 200,000 registered pesos. Reportedly a large additional sm of 
unregistered money also arrived. 
4o 
Several regulations were promulgated specifically for this fair which 
were intended to rectify previous abuses. To dry up sources of funds to 
contrabandistas., no money could be sent from the various Spanish American 
provinces except during the fair. All sales were restricted to the site of the 
fair itself; goods could neither be sold inland by the factors nor by merchants 
travelling on the fleets. 
Merchants on the galleons and those from Peru met in May to try to 
regulate prices for the fair, but they could not reach an agreement., which was 
undoubtedly advantageous to the Coupany who could always offer competition 
prices. Coupany agents were later accused of undercutting illegally the prices 
of the galleon merchants. In fact., instructions. had been issued by the directors 
to sell the cargo "at any price". Eyles suggested that this was necessary 
because of Spain's refusal to return reprisaled goods or to reinstate the trade 
as it was before the war. 
The directors altered the procedures for selling the cargo of the Prince 
William because of accusations of illicit trade made against supercargoes on 
previous voyages. The merchandise was consigned jointly to a council ccuposed 
of the factors in Cartagena and Panama and Portobelo., the supercargo., James 
Dollisse3 and Captain Cleland. They were to divide a commission of 4% on sales 
into 50 equal parts as follows: 
Table VI 
26 parts to the Panama and Portobelo 
12 parts to the, Cartagena, factors 
8 parts to James Dollisse 
4 parts to William Cleland 
factors 
40. Patifto to Paz, 10 Novenber 1730, AGS2 Estado 6880; Keene to Newcastle,, 17 
November 1730, PRO., S. P. 94/104; Keene to Paz., 2 Novenber 1730, PRO, S. P. 
94/104; Paz to Keene., 14 November 1730, PRO, S. P. 94/lo4; Rigby and Pratter 
to Stewart, 20 March 1731, PRO., AcIn. 1/231; Stewart to Burchett, 10 
February 1731, PRO, Adra. 1/231; Fran John Eyles., 15 May 1731, PRO., S. P. 
36/232 f. 115; Jimenez to Varas y ValdEýs, 26 March 1731., AGI, Contrataci6n 
5146. 
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All business was to be negotiated jointly by this council. Sales were to be 
restricted to the period of the fair, with unsold goods (on which no commission 
was paid) to be returned to England. 
41 
To canpensate for these restrictions the directors decided again to allow 
the ship's officers to trade in "privileged goods". Money was advanced to 
purchase merchandise., and bonds were issued at a premium of 15% to guarantee 
repayment of the loans. All advances were deducted fran the remittance,, and 
the net profit divided according to shares. As an incentive to curb illicit 
trade an award was offered worth 25% of the value of any illegal merchandise 
discovered. 
The total value of the private merchandise was not to exceed 40 
tons or E15,000, with the 40 tons to be part of the Company's allotted 650 
tons. It was to be divided as follows: 
Table VII 
Captain E4., 500 
Supercargo 4,500 
Writer 400 
Chief mate 1.500 
Second mate 500 
Third mate 400 
Fourth mate 300 
Fifth mate 200 
Surgeon and purser 150 each 
Boatswain,, gunner., carpenter and caulker 75 each 
Eight midshipmen., six mates and petty officers., 
eight quartermasters and an amoner 45 each 
As rdVit have been predicted the precautions taken to avoid illicit trade 
proved useless. An anonymous address to the Carpany proprietors charged that 
although there was concern that the ship would not arrive in time for the fair, 
the "convenanters" took time to go to Portsmouth to load a cargo of illicit goods- 
42 
When the ship arrrIved at St. Christophervz in January 1731., Captain Cleland 
41. Keene to directors., 31 August 1730, PRO., S. P. 94/104; Keene to directors, 
8 February 1730, PROj S. P. 94/103; Minutes connittee of correspondence and 
factories., 7 May and 4 June 1730., BM, Add. 25,553,, ff. 27-28., 37; Stewart 
to Burchett, 30 May 17313 PRO, Aft. 1/231. 
42. Both Captain Cleland and James Dollisse had served on a previous annual 
ship, the*E2y2j'Prince, which had carried considerable illicit merchandise. 
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transferred the ship ts guns to a Company snow and loaded his ship to the gunwales 
with illicit merchandise. 
43 
The Company made an enquiry into the voyage when the Prince Willi= returned 
to England, "The result of which amounted to nothing of Importance". Cleland 
placed himself at the Conpany's mercy after having confessed to an involvement 
in illicit trade. Others agreed to testify., but only on certain conditions. 
Mr. Hutchinson,, a former factor at Portobelo, said 
That he did know of some Things that might be of advantage to the Ccnpany., 
and if the Company will adjust his accounts,, he will give them what 
assistance he is able3 but 'till That is done3 he desired to be Excused. 
After agreeing to this provision the COITpany heard the testimony of several 
witnesses. Their evidence proupted the directors to appropriate the profits 
from the privileged goods to recover losses caused by the illicit trade. 
44 
UAs was one of the poorest fairs yet held., in spite of expectations. 
Considerable merchandise remained unsold from the 1727 fair., and the market was 
glutted with contraband goods. Furthermore, *a disastrous earthquake in Chile 
restricted mining activities., and reduced the amount of money available. Finally., 
an epidemic broke out after the arrival of the galleons which killed hundreds 
of people,, and probably scared off many merchants. Sir John Eyles calculated 
that after deducting duties, religious tithes., returns of former galleons and 
other private investments and past debts, the galleons returned less than the 
cost of the goods. (The original cost had been approximately lo., 000., 000 pesos. ) 
On the other hand., the annual ship made a healthy profit. Some British officials 
feared that news of this profit would be ill-received by the Spanish., although 
Eyles believed that it might offer an opportunity to obtain concessions from 
43. Minute comdttee of correspondence and factories., 15 May 1730., BM, Add. 
25j553, ff. 31-33; Anon. ý An'Address to the'Pro2rietors of the South-Sea C2pital (London, 1732),, pp 0 Minute general court -11F-January 
1731, BM, Add. 25,544, f. ý51; 
-Alml; 
te frcra E. V. .9 
43. , 
n. d., C. L. Shel. vol. 
44. Minutes cormaittee for law suits3 26 June and 12 Noventer 1735, BM, Add. 
25,5693 ff. 63,72; Minute. general court., 14 January 1731, EM3 Add. 
25,5443 ff. 85-86. 
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Patifto., and teach him a lesson into the bargain. 
45 
There are considerable discrepancies regarding the accounts of the Prince 
William. The cost of the trip., Z250,370/9/13ý (about 1,112., 757 pesos)., included 
the cargo and construction of the ship, various carnissions, supplies, gifts 
and salaries. The total sale price of its cargo was E299,814/7/5, suggesting 
a profit of E-43,443/18/4. Yet Philip V only received Eq., 102,13110 as his share, 
although by the terms of the asiento contract he should have received E12,, 395. 
As was the case for other annual ships the difference probably represents 
interest on the original investment. 
46 
The last and most profitable annual ship., the Royal Caroline,, Captain 
Samuel Mead., left England in October 1732 to join the flota commanded by Rodrigo 
de Thrres. It arrived in Vera Cruz on Christmas day, frcra where its cargo was 
transported to the site of the fair at Jalapa. 
47 The ship sailed at an 
inauspicious time. A Spanish register ship., the Dichosa, had recently been 
seized by a British warship., and Company directors were afraid that their vessel 
would be seized in retaliation. They'induced Newcastle to send an express ship 
to Cadiz to relay to America any orders that Keene could obtain fran the Spanish 
court to prevent its seizure., or to release it if seized. 
48 
Conditions for the sale of the cargo were sindlar to those for previous 
annual ships. All goods were duty free and could be sold at any place where 
the flotistas did., or four rmnths after the ship's arrival if the flota did 
not arrive. The Company received pern-dssion to sell its goods elsewhere in 
45. Alzedo to Patifto., 23 December 1731., AGI., Santa F4 1.161; Eyles to Keene., 
16 September 1731, PRO, S. P. 36/243 ff. 130-132; Delafaye to Keene) 1 
October 1731, PRO, S. P. 94/109; Salas to Philip V-, 3 November 1730, AGI., 
Santa Fe 440. 
46. Eyles to Keene., 16 Septerrber 1731., PRO S. P. 36/24ý f. 131; Undated 
general accounts, C. L.., Shel. vol. 43.1f. 15. 
47. For a discussion of the organization of the new fairs in Jalapa see 
Eduardo Arcila. Farias., Reformas econ6micas,, 1,80-91. 
48. Extract., 14ewcastle to Keene, 30 October 1732, Bodleian, Rawl. C 468; 
State of orders for reprisals., c. 1732., PRO., S. P. 94/101. 
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the viceroyalty upon payment of the alcabalas if no buyers came to the coast - 
49 
The Royal Caroline was constructed on the Company's specifications. Four 
and required to sign a supercargoes were selected by ballot to acconpany it. 
50 
joint covenant agreeing not to engage in activities contrary to the asiento 
contract on pain of forfeiting their com-nissions and allowances. Ship's officers 
caught participating in illegal activities were to lose their wages and be 
discharged from the Conpany., and to pay the Conpany for the value of the 
contraband goods, or E250 per ton if the value was not ascertainable--but only 
if fraud were discovered within six mnths after the ship returned to London. 
51 
The accounts of the voyage are the most complete of any of the two license 
and seven annual ships. The cargo cost L180!, 814/13/7., with other expenses 
including 9-11,765/-/10; 1 for the ship and supplies, Z5,756/10/9; j in salaries for 
sailors and soldiers, and E24., 613/5/8 for the expenses and salaries of the 
supereargoes. This last item included the cost of unloading the cargo., payments 
to carpenters, servants, doctors and for other services required., rent of a 
house in Vera Cruz., travel., mail., gifts for Spanish officials, and other 
miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses in selling the cargo. 
52 Thus the total 
cost of the trip was E222,967/10/9, not counting interest paid by the CoapanY 
or Philip V. 
49. Real. c6dula. 26 March 1732, PRO, S. P. 94/111. Although Thomas Geraldino 
was secretjý instructed not to permit the Royal Caroline to carry any 
foreign merchandise., it was not enforced. To Geraldino, 1 May 1732., AGI., 
Ind. Gen. 2851. 
50. Geraldino asked to be allowed to name one of the supercargoes to protect 
his king's interest,, but the directors rejected his request although they 
did make efforts to eliminate fraud. Geraldino to directors., 14 July 17323 
AGS., Estado 7010. 
51. Minute comrdttee of correspondence and factories., 27 July 1732., BM, Add. 
25,5531 ff. 133-134. 
52. Probably included in the expenses of the supercargoes were two sum, 6,000 
and 6,607 pesos, set aside "to facilitate" the departure of the ship and 
to "award the zeal of royal officials". The Spanish officials who assited 
in the trip to Jalapa received 400 pesos., and several other British and 
Spanish servants received small amounts. Very little of the 6,607 pesos 
was spent.., and there is no record of what happened to the other 6,000. 
Almost certainly the money was divided among the supercargoes. Via Ochoa 
to Gera-ldino, 23 April 1735, AGS, Estado, 7006. 
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The legal cargo was sold for 1,550,000 pesos (E349/778/9/12) to two Spanish 
merchants., Manuel de la Canal of Mexico and Juan Baptista de Belannaran of Vera 
Cruz. A secret contract between the two merchants and the supercargoes 
stipulated that 900., 000 pesos would be paid in Mexican plata doble del cuffo, 
in cash, and the remainder in local produce by the following 20th of September. 
The two had the option of paying the entire amount in cash. The gross profit., 
therefore, was F-126., 81o/18/5.53 Philip V received as his share E27,896/12/3., 
which indicates that the net profit was E97,, 034. As authorized by article xxviii, 
of the asiento treaty., the Company charged him 8% interest per year for his share 
in the cargo, ship and supply costs. The Coupany charged themselves 4% interest 
on the remaining original investment. 
The F349., 778/9/12 was returned or spent in the following way: 
Table VIII 
Sale price Net profit 
Amount Acquisition Expenses in England or loss 
Y-24.9631/ý/8 Supercargoes c=nissions 
and expenses 
143,109/18/8 Flax,, 900 serones F-9,897/2/10 E157 803/12/10 Aj796/11/4 
22,724/17/9 Indigo., 700 serones 1,372/16/- 21: 856/7/11 -2ý241/5/10 
15ý, 312/7/1 Gold and silver 9., 735/4/4 159s520/4/7 -9., 767/13/4 
The apparent loss on the returns was vastly compensated by the net profit 
of the entire voyage., which was about 46% on the original investment. Each 
supercargo earned approximately z6., 783 on the sale of the returns in England3 
and approximately z6,995 on sales at the fair. Thus their total earnings., not 
considering any illicit profit they might have made, was about E13)778 each . 
54 
The accounts above represent only the legal and recorded trade on the 
Royal Caroline. There was considerable illicit trade, and other illegal 
activities. In spite of the apparent uniaportance of the incident., the Spanish 
53. The Corrpany accounts show that the profit was E125,834/18/6, but a check 
of their figures suggests that an error was made in their calculations. 
54. Davila to Geraldino, 13 March 1733, AGS, Estado 7006; Anon. letter, 2 
June 1733, AGS, Estado 6897; Accounts of the'EgAl Caroline's voyage to, 
Vera Cruz, AGI, Contadur-Ta 266; Via Ochoa to Geraldino., 23 April 1735., 
AGS, Estado 7006. 
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were greatly disturbed by a report that a poor Italian named Geronimo was 
brought to England on the ship. They considered the case to be evidence that 
there had been more serious infractions of the orders against transporting 
passengers and unregistered money frcm the Indies, and accused the supereargoes 
of returning unregistered goods. Just before the vessel left Vera Cruz in 
November 1733., royal officials confiscated five bars of silver worth over 4., 000 
pesos which were found hidden in barrels of meat. They missed a great deal 
more. According to a member of the crew, Alexander Menzies., as soon as the 
Spaniards left the ship provision casks were opened and silver removed for 
storage elsewhere. The provisions were badly damaged in the process, and hardly 
fit to eat during the voyage. Menzies said that he later saw six chests of 
silver unloaded onto a waiting ship in the Downs., and that he himself helped to 
unload approximately another 40 chests. The Spanish estimated that the amount 
of illicit silver involved was worth over 600,000 pesos. 
55 
Captain Mead denied having any knowledge of illegal returns. Several 
directors told Geraldino that they hoped to give the Spanish complete satisfaction 
on the question,, but that they could not issue formal complaints against Mead 
and Captain Waring of the'St. Jams, the vessel which accompanied the Royal 
Caroline on the return voyage., or the supercargoes. Captain Waring was dismissed., 
but this action want little because he and his ship were only on contract for 
the one voyage; the supercargoes were cleared of any misdeeds., as was Mead. 
According to their contracts any frauds committed had to be discovered and 
accusations proved within six months after their return to England. Although 
six months had not passed when the frauds were discovered, no action was taken, 
prompting Geraldino to accuse the directors of evasion. 
56 
55. Geraldino to Patifio., 18 March 1734., AGi. Ind. Gen. 2790; Minute comdttee 
of correspondence and factories, 5 March 1733, BM3 Add. 25,554., ff. 81-82; 
Vera Cruz govemor and royal officials to Philip V., 26 March 1734., AGI., 
Ind. Gen. 2811; Geraldino, to Avila, 30 March 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; 
Alexander Menzies testtnony., 20 February 1733, AGS, Estado 7009; Keene to 
Newcastle, 12 May 1734, EM, Add . 433418, f. 132. 
56. Hopkins to Newcastle, 24 Januax-j 1735, EM$ Add. 32,787, ff. 62-63; 
Geraldino, to Patiflo., 27 May 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790. 
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Meanwhile Philip V was not paid his share of the profits. When he asked 
for payment the Canpany was short of cash and put him off by claiming that the 
accounts were incorrplete, and would remain so until after the returns were sold. 
This was misleading because their sale was not related to the profit realized by 
the sale of the cargo3 the basis on which Philip V's share was determined. Even 
after the sale of the returns in May 1734 the directors still refused to pay. 
In August 1735 the Canpany said that the ship's accounts would be submitted in 
January 1736, at the end of the five year accounting period on the slave trade. 
The asiento contract did not in fact stipulate that the accounts of the slave 
trade and the annual ships be considered together. Moreover, the directors 
claimed that Philip V was responsible for a share in certain losses sustained 
in the voyage., but that they had not yet been fully calculated. This was a 
reference to the loss on the returns, which were not his responsibility. Philip 
v was never paid his share of the profit of the Royal Caroline, and his claim 
blended into the general Spanish claims against the Company negotiated after 
the War of Jenkins' Ear. 
57 
In conclusioný between 1715 and 1732 the South Sea Corrpany sent seven 
annual and two license ships to America., an average of slightly more than one 
merchant ship every two years. These ships introduced legal merchandise valued 
at 92,, 208,158/14/6; 1 (9,815,075 pesos 5 reales at one peso per 54 pence), an 
average of E245., 376/18/- per trip., or L128,644/3/91ý per year. These figures 
suggest a relatively small volume of trade, but they represent only stated legal 
introductions., and to not take into consideration the voluminous legal and 
contraband introductions on provision ships and by Corrpany licensees. Every 
indication is that more than that amount of illicit merchandise was introduced 
on each license and annual ship or accompanying vessels. A conservative estimate 
57. Geraldino to Patiflo., 29 April 1734., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2790; Patifto to 
Newcastle., 7 August 1735, PRO, S. P. 36/36, f. 170; Patifio to Keene., 7 
August 1735, PRO, S. P. 94/244., f. 17; Hopkins to Newcastle, 4 December 
1735, PRO, S. P. 36/37s ff. 92-94; Hopkins' general suwm-j of negotiations, 
1735s C. L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 537-540. 
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of the total value of legal and illegal goods introduced annually into Spanish 
colonies by the South Sea Ccapany and its errployees on the annual and license 
ships is E300,000 (1,333., 333 1/3 pesos). 
Table VIII 
The Licensed and Annual Ships., 1715-1732 
58 
London 
First IC221M Period 
Destination 
Ship and- Departure and Date of 
Captain Date Supercargoes Arrival 
Elizabeth August 1715 Cargoes of the Vera Cruz 
ýSamuel Vincent) 
Bedford November 
ý-Thomaz Lyell) 1715 
Roval Prince August 1717 
(Baynharn Raymond) 
first four ships 2 November 





Manuel I, 6pez 
Pintado 
Cartagena & none 
Portobelo 
Vera Cruz Antonio Serrano 
19 Novenber 
1717 
Second Trading Period 
Uo al Gem 4 Noveriber Cartagena & Balthasar de 
(John Davison) 1721 Portobelo Guevara & Carlos 
7 January Grillo 
1722 
Eoyal Prince Sumier 1723 1. Catlin Vera Cruz Antonio SerTano 
Mi-illam ff-eannd) 'IborOW900d b August 
2. John Pitt 1725 
3. James Doll I sse 
4. William Cleland 
Uo al George 3 February 1. William Dmpsted Cartagena & Carlos Grillo & 
(John Davison 1724 2. Joseph Batchelor Portobelo Francisco COMeJO 
& Edward 3. Thomas Canham 7 May 1724 
Phillips) 4. John Tatt 
Prince Frederick August 1725 1. Samuel Lockpox Vera Cruz Antonio Serrano 
(Whittington 2. David Patton 25 October 
Williams) 3. John Shippeen 1725 
4. Thomas Bowles 
TIArd n: LqLnZ Period 
Prince William 
. 
Winter 1730 1. James Dollisse Cartagena & 
(WilLiam Cleland) 
Manuel I, 6pez 
and a writer Portobelo Pintado 
11 February 
1731 
Royal Caroline October 1. Shadrick Bastie Vera Cruz Rodrigo de Torres 
TS-amuel ad 1732 2. Christopher & Jalapa ýER7 
Burrows 
3. Harry Spencer 
4. James Holland 
5. Samuel Mead 
(Table VIII continued on next page) 
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Prince Frederick 290., 352 
Sale to London & Total Lenp-th Miscellaneous 
Price of Voyage- Caments 
1 Noventer Transported 9 
1716; 1 year passengers to England., 
4 months including 2 Spaniards 
249)371/-ý/5 75., 000 peso bribe 
given to Spanish 
officials 
357,551/16/10 3 Decenber Acempanied by H. M. S. 
1718; 1 year Diamond & Sarah 
5 months 
290,569/3/9 
Prince William 250,, 730/ý/1; 2- 299s8l4/7/5 
c. August 




4 years 9 
months 
Captain Davison died 
in Cartagena 
On 9 July 1727 the 
ship was seized and 
used as a Spanish 
warship during the 
war. 
Stopped in St. 
Christopher's en 
route to take on 
contraband 
Royal Caroline 220,967/10/9 349,778/9/12 6 Januar-i Transported money on 
1734; 1 year account of private 
4 mnths individuals to Europe 
58. References for licensed and annual ships' table: 
Minute court of directors,, 29 September 1714, BM, Add. 2534952 f. 208. 
Varas y Vald6s to Morales Velasco, 21 July 1715., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2645. 
Ur7 to Vera Cruz factors., 11 February 1716, BM,, Add. 259,563., f. 23. 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V3 22 May 1716, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Elizabeth's returns, 16 August 1716., AGI, Ind. Gen. 6. 
Bedford's certificate, 24 August 1716., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Montele3n to Grimaldo., 5 November 1716., An., Ind. Gen. 6. 
Montele6n to Grimaldo., 19 November 1716, AGS, Estado 6835. 
Directors to Vera Cruz factors., 12 July 171T, BM, Add. 25,95631 f. 45. 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 14 March 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801 
Measurement of the Royal Prince by Antonio Serrano, enclosed in royal 
officials to Philip V., b April 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801. 
Directors to Bowles., 26 June 1718, BM2 Add. 25,555, ff. 88-89. 
Wescomb to Craggs., 27 June 1718, EM., Add. 25., 555, f. 88. 
From. Antonio de la Rosa, 8 December 1718., AGS., Estado 6841. 
Grimaldo to Stanhope., 10 August 1721., BM., Add. 22520, f. 182. 
Minute court of directors., 2 November 1721., BM2 Add. 25j500, f. 123. 
Frm Robert Shee., 13 November 1721, AGI, Caracas 891. 
Auto., 15 January 1722,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726. 
To Philip V, 17 January 1722,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2726. 
Guevara to Pes., 24 January 1722., AGI. 9 Ind. Gen. 2803. Minute court of directors, 14 February 1722, BMp Add. 25,501, f. 21. 
(Continued on next page) 
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58, (continued from, previous page) 
Eon to Corobarrutia, 4 March 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802. 
Real c6dula, 3 13 March 1723., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776. Minute court of directors, 28 March 1723., EM, Add. 25,, 501, f. 47. 
Real c6dula., 14 August 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776. 
Serrano to Cordbarrutia., 19 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 19 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803 
Real c6dula., 26 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776. 
Directors to Royal George supercargoes., 12 December 1723, BK3 Add. 
25,5643 f. 25. 
Cartagena royal officials to the crown., 18 May 1724., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Corobarrutia to Serrano, 29 August 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2524. 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 19 Noverrber 1723., AGI, Ind. Gen. 
2803. 
Eon to Corobarrutia, 21 December 1724, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2803. 
From a Spanish agent, 11 January 1725., AGS., Estado, 6862. 
Wescoft to Delafaye, 1 June 1725,, BM, Add. 25., 556., f. 69. 
Cornejo to Alderete, 9 February 1726, AGI, Panama 134. 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V., 26 March 1726., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Testimony of Edward Phillips., 13 June 1727.,, AGS, Estado, 7017. 
Extract 
. art ., 
Upton to directors, 15 September 1727., PRO, S-P 36/3. P 
f. 84. 
Poyntz to Stanhope and Walpole., 14 July 1728., BM., Add. 32,, 757., f. 82. 
Accounts by John Read of the Elizabeth and Bedford, 1 August 1728., 
AGS, Estado 7017. 
Plowes to Barranechea., 30 September 1728., AGS, Estado 6878. 
Burnett to Barranechea., 3 February 1729., AGS., Estado 7017. 
Testimony by John Burnett on exports., 15 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017. 
Prince William's account, n. d., C. L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 121. 
From a Spanish agent, 17 April 1730, AGS, Estado 6880. 
Minutes joint committee of correspondence and factories., 7 and 15 May 
17303 BM., Add. 25,553, ff. 273 31-32. 
Luis Jacob de Beaufort certificate., 25 September 1730, PRO3 S-P- 94/104. 
Minute general court, 14 January 1731, BM,, Add. 25., 544,, f. 85. 
Covenant between the South Sea Company and Messrs. Spencer and Bastie3 
31 August 1732, EM, Add. 25,576, f. 198. 
Panama, royal officials testimny, 18 September 1732., AGI, Contadurfa 268. 
Panama. royal officials to Philip V. 9 20 September 1732., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Vera Cruz royal officials, 8 November 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2809. 
Davila to Geraldino., 17 January 1733., AGS, Estado 7006. 
Petition of Thanas Bedell, 24 January 1733, AGS, Estado 7008. 
Copy of Elizabeth's returns, 14 August 1714., AGI, Contadurfa 266. 
Accounts of the Elizabeth. and Royal Prince 14 October 1733., AGS3 
Contaduria, 266. 
Avila to Philip V, 15 November 1733, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2794. 
Vera Cruz governors and royal officials to Philip V., 1 December 1733., 
AGI., Ind. Gen. 2789. 
Vera Cruz governor and royal officials., 26 March 1734., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Geraldino to Avila, 30 March 1734., AGi., Ind. Gen. 2790. 
Keene to Newcastle., 12 May 1734., BK, Add. 43,418, f. 132. 
Geraldino to Patiflo, 10 February 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791. 
La Via to Geraldino, 23 April 1735,, AGS, Estado 7006. 
John Read account of the Royal Caroline, 28 December 1735, AGI, 
Contadurfa. 266. 
Geraldino to Patifto., 28 December 1735,, AGI, Contadurýa 266. 
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C. L. " Shel. vol. 43, ff. 4-5. Philip V's general account fnn 1 May 1713 to 30 April 1736., n. d.. ' C. L.. 1 Shel. vol. 43, ff. 500-501. 
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Chapter XI 
The Third Represa-Ua, 1739 
The failure of royal officials in New Spain and Peru to return most of 
the money and goods seized from South Sea Company factories in 1718 and 1727 
remained a constant irritant to the Corpany., and was an inportant reason for 
the deterioration of Anglo-Spanish relations during the 1730s. Diplomatic 
efforts were made throughout the period to improve relations,, and the Spanish 
were aware that the restoration of effects was a prerequisite. As late as 
October 1738 Philip V sent instructions to Matheo Pablo Diaz, the viceroy of 
New Spain., to restore immediately money owed to the Company; the following 
February he reemphasized his desire for harmony between the two crowns. 
However a rupture was near. Even before Philip V's real orden reached 
New Spain Company factors in Santiago de Cuba had been placed under guardt and 
Company ships in Havana denied permission to sail on the orders of the governor., 
who had heard that war had actually broken out. This action during a period of 
peaceful if deteriorating relations caused considerable consternation in England- 
Pedro Tyrry advised the Marquis of Torrenueva that the factors must be released 
im-ediately and the embargo on the Company ships raised if peace was to be 
maintained. 
1 
The Spanish government took Tyrry's advice (although war remained imdnent) 
and ordered the release of Company personnel and property. Meanwhile the 
directors made preparations to avoid the losses that would accoapany a third 
represa-lia. Newcastle told them on 19 June 1739 of the differences between the 
two crowns, and soon afterwards they ordered their agents in Jamaica to stop 
shipping slaves to the factories. This annoyed Pedro Tyrry., who called it a 
breach of the asiento contract and prejudicial to Spaniards in the Indies who 
needed the labour. The directors explained samewhat weakly that all factories 
1. Real. orden to Pablo Diaz., 13 October 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; TYrry to 
'ibr-renueva, 22 January 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815; Philip V to Tyrry 9 
February 1739., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.3 
249 
were well stocked. In any case3 they said., the action was justified because 
of the losses they had suffered in 1718 and 1727, and because of the steps 
taken recently in Cuba "upon Suspicion only of a Rupture". They explained that 
they 
think it highly reasonable for them on sane occasions, to use Such 
Caution as may be proper for preventing damages of this sort to the 
Ccurpany, and that it is by no means Incumbent on them to give an Account 2 
of what Measures , They may think it necessary to take for that purpose.... 
Their precautions proved appropriate. On 27 August 1739 Keene inforrwd 
the Spanish that he had received instructions to return to England. On the 
same day royal officials in the Indies were ordered to seize all British effects. 
The-, next-day'-Pliilip V ordered Tyrry and Geraldino to leave England for France. 
Just as in 1718 and in 1727, orders were issued to place all factors under house 
arrest and to seize all Company money,, supplies.,, slaves and boats; special 
emphasis was placed on acquiring Company account books and registers. Few of 
the Company books were found during the first and second represalias., and as a 
result the Spanish government had no record of Spanish merchants who had 
purchased slaves,, cmerchandise, or provisions from the Company on credit. Laters 
when the Coupany demanded that the reprisaled goods be retumed they also demanded 
payment on these prcmissory notes. Since royal officials had no record of these 
debts., or feigned ignorance of them., disputes arose about their actual value. 
The Spanish government were bothered because they suspected that the royal 
treasury had been defrauded,, believing that sane credits were given secretly 
to avoid the payment of duties. 
3 
Orders to seize ConVany effects reached Cartagena in January 1740j, but 
they were unnecessary. Royal officials there had learned of the war late in 
September and had errbargoed all Conpany goods then. The seizure included lj330 
2. Smith to Tyrry., 19 JulY 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Tyrry to Quintana, 22 
July 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; To Geraldino, 27 July 1739, AGS, Estado 
6909; Geraldino to Villarias, 13 August 1739, AGS., Estado 6909. 
3. Junta del asiento,, 5 December 1739, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2771; Marquis of 
Villarias to Quintana, 12 August 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Zuloaga to 
Philip V., 30 Decerrber 1739, AGI., Caracas 891. 
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pesos 6 reales, flour, household furniture and 26 slaves, but no accomt 
books. The factors were placed under house arrest away fran the coast to keep 
them from having any contact with British ships., arid told to acquire whatever 
provisions they needed on credit if they had no money. The money seized was 
insufficient to maintain them, and the city treasury was errpty. Details of 
their release and return to England are unknown. The flour, which was worth 
2,624 pesos, was given to the San T-azaro Hospital for incurables in Cartagena) 
saving the 160 residents fran being turned into the streets because of 
insufficient funds. 
4 
The factors in Panama and Portobelo did not experience a long period of 
house arrest during the third represa-lia. A British fleet com*nanded by Vice- 
Admiral Edward Vernon seized Portobelo in December 1739, and Vemon demanded 
the release of all British subjects and their effects. He based his demand on 
article xl of the asiento treaty., which guaranteed the Company 18 months to 
remove their agents and effects from the Spanish colonies in the event of war. 
The president of Panama., Dionisio MartInez de la Vega.,, at first rejected 
Vemon's demands., but when Vernon reminded Martýhez de la Vega that the 
inhabitants of Portobelo and their possessions were in his hands, and that "he 
had little compassion for them",, Mart: fnez capitulated to prevent the threatened 
destruction of the city and death of its inhabitants. The factors were 
transported to Jamaica. There is no indication of whether Caapany effects were 
remitted to Jamaica at the same time or seized during the represalia. 
5 
While the departure of the British factors ended the comercial. activities 
of the South Sea Coupany in Panama., at least one CoiTpany factor., Joseph Conptoný 
remained behind. Carpton switched his a-1legiance to the Spanish when Vernon 
4. Philip V to the govemor of Cartagena, 1 November 1740, AGI, Santa Fe 432; 
Cartagena royal officials to Quintana, 4 January 1740, AGI.,, Santa Fe 1160. 
5. Vemon to MartInez de la Vega,, 24 November,, 1 and 10 December 1739, AGIj 
Lima 651; Martinez de la. Vega to Vemon., 9 and 15 December 1739., AGI, 
Lima 651; Villagarcia to Monsso,, 23 February 1740., AGI., Escribania. de 
C&nara 878. 
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seized the city . and II ved in the abandoned factory in Portobelo after the 
other factors left. Eventually he enbraced Cathol6cism., and for a fee of 200 
pesos received his carta, de naturaleza, good so long as he lived in Panama 
rather than Portobelo. 
6 
The governor of Caupeche., Manuel de Salcedo., ordered the seizure of all 
British effects there in March 174o, although it is mknown if any were found. 
belonging 
The orders of reprisal were received in Santa Marta in June; nothing/to the 
British was found there. Nor does it appear that any of their effects were 
confiscated in Caracas or AM. 
7 
The only important item seized in Santiago de Cuba was a brigantine., the 
Santa Clara, which was converted into a guardacosta. The seizure in Havana began 
on 18 September 1739. Many British ships., including the Woolball,, were seized., 
as were all effects belonging to the Company and a great deal of other British 
property. However not much was found in the Company factory. These included: 
Table I 
Pinount 
Item (in i2esos) 
Fran the factorsf house 5., 60-4 
From the factory 120 
Owed to the Canpany for the purchase of slaves 12000 
Pranissory notes seized 1., 329-6 
Nine barrels of flour 63 - 
Total: 89121-2 
One Conpany factor., Anthony Weltdon., was kept in Havana until July 17413 
when he was allowed to sail to Spain. He ultimately made his way to England- 
His living expenses, including provisions for the return voyageý in Havana were 
paid out of seized funds - They armunted to 81% of the total recorded aTmunt 
seized at the factory. It can be accounted for as follows: 
6. Philip V to bishop of Panama., 1 February 1744, An., Panama, 120; Philip V 
to audiencia. of Panama, 3 July 1749, AGI. % Panama 120. 
7. Governor*and royal officials of Santa Marta to Philip V., 8 June 174o,, An. 
Santa F4 1243; Manuel de Salcedo to Quintana., 6 March 174o,, AGI, M6xico 
3162; Zuloaga to Philip V., 30 December 1739., AGI, Caracas 891; Villagarcia. 




Itein (in pesos 
Maintenance from September 1739 through July 1741 
at 6 pesos per day 4,098 
House rent 2,125 
Expenses for the voyage to Spain 360 
Thtal: 6., 583 
Because the inventory of Company property seized in Havana is included in the 
general accounts of all British property seized there., it is impossible to say 
how the remaining 1,538 pesos 2 reales seized from the Company were spent. 
However other embargoed funds were spent on salaries., legal services., the 
garrison and the costs of making the seizure. 
8 
Company goods were seized at Vera Cruz in October 1739., after royal officials 
there had received news from the governor of Havana that the English had 
committed numerous depredations along that coast. It was the most substantial 




Item (in pesos) 
From the sale of goods on the Royal Caroline 21., 500 
From the auction of factory furniture 8,790 
From the sale of slaves 6 830-5-3 
n ic Belonging to Shadrick Bastie 1: 607-2-6 
Of this amount 5,550 pesos 2 reales were used to transport the factors and 
crew of an English ship to Toluca for detention and to maintain the slaves until 
they were sold. 
9 
Five boxes of books and accounts were also seized, and sent to Madrid. 
They showed that that the Corrpany was owed 228., 741 pesos 7 reales 3 nmravedis 
8. Represalia de ingleses corriente desde 18 Septiembre 1739 hasta 12 
Diciembre 1742,, AGI2 Contadurfa 1170; Royal officials' certificate of 
expenditures, 1 May 1743, AGI., Contadurfa 1170. 
9. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip Vs 9 January 1740, AGI., Santo Domingo 
408; Extract of goods seized at Vera Cruz,, 20 October 1739, AGI., Ind. Gen. 
2819; Vera Cruz royal officials and governor to Quintana., 16 February 1740, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819. 
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for negroes and merchandise introduced on the annual ships. Of this amount 
130,000 pesos were owed by Gabriel de la Laguna., the late alcalde mayor of 
Chiapas. A special cannissions headed by Antonio de Pereas ministro principal 
de marina, in Vera Cruz., investigated Laguna's debt, however neither it nor any 
other was ever paid to the Company. 
10 
The factory about which we have the most complete information for the 
third represalia is Buenos Aires., where the represalia, took place on 21 April 
1740. An inventory of items seized was made by the royal officials in the 
presence of two factors., Henry Faure and Rudolph Tooke, and included all factory 
property and the personal possessions of Company employees (who were permitted 
to remain in the Company residence for lack of a decent jail). In the main 
room of the factory there were three large mirrors., 12 armless English chairs., 
two sitting chairs., 17 small paintings.,, one marble and two round cedar tables., 
a clock and a cabinet filled with English books. The office contained 181 
books., note books and accounts of past factors, and 12 books containing the 
current accounts. All were placed in a strong box and taken to the real 
contaduria. Other interesting items included three dozen Chinese plates and a 
telescope over 21 feet long. No money was found but 58 or 59 slaves were 
seized, of Whcra seven were women. 
Rudolph Tooke's private quarters in the factory contained one red English 
writing desks six small red chairss a sitting chair., a small round tables a 
cabinets three swords with silver handles., a pair of pistolss several hats and 
assorted clothing3 a bed with a camelote of silk and wool, a bedside table 
and a gilded mirror six feet high, three engravings., six small maps and 
miscellaneous other items. The rooms of the other factors were similarly 
furnished. 
At El Retiro, the large Company farm outside the city walls which was also 
10. Philip V to viceroy of New Spain, 2 September 1746, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2819; 
Vera Cruz royal officials to Quintana, 21 June 1740, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2819; 
Geraldino, to Carvajal y Lancaster., 20 December 1743., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; 
Junta del asiento,, 22 August 1746,, AGI., Ind. G 1.2819. en 
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used as an infirmary for slaves., and at the factory's cerveceria nearby, the 
Spanish seized 29 more slaves and considerable furniture and equipment. 
Confiscated items included numerous tables and beds., large cooking pots, 22 
hides,, 90 strings of onions and 50 of garlic, dozens of barrels., pipes and 
other large containers. The farm itself was appropriated with its gardens 
and groves of trees: 71 walnut, 39 pear, 20 orange, 100 apple., and a grove of 
peach and fig trees. A great number of items used in the various aspects 
of the slave trade were found in a Ccmpany storehouse. They included five 
scales with weights., 14 rolls of ship rigging, five muskets, burlap, 49 
bedspreads for slaves.,, two garden rakes., 31 scythes., 53 ankle shackles and 46 
hand-cuffs., six "iron cats"(used in the punishment of slaves)., iron pokers, 
kettles, brooms., padlocks, files, saws, drills and other items. The factory 
launch, the Britania, was-also seized. 
11 
The royal officials in Buenos Aires sold some of the Campany effects after 
the seizure, and placed the proceeds in the roya. 1 treasury. Slaves were 
auctioned at intervals as follows: 
Table IV 
Date Price and Average Number Men Women Boys Girls 
Price (in pesos 
7 Decezber 1740 3., 025 137-4 22 
13 Noven*ber - 26 
December 1741 2., 170 197 11 6320 
20 February - 15 
August 1742 760 190 44000 
16 June 1745 1,250 250 55000 
However most of the Company effects, including the Britania, were not sold 
until well after the war. 
12 
The factors remained under house arrest of varying forms throughout the 
Inventory of Buenos Aires factory., 21 April 1740, AGS., Escribania de 
Mwa, 878; Junta of royal officials., 21 April 1740., AGI,, Escribania de 
C&nara 878; Further embargoes., 21 April 1740, AGI, Escribania de Cc6mara 878. 
12. Account of the sale of 22 slaves, 7 December 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818; 
Account of the sale of slaves., 13 November 1741,15 August 1742 and 16 June 1745, AGI., Escribania de CAmara 878. 
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war. Their first opportunity to leave came in May 1741 when a British war 
ship arrived at the neighbouring Portuguese colony. Tooke and Faure asked 
permission for the factors to return to England on the ship., but their request 
was denied and they were taken seven leagues into the country to thwart any 
possible escape attempt. They complained bitterly of this treatment., and the 
royal officials were., in fact,, in a dilemma about how to treat the factors. 
They had instructions from the king not to molest Company employees, which 
implied that they should not be imprisoned., but the officials feared that if 
they were allowed their freedan they would try to escape or act in scme other 
sinister fashion. Eventually they decided to give the factors freed= of the 
city if they would post a bond of 20., 000 pesos. However the factors had no 
way of raising that much money., and on 7 September., after numerous petitions 
in which they argued that such restrictions had not been made on the movement 
of factors during previous represali2a, they received the freed= to move about 
the city without having to post a bond. 
In October a Spanish ship, the Real Mercurio., arrived in port., and TOoke 
and Faure announced that they had resolved to sail on it with their dependents 
to place themselves in the hands of the king of Spain. To support their 
petition they cited the real c6dula of 12 April 1726., which said that factors 
seized should be sent to Spain., and the c6dula of 27 August 1739, which said 
that previous c6dulas relating to represalias should be observed. The Spanish 
officials agreed to allow the factors to leave (no doubt happy to resolve the 
problem in that fashion),, on condition that someone remain behind with authority 
to represent the Company. Consequently Richard Lindsey was selected by Tooke 
and Faure to act as factory director after their departure. 
Tooke and Faure sailed in January 1742., taking with them the factory 
surgeon, William Mitchell, and the mayordcno of El Retiro, George Shrtrpton. 
Anticipating the eventual reopening of the asiento trade, they left three other 
factors with Lindsey: William Grey., Joseph Harrison and Thomas Stewart. Three 
other factors also remained behind., but only because there was insufficient 
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space on the ship. 
13 
Lindsey did little in behalf of the Company; in fact there was little 
to do. His expenses, and those of the remaining factors and slaves, were paid 
by royal officials f): Nn the reprisaled money. In June 1743 he went to Cordoba 
without delegating authority to anyone to represent the Company,, and from there 
to Europe in March 1745. It was obvious by then that the asiento trade was 
not going to be reestablished. The factory ccimplex was nearly in ruins., as 
was the Britania, which was sold in July 1744 for 560 pesos. In August 1745 
the royal officials decided to sell the remaining slaves., cattle., furniture 
and other Company effects at auction., although their value had greatly 
depreciated through the nonml ravages of time. 
. 
The auction was a disaster. Every morning for over a week various royal 
officials., including the alcalde ordinario de primer voto,. the tesorero and the 
contador., met at the ayuntamiento in Buenos Aires where the auctioneer described 
"in a high and intelligible voice" the various effects, slaves and livestock 
belonging to the South Sea Company being sold for the account of the royal 
treasury. As night approached on the last day, after the auctioneer had cried 
repeatedly with "all precision and clarity"., but without selling a single item3 
the officials suspended activities. Eventually they decided that William Grey., 
who they had named defender of the asiento after Lindsey's departure., with a 
salary of 300 pesos a year., would be allowed to sell the goods extrajudicially., 
i. e., without duties, and at the best price he could get. The outcome of these 
sales is unknown., but the proceeds must have been negligible. 
13. Petitions from Tooke and Faure., c. 15 October, 4 May, 9 June 7 September. $ 
7 and 19 November 1741, AGI, Escribanla de C6mara 878; Memorial, c. 22 
Deceirber 1741$ AGI, Escribanfa de C, 6imara 878; Judgrrent by Joseph Idpez, $ 
31 August 1741., AGI., Escr-lbania de C6mara 878. 
Provisions acquired by Tooke and Faure for the return voyage included 
10 barrels of wine., four large sacks of biscuits, six small sacks of 
barley and one bale of mat6., flour., seven barrels of salted mat., 100 
pounds of dried beef., a bale of gaxbanzos and another of pocotos beam., 
and one of oregano; ten legs of ham., a box of sugar., chocolate, almonds 
and pork sausages., 20 sacks of corn., dried fruit and various other items 
such as chickens, ducks, geese and suckling pigs. Memorial., c. 22 Decerrber 1741ý AGI, Escribania de C6mara 878. 
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Grey was still in Buenos Aires as late as October 1747, when he asked 
for and received 1,465 pesos fran the royal officials for maintenance., canplaining 
that he was poor and ill clothed. The amount he received included 576 pesos for 
the subsistence of several unsold slaves. 
14 The accounts of the represalia 
in Buenos Aires end at this point., and it is uncertain what became of Grey or 
the remaining Company property there. However almost certainly all money earned 
from the sale of Conpany effects was spent in the maintenance and upkeep of 
the factory,, factors and slaves. 
The amount seized during the third represalia was small. Nothing was 











Balance of the Third Represalia 
Effects and 
Pesos Seized 
one ship., 58-59 slaves and miscellaneous effects, 
3,954-61 26 slaves and miscellaneous effects 
8., 121-2 
One ship 
38,727-7 and 5 boxes of account books 
14. Petitions from William Grey., c. 16 June 1743,. c. 11 March 1745., and c. 6 
October 1747, AQI, Escribanfa-de Maara 878; Petition from J. F. de 
c. 17 JulY'1744 * AGI3ýEscribanfa deýCftara 878; Ortiz de Rosas 
et al to--Philip V,, 17 August 1745, AGI, Escribanfa de C&wa 878; Auction 
account, 18-August 1745, AGI, Eser-lbanfa de C6mara 878; Petitions fran 
Richard Lindsey., c. 15 April and 2 September 1742., Escribanfa. de C&wa 
878; Auto, 27 August 1745, AGI, Escribarda de Cdmara 878. 
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Chapter XII 
Asiento Slave Accounts 1714-1739: 
An Approach at Quantification 
Several problems make the systematization of Company accounts difficult. 
A bi-annual audit of factory books was mandatory., but rarely observed., primarily 
because they were incomplete and inaccurate, and confomed to no standardized 
accounting system. The distinctive method of book-keeping that evolved at 
each factory., often with each new accountant, resulted in numerous errors and 
omissions. In addition many of the account books were seized by the Spanish 
during the three represalias. Of those that survived sane were lost or 
destroyed in America while others were sent to Spain and often misplaced. 
Consequently when Company accountants in London began their final audit of 
factory books at the end of each five year period so as to submit a complete 
record of the asiento trade they had insufficient information to determine the 
amount of duties owed from the introduction of slaves., or the profit due to 
Philip V from the merchandise introduced on the license and annual ships. An 
attempt was made to extract the missing information from, the factors' letters2 
but when no record of sales could be found, the Company and Spanish officials 
agreed that for purposes of book-keeping the sale price of each slave introduced 
would be entered as 200 pesos., a figure that probably favoured the Company. No 
such easy coupromise was reached over the disputed merchandise sold from 
Company ships. 
Until 1732., when Philip V appointed a representative at each Company 
outpost in the West Indies to monitor and send records of the asiento trade 
to Thomas Geraldino in London and to the junta del asiento in Madrid., the 
Spanish had no consistent means of obtaining accurate accounts of slaves 
introduced, merchandise sold or goods and money remitted. While royal officials 
at one factory would send detailed records of the visitas., measurement and 
sale of slaves and the money or goods purchased from. the sale., those at another 
I 
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might be careless and negligent. Even after the Spanish agents were appointed., 
records dispatched to Spain were incarrplete. Spanish records usually ended with 
the arrival and measurement of Company slaves. Therefore various details of 
sales, including dates, prices, names of buyers., expenses and medical records,, 
and factor7 operating expenses such as rent,, food., salaries and transportation., 
are often missing. The Spanish accounts were resumed., although sporadically, 
when Canpany ships prepared to return to Jamaica or England and royal officials 
inspected the ships for contraband and recorded the contents of outgoing 
cargoes. 
Although Company accounts occasionally conplement the Spanish ones., there 
are great gaps for which no information is available, particularly the details 
of sales and of merchandise and bullion remitted to the Conpany. Moreover most 
Spanish and English accounts were conpiled in the 1730S from earlier records 
when it became necessary to resolve disputes over the payment of Corrpany debts 
which had accrued on the asiento trade. As a result entries were often 
misunderstood, and clerical errors were frequent. 
2 
Because of the lack of docmentation and the triangular structure of the 
slave trade, it is impossible to determine the ultimate profit or loss the 
South Sea Company experienced fran the asiento contract. Records are scarce 
covering the purchase of merchandise in Europe and the bartering for slaves in 
Africa. The approximate cost of delivering one slave frcm Africa to America 
at the beginning of the British asiento contract was t6/15; towards the end of 
3 the contract it had increased to Z20 or even higher. The last branch of the 
1. Secret instructions to Ger-aldino., 1 May 1732., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2851; 
Instructions to Spanish factors, 15 September 1733, AGI Ind. Gen. 2785; 
Vara y Vald4s to Paz3 c. 4 August 1725., AGS, Estado 6846. 
2. The majority of the accountS3 including copies of the Carpany books., are 
in Spanish archives. There are almost no financial statements of the 
asiento trade in the papers the South Sea Company trustees deposited in 
the British Musem in 1864. 
I 
3. Accounts of the St. Michael and DAje,, n. d., C. 1738.9 C. L... Shel. vol. 44, f- 137; Pery to PYM., --2? -T November 1713, BM, Add. 25., 562, f. 6. 
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trade, when the proceeds of the slave sales (bullion and indigenous products) 
were remitted to the Conpany, is also incompletely -documented. While some 
accounts of merchandise and bullion remitted are available there are alrmst no 
records of the price they realized when they were sold in Europe. As a result 
the discussion here is necessarily limited to analyzing the middle branch of 
the trade-the introduction and sale of Company slaves in Spanish America. 
No effort has been made to quantify the extensive contraband trade in 
merchandise, provisions and slaves introduced at each Company factory and 
licensed trading post. Undoutedly the illicit trade was profitable to some 
directors and most factors and Company ships' officers; it is doubtful if much 
benefit accrued to Company stockholders. The final balance sheet of the 
Companyts asiento trade can be assessed only fran the legal, registered and 
recorded trade. 
In examining the general factory accounts for the first trading period 
(1714-1718) there are several components that must be considered. They include 
the accounts for the two license ships, one annual ship., the duties paid by the 
Company to Fhilip V, and the goods seized during the war of 1718. These 
accounts will be analyzed separately for several reasons: 1) because the payment 
of duties was calculated and paid in London., and therefore not included in the 
factory records., 2) because a large quantity of the merchandise introduced 
on the license and annual ships was not sold during the first trading period, 9 
so the accounts remained opened throughout the asiento contract, and 3) because 
the amounts of money and effects seized during the re2resalia were contested, 
resulting in repayment by instalments. 
The first trading period began when the Charles arrived in Cartagena in 
December 1714 and ended when the Arabella arrived in Buenos Aires in May 1719. 
The trade, however, had technically ended the previous autum with the outbreak 
of war. For purposes of calculation the last ship at Buenos Aires will be 
included in the accounts of this period., but its arrival date will be 
discounted since the Company had no way Of Communicating rapidly with ships 
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engaged in the Guinea trade to notify them of the war. The trade lasted three 
years and 11 months, with Cartagena and Caracas enjoying the longest periods 
of consecutive commerce (the fall time) and Vera Cruz the shortest (two years 
and 10 months). During this time 12., 013 Con'Pany slaves were introduced at 
factories and licensed trading posts and 572 indulted., giving a total of l2j585.4 
By the terms of the asiento contract the Corrpany should have introduced 18., 800 
slaves during that period (400 slaves per month). In fact., they only 
introduced 64% of the agreed number. Slave introductions began slowly (174 
in the first year), reaching a peak of 4,065 in 1718. Ninety-five percent of 
all Conpany slaves were introduced at the factories., with the remaining 5% 
at the licensed trading posts. 
Table I 
Factory Percent2, Se of total number of slaves introduced 
Buenos Aires 
Cartagena 














Canpany slaves were transported to Spanish colonies during the first 
trading period in 117 voyages,, with an average introduction of 102.68 slaves 
per voyage. The largest, average number of slaves per voyage was at Buenos Aires 
(222.5), where the ships cam directly from Africa., and the lowest were at 
4. According to one account the Coupany purchased 19., 934 slaves between 1714 
and 1718, of which 
1,267 were sold in Barbados and Jamaica 
2. 
., 
900 were sold in British colonies after the outbreak of war 
1., 209 were sold in British colonies because they were too ill to be 
transported to Spanish colonies 
3,386 died 
8., 762 
Thus 11', 172 slaves were shipped to the factories, plus, another 386 slaves 
delivered by the licensed traders,, giving a total of 11,944. By this 
account only 58% of the slaves purchased by the Corrpany ever reached 
Spanish buyers, and 17% of the total purchased died. Duties paid to 
Philip V to 1722., n. d., AGS, Estado 7009. 
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Santiago de Cuba (33.87) and Caracas (37-54), where smaller sloops ferried 
the slaves from entrepOts in Jamaica or Barbados. The number of slaves nornally 
introduced per voyage at the licensed trading posts w9-e small., partly because 
of the unknown demand,, with voyages tending to be more frequent and unscheduled. 
For example., there were almost as many voyages to Caracas as to Buenos Aires., 
yet 3074 more slaves were introduced at the latter. The main reason., however., 
was that the licensed trade was used as a cover for extensive illicit 
introductions of provisions and merchandise., and some slaves. 
The trade to Havana was insecure., almost as insecure as at Santiago., 
which was always considered a secondary factory., and which the directors 
considered closing on several occasions. In May 1718 residents of Havana 
carrplained to Philip V that the Company failed to supply the demand for slave 
labour, thus forcing them to abandon some sugar plantations and divert the 
labour force to cultivating tobacco., which needed fewer hands. This is One 
of the rare examples. of the Company not supplying the labour required; it is 
difficult to determine exactly why the market was misjudged. It might have 
been a deliberate attempt to force Cuban plantation owners away from sugar 
cultivation because of the potential competiton with the British sugar colonies. 
A more likely explanation, however., is the erratic nature of the slave trade. 
Little or no effort was ever made to analyze the slave market, although that 
was one reason for carrying slaves first to entrep6ts in Jamaica and Barbados. 
Slaves were likely to be shipped in large quantities to factories where there 
was neither money nor demand. Moreover., since the factors were required to 
sell for cash only at the beginning of the asiento they frequently found 
themselves saddled with huge expenses for maintaining the slaves until they 
could be sold. This problem improved somewhat when the factors were permitted 
to sell on credit or in exchange for local products. 
5 
5. Cam-dttee of correspondence to Woodbridge, 10 May 1718, EM, Add. 25)5633 
f. 165; Directors to Santiago factors, 31 October 1717, EM, Add. 253563., 
f. 83; Directors to Buenos Aires factors,, 24 January 1716, BM, Add. 2535633 
f. 2; Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, BM3 Add. 253563, 
f-7. 
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The frequency of slave introductions can also be viewed in term of time. 
For the first trading period, an average of 255.60 slaves were introduced 
monthly, the highest nunber at Panama and Portobelo (99.13 slaves per month) 
and the lowest at Caracas., a license port, (10-38 per =nth). 
The figures are incomplete, but we do have some indication of the number 
of men, women and children introduced during the first trading period. While 
the Conpany normally expected a ship's cargo to be two-thirds men., in fact 
percentages varied from factory to factory, and were related to the needs 
of the Spanish commmities, and to a lesser extent the availability of the 
proper slaves in Africa. For those factories for which statistics are available,, 
the proportion of men,, wanen and children introduced is as follows: 
Table II 
Percentage of 
Factor'y Men Women Children Uncertain 
Panama and Portobelo 43% 24% 17% 16% 
Cartagena 45% 28% 19% 8% 
Havana 54% 13% 21% 12% 
Santiago 54% 17% 5% 21% 
It is assumed that the high percentage of men introduced at the two Cuban 
factories indicates a demand for labourers on the sugar and tobacco plantations. 
In theory the ratio of pieza de indias to slave should also serve as a 
guide to the type of slave introduced., and therefore the labour required. The 
higher the ratio the greater the number of prime male slaves. If this were 
the case the correlation should be evident where information is available on 
both the ratio of pieza to slave and the percentage of slave introductions by 
sex-Havana and Santiagowhich had 54% male slaves, should have the highest 
ratios-of-pieza to slave; In fact they do not. Cartagena had the highest., 
. 88, although only 45% of the slaves introduced there were men. There are 
only two plausable explanations for this discrepancy, one that female slaves 
were greatly sought after in Spanish camunities where white and Indian wcmen 
were less readily available., and the other that the system of measuring piezas 
varied considerably at the different ports in the Spanish colonies. Few 
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details are available conceming the measurement of slaves., but the factors 
had instructions to obtain the most advantageous Measurements,, and there are 
indications that royal officials, could be bribed to alter their measurements. 
Because the Corpany paid a duty on the number of piezas de indias rather than 
on the number of slaves., it was in their interest to have the smallest ratio 
of piezas to slaves as possible. 
Illness could also have effected the masurements. Although sick slaves 
were given a period of 15 days to recuperate before they were measured., 
undoubtedly sane were measured when they were still ill,, which would have 
resulted in a reduction in the number of piezas. For these reasons it is 
misleading to think of a pieza de indias as a strict measurement of labour., 
or work unit. 
Slaves were purchased individually and in large groups., by private 
citizens for domestic purposes., by royal officials for public works., and by 
slave merchants for resale. Purchases were made in the following manner at 









! yers Average No. Slaves No. Eu 
3, s560 303 11-75 1,588 368 4.32 
3., 767 712 5.29 
523 102 5.13 
1,479 503 2.94 
508 265 1.92 
113'425 2,253 5.07 
Purchases in large nunters were usually for resale,, although occasionally a 
private individual would require a large parcel of slaves to open a new 
plantation. The figures suggest that most of the slaves-introduced at Buenos 
Aires were bought by merchants., who took their slaves to Chile and Peru., 
particularly to Potosi, for resale. The saw is true to a lesser degree at 
Cartagena., Portobelo and Vera Cruz., the sites of annual fairs. The small 
average number of slaves purchased at both Cuban factories would appear to 
indicate that most purchases were for personal use. 
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It is impossible to calculate the amount of duty the South Sea Company 
paid on the slaves they introduced during the first trading period. The 
number of piezas de indias, (including indulted slaves) known to have been 
introduced in the first trading period was 8., 303. At 33 1/3 pesos per pieza 
the Company would have been liable for a payment of 276., 905 pesos 5 reales. 
There are indications, however, that more than this was paid. The treaty 
stipulated that only the first 4,000 slaves/piezas introduced yearly were 
taxable. If all 4,000 were introduced it would have amounted to 133., 333 pesos 
in duty., but it is uncertain if they were required to pay duty on the entire 
4., 000 regardless of the nunber actually introduced. 
6 
In 1723 the Spanish tried to detennine the state of the asiento contract. 
According to their calculations (They had no access to any Ccrnpany accounts. ) 
they were owed 1., 000., 000 pesos in duties on slaves introduced between 1 May 
1714 and 1 May 1723. (None were entered during the three years of war between 
August 1718 and June 1721. ) They assumed the Ccrrpany was liable for duties on 
the full 4,000 slaves/piezas per year. The Company actually paid 683,602 pesos 
3 reales in duties during this period. Disregarding the 200., 000 pesos of 
"anticipation" money that they had agreed to advance Philip V when the contract 
was signed, but had not done so, and which was included as part of their debt., 
the Company had liquidated all but 116., 396 pesos of the duty they owed. A 
payment of 435,623 pesos 2 reales was made to the treasury in Hinolosa, scmetime 
between 1 January 1717 and 1 Januar-j 1721; the remainder was paid directly 
to various Spanish officials in salaries and pensions. 
7 
- 
Assuming the duty was assessed on 4,000 slaves/Riezas annually, then for 
three years and 11 months of trade the Campany would have owed 522,168 pesos 
6. Asiento contract adjusted between Spain and England,, 26 march 1713, AGS. 9 Estado 6896. 
7. The State of the Asiento trade...., 27 August 1723,, AGS,, Estado 6870; 
Spanish account of negro duties from 1 May 1714 to the end of April 1722., 
enclosed in Smith to Keene, 9 February 1738, BMI Add. 32,797, ff. 69-70. This account indicates that the Company calculated their duties on the fýLU 4,000 slaves. 
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6 reales on a maximun introduction of 15,666.63 piezas/slaves. The Company 
paid 634,674 pesos 3 rea-les in duties before the war broke out in 1718,, the 
remaining 48., 928 pesos between 1718 and 1723. In other words, on a maximun 
assessment for the time they actually traded., they overpaid by 112., 505 pesos,, 
or by 22%. 
The gross sale price for Company and indulted slaves was 2,325,659 pesos 
6 reales. Excluding Santo Dandngo., where 100 men were sold at a fixed price 
of 300 pesos each, the highest average sale price was at Panama and Portobelo 
(241 pesos 7 reales per slave)., and the lowest at Cartagena (189 pesos 6; 1 
reales per slave). The low average price at Cartagena is another indication 
that the ratio of pieza de indias to slave (this factory had the highest ratio). 
cannot be used as an indication of the type of slave introduced. 
Although it is impossible to conpute the profit on the asiento trade,, 
we can detenrdne the relation between expenses and the net proceeds from the 
sale of slaves. Expenses and percentages to gross sale prices are as follows: 
Table IV 
Factoa 
















Expenses Net Sale Percentage Of 
Price Gross Sale 
Price (in pesos) 




32., 583 693957 









Me least efficient factory was Vera Cruz, where only 4% of the gross sale 
price could have been remitted to the Company, and the most efficient was Panama 
and Portobelo, where 81% of the gross sale price could have been remitted. 
There appears to have been no correlation between efficiency and size or any 
other easily discernable criteria, since expenses at the different factories 
should have been more nearly unifom. 
Although the money and effects remitted by the factors to the Company 
do not equal the net proceeds from the sale of slaves, the difference is 
probably explained by the lack of sufficient data. Fifty three percent of 
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the net sale price was remitted to the Company in the fonn of bullion., but 
the percentage of the total bullion remitted (819,163 pesos 2% reales) varied 
tremendously fran one factory to another. 
FactoEy 
Table V 
Percentage of total 
bullion remitted 




Panama and Portobelo 69% 
Vera Cruz 1% 
These figures give a good indication of the availability of money at the 
various locations where the Company traded. All factors were instructed to 
sell for cash if possible. While it is possible that money was received for 
a sale, converted into a local product such as cochineal, and remitted to the 
Company., it probably was not a frequent occurrence. The main objective of 
the Company had always been to acquire bullion. The calculations of bullion 
remitted by each factory do not, however., take into consideration the number 
of slaves sold on credit for which bullion might have been received at some 
later date. 
The total known value of produce and money remitted fr= the six factories 
is 1,016,807 pesos -153,4 reales. 
This sun does not include returns sent on the 
Royal Prince from Vera Cruz since it was an annual ship, or the cost of 
211., 120 pounds of cacao sent fraa Vera Cruz., which is unknown. The total 
known remittance is 48% of the gross sale price of all slaves sold for which 
there are accounts. The following percentages of the net sale 
were remitted to 
'Facýoa 





Panama and Portobelo 
Santiago 
Vera Cruz 
price of slaves 
Gross Sale Price Amount Remitted Percentage 
(in pesos) (in pesos) Remitted 
590,024-6 
2453861-514 



















The general trading pattern in the second trading period (1722-1728) 
was the same as in the first. It opened when the Asiento arrived at Cartagena 
in March 1722, and ended with the Sea Horse's arrival in Buenos Aires in 
January 1728. Trade ended., however, six months earlier in June 1727 when war 
again broke out., and Canpany factories were closed, their merchandise and 
effects seized and the factors arrested. The effective trading period was 
five years and four months., one year five months longer than the first trading 
period. The factory enjoying the longest period of trade was again Cartagena 
(five years four months)., and the shortest was Panam and Portobelo (four 
years eight months). The length of trade at the various licensed posts., which 
in all cases began several years after the factories opened, varied fran an 
individual voyage (Rio de la Hacha) to two years six months (Maracaibo). 
During this time a total of 20,113 slaves were introduced by the factors 
and licensed traders., and 89 slaves were indulted., giving a total of 20., 202, 
or 7,617 more than were introduced during the first trading period, but still 
only 78% of the amount that they should have introduced by the terms of the 
asiento contract (25,600). Yet this was a considerable advance on the 64% 
of the agreed amount introduced in the first trading period. 
The frequency of slave arrivals was different than previously. Introductions 
built to a peak in the fourth year of trade, then dropped dramatically in the 
last two years - The Company introduced more than the stipulated mount 
(5,076 slaves) for the first time in 1724; the following year a high introduction 
was maintained (5,177 slaves). M-te decline in slave introductions towards the 
end of the period was probably caused by deteriorating relations between Spain 
and England rather than because of econanic conditions or changes in supply 
and demand. Relations had been tense between the two crowns from 1726 until 
hostilities broke out. Realizing the consequences a war would have on their 
trade, the Company probably tried to keep their introductions down to avoid 
seizure. 
The factories received 97% of all slaves; the licensed Posts 3%. The 
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proportion of slaves introduced at each factory and licensed trading post 











Rfo de la Hacha 
Santa Marta 
Santo Dorrdngo 
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The only factory where there was a significant fluctuation in the number 
of slaves introduced was at Cartagena. The expansion of this factory is 
attributable to an increasing demand for labour and to a change in trading 
patterns. The Spanish had taken precautions to eliminate contraband in this 
area by sending more g2gELcostas to cruise against the contrabandistass thus 
forcing more Spanish merchants to purchase slaves through a legitimate 
channel-ý-the South Sea Company. 
The slaves were brought on 177 separate voyages with an average of 
1-13.63 slaves per voyage., an average increase of 10-95 slaves per voyage from 
the first trading period. As would be expected the highest average nUTIber of 
slaves per ship continued to be at Buenos Aires (343.18), the only factory to 
receive slaves directly from, Africa. This figure represents an increase of 
120.68 slaves per voyage, indicating an increase in the size of Guinea ships,, 
and greater efficiency gained through experience in the first trading period. 
The lowest nurrber of slaves per voyage (4.42) was at the licensed trading post 
of Caracas. 
9 
8. Jorge Palaciou -says that the ýsecond trading period 
lasted six years. during 
which, time 4,096-f3laves. were-introduced in Cartagena in 26 voyages. By 
this calculation Cartagena. -still claimed 20% of the asiento trade. Palacios, 
,, _La 
Trata p. 286. 
9. ' The - question - of :, tonnage - cannot - 
6ý resolved sa6isfactorily. What accounts 
we'have indicates that the increase was small. From Julian Garcia 
Guitierrezs 9 January 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817. 
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Despite the success against contrabandistas on the Spanish Main., canbating 
illicit trade on Company ships., or ships carrying Company licenses, was far 
more difficult. The governor of Caracas, Diego Portales Meneses., estimated 
that every one of the 50 Company ships that had entered Caracas., La Guaira and 
Coro carried contraband. The smallest amount was worth 4,000 pesos, he said., 
the largest between 12., 000 and 16,000. Taking 10,000 pesos as an estimate of 
the average per voyage,, then the total va-lue of contraband was a staggering 
500,000 pesos for an 18 month period. At La Guaira alone 5., 000 barrels of flour 
were introduced on 24 ships (an average of 208-33 barrels per ship). No Spanish 
register ships had visited the area since 1720., thus local inhabitants., 
merchants and royal officials presented few obstacles to the illicit trade. 
They needed supplies. 
10 
While it is lirpossible to quantify accurately the contraband entered by 
South Sea Conpany enployees or censees., we can get some idea of the magnitude 
of this trade from co=Lents made on the amount of provisions and supplies sold 
by these men. Between 1 January 1721 and 1 January 1730 the factors in the 
province of Caracas sold supplies worth 137,, 148 pesos 7 reales, paying a duty 
of 21,698 pesos (15.8%). During the same period they introduced about 400 
slaves. This gives an average of 342 pesos 6 reales worth of provisions per 
slave. If that volume was maintained throughout the asiento contract at all 
licensed trading posts and factories., then 21,679,658 pesos worth of provisions 
and supplies were sold quasi-legally by the Conpany. However the ýunta del 
asiento estimated that only 200., 000 pesos worth of provisions were sold yearly. 
The monthly introduction of slaves increased by 58.67 to 314.27 slaves in 
the second trading period,, but was still short of the 400 slaves per month they 
had contracted to deliver. Panama and Portobelo continued to have the largest 
number (115-73); the smallest (4.1), as would be expected,, was at one of the 
10. Portales Meneses to Philip V, 24 Noveirber 1725, AGI, Santo Dordngo 700. 
ii. Junta del asiento., 26 March 1733, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2785. 
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licensed posts., Maracaibo. 
No informtion is available on the division of slaves by sex during the 
second trading period. Therefore the only indication of the type of slave 
supplied to the Spanish colonies is the ratio of pieza de indias to slave. The 
average for all factories and licensed trading posts is . 79, an increase over 
the previous trading period. (The number of piezas de, indias at Campeche., RIo 
de la Hacha and Santo Domingo was estimated by a comparison with the known 
ratio of piezas to slaves at other licensed trading posts. ' The calculation is 
based on the assumption that the type of slave delivered at all licensed posts 
was similar. The average ratio (. 53) was then divided by the number of slaves 
at each licensed post to get the estimated ratio of pieza to slave at that 
post. ) The highest ratio continued to be at Cartagena (. 958)., closely followed 
by Vera Cruz (. 925). While it is knownthat there was a growing need for 
slave labour to work mines near Cartagena., and that slaves were purchased there 
for that purpose,, it is difficult to believe that almost all slaves introduced 
at these two factories were prime males, as the ratio would seem to indicate. 
12 
If measurements were carried out under the same conditions as previously 
then more adult slaves were introduced in the second trading period. At Buenos 
Aires., Panama and Portobelo the ratio of pieza to slave was much lower than at the 
other factories. M-ds would be expected since most of the slaves there were 
sold to Spanish merchants for resale so a less unifom cargo was desired. The 
lowest ratio was at a licensed trading post (Santo Dmingo, . 39). In general 
the ratio Of 21eza to slave had not changed markedly at any of the factories 
(in Vera Cruz it was . 92 for both trading periods) which would seem to indicate 
that the conposition of slaves was constant, and therefore that the demand for 
labour had not significantly altered. 
12. Slaves in New Granada in the 18th century were used in mining, allicultum, 
cattle-raising3 handicrafts, commerce and domestic work. Women and girls 
were often-perhaps usually placed into concubinage. Most of the sales 
in Cartagena appear to have been to miners either directly or through 
slave merchants. Palacios3 op. cit .., p. 289; JaJne Jaramillo Uribe, EnsMos sobre historia social Colombiana (Bogotq., 1968), pp. 209 27. 
272 
The amount of taxes the Company actually owed on the slaves introduced 
during this period is uncertain. If the duty was calculated by the number of 
piezas introduced it would have amounted to 526,614 pesos. If, on the other 
hand., it was based on the full conplement of 4,000 slaves/piezas per year, then 
it would have been 711,039 pesos 4; j reales. Between August 1721 and April 1725 
the Company paid 321,656 pesos in duties. They claimed to have paid an 
additional 44,374 pesos., but this was contested by the Spanish. Thus at best 
the Company paid only 70% of the amount of duty they owed (366,030 of 5269614 
pesos), or as little as 45% (321,656 of 711,, 039 pesos 41ý reales). 
13 
The Spanish had no record of the number of slaves provided by the Company) 
but appear either to have assumed that the maximum, number had been introduced 
or that the full duty was mandatory regardless of the number. While Company 
officials used every excuse to avoid the tax-even claiming that the contador 
was ill on one occasion-they based their figures on the maxim= duty on 4,000 
slaves per year. Thus they calculated that they owed 133,333 pesos per year. 
As with the Spanish they were either unsure of the actual number of slaves 
introduced., or they interpreted the treaty to man that the full tax was due 
annually regardless of the number supplied. 
14 
There are no accounts for Santiago de Cuba for the second trading period, 
and only sporadic records of sales and of money and effects remitted frcm the 
proceeds of the slave trade. It would appear that remittances made by the 
factors had not changed markedly., although there is insufficient data to 
determine this conclusively. Buenos Aires continued to return large numbers of 
hides; Havana remitted primarily logwoodj although tobacco now occupied a 
13. Eon to Paz, 7 September 1725, AGS3 Estado 6866; Philip V's account of 
negro duties fran 1 May 1722 to end of April 1727,, enclosed in Smith to 
Keene, 9 February-1738, BM., Add. 32.9797-, ff. 71-72. This account., which 
was made years later, indicated that the Corpany paid 401., 485 pesos 
7 1/3 reales. 
14. Blanco to Paz, 19 December 1726, AGS, Estado 6874; Relaci6n de las 
cantidades en el producto del asiento de negros segl5n la noticia que 
hay en la tesorerfa general., 13 April 1726, AGS, Estado 6870. 
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larger percent of the returns than previously,, and sugar was exported for the 
first time; Panama and Portobelo continued to remit mainly bullion. 
The third and last trading period opened when the Hermosa Ana landed in 
Caracas in February 1729 and closed 10 years five months later in July 1739 
when the Britania, docked at Vera Cruz. It had lasted five years one month 
longer than the second trading period (1.95 times longer)., and six years six 
months longer than the first (2.65 times longer). The number of introductions 
reached a peak in the third and fourth years of trade., and then dropped 
steadily until trade stopped. In 1731 and 1732 the Company introduced 5,906 
and 5,119 slaves respectively., only the third and fourth years in which they 
introduced more than the stipulated number of slaves. 
The Company introduced 31., 080 slaves during the period., and 532 more 
were indulted, for a total of 31,612. This is 64% of the 50,000 slaves that 
they should have introduced-exactly the same percentage of introduction as in 
the first period, but 14% less than in the second. The factories had 84% of 
the trade, the licensed trading posts 16%., unless Caracas is considered to have 
been a factory, which it was for all practical purposes, then 95% of the slaves 
were introduced at the factories and 5% at the licensed posts, the same 
proportions as in the first trading period. The percentage of slaves introduced 
at each factory and licensed posts is as follows: 
Table VIII 
Factory Percentage of Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Introductions over lst over lst over 2nd over 2nd 
p. 2. riod period period period 
Buenos Aires 19% 
Cartagena 17% 4% 
Havana 9% 
Panama and Portobelo 33% 2% 
Santiago 2% 
Vera Cruz 4% 
CaiTpeche 2% 
Caracas 11% 7% 
Guatemala 1% 
Maracaibo 1% 
Puerto Rico - 
Santa Marta 1% 











Panama and Portobelo maintained the largest percent of the trade during 
all three periods. Although Buenos Aires always received the second highest 
number, it dropped considerably in the third trading period., falling f! rm 29% 
and 30% in the first two periods to 19% in the third. The most likely reason 
for this decline was a great increase in contraband introductions. During the 
last years of the contract the factors there frequently ccuplained of the 
extensive illegal introductions of slaves through the Portuguese outpost of 
Colonia do Sacramento. The only other location where the percentage of 
introductions changed significantly was at Caracas. Here the percentage of 
trade increased 7% over the first period and 10% over the second. The demand 
for slaves increased steadily until the directors decided to station factors 
there permanently. Perhaps the slight decrease in the 
percentage of trade handled by the Cartagena factory in the third trading period 
was because slaves previously sent there to supply slave merchants who 
frequently came frcm distant provinces were now sent to several ports on the 
windward coast of South America. 
The slaves were delivered on 244 voyages with an average of 127-38 slaves 
per voyage. This represents an average increase of 13-75 slaves per trip over 
the second period and 24.7 over the first. The increase was primarily the 
result of new Spanish regulations governing the trade., but it also represents 
a continuing increase in the tonnage of ships employed in the asiento trade. 
During the later years of trade the Company was told that one slave for every 
two tons was the mininut-a shipment permitted in order to prevent., or at least 
to limit., contraband. 
15 If this regulation was enforced rigorously,, the tonnage 
of ships at Panama and Portobelo, for example,, was a total of 5., 112, or 
approximately 1-16 tons per ship. The highest ratio of slaves per voyage (364) 
continued to be at the only factory receiving slaves directly from Africa--Buenos 
Aires. It represents an increase of 20.82 slaves over the second trading period 
15. Geraldino to Saravia y Antolinez., 10 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792. 
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and 141-50 over the first. 
The lowest number of slaves introduced per voyage was at the licensed port 
of Campeche, where an average of 31.1 slaves arrived on each ship. The only 
factory which consistently had such a small average delivery was Santiago,, with 
33-87 in the first period and 34-17 in the third. Most slaves introduced in 
Cuba were supplied to the Havana factory. It was probably unnecessary to keep 
a factory in Santiago., though it served as a convenient door for illicit trade. 
(See above p. 1% ) Overall., the average number of slaves introduced on each 
II cense ship increased in the last trading period. At three licensed posts,, 
Caracas (106.94 per voyage)., Santa Marta (99.67) and Guatemala (79-5)., the 
average introduction of slaves per ship was higher than at three of the 
factories: Havana (77-39), Vera Cruz (65.89) and Santiago (34-17). 
The average number of slaves delivered each month in the last period 
(248.64) was only 6.96 slaves less than in the first period, but 65.63 less 
than in the second. By these accounts, therefore, if the same period of trade 
elapsed during each trading period the projected number of slaves delivered 
would have been greatest in the second trading period and the least in the 
third. In fact., the volume. of slaves introduced per month was the greatest 
during the second trading period for all factories except Cartagena, which had 
a slight increase in the third period., and Havana, which had a slight increase 







Panama and Portobelo 
Vera Cruz 
Average Nunber of Slaves Introduced per Month 
First Second Third 
Period Period Period 
79-11 95.64 60 
33-79 64.41 66-30 
36-07 32.68 27.65 
14-51 - 7.59 99-13 115-73 92-95 
15-38 16.84 10.02 
There is no indication that the supply of slaves decreased in the last 
trading period; the paucity of introductions was partly the result of a decrease 
in the demand for Company slaves caused by competition from illicit traders. 
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but primarily because of the long period of deteriorating Anglo-Spanish 
relations prior to the War of Jenkin's Ear. 
The average ratio of pieza de indias to slave (. 81) for all factories 
and licensed posts in the last period is close to that in the second period 
(. 79). This is the only indication of the composition of slaves delivered 
during the third period, and while it does not identify any characteristics 
of slaves such as age., sex or health,, it probably demonstrates that the labour 
demand had not altered significantly. The composition of slaves introduced 
at the licensed posts had changed as can be seen from the following chart: 
Table X 
Ratio of piez to slave 
First Period Second Period TMrd Period 
Factories Licensed Factories Licensed Factories Licensed 
. 77 . 77 . 
838 . 498 . 85 . 708 
The chart indicates that a large number of very young, very old, or infirmed 
slaves were sold by the licensed traders during the second period. 
The question of duties cannot easily be resolved. If the Company paid 
a tax on the 25,330 piezas de indias introduced during the third trading period, 
the amount would have been 844,248 pesos 7 reales. If., on the other hand., they 
paid on the full quota, the amount due would have been 1,388,749 pesos 3 reales. 
One account claims that the Company paid 1,039,337 pesos 4 reales to cover 
slaves introduced between January 1731 and April 1739. This amount is 74% 
of the full quota and represents an over-payment of 195,088 pesos 3 reales on 
the actual number of piezas de indias introduced. 
16 
The only factory where there are any reasonably complete statistics on the 
sale prices during the last period is Buenos Aires. Between October 1730 and 
October 1736 this factory received 3,800 slaves., of which 1., 124 died (34%)., 
and 2,676 were sold for 534,980 pesos, an average of 199 pesos 7k reales per 
16. Paynent by the CaiTpany for duties since 1 January 1731., 26 April 1739, 
AGS, Estado 7007. 
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slave. The expenses were as follows; 
Table XI 
Amount 
Item (in pesos) 
To deliver 3., 652 slaves fIxn Africa 3M., 941-231 
Maintenance of slaves 48., 021-13ý 
To purchase 75 slaves already in the factory at 90 pesos each 6., 750 
Factors' caTudssions 1793150-6; 1 
Total: 5403863-2ý 
This indicates that there was a net loss of 5,882 pesos during the third 
trading period at the Buenos Aires factory. The loss is explained by the 
extremely high mortality among the slaves. 
17 
Unfortunately the data on the proceeds from the slave trade which were 
remitted to the Company is too sparse to analyse. 
In conclusion., the Company introduced 61,206 slaves at the various 
18 
factories and licensed posts in 19 years and eight months of actual trade 
In addition., 1,193 slaves were indulted, giving a total of 64., 399 slaves - 
They were brought on 538 separate voyages., an average of 117.48 slaves per trip. 
Assuning that the Conpany should have paid a duty on the number of piezas 
de indias actually introduced (49,439). then Philip V would have received 
1,647,768 pesos 4 reales (. E370,748/i/1) fran the asiento trade. Taking the 
average sale price of slaves introduced during the first period (210.46)., and 
assuning that it ranained constant., 
19 then the Corrpany would have received 
17. General Buenos Aires account, October 1730 to October 17363 n. d.. ' CqL.. j 
Shel. vol. 43, ff. 542-543. 
18. This is an average introduction of 267-82 slaves per mnth, or 3,213.84 
slaves per year. Curtin estimates that the average nuTber of slaves 
introduced from all sources between 1641 and 1773 was 3,880 slaves per 
year. Curtin argues that the asentistas ' 
pretended to carry more slaves 
than they actually did,, filling the cargo space with merchandise rather 
than slaves. This was not the case with the South Sea Company's trade. 
In fact Company factors used various mans to smuggle in more slaves. 
The trade in contraband merchandise was lucrative., but generally over and 
above the slave trade. Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade 
(Madison., 1969), pp. 21-223 25. 
19. One of the unanswered questions is whether or not the South Sea Ccupany 
caused the price of slaves to rise in the Spanish colonies. It would 
appear frm the accounts available that it remained fairly constant,, 
although the price in Africa and Jamaica more than doubled. Ignacio de 
Frias, account, 11 January 1737, AGS, Estado 7013; Manuel Alvarez account, 
30 Decerber 1735, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2817. 
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13,553,413 pesos (Y-3,049,517/8/6) for slaves they introduced and those 
indulted. 
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ls588 709 437 
1,479 792 186 
3,767 1,602 903 
508 275 84 
523 
3 years 13 
11 months 














12,013 3078 1,610 
Number Ratio of Number 
of pieza to of dead 
Piezas slave slaves 
21 . 67 500 085-6 
1094-2 . 88 86 7 
1. *085 . 73 50 
2,9583-1 . 69 78 
est. 373 2 est. . 73 11 
482-5 . 92 3 
376 . 77 
Totals 896 391 c. 8,308 728 
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Factory Number Indulted Total Expenses Net Sale 
or of Slaves Sale Pesos Price 
Licensed Slaves Price Pesos 
Trade Sold Pesos 
Buenos 3,060 
Aires 
592,635 2,610,02 590sO24226 
Cartagena 1,1295 27 274j778,, 4 280916,, 61 245,861,, 51 
Havana 19246 234 307,437ss5 48,906,911 257,980j241 
Panama & 3,671 311 9250216 45,373., s3 8882029,, 24 Portobelo 
Santiago 457 102,54o 14549 902991 
de Cuba 
Vera Cruz 389 93., 052st5 15,469ss6 M582ss7 
Caracas -- 
Santo 
Domingo 100 30,000 
Totals 10., 218 572 2,9325,659s, 6 152,, 825,,, 1 2j5o,, 470,, 25 
Factory Average Salaries Expenses Number Number 
or Sale Pesos of of of 
Licensed Price Factory Slaves/ Slaves/ 
Trade Pesos Pesos Voyage Month 
3 Buenos 192.8 76,601,, 4 l8qs535ss-q 222.5 79-11 
Aires 
Cartagena 189.8 59s557,911 24$148. s, 51 79.4 33-79 
Havana 207 25s2OIls2l 11,033,04 64.3 36-07 
Panama & 241.9 93,792 32,993 163-78 99-13 
Portobelo 
Santiago 199.1 11,896 9,138 33-87 14-51 
de Cuba 
Vera Cruz - 12$185 62, o88,, 7 74-71 15-38 
Caracas 300 - 37-54 10-38 
Santo 
Domingo 
Totals 210.46 2793,232 3 
, 9,7zr 
328037s, ll 102.68 255.60 
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Factory Contraband Number Pesos Logwood Tobacco 
or Pesos of Returned lbs. lbs. 
Licensed Barrels 
Trade Flour 
Buenos 21,139,,, 4 
Aires 
Cartagena 1399937,, 31 219,645 
Havana 1,071 135,622 4962250 339450 
Panama & 582 517,597,, 3 
Portobelo 
Santiago 16pooo est. 
de Cuba 37olOO 
Vera Cruz 612 iooo6,. 4 96,435 
Caracas 691 
Santo Domingo 
Totals 21,75lpp4 2,344 8190163,921 849,430 33,450 
Factory Hides Cochineal Mate Tallow Wool Cacao 
or lbs. lbs lbs. lbs. lbs. 
Licensed 
Trade 












Totals 113P990 l2s736 1 10,475 107,106 303 2119120 
1. Fractions are rounded off for purposes of calculation. 
2. The estimate is based on the ratio of pieza to slave at the Havana factory. 
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BUENOS AIFM 1715-1718 
DATE OF LONDON DATE OF SEIP 
DEPARRM ARPTVAL 
15 MaY 1715 15 September Willdam & 
1715 Sarah 
21 January 15 Septenber Warwick 
1715 1715 
13 December 15 October Wiltshire 
1714 1715 




NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
Henry Partington, 
Degory Herle 248 197 2/3 
Thomas Bound 373 291 
18 Noventer 25 December Indian Queen William Nabbot 247 202 1/2 
1714 1715 
2 January Prince of 
1716 Wales 
10 June 1715 10 August Windsor 
1716 
15 August 1715 29 Noverrber Hope 
1716 
24 February Kingston 
1717 
9 April 1717 Sarah 
19 May 1716 11 July 1717 George2 
31 January San Quintin 
1718 
8 February Thomas & 
1718 Deborah 
30 April Europe- 
1718 
11 August The Crown 
1718 
15 May 1719 Arabella 
Totals 
Henry Dodson 353 2o6 
Isaac Townsend 162 
Walter Croný: er 189 146 
Thomas Sanders 
Henry Bloom 356 217 
William Malthus 243 
Thomas Hunt 297 284 V3 
John Norton 281 208 
James Dufay 314 24o 1/2 1/6 
Giles Lone 285 250 2/3 
William Hamilton 212 141 1/6 
for three years nine months trade in the 
first trading period (16 voyages) 
References 
3)560 2)385 1/6 
2. The George was placed in quarentine On its arrival because small pox 
was raging on board. 
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SHIP NO. SLAVES SOT-D EXPENSES NLT SALE AVG. / NO. SLAVES 
& SATIE PRICE P13ICE STAVE BUYERS DEAD BEFORE 
(pesos) SALE 
Wiltshire 242 46., llo 130 45., 980 190 66 
Europe 336 59,865/2 0 59,865/2 178/1 9 37 
Indian Queen 236 41,920 0 41,920 177/5 20 11 
Prince of 323 55,881/6 30/2 55,551/4 172 38 30 
Wales 
Windsor 120 22j136 250 21ý886 182/3 46 42 
Hope 149 273090 180 26,910 180/5 11 40 
Sarah 339 , 69j959 13070 68,889 203/2 82 17 
George 95 18,, 525 0 18,525 195 1 148 
San Quintin' 286 57,145 200 56,945 199/1 3 1-1 
Thanas, &2 220 473320 0 47., 320 215/1 28 61 
Deborah 
Europe 
3 279ý, 563855 500 56., 355 202 15 35 
The Crown 238 523649 250 52j399 220/1 44 47 
Arabella 197 37,, 179 0 37., 179 188/6 15 
Totals: '3,060 5929635 2., 610/2 590,024/6 192,16 303 500 
1. Contraband carried on the San Quintin " Europe and Thanas and Deborah was 
sold to two Spanish merchants for 20,000 pesos down and an unspecified 
sun to be paid later. 
2. Over one-half of the cargoes of the Thomas and Deborah and Europe were 
female., which., according to the fact3rs., "effectually contributes to 
the Sale of them., otherwise there would be very little demand of these 
two Cargoes". 
3. The Europe carried contraband on its second voyage valued at 1,139 
pesos 4 reales. 
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SHIP DATE OF DEPARTUBE DATE OF CATTLE COST DUIY TOTAL 



















12 December 1715 8 March 
England 1716 
3 June 1716 
England 
1 January 1716 19 April 
England 1716 
3 March 1716 22 May 
England 1716 
2 April 1716 20 June 
England 1716 
15 April 1716 22 June 
England 1716 
16 February 1717 
England 
13 January 1718 
15 September 1717 
5 April 1718 
10 MaY 1718 
23 September 1718 
England 
24 June 1718 
30 October 1718 
16 December 1720 
Totals: 
3,200 5., 000 450 5,450 
11,215 17., 523/n 1,577/7 19., 101/231 
3,009 4s7Ol/4; 1 423/1 5,124/5'41 
8,010 l2s515/5 1,126/3 13,642 
6,942 10,846/7 976/1 3/4 11., 823/ 3/4 
52800 9,062/4 815/5 9,, 878/1 
6,603 10., 317/13ý 928/431 11,245/6 
4.4o4 6,881/2 172 
6., 197 9,862/6ý 242 
14,761 2, ý, 064/ :ý 576/4 
132196 20,618/6 515/3; 1 






lOsOOO 15,625 390/5 16,015/5 
7s157 11$182/6ý 279/4ý 11$462/3 
5sOOO 7s812/4 




COCHINEAL TALLOW WOOL 
(pomds) (cost) (pounds) (cost) (pounds) (cost) (pounds) (cost) 
William & 948 75/1 
Sarah 
Kingston 1.1220 87/5 1,795-2 226/5; -2 68,114 1., 307/5 117 11/5 
Sarah 1., 508 lo7/6; 1 1., 840 232/2 
George ls379 98/6 1., 771 223/5 lo., 114 194 105 10/5 
San Q1_3ý, ntl-1,378 98/6 13760 223/4 81 8/1 
Quintin 
Thanas & 13 3 85ý2- 99/2 1,947 245/5 28., 878 553/7h 
Deborah 
Europe 133073ý 93/6 1,731; ý 218/5; j 
The Crown 1,349 96/5-1-2 1,8919ý 238/53-2 
Tbtals: 2 10,475 757/6 12,7361ý 1,6093ý 107, lo6 2,055/491 303 30/3 
1. The cost of the mate returned included 24/7 in duty; that of the 
cbchineal 15/6; and-tallow"2,008/7*' There was no duty placed on the 
wool. 
2. Figures are not available for ships returning between 3 June 1716 
and 16 February 1717 (the Warwick, Wiltshire, Europe, Indian Queen, 
Prince of Wales, Windsor and t2pe). 
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Buenos Aires 1714-1718 
Account of slaves introduced since 1715., 27 July 1734., ýGI, Contadurla 268. 
Cuenta general del trato de negros en Buenos Aires desde su principio, en 
Julio 1715 hasta Junio 1722., n. d., AGI, Contadurýa 267. 
Fran Monteledn., 16 December 1714, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 24 November 1715., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Minutes court of directors, 6 June 1716., BK., Add 253496., f. 126. 
List of South Sea Company ships, 28 June 1716, AGS, Estado 6835. 
Resume of royal officials testimony, 28 November 1716., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Royal officials to Philip V2 22 February 1717., AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials certificate of Company returns, 11 January 1718., AGI., 
Ind. Gen. 2801. 
Buenos Aires factors to directors, 4 and 28 April 1718, AGS., Estado 7017. 
Royal officials to Philip V, 12 May 1718., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801. 
Buenos Aires factors to directors, 11 and 21 September 1718, AGS., Estado 7017. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 24 September 1718., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801. 
Royal officials visita de salida, 23 December 1720., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801. 
Buenos Aires factors to directors., 2 July 1718,, AGS., Estado, 7017. 
Various accounts of slave sales., 1718-1722 (part of general account), 
n. d., AGII Contadurfa 267. 
Royal officials to Philip V,, 17 May 172T, AGI.,, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Accounts of Expenses and Costs of goods returned on Company Ships 
(part of general account), n. d., AGIj ContadurA 267. 
de Studer., La trata de negros., pp. 200,, 212.9 236. 
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Sale of Negroes 
War supplies 
Bills of exchange remitted 
Received for various salaries 
Various expenses 
DEBIT 








Hides remitted (including cost & expenses 
of 113,990) 186,915s, 11 
Horse hides remitted (10 with cost & 
expenses) 
Mate remitted 



















The same figures have been used in calculating this general 
account as used by the company. However, the account of 
expenses has been redone because it was inaccurate. These 
expenses probably account for the discrepancy of 305, A pesos 
in the credit and debit. Cuenta general del trato de negros 
en Buenos Aires, 1715-1722, A6-1 Contaduria 267. 
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PAYEE PERIOD & SALARY AMOUNT IN 
PESOS 
Balthazar Garcýa 19 August 1715 - 
Ros,, juez con- 31 December 1716 
servador @ 4000 pesos/year 5,466,, 5 
Francisco de Salas, Same 
lawyer @ 400 pesos/year 543 
Dover., lst factor 11 July 1715 
20 March 1717 
4000 pesos/year 6s754,, 5 
Richard Martyn December 1716 to 
present 
e 2000 pesos/year ls033P. 92 
Benjamin Thistle- same time 
waite e 1333 1/3 pesos/year 689 
"when he became to 31 December 1716 1,905P, 41 
2nd factor when 
Martyn died 
to 31 December 1716 
@ 1000 pesos/year ls786,, 7 
to 23 August 1716 
@ 1000 pesos/year 1,116, j5 
to 20 September 1716 
when he died 
@ 800 pesos/year 949 
Francisco Rodriguez, to 31 December 1716 





24 John Thrupp, 1 year 3 months 
June lst factor 4 days 








1 year 6 months 
less 6 days 
@ 2000 pesos/year 2,967,, 1 
same time 
@ 1333 1/3 19978spi 
1 year 10 months 
I day 
@ 1000 pesos/year 19836spi 
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John Mylam, 1 year 3 months 
5th factor 4 days 
8 800/9133 1/3 
Pesos/year 
Fracisco de Salas 1 year 
Manuel de Barranco, 25 days 
juez conservador 82000 pesos/year 
Joseph Blanco, 5 months 3 days 
overseer 8 500 /year 
Balthazar Clements, 15 months 4 days 
house overseer 8 200 / year 
Mathew Baudy, 2 years 9 months 
negro overseer 14 days 
e 180 / year 
Frank Gregg, 13 months 4 days 
lst master of boats @ 120 / year 
Diego de la Playa,, 22 months 10 days 
guard 0,; 144 / year 
Francisco Lamp4-yo, 9 months 
guard @ 96 / year 
Pascual de la Cruz, 10 months 24 days 
driver @ 96 / year 
Balthazar Garcia 
Ros 
B. Manuel Zavala 1 year 
all factors 1 year to 24 June 
1719 
Balthazar Clements 15 months 4 days 
@ 300 / year 
Same 1 wr 
@ 00 / year 
Mathew Baudy 1 year 
*For Various under general expenses 
































all factors 1 year to present 
*For Various from 24 June 1719 to 
, same 1720 
all factors 1 year to present 
juez conservador 8 months 5 days 
*For Various from 24 June 1720 to 
same 1721 
all factors 1 year to present 
*For Various from 24 June 1721 to 
same 1722 
Advanced to factors in salaries & 
expenses 










The salaries which are starred (*) are also included on 
the credit side in the general account. It would 
appear that money was received for thise salaries from 
outside the factory. Cuenta general de trato de negros 
en Buenos Aires 1715-1722, A&l Contadurýa 267. 
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BUENOS AIRES 1715 - 1718 
Expenses 1 
DATE PURPOSE 
31 March Supplies for negroes JulY 
1717 1715 to present 
House expenses for same 
period 
24 June Supplies for negroes 31 March 
1718 1715 to 24 June 1718 
Gifts 
Money owed from the Kingston 
account 
House expenses for same time 
24 June Goods for 1 year 
1719 
House expenses 
24 June Goods for one year to 
1720 present 
House expenses to present 
24 June Goods for one year 
1721 
House expenses for one year 
For 311 tanned hides e 121 
reales 
For 361 tanned hides lost on 
the Arabella 
24 June Goods for one year 
1722 




AMOUNT IN PESOS 
















189., 535s, 3/4 
This account included a number of sold and supplied goods 
which were subtracted from the total, as well as five 
salaries. They are listed separately so this account 
only reflects expenses. Cuenta general del trato de 
negros en Buenos Aires, 1715-1722, A&l Contaduri'a 267. 
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CARTAGENA 1715-171 
DATE OF ARRIVAL SBIP 
AND ORIGIN 
22 December 1714 Charles 
Jamaica 
23 March 1715 Sarah 
Baxbados 
November 1715 
29 February-1715 Mercury 
Jamaica 
CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, 
BOYS,, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA 
Robert Bem 174 89 45 25 15 166 V7 
John Stevens 293 133 137 13 10 255 3/7 
Jorge Correz 10 44209 3/7 
William Lake 26 14 570 25 1/7 
February 1716 - Undulted slaves) 10 7210 
November 1718 
2 April 1716 Undulted slaves) lo 
Foot 156 57 34 45 20 142 4/7 
15 April 1716 George Richard Farrell 81 76 500 78 
Jamaica Augustus 
11 June 1716 Resolution Joseph Hirchear 206 81 83 28 14 191 
Guinea 
13 January 1717 George Alexander Gordon 20 20 000 18 3/7 
Jamaica Augustus 
January 1717 (slaves received from Cuba) 66000 
5 APril 1717 Royal African Samuel 
Guinea 
29 April 1717 Speedwell 
Jamaica 
13 JulY 1717 Herbert 
Jamaica 
Decenber 1717 SPY 
28 April 1718 Neptune 
Jamaica 
16 may 1718 London 
London and 
Jamaica 
4 july 1718 Fortune 
Curagao 
1. References 
Antonio Angel 10 10 0009 2/7 
- David Greenhill 160 70 33 35 22 145 
Peter Girardeau 80 , 
9 3/7 
42 2/7 
Alexander Gordon 131 75 25 23 8 ill 
Paul Lill-iwhite 11 11 000 10 6/7 
Albert Moor 42 26 5/7 
2. The §pZ,, Fortune and Royal Prince all anchored at Maracaibo. 
I 
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DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, 
AND ORIGIN BOYS,, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA 
4 july 1718 Royal Prince Nathaniel Clark 25 
Barbados 
18 3/4 
18 July 1718 Dragon 76 
19 October 1718 Sarah Robert Porter 150 52 62 27 9 138 5/7 
Barbados 
February 1719 Undulted slaves) 74210 
Totals for three years 11 months trade in the 1., 5881709 437 207 98 13394 5/7 
first trading period (20 voyages) 
1. In addition there were 27 indulted slaves. 
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SHIP NO. SLAVES SOLD EXPENSES NET SALE AVG. / NO. 
& SALE PRICE PRICE SLAVE BUYERS 
(pesos) 
Charles 158 34., 361/4 
Sarah 245 473199 
10 2,260/4 
Mercury 26 6,257 
Undulted 8 13512 
slaves) 
Undulted 9 115512 
slaves) 
George 52 143500 
Augustus 
Resolution 186 393396 
George 2 472 
Augustus 
(from Cuba) 5 915 
Royal African 153 31., 757/4 
Speedwell 9 1., 870 
Herbert 142 30,112 
Neptune 129 27P568 
London 11 2., 615 
Sarah 143 30,831 
Undulted 7 1,64o 
slaves) 
5,867/1 28,494/3 180/3 61 
7., 791/6 39,407/2 160/7 8o 
1., 162-12 1,098/2 109/7 9 
4., 078/1 2., 178/7 83 23 
756/ 1/4 755/7 3/4 94/4 4 
756/ 1/4 755/7 3/4 84 
585/5 13014/3 267/5 23 
2,269/6 37,126/2 199/5 70 
203/6 268/2 13V1 
121/2 1/2 793/5 1/2 158/6 2 
1,46o/6 1/2 30,296/5ý 198 25 
307/ 1/2 1., 562/7; 1 173/5 4 
19561/ 1/2 28., 550/n 201 30 
535/6 27sO32/2 209/4 13 
252/4 3/4 2., 362/3'14 214/6 4 
1,207/6 1/2 29., 623/1; 1 207/1 13 
1., 64o 234/2 3 
Totals: 1., 295 274,778/4 28,916/6k 245,861/5; 4 189/7 364 
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SHIP DAM OF PESOS WGWOOD 
DEPARTURE REF D (pounds - cost - expenses) 
Anglesea. 17 May 1715 20,, 559/1 
Bedford 3 August 25, oog/4 1/2 4o. 770 305/2 1/2 13 
1716 
George 17 January 10,015/4 1/2 
Augustus 1717 
Royal 30 April 
African 1717 
108,875 680/3 1/2 34/6 
Speedwell April 1717 10,000 62/4 3/2 
Herbert 8-September 45P585/ 1/2 
1717 
Neptune 12 May 1718 60pooo 375 16/4 
London 31 July 1718 21., 93616 3/4 
Hope 30 September 16., 791/2 
1719 
Totals: 139., 937/3 1/4 219,645 11423/2 67/4 
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Cartagena 1714-1718 
Cuenta general del tr9fico de negros en Cartagena desde el principio del 
Enero 1715 hasta Junio 1722, n. d., AGI, Contadurfa 267. 
Relacio'n de los navlos despachados el aho de 1731 para la. introduccion 
de esclavos..., AGI, Contadurfa 267. 
List of South Sea Corrpany ships., 28 June 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Badillo to Philip V., 25 September 1717, AGI., Santa Fe" 436. 
Various accounts of slave sales in Cartagena (part of general account)., 
n. d., AGI., Contadurla 267. 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1714., 2 June 1734., 
AGI., Ind. Gen. 281o. 
Royal officials to Philip V3 18 April 1721., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801 
Joseph Sanchez et al to Philip V., 16 January 1733., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Royal officials account., 31 January 1734., AGi., Contadurýa 268. 
Royal. officials to Philip V., 31 July 1734., Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Jorge Palacios Preciado, La trata de negros por Cartagena de Indias p. 265. 
297 
CARTAGENA 1715 - 1718 
General Account 1 
CREDIT 
Sale of negroes 
Sale of indulted negroes 
Cash received from various ship captains 
From the Santiago de Cuba factors 
TOTAL 
DEBIT 
Gold & Silver remitted to the company 
Logwood remitted 




Negro provisions (expenses for unloading 
same) 
AMOUNT IN PESOS 
250P171to5i 












Cuenta general del trafico de negros en Cartagena desde 







































cook &2 helpers 
PERIOD & SALARY AMOUNT IN 
PESOS 
6 months 
@6 pesos/day 182 
9 months 234 
Domingo de Torres, 7 months 


















1 year 365 





1 year 730 
1 year 365 
31 years 
@ 4000 pesos/year 14000 
31 years 
@ 1000 pesos/year 3500 
31 years 
@ 800 pesos/year 2800 
31 years 
@ 1000 pesos/year 3250 (250 to complete) 
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DATE PAYEE 




31 Arthur North 
December 







Domingo de Torres 
Thomas Bacon 
31 Edward Garthwaite 
December decretary 
1721 









Domingo de Torres 
PERIOD & SALARY 
31 years 
e 13331 pesos/year 
3 
3 3-W years 19 days 
@ 2000 
this month salary 
it It 11 
1 year 
MOB 
1 April 1720 - 31 
December 1721 
@2 pesos/day 
3 years 38 days 
3 years 7 days 
1 year 5 months 
17 Jan. 1719-31 
March 1720 
SUB TOTAL 
















133..,, 23 14 
59s557s, sl 
1 14 
There are no other Spanish officialst, salaries included in 
this account. Cuenta general del trafico de negros en 
Cartagena desde el principio hasta 24 Junio 1722, A&l 
Contadurfa 267. 
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HAVANA 1715 - 1718 
DATE SHIP CAPTAIN 
15 July Three Brothers William Greenway 50 42-3 -1 
1715 IF "ff 







William Martindale 48 
NO. OF SLAVES & 
PEZAS DE INDIA 





March Royal Asiento Thomas Cheesman 52 43 
1716 
22 June Royal Prince Nathaniel Clark 49 36 
1716 
26 July Philip V Benjamin Clark 60 26,9 2 
1716 '3 











30 March Royal Prince 
1717 
1 April Virgin Polly 
1717 
11 July Sacra Familia 
1717 
3 August Tiger 
1717 












136 819,91 3 
Nathaniel Nash 36 30 
William Cleland 23 20 
Franco YýVez de 2 
la Cruz 
3 George Lason 137 68,, g,, l 
Charles Baggs 132 101 
Daniel Graves 
Charles Baggs 135 122 




DATE SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
12 March Catherine Pedro Papillon 69 -. 53 
1718 
April received from Puerto del Principe 59 
1718 




1718 confiscated slaves 4 
November 
1718 received from Barbados 87 
November 
1718 confiscated slaves 91 ? 
2 14 John & Isaac Coleman 120 106, $5 November Elizabeth 
1718 
22 3 November Neptune Thomas Cheesman 30 26ý21rssl 
1718 
January 
1719 indulted slaves 3? 
Totals for three years five months trade in the 19479 lj085 
first trading period (23 voyages) 
1. This does not include 234 indulted slaves, 
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SHIP SLAVES SOLD SALE PRICE EXPENSES NET AVG. NO. 
MEN WOMEN BOYS GIRLS (pesos) BUYERS 
George 1 51 35 39 Augustus 
14 
Royal 40 000 
Prince 
indulted 75 24 23 14 
Royal 36 000 
Prince (2 dead) 
Virgin 23 000 
Polly (2 dead) 
Tiger 91 14 31 1 
(3 dead) 
Eagle 57 23 21 31 
(4 dead) 
? (1 of 7 dead) 
Eagle 81 15 29 10 
Margaret 47 16 70 
and Mary (5 dead) 
Catherine 37 14 13 
(11 dead) 
5 
from 58 10 
Puerto de (13 dead) 
Principe 





Barbados (2 dead) 
indulted 81 28o 
(3 dead) 
John and 64 32 17 
Elizabeth (2 dead) - 
7 
Neptune 20 40 
indulted 2100 





996/4 35., 788 257/4 35 
231 11., 769 294/2 10 
1., 072 7.9071/1 52 35 
10,125 231 9,894 291 11 
6., 300 236/4 6, o63/4 288/6 12 
37., 390 
34,642/4 
20,905/6; 1 16,484/131 123 43 
241/6; 1 33,800/5; 1 264 83 
1.9320 357/631 962/1k 160/3 2 
34,085 1,602/n 32,482/43ý 240/5 63 
l7s577/4 996/5 16., 580/7 255/1 30 
16., o4o 934/ k 15slO5/ 3ý 260/3 26 
10., 560 9,535/1; 1 1,024/61ý 22/2 4 
13,, 66o 925/491 12,744/h 220/2 37 
900 249/4 650/4 216/7 1 
1., 76o 908/h 851/43ý 141/7 5 
24., 205 9,180 15,025 172/6 7 
33,245 247/4 32,997/4 282 43 
8., 510 54/3li 82455/4; 1 281/7 14 
200 200 66/5 2 
307., 437/5 48., 906/1; 1 257j980/43ý 207 503 
1. Accounts are missing for ships arriving prior to the GeoýMe August e Augustus. They were reportedly corrpiled by ship's supercargoes rather than by resident factors. 
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SHIP DATE OF DEPARTM PESOS TOBAC50 ý%ý, J25D 
AND DESTINATION (LB4. 
George 30 October 1716 20,321/1 
Augustus Jamaica 
Adventure 30 October 1716 
Jamaica 
Royal 23 November 1716 10,102/4 
Prince Barbados 





Virgin BarbadoG 6,782, /3 15 
Polly 
Eagle 8 September 1717 lOs2O5 
Jamaica 
Eagle 13 JanuarY 1718 
Jamaica 
Catherine 29 March 1718 
Barbados 
Neptune 28 August 1718 
Barbados 
John &8 February 1719 
Elizabeth Barbados 
Neptune 8 February 1719 
Barbados 




21,436/5 10,758 1/2 





29 3, /8 
28 
32 
Totals: 135,622 33,450 248 1/8 
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Havana 1714-1718 
Relaciýn de los nav-fos despachados el ano de 1731 para la introducci6n 
de esclavos..., n. d., AGI., Contadurfa 267. 
Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana desde Septierabre 1716 
hasta Junio 1722..., n. d., AGI, Contadurla 266. 
List of South Sea Cm-pany ships., 28 June 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Various accounts of slaves in Havana., 1715-1718., n. d.., AGI., contadurla 266. 
Account of slaves introduced in Havana, 12 April 1734, AGi., Contadurýa 268. 
Account of slaves introduced fýrom 1715-1736., 25 June 1736., AGI., Ind Gen. 2812. 
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From Debts collected left behind by 
Cleland & Graves 
Proceeds of 7 negroes entered by Graves 
Debt received from Juan Manez 
Negro provisions 
DEBIT 
Trip to Barbados by Greyhound: 
merchandise 2 310,, 4 
ship expenses 4: 528$p 





















The actual sale price was 307,437,, 5, but the general 
account does not include the expenses involved in selling 
which amount to 48,906,, 11. This factory, as is the case 
with most, often has a variation of several negroes in 
computing the totals sold. The reasons include clerical 
errors and unrecorded deaths. Cuenta general del trato 
de negros en la Havana 1715-1722, A6*1 Contadurloa 266. 
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PERIOD & SALARY 
55 days 
e 500 pesos/year 
55 days 
@ 260 pesos/year 
55 days 
8 300 pesos/year 
55 days 

























4 months 2 days 
@ 500 pesos/year 169 
4 months 2 days 
8 300 pesos/year 101t, 5 
4 months 2 days 
e 500 pesos/year 169 
4 months 2 days 
@ 250 pesos/year 84,, 4 
4 months 2 days 
9 q00 neaoa/vear 140 1. The factors drew salaries-throuýh8U M; -; qýMe in týtFe- 






PERIOD & SALARY AMOUNT IN 
PESOS 
Richard Farrill 2 years 3 months 
8 2000 pesos/year 4740,, 5 
John Paris 2 years 3 months 
@ 500 pesos/year 1185til 
Wargeant Nicholson 3 years 2 months 
@ 1200 pesos/year 3853,92 
Juan Gerardo 3 years 15 days 
@ 200 pesos/year 608,3,2 
18 April W. Nicholson 6 montýs 20 days 
1722 @ 1333- pesos/year 740,. 7 
3 
Juan Gerardo 6 months 20 days 
@ 5331 pesos/year 324996 
3 
Sub-Total 25,50lis2i 
Advanced to Nicholson in London - 300 
TOTAL 2592010921 
Footnote 1 continued from previous page 
Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 1715-17229 A6-1 




DATE PURPOSE AMOUNT IN PESOS 
House rent upon arrival 163 
To build a house to replace the 
one the negroes burned 13709ol 
House rent for a factor for 
2 years 1203P, 61 
1718 To build a boat 
Reduction in price of two 
234 
negroes 200 
Tallow to careen the George 
Augustus lg,, 4 
For books, wood & other minor 
expenses 43s, 4 
18 July 1719 House rent from 18 September 
1718 to present 541,95 
29 Various general expenses 841,, 92 
September 
1721 To Veronica Hawkins 68,, 4 
Factory rent from 18 July 
1719 to present 1318902 
Money lost during seizure 115 
To Gregorio Bernardo for 
delivering autos 40 
Expenses in catching fugitive 
negroes 83 
To cure a sick negro 10 
18 April 1722 House expenses from 29 September 
1721 to present 2256 
For wine since October last 139soll 
Factory rent from 29 September 
1721 416,, 6 
Expenses in litigation against 
the French factor, Jonchee, for 
introducing negroes after 1713 1820 
TOTAL 119033,, 4 
1. Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 1715-1722, A6-1 ContadUrila 266. 
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HAVANA 1715 - 1718 
Flour Introduced 1 
DATE SHIP NUMBER AVERAGE SALE 
OF 
BARRELS PRICE PRICE 
January George Augustus 68 16.63 1131 
1717 
Royal Prince 15 16.62 249,, 3 
September Virgin Polly 30 7.40 22291,2 
1717 
Royal Prince 30 8.74 262j, 92 
Eagle 231 9.67 2234 
September Eagle (2nd trip) 140 12-51 1751sj, 6 
1718 
Margaret & Mary 100 10.86 lo86,,. 4 
Catherine 98 11.66 1143,9-t4 
Neptune 150 16.62 2493,, 6 
1720 Neptune 209 9.89 2069 
TOTALS 1071 11.88 12,9643 
By article 34 all provisions were to be used at the factory. 
However it was common practice to import more goods than 
were needed for resale. The factors did not pay for these 
supplies. Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 
1715-17220 A6-1 Contadur. ia 266. 
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PANAMA AND PORTOBELO 1715-1718 
DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, 
AND ORIGIN BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA 
18 September George Richard Farrell 15o 6o 6o 17 13 119 3/7 
1715 Augustus 
Jamaica 
24. -ýOctoberI1713- (indulted, slavesýrln Panama) 
JulY-ýý1715` 110 
31 January 1713- Undulted slaves in Portobelo) 
25 May 1715 
5 
Septenter 1715- Undulted slaves) 245 ill 6/7 
Decenber 1716 
16 February George Richard Farrell 131 47 53 22 9 8o 9/14 
1716 Augustus 
Jamaica 
30 March 1716 Dunwich Samuel Boyles 349 273 40 29 7 337 1/7 
Guinea 
23 JulY 1716 King Solanon Edward Coward 288 133 65 76 14 217 9/14 
Guinea 
16 October 1716 Pearl 
Pearl 
2 March 1717 Dragon 
21 March 1717 James 
Jamaica 
25 June 1717 Green Bay 
Jamaica 
14 Septen-ber John 
1717 
Jamaica 
27 October 1717 Indian Queen 
Jamaica 
16 January 1718 14eptune 
8 March 1718 John 
Jamaica 
6 APril 1718 Eagle 
Edward Tizard 147 73 58 13 3 81 5/7 
Matthew Hitching 211 141 68 11 172 9/14 
Jonathan Dennis 250 158 86 24 182 6/7 
Thomas Atkins 186 42 67 59 18 114 1/14 
William Lock 208 133 51 14 10 132 6/7 
William Nabbot 260 110 69 61 20 168 3/7 
William Vial 200 130 42 23 5 130 5/14 
Edward Coward 287 63 106 76 42 148 1/14 
Charles Baggs 135 105 28 20 98 7/14 
1. References 
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DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, 
AND ORIGIN BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA 
30 June 1718 Crown Will I am Hall 218 69 65 56 28 150 1/14 
Guinea I 
1 August 1718 Friendship Will I am Arnold 110 65 45 00 80 4/7 
14 August 1718 George William Owen 266 161 9/14 
Jamaica Augustus 




8 October 1718 John Thomas Dunckle 182 94 5/7 
Guinea and 
Jamaica 
Totals for three years two months trade 4,078 
1 
1,602 903 451 174 21695 5/14 
in the first trading period (23 voyages) 
1. Includes 311 indulted slaves. 
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SHIP NO. SLAVES EXPENSES NET SALE AVG. / NO. BUYERS & REMARKS 
SOT-D & PRICE PRICE SLAVE 
(pesos) 
George 141 37s334 4,104/6 303229/2 214/3 57 Pablo Freire purchased 
Augustus 28 slaves 
indulted 8,186/7 
slaves 
George 122 28., 898 2,146/5 26., 751/3 219/2 44 Captain Balthazar de 
Augustus Ricoba - 45 
Dunwich 332 86sO75 4s374/2 81.7oo/6 246 81 Captain Esteban Dfaz - 111 
King 275 68,88o/4 51838/6 633041/6 229/2 3a6 Geronimo Pacheco de 
Solanon Quiftones & Co. - 55 
Pearl 138 35., 245 2,412/5 322832/3 237/7 42 
Dragon 209 53,912/4 1,501/5 52., 410/7 250/6 5 
James 249 63)140 2,056/4 61,083/4 245/3 38 Captain Francisco 
Morales - 121 
Green Bay 185 43., 500 1)275/5 42,224/3 228/2 15 Ricoba - 158 
John 207 493225 12280/3 47,944/5 231/5 25 Captain Joseph de 
Engui, - 97 
Indian 259 68j7O9 1,954/5 66., 754/3 257/6 62 Captain ValentIn de 
Queen Aguilar - 122 
Neptune 199 52., 337 19213/6 51,123/2 256/7 10 Pedro Carpinteros - 188 
John 280 70,583 ls903/5 68,679/3 245/2 17 Juan Baptista 
Belzunce - 221 
Eagle 134 352239 13095/3 34,143/5 254/6 7 Bernardo Garze & Co. - 1-18 
Crown 214 583173 23122, /5 56., 150/3 261/7 66 Juan Baptista 
Asurza, & Co. - 106 
Friendship 109 29,325 13391/5 27,933/3 256/2 13 Juan Baptista 
Asurza & Co. - 90 
George 259 68., 370 42263/5 64,106/3 247/4 51 137 seized and sold byl 
Augustus royal officials 
The 187 48,86o 3., 082/5 45., 777/3 244/6 55 107 seized and sold by 
Clapham royal officials 
John 172 302410 3P354/3 27sO55/5 157/2 8 109 seized and sold by 
Totals: 3,671 925s216 45s373/3 8882029/4 239/5 712 
royal officials 
1. Unsold slaves introduced on the George Augustus, The 122ham, and the 
John at the time of the first mpresalia were seized along with other 
Conpany effects by royal officials. 
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SHIP DATE OF DESTINATION PESOS RETURNED EXPENSES 
DEPARTURE 
George Augustus 20 February 1716 Jamaica 22., 150 12824 
Dunwich 20 August 1716 Jamaica 
Pearl 10 March 1717 Jamaica 50.1400 582 
]Dragon 10 March 1717 Jamaica 25., 717 1 
Adventure 5 April 1717 Jamaica 75,, 000 1 008 
Winchelsea 14 September 1717 -Jamaica 82,669/2 V2 : ý1102/5 3, /2 
Winchelsea 10 MaY 1718 196,187/4 lj079 
Winchelsea June 1718 
London 30 September 
6., ooo 
85,190/4 1/2 416/4 
Totals: 517., 597/3 6301211 1/2 
1. The Iýragon was seized by pirates. 
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Panama and Portobelo 1714-1718 
Cuenta del trato de negros en P g! rtobelo y Panam desde su prineipio en 
Julio 1715 hasta Enero 1722, n. d.., AGI., Contadurla 267. 
Relaciýn de los navios despachados el aiio de 1731 para la introduccidn 
de eselavos...., n. d.. AGI, Contaduria 267. 
Hurtado de Amesaga. to Philip V, 23 SepteTrber 1715., AGI , Panama 132. 
Thomas F. de Ayala certificate., 20 June 1716., AGI,, Panama 142. 
List of South Sea Conpany ships, 28 June 1716, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2800. 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1715., 16 April 1734., 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. 
Various accounts of effects remitted from Panama and Portobelo (part of 
general account)., n. d., AGI,, Contadurla 267. 
Royal officials and governor to Philip V., 25 February 1724., AGI., 
Contadurýa 268. 
Various accounts of slave sales 1715-1722 (part of general account), n. d. 3 
AGI., Contadurla 267. 
315 




From the Marques de Villadarias 
Sale of Negroes 
Sale of indulted Negroes 
Sale of seized Negroes 
Negro provisions 
From the Cartagena factory 
TOTAL 
DEBIT 







7,9669,1845s,, 26 3/4 
Gold and silver remitted to the Company 4,382,532 
House rent 
Servants salaries 
Spanish officials' salaries 
Expenses 







2 273 2024 9 016 3/ 
4 
7., 699,9845s, 26 3/4 
This is the only factory in which all the accounts were 
in reales. The amount credited from the Cartagena factory 
relates to the cargo of the licensed ship Bedford. The 
details of this amount will be discussed separately. 
This factory also sold negro provisions in contravention 
of the asiento treaty. See above Cuenta general del 
trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 
hasta 7 Enero 1722, A61 Contaduria 267. 
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DATE 
PANAMA & PORTOBELO 1715 - 1718 
House Rent 1 
22 June 1716 Portobelo 1 year 
12 July 1716 Panama 1 year 
Portobelo Negro enclosure 
to 26 March 1716 
LOCATION & TIME 
26 March 1717 Portobelo Negro enclosure 
to present 
24 June 1717 Portobelo 1 year 
Panama 11 months 12 days 
26 March 1718 
22 June 1718 
1 January 
1719 










Panama 13 months 
Panama 9 months 25 days 
Panama 3 months 
SUB TOTAL 
























It appears that the house and Negro enclosure at Portobelo 
were closed during the war 1719. Expenses at this factory 
were high because two houses were maintained. Cuenta 
general del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde 
Julio 1715 hasta, 7 Enero 1722, A&l Contadurfa 267. 
(price increase) 
Portobelo Negro enclosure 
1 year 
Portobelo 1 year 
Panama 1 year 
Portobelo Negro enclosure 
6 months 
Portobelo 6 months 
Panama 1 year 























Thomas Geraldino, Philip's representative to the South Sea 
Company complained that this flour was sold in contraven- 
tion of the asiento treaty. Cuenta general del trato de 
negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 hasta Enero 
1722, -A. 61 Contaduria , 267. 
PANAMA & PORTOBELO 1715 1718 
Flour Introduced 
SHIP NUMBER AVERAGE SALE 
OF PRICE PRICE PESOS 
BARRELS 
George Augustus 12 72 











PANAMA & PORTOBELO 1715 - 1718 
Expenses of George Augustus' 
DETAILS OF EXPENSES (1715) AMOUNT IN REALES 
For a guard on the ship 16 
For the boat which brought-the royal 
officials forýtheir inspection 32 
For a canoe to take kitchen equipment to 
land 8 
Fresh meat for the slhves 666 
Fresh salad 420 
Fresh bananas 336 
Candles, salt . wool 270 
12 days provisions for guards &a nurse 114 
11 days provisions @8 reales /day for 
nurse's assistant 88 
For a guard 96 
For a doctor 64 
Church expenses for a funeral of a girl slave 51 
For rum 258 
Expenses to take Negroes to Panama 
For 15 mules @ 15 1920 
A mule for Mr. Cooke 240 
For 15 guides (one for each 10 Negroes), 
a cook @ 16 pesos and an overseer 2176 
For the inns where they stayed 4 nights 
@1 real - each 588 
For 60 arrobas of salted meat @ 51 reales 330 
9 bundles of bananas 288 
For transporting the meat to the inns 200 
For candles in the inns & canoes to take the 
slaves across the rivers 24 
Duties on mules 30 
Cooke's expenses on the road 86 
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DETAILS OF EXPENSES (1715) AMOUNT IN REALES 
For a surgeon & barber to shave 
the slaves 
For a negro to prepare meals 
Church expenses for burying 5 men and 




SUB TOTAL 9xO36 
For keeping Negroes in Panama @I real 
each / day from 4 October 1715 to June 
1717 23,802 
TOTAL 32, t838 
The expenses of this ship are typical of those encountered 
in selling slaves at this factory. They vary little from 
expenses incurred at other factories; only the cost of 
transport from Portobelo to Panama is unique here. 
Cuenta general del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 hasta 7 Ertero 1722, A&l Contaduria 267. 
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DATE OF SHIP 
ARRIVAL 
SANTIAGO 1715-171 
CAPTAIN NO. MEN WOMEN BOYS GIff-S 
SLAVES 
51 
January Santa Rosa Nicolas de Bari 40 30 10 00 
1716 
March 1716 Sacrafamilia. 
April 1716 ? 
Carlos Macourt L011 





March 1717 Isabel 
March 1717 Endeavour 
June 1717 Neptune 









1718 Prince of 
Asturias 
Juan Jose Cano 2100 
Damian de Salas 44 28 961 
William Mustoe 16 9700 
Pedro de Acosta 30 30 000 
Nicto 
Nathaniel Vial 75 65 10 00 
Nathaniel Vial 86 40 23 19 4 
Henry Coley 45 41 310 
Houragin 58 27 22 72 
Robert Saunders 20 
Francisco de Rojas 2 
?3 
George Willis 30 
Totals for two years 11 months trade in 508 275 84 35 8 
the first trading period (15 voyages) 
1. References 
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SHIP NO. SLAVES SOLD 
& SALE PRICE 
(pesos) 
? 51 6,945 
Santa Rosa 40 9,785 
Sacrafamilia, 6 1,016 
2 340 
Sacrafamilia, 24 7,900 
Newport 16 3,535 
Isabel 30 73225 
Endeavour 74 173675 
Neptune 83 18,595 
Laricl)erity 45 113000 
Prosperity 54 12,100 
9 17,3,245 
5 1"Olo 
Prince of 10 2., 175 
Asturias 
Totals: 457 102.540 
EXPENSES NET SAT-E AVG. / NO. 
PRICE SLAVE BUYERS 
4., 386/4 2,558/4 50/1 
214 9., 571 239/2 20 
348/49ý 66113; -ý 110/2 5 
137/51' 202/231 101/1 
4jo4o 3., 86o 160/7 23 
98 3,437 214/6 13 
154 7., 071 235/6 16 
224/4 17,450/4 235/6 38 
682/1 17., 912, /7 215/6 63 
213/7 1OP786/1 239/6 29 
149/3 lls950/5 221/2 40 
359/2' 2,885/6 16916 10 
380 630 126 
161/1 2sO13/7 201/3 8 
11., 549 90.1991 199/1 265 
RETURNS 
DATE OF DEPARTURE 
AND DESTINATION 
4 April 1717 
Jamaica 
17 June 1718 
Jamaica 
5 Novenber 1718 
Baxbados 
Tbtals: 
SHIP PESOS LOGWOOD 
(pounds) 
Endeavour 37,100 est. 
8., ooo 
8., 000 
16ý000 37., 100 
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Santiago 1714-1718. 
I Relacion de los navfos despachados el afio de 1731 para la introduccion 
de esclavos...., n. d., AGI, Contadurla 267. 
Quenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba desde el principio 
en Diciembre 1715 hasta Junio 1722., n. d.., AGI., Contaduirla 267. 
Various accounts of slave sales in Santiago de Cuba (part of general 
account), n. d-3 AGI, Contadurla 267. 
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SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718 
General Account 1 
CREDIT 
From French factors for introducing 
25 negroes 
For negro supplies 
Money received for shipwrecked French 
negroes 
Same 
Sale of negroes 
For the balance of Peter Walsh 
TOTAL 
DEBIT 
Gold and silver remitted to the company 
Logwood remitted 
For the Cartagena factory 




Account with royal officials 
For Angel de la Gala de Campeche 
TOTAL 


















Most of the entriess except those which are self-explana- 
tory or consist of long lists of names such as the 
category of existing debts, are further expanded in 
the following pages. Cuenta general del trato de negros 












SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718 
Salaries' 
PAYEE PERIOD & SALARY 
Juez Conservador 1 year 
Overseer 1 year 
Cook 1 year 
Juez Conservador, 
Overseers cook 1 year 
@ 80 pesos/year 
31 years 










Diego de Fuentes, 3 years 
barber @ 30 pesos/year 
31 years 
@ 20 pesos/year 
surgeon 
Juez Conservador, 
Overseer, cook 1 year 













@ 100 pesos/year 
& some expenses 343 




@ 200 pesos/year 1053 
61 years 
@ 1000 pesos/year 6500 
TOTAL 119896 
Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 
1715-1722 s -A&l Contadurl. a 267. 
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SANTIAGO 1715 1718 
Expenses 
DATE PURPOSE AMOUNT IN PESOS 
December Silver seal of company coat 
1715 of arms 9002 
February Hire of a negro for house- 
1715 keeping 122., 6 
May 1716 PresentationcC a negro to the 
governor 200 
To a doctor 12 
Hire of a negro for house- 
keeping 
To the negro Santiago 





August 1717 To Thomas Noble for writing 
letters 20 
For paper and ink 
December To Peter Walsh for expenses in 
1717 Bayamas 40 
March & 
May 1718 Paper 6,, 5 
June 1718 For certificates 13*22 
For debts in Havana 61,, 6 
Charity 12 






To Simon Nunez, notary, for 
expenses of seizure 62 
Expenses of adjusting seizure 
account 146 
Expenses of the cargo of the ship 
Barbara 24 
To the counsellor 26,902 
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DATE PURPOSE AMOUNT IN PESOS 
December To Thomas Noble 100 
1718 
To Peter Walsh for odd 
expenses 3000 
TOTAL 3j871j, 6 
1. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 
1715-1722s A61 Contaduria 267. 
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SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718 












PURPOSE AMOUNT IN PESOS 
House furniture 18#96 
House expenses 60 
Maintenance of negroes until 
sold 16,, 4 
House expenses 59sp4i 
House expenses 60,, 71 
Maintenance of negroes until 
sold 
House expenses 





House expenses (last entry 
before seizure) 122 









EXPENSES DURING SEIZURE 
General maintenance of factory 
for 1025 days @ 29 reales/day 3715*, 4 
General maintenance of factory 
for 223 days @ 34 reales/day 
TOTAL 
Received from royal officials 






Add in the above general 
expenses before the seizure + 59266,, 1 
TOTAL 8sl74*93 
Only selected examples and the total amount of this account 
are entered for the purpose of demonstrating cost. Cuenta 
general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 1715-1722, A&l 
Contadurla 267. 
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SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718 
Account with Royal Officials 
1 
PURCHASES AMOUNT IN PESOS 
4417,, 11 arrobas of white sugar 
0 12 reales 6625. 
260 boxes of unrefined sugar @8 reales 4809,, 11 
16 boxes of unrefined sugar @8 reales 272 
142 bales of tobacco with 6750 bundles 
@2 reales 1687,, 4 
40 bales of tobacco 250 
powdered tobacco 1058 
806 tanned hides @5 reales 503,, B 
32, bars of iron 150 
86 bars of lead 150 
weights 100 
2 mules 76 
1 sawfish 6 
2 copper kettles 25 
2 pairs of iron for kitchen cookers 4 
2 barrels of irons 80 
Money captured from a factor during the 
seizure 1718-1719 55 
Various things lost 500 
1 negro 250 
Money received from various accounts 3042,, 4 
l9s6449951 
Funds reintegrated - 5052914 
TOTAL 13,6929211 
There are no dates for any of these entries. Cuenta general 
del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 1715-1722, A&l 
Contaduri Ia 267. 
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VERA CRUZ 1715-171 
DATE OF SBIP CAPTAIN 
St. George2 Richard Ashford 
ARRIVAL PIEZAS DE INDIA 
6 April 1716 
2 May 1716 
5 March 1717 
1 June 1717 











NO. OF SLAVES & 
74 73-231 
Josiah Nixon 42 38-ý 
Alexander Gordon 130 119-3'1 
Paul Lilliwhite 150 135 
Alexander Duncan 96 87-5h 
Will I am - Cleland -, 1 
Neptune Alexander Gordon 30 28 h 
Totals for two years 10 months trade in the 523 482-5 
first trading period (7 voyages) 
SHIP NO. SLAVES SOLD EXPENSES NET SALE AVG. / NO. 
& SAIE PRICE PRICE SLAVE BUYERS 
(pesos) 
St. George' 72 19,413/3 2., 932/3 16., 481 228/7 24 
Catherine 39 122159/2 7,848/5 43310/5 llo/4 21 
George 130 29,9914 2., 564 27)350 210/3 
Augustus 
London 148 312566 23124/6 29,441/2 198/7 57 
Totals: 389 93., 052/5 15,469/6 77s582/7 199 102 
1. References 
2. The St. GeorSe sailed fran Vera Cruz on 4 August 1716 carrying 10,006 
pes reales. 
3. The Endeavour sailed from Vera Cruz on 31 August 1718 for Jamaica with 
96,435 pounds of logwood acquired for 1,027- pesos 7 reales. 
I 
Contraband worth 612 pesos was seized by royal officials in Vera Cruz 




Relaci6n de los navlos despachados el afto de 1731 para la introducci6n 
de esclavos. ý.. n. d., AGI, Contadurýa 267. 
Cuenta corriente de la factoi-la de Vera Cruz y Mexico, 1715,1722, n. d., 
AGI,, Contadurla 266. 
Lezeaga to Philip V, 13 April 1713., AGI, Mexico 856. 
Various accounts of slave sales in Vera Cruz (part of general accomt)j 
n. d, AGI, Contadurla 267. 
Royal officials account., 8 November 1732., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Account of slaves introduced since 1716,12 April 1735,, AGI,, Contadurfa 268. 
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Sale of negroes 
Import of 127 negroes e 200 
pesos each 
Seized slaves 
Merchandise on the Herbert seized by the 
royal officials 
Goods seized from the Isabel by royal 
officials 
Estimated cargo of the Royal Prince 
TOTAL 
DEBIT 
Factory expenses from 1 November 1715 
to 19 November 1719 
House expenses (mostly food which the 
factors were obliged to pay from 
their salaries) 
Salaries 
House rent (15 November 1715 - 31 
October 1717) 
Expenses 
Salaries to royal officials (the entire 
amount went to the juez conservador) 
Remitted goods 
Debts 
Unaccountable, but probably in house 
maintenance & salaries for other 
Spanish officials, expenses, etc. 
TOTAL 
















1,832 s 39 8s 16 
The factors sent no books after November 1717. All subsequent 
accounts, except those of the royal officials during the 
seizure of 1719, were calculated from letters. In balancing 
the 
' 
books an attempt has been made to include goolds sold on 
the licensed and annual ships. The debts are high because 
they include goods seized during the war of 1719; these 
debts will be considered in the section of seizures. 
Cuenta corriente de la factoria de la Vera Cruz y Mexico 
1715-1722s AGI Contaduria. 266. 
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VERA CRUZ 1715 - 1718 
Salaries' 














Catalen Thorowgood 1/4 year 
@ 2666 2/3 
pesos/year 
Thomas Bedell I year 
@ 1333 1/3 
pesos/year 
William Clark I year 
e 889 pesos/year 
John Newton year 
666 2/3 
pesos/year 
John Strode 11 It 
David Patton year 
5331 pesos/year 
Salaries as above I year 
Salaries as above 15 days 
Thomas Bedell I year 
@ 2666 2/3 
pesos/year 
William Clark year 
1333 1/3 
pesos/year 
John Newton year 
889 pesos/year 
John Strode year 
@ 666 2/3 
pesos/year 
David Patton it It 



























PAYEE PERIOD & SALARY AMOUNT IN 
PESOS 
Salaries as above 9 months 3 days 4718s, 4 
Money paid to 9 months 15 days 








Money advanced to factors in London - 3,718024 
TOTAL lo., 484,, 4 
These salaries only include the factors and not the 
supercargoes who came gut on the annual ships * Cuenta 
corriente de la factoria de la Vera Cruz y Mexico 1715-1722j, A6-l Contaduria 266. 
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VERA CRUZ 1715 1718 
Expenses 
DATE PURPOSE AMOUNT IN PESOS 
1 July 1716 For two canoes and freight 66 
5 August For three horses 130 
1716 
7 March 1717 For goats, mules and mutton 56o.,. 1 
14 March 1717 For 6 silver plates weighing 
168 ozs. and a silver basin 168 
24 August For 12 silver spoons &2 
1717 large silver spoons 76,, 4 
6 For a gift to the parish 100 
September 
1717 
19 For goods purchased from the 
November Isabel for use in the house 1677ti5i 
1717 
4 December Hire of a mule for Thorow- 
1715 good's trip to Mexico 





39402, *, 24 
This account is incomplete. The silver plates and spoons 
must have been purchased as gifts and the large amount of 
goods purchased for house use is suspicious considering 
that goods were already supplied from London. Cuenta W corriente de la factoria de la Vera Cruz y M4xico, 
1715-1722 $ A6-1 Contaduria 166. 
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Caracas 1715-1718 
NO. ., I NO. OF 
DATE ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN OF PIEZAS BARRELS 
SLAVES FLOUR 
February Barbados 3 Brothers Wm. Genosay 125 97-4 
1715 
April Barbados Elizabeth Nath. Owen 117 lol-6 
1715 









Royal George Thos. Bardel 30 16-2 c. 280 
Royal George Thos. Bardel 12 8 c. 411 
Royal George Thos. Bardel 19 16-1 
September Curacao La Fortuna Arman . 1717 Borrain . 
13 
January 
1718 Curacao Royal Prince Nath. Claque 2 
April Curacao Royal George Quarter Mor 50 37-1 
1718 
May Curacao Sarah Alex Kerney 22 14-2 
1718 
June Barbados Jasper Wm. Cleland 60 42 
1718 
June Barbados Catharina Roberto de 18 13-31 
1718 Garcia 
December Barbados Benjamin Dennis Daly 13 101 
1718 
Totals 
3 years 11 months trade 13 Voyages 488 376 691 
From Jonathan Sisson, 30 October 1716, A&l Caracas 63. 
Gov. ff6tacourt to Philip V, 7 February 1717, A6-1 Caracas 63. 
Lezeaga to Philip Vs 13 April 1719, A&l M4xico 856. 
Caracas Royal Officials to Philip Vs 18 April 1718, A&l Ind. 
Gen. 2801. 
Caracas Royal Officials to Azana, 18 April 1721A&l Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Abreu to Governor Of Caracas. 30 October 1716 # A6-1 Caracas 
63. 
336 
SANTO EX)MINGO 1715-1718 
DATE OF SHIP CAPTAIN NO. SLAVES SALE PRICE 
ARRIVAL 
1718 ?? 100 30"000 
1. These slaves were purchased from the South Sea Coripany to work on 
Spanish fortifications in Santo Domingo. Junta delasiento de negros 
25 May 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2773; Minutes committee of correspondenceý 
31 January 1715, BM., Add 25., 550, f. 42. 
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Number Number Ratio 
of of Pieza to 
Slaves Piezas Slave 
Buenos 5 years 17 
Aires 1 month 
Cartagena 5 years 24 
4 months 
Havana 5 years 26 
2 months 
Panama &4 years 30 
Portobelo 8 months 
Vera Cruz 5 years 15 
1-month 
Campeche 6 months 2 
Caracas 1 year 50 
7 months 
Maracaibo 2 years 
.6 months 
Rio de la 1 mnth 
Hacha 
Santa Marta 5 months 
Santo 7 months 
Domingo 
Totals 5 years 177 
4 months 
52834 4,541 1, /3 . 78 
4,122 33952-2 1/2 . 96 
23026 13747 1/7 . 86 
6,481 4,275-3 . 66 
1,027 950 5/28 . 93 
46 24.589, ---est. . 53 est. 
221 138 2/4 . 
62 
123 58 . 47 
24 12.82 est. . 53 est. 
148 66 1/2 . 45 
61 23 2/3 . 39 






Avg. No. Slaves Avg. No. Slaves Known Indulted 
per Voyaýe per Month Contraband Slaves 
(pesos) 
Buenos Aires 343-18 95.64 35,159/5 
Cartagena 171-75 64.41 2 est. 
Havana 77.92 32.68 34,811 87 
Panama & 216.03 115-73 
Portobelo 
Vera Cruz '68.46 16.84 153837 Plus 




Canpeche 23 7.66 4j954 




Maracaibo 24.6 4.1 6,185 
Rfo de la Hacha 24 24 
Santa Marta 49-33 29.6 
Santo Domingo 15.25 8.71 3., 474 est. 
Tbtals: 113.63 314.27 estimate 89 
between 
4oo, 421 and 
goo. 421 
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Factory Pesos Cattle Cacao Logwood Brazilwood Sarsaparilla 
Returned Hides (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) 
Buenos 87., 035 149., 711 17 tercios 
Aires 
Havana 32,000 624 624., 700 13250 
Panama & 
Portobelo 1,087,675 33., 072 454,500 
Maracaibo 419 84 22,000 
La Guaira ý'6'7,444 2,67,444 
& Coro L, j " 
Totals: 1., 2o6,7lO 150,754 267,, 528 657,772 22., 000 4553750 
17 tercios 
Factory Snuff Leaf Sugar Red Peppers Mate 
(pounds) Tobacco (pounds. ). (pounds) 
(bundles) 
Buenos 164 tercios 
Aires 21 serones 
Havana io6l,, 354 3,, 000 198,975 2., 325 
Maracaibo 2.9975 




BUENOS AIRES 1722-172 
DATE OF LONDON - DATE OF ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES 
DEPARIURE ARRIVAL 



















Assiento Edward Tizard 375 
17 March London Tendrin Giles Lone supply ship 
1723 (200 tons) 
April 1723 King William Hamilton 6oo 
William 
August San Quintin John Bird 300 
1723 





Sea Horse Moore White 325 
April London John Frank Pearse supply ship 
1724 (159 tons) 
27 Angola Essex Nathaniel Smith 400 
October 
1724 
Decenber Angola Syria Francis Willians 500 
1724 
26 Levantine John Thanas 380 
December 
1724 
March, -)1725 Guinea Assiento Edward Tizard 375 
Noverrber Angola Bonita Samuel Roberts 520 
1725 
18 Angola Duke of Thomas King 480 
]December Cambridge 
1725 
March 1726 Angola Boothe Nicholas Webb 434 
September Cariffe William 444 
1726 Goldsborough 
September London Bristow Mathew Kent supply ship 1726 
1. Werences 
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DATE OF LONDON DATE OF ORIGIN SBIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES 
DEPARTURE ARRIVAL CONTRACTED 
FOR 
Deceirber 1725 27 Guinea Essex Nathaniel Smith 350 
September 
1726 
January 1726 17 May King Jererdah Winter 500 
1727 William 
July 1726 ýugust Madagascar St. Michael Charles Burnham 500 
July 1726 11 Madagascar Sea Horse Moore White 400 
January 
1728 
Totals for five years trade in the second 71283 
trading period (17 voyages) 
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SHIP NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, CONTRABAND REMARKS 
WOMEN & PIEZAS DE INDIA (value in pesos) 
Assiento 370 309 70 283 520 
Tendrin supply sbip Carried contraband including watches, 
mirrors, books and carriage ornaments. 
King 555 357 198 390 
Will i am 
San Quintin 288 255/8 
723/6 Captain Hamilton drowned 
during the voyage. - 
3,400/2 Two Spaniards and their 
effects traveled to England 
on this ship. 
Carteret 327 261 66 259 Two Jesuits traveling to 
Rome returned on this ship. 
Sea Horse 304 251 53 259 11/12 
John supply ship 
Essex 376 222 154 273 1/2 
Syriatine 443 283 160 325 6/7 25o/6 
Levantine 366 276 190 285 116 50,6 
Assiento 282 171 111 193 184/4., all in hats 
Bonita 444 396 6., 203/1 
Duke of 442 352 2., 000 
Carrbridge 
Boothe 403 306 1/2 7jO58/3 
Cariffe 360 235 125 286 
Bristow supply ship 14., 818/7 
Essex 256 164 42 156 
King 234 201 
William 
St. Michael 282 191 91 234 3/4 
Sea Horse 102 84 1/3 All slaves from this ship were seized and 
sold by the Spanish during the last 
represalia. 
Totals: 5,834 4,541 2/3 
343 
SHIP DATE PESOS BIDES MATE PESOS DUTY 
FETUFMM RETURNED 
Assiento 59,, 500 1 2000 21 serones 
Tendrin 11 August 25., 000 7., 100 
1723 
San Quentin 15,056 20 tercios 
Carteret2 20., 264 20 tercios 
Sea Horse 24 May 12,500 20 tercios 492/6 1/2 
1725 
John 5 2,535,102800 
Septenber 
1724 
Essex 24 may 5,000 20 tercios 19916 1/2 
1725 
Syria 31 May 123051 24 tercios 
1726 
Levantine 30 October 8,430 20 tercios 334 
1725 
Assiento 20 May 81000 20 tercios 
1726 
Bonita 7 JulY 15)710 
1727 
Cariffe 15 11,000 
January 
1727 
Essex 11 June 
1727 
1,310 
Totals: --87,035 149)711 164 tercios 21 serones 
1. The Assiento also returned 6,000 pesos belonging to a French=. 
2. The Carteret also returned 17 tercios of sarsaparilla. 
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Buenos Aires 1722-1728 
List of South Sea Company ships sent to Buenos Aires., c. 1729., AGS., 
Estado 7017. 
Account of slaves introduced., 7 and 27 July 1734, AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 7 July 1727., AGI., Contadurfa 268. 
List of South Sea Company ships which left England, n. d., AGS., Estado 6878. 
Directors to Buenos Aires factors., 23 January 1723., EM, Add 25., 564,, f. 3. 
Royal officials testimony, 17 March 1723., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2804. 
Governor and royal officials to Eon,, 9 May 1723, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2802. 
Eon to Grimaldo., 28 October 1723,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Royal officials testimony3 11 January 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Directors to Stratford., 4 February 1724., BM, Add 25j5642 f. 99. 
Fiscal's report, 23 July 1724, AG13 Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Royal officials to the crown3 5 September 1724., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804. 
Blanco to Corobarrutia, 12 October 17243 AGI., Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Th Buenos Aires factors., 23 December 1725, BM3 Add 25,564, f. 86. 
List of South Sea Company ships,, n. d.., AGS., Estado 6878. 
Eon to Corobarrutia3 4 January 1725., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Tijano to the crown3 15 February 17253 AGI., Ind. Gen. 2804. 
Royal officials to the crown., 24 May 1725., AGIj Contadurýa 268. 
Royal officials to Eon, 2 July 1724., AGI3 Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Royal officials certificates., 24 July 1725,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776. 
Royal officials to the. crown3 30 October 1725., AGIj Contadurýa 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V, 31 May 1726, AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials certificate., 15 January 1727, AGI,, Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V3 17 May 17273 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 11 June and 7 July 17273 AGI3 Contadurfa 268. 
Junta del asiento de negros3 11 September 1728, AGI3 Ind. Gen. 2774. 
Extract of anon. letter., 29 September 17283 Historical Register., 
xiv (1729)., p. 15. 
Statement by Nathaniel Smith., 3 October 1728, BM, Add 25,562, f. 112. 
Royal officials to'Philip V, 31 October 1729., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2806. (several 
letters). 
Royal officials to Philip V, 4 and 5 Novezber 1729., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2807. 
Account of slaves introduced since 1715,27 July 1734, An. Contadurfa 268. 




DATE OF SHIP 
2 CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
ARRIVAL PIEZAS DE INDIA 
March 1722 Assiento David Greenhill 6o 56 4/7 
3 May 1722 Virgin Polly 26 
3 
23 June 1722 Chinston 
2 September Assiento 
1722 
26 Novezber Assiento 
1722 
22 February Prince of 
1723 Asturias 
8 October Don Carlos 
1723 
30 December Don Carlos 
1723 
7 February Assiento 
1724 
20 April 1724 Assiento 
22 May 1724 Assiento 
8 June, 1724 Luis I 
8 July 1724 
John Masters 170 159 6/4 
David Greenhill 100 94 6/4 
David Greenhill 150 142 
David Greenhill 236 230 3/4 
John Touron 299 287 
John Tburon 254 240 
Alexander Gordon 140 136 
Alexander Gordon 149 144 3/4 2/4 
Alexander Gordon 150 147 
Samuel Loft 150 143 
2 Undulted slaves) 
28 November Queen of Spain4 Frank Dufay 200 190 
1724 
1. References 
2. All ships originated in Jamaica. 
3. The sale price for these slaves was 5., 765 pesos 2 reales (an average 
per slave of 221 pesos 6 reales). 
4. One hundred ninety barrels of flour were introduced on the Queen of 
Spain. One hundred were seized by royal officials as contr; E-and, but 





















9 June 1727 
SHIP 
Don Carlos 









Queen of Spain 
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CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS ICE INDIA 
John Touron 299 287 
Frank Dufay 299 289 
Charles Gipson 300 291 
Charles Gipson 200 195 
Charles Gipson 200 197 1/4 
Charles Gipson 150 146 3/4 2/4 
Charles Gipson 150 145 3/4 2/4 
Thanas Porter 120 118 
Charles Gipson 120 118 
Benjwdn White 100 97 
Frank Dufay 100 97 
Totals for five years four months trade in the 4,12zl 3., 952-2 1/2 
second trading period (24 voyages) 
1. In addition there were at least two indulted slaves. 
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Caxtagena 1722-1728 
Royal officials account, 2 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. 
Governor and royal officials report 4 June 1734, AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Pim to governor of Cartagena., c. 28 Noveirber 1724., AGI S ta F" 439 ., an e 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1714., 2 June 1734., 





SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 






13 APril 1723 Assiento Alexander Gordon 









16 April 1724 




































28 Undulted 'slaves) 
60 44- 
6o 39 24/3 
7 (indulted slaves) 
24 19 
6o 47 1/2 
60 47 1/3 
50 46 2/3 
60 52 1/2 
60 56 2/3 
59 53 
100 92 1/2 
20 15 
43 (indulted slaves) 
Undulted slaves) 
2. Contraband goods,, including 120 barrels of flour, worth 16,889 pesos 
were seized on the Jamaica-by royal officials. 
3. Contraband goods worth 17,922 pesos were seized on the Assiento by 
royal officials. 
DATE OF SHIP 
ARRIVAL 
21 March 1725 Fantasy 
28 April 1725 Treasure 
-22 July 1725 Success 
25 August Watson 
1725 
14 November Assiento 
1725 
24 December Devonshire 
1725 
30 January Francis 
1726 Catherine 
14 May 1726 Mariscal 
5 June 1726 Abigail 
8 July 1726 Belmont 
23 August Phoenix 
1726 
30 December Europe 
1726 
7 January Charlotte 
1727 







NO. CF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
6o 47 
6o 53 2/3 
100 86 
97 76 
Alexander Gordon 100 82 1/2 
1 
Abraham Estorhuz 100 86-1/2 
John Young 6o 52 2/3 
Robert James 98 97 
Linthorn 6o 50 2/3 
John Bemett 119 98 
Richard Durfeet 139 120 
Perint Spoferst 100 87 
Joseph Boswell 100 80 2/3 
Charles Wilson 50 49 2/3 
Tbtals for five years and two mnths trade in, 
the second trading period (26 voyages) 
2,026 
1 
1., 747 2/1 






DATE CF DEPARIURE PESOS SNUFF TOBACCO (LEAF, LOGWOOD 




April 1723 'W Jamaica 
September 1723 
Jamaica 
Sirehaancisco October 1723 








































































SHIP DATE OF DEPARTURE PESOS SNUFF TOBACCO (IEAF., LOGWOOD 
AND DESTINATION RETURNED (pounds) SMOKING, ETC. ) (pounds) 
(pounds) 
Belinont February 1727 157., 500 
Portsmouth 
Europe February 1727 70., 000 
Jamaica 
Success March 1727 1003000 4., goo 
Portsmouth and 
Amsterdam, 
Don Luis May 1727 LADIZ 9., Ooo 1503000 
Cadiz and 
Portsmouth 
Totals: 32, OOOD 13o6l, 354 21,750 and 624,700 
5,500 bundles 
353 
SHIP SUGAR CATHE FED PEPPER SARSAPARILLA 






Francis go., 4oo 24 
Catherine 




Totals: 1983975 624 2,325 1., 250 
354 
Havana 1722-1728 
Account of slaves introduced in Havana, 12 April 1734,, AGI,, Contadurfa 268. 
Royal officials certificate, 2 April 1734., AGi. Ind. Gen. 2810. 
Royal officials account., 25 June and 7 July 1736ý AGI, Tnd. Gen. 2812. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 17 May 1723. s AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana., 1715-1722., n. d.., AGI., 
Contadurfa 266. 
Royal officials to the crown., 17 June 1724., AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Account of slaves introduced fran 1715 to 1736,25 June 1736, AGi., 
Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Royal officials certificate of returns., 7 July 1736, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Royal officials certificate of indulted slaves, 23 July 1736., AGi,, 
Ind. Gen. 2812. 
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1 
PANAMA AND PORTOBELO 1722-172 
DATE OF 
ARRIVAL 
8 April 1722 
9 MaY 1722 
29 May 1722 
6 June 1722 
14 June 1722 
9 July 1722 















5 June 1723 
7 June 1723 
















CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
2 Undulted slaves) 
1 Undulted slave) 
1 Undulted slave) 
1 Undulted slave) 
David Greenhill 173 117-2 1/2 
Wil Ii an Marchant. 189 1.10 1/2 
5 Undulted slaves) 
Matthew Pauzi 98 73-5 1/2 
Peter Homes 231 123 1/2 
44 (indulted slaves) 
Rupert Waring 199 135-2 1/2 
George Besm 270 178-6 
Alexander Gordon 170 116-6 
John Touron. 279 202-4 5/6 
David Greenhill 300 176-2 1/2 
29 Undulted slaves) 
David Greenhill 162 100-2 1/2 
5 October Prince of David Greenhill 
1723 Asturias 
1. .. "References 
198 124-6 
2., -Most or all,. qý ('. the -ships lisýýqrbelow originated in. Jamaica. 
3. TheýSt. George stopped in Cartagena after leaving Portobelo for water 
-and supplies. -Royal-officials--, inspected. -the--cargo-and seized 
4,000 
pesos unregistered in the ship's manifest. Account of the St. George, 
17 February 1723, AGI, Escribania de Camara 583A. 
DATE OF 
ARRIVAL 
27 March 1724 
30 April 1724 









10 March 1725 
31 March 1725 
25 May 1725 







16 may 1726 
6 July 1726 



























Queen of Spain 
Sicilian Galley 
Queen of Spain 
Queen of Spain 
Queen of Spain 
Queen of Spain 













Queen of Spain Frank Dufay 
Totals for four years eight months trade in 
the second trading period (30 voyages)3 ' 
NO. OF SLAVES & 








365 238-3 1/2 
296 217-1 
279 188-1 2/3 
329 22o-6 
80 52 1/6 
299 210-3 
99 65-4 1/2 
98 72-2 1/2 
100 70-3 
97 72-2 1/3 
195 132 116 
299 221 1/3 
2 
6,481 41275-3 
1. This is probably the same vessel as the one listed as the Luis I in 
the shipping chart for Cartagena in the second trading period., and the 
Don Luis, King of Spain in the chart for Vera Cruz in the same period. 
2. In addition there were at least 83 indulted slaves. 
3. Returns for the period February 1724 - 4ugust 1727 included 33,, 072 pounds 
of cacao 
., 
454,500 Pounds Of sarsaparilla and 1PO87ý675 pesos. 
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Panwa and Portobelo 1722-1728 
Govemor and royal officials to the crown., 25 February 1724, AGI., Contadurfa 
268. 
Royal officials account of slaves., 16 April 1734., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. 
Relacion de los navdos despachados el affo de 1731-1732..., n. d., AGI, 
Contadurla 267. 
Relacidn de los navlos despachados desde 30 Septienbre 1733 hasta 9 
Septiembre 1734., n. d.., AGI., Contadurfa 266. 
Royal. officials to Philip V., 5 August 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Royal officials certificate of returns fran 5 February 1724 to 19 June 
1726.1 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1715., 16 April 17349 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. 
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VERA CRUZ 1722-1728 
DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
& ORIGIN PIEZAS DE INDIA 
26 April 1722 St. George Rupert Waring 72 66 3/4 
12 May 1723 St. George 
1 Rupert Waring 109 100-2 1/2 
Jamaica 
9 August 1723 Sarah Thanas Dillon 8 7-2 1/2 
29 Novenber 1723 Don Carlos John Touron 155 149-4 1/2 
24 may 1724 Prince of David Greenhill 160 149-5 
Asturias 
26 Septeirber 1724 Don Luis, 2 Samuel Loft 200 180-2 1/2 
Jamaica King of 
Spain 
30 June 1725 Assiento Alexander Gordon 100 87 : L/4 
Jamaica 
25 October 1725 Prince of Jobn Cleland 50 44 1/4 
Asturias 
30 January 1726 Assiento Alexander Gordon 29 27-3 1/2 
Jamaica 
29 April 1726 Prince of John Cleland 30 28-6,1/2 
Jamaica Asturias 
7 August 1726 Samuel Isaac Samuel 29 26-6 1/2 
Jamaica 
14 January 1727 St. George John Rogers 60 57-1 1/2 
Jamaica 
23 April 1727 Don Carlos Edward Femell 15 14-2 1/2 
Jamaica 
28 April 1727 St. George John Rogers 10 10 
Tbtals for five years 1 month trade in the 1,027 950 5/28 
second trading period (14 voyages) 
Several iterns of contraband were introduced on the St. George,, including 
10,700 pounds of iron. 
2. Contraband worth 15,837 pesos 3 reales were introduced on the Don Luis, 
King of Spain. 
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Vera Cruz 1722-1728 
Account of slaves introduced, 12 April 1735, AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials account, 8 November 1732., AGI., Tnd. Gen. 2811. 
Casafuerte to Philip V! p 25 May 1723., *AGI., Ind. Gen. 2803. 
Royal officials to the crown, 19 May 1725, AGI,, M4xico 858 (several letters). 
Account of slaves introduced since 1716., 
`12 April 1735., AGI, Contadurla 268. 
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CAMPECHE 1722-172 
DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP AND CAPTAIN NO. WOMEN BOYS GIRLS CONTRABAND 
AND ORIGIN TONNAGE SLAVES (in pesos) 
4 January 1726 Prince of M. Lilly 19 9 10 4., 515/6 
Jamaica Wales 
(200) 
8 June 1726 Fama William 27 15 12 439 
(300) Lea 
Totals for six months trade in the 46 9 25 12 
second trading period (2 voyages) 
References 
RIO DE LA HACHA 1722-172 
1 
4,954/6 
DATE OF A=AL SHIP CAPTAIN NO. SLAVES BOYS GIRLS 
AND ORIGIN 
c. March 1727 24 18 6 
Caracas 
1. Collett and Perrie to Moriate., March 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 28o8. 
CARACAS 1722-1728 
PERIOD SHIPS NO., OF SLAVES & CACAO REIURNED 
OF TRADE PIEZAS DE INDIA (pounds) 
MaY 1724- 24 at La Guaira 
2 221 138 2/4 267,444 
November 26 at Coro 
1725 
1. Portales Meneses to Philip V., 24 November 1725., AGI, Santo Domingo 700. 
2. Estimates of total contraband trade introduced on the 50 ships at 
la Guaira and Coro range from 200., 000 to 800., 000 pesos in value. 
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CaiTpeche 1722-1728 
Figueroa to Philip V, 3 April 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 280,4. 
Aguirre to Philip V, 3 October 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804. 
Aguirre to Philip V, 21 January 1727., AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Figueroa to Philip V, 5 July 1728, AGI; Ind. Gen. 2807. 
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. MARACAIBO 1722-17281 
DATE OF ARRIVAL 
& ORIGIN 
23 October 1724 
Jamaica 
4 January 1726 
Cura. gao 
19 JanuarY 1726 
Curagao 
17 September 1726 
Jamaica 
17 March 1727 
Curagao 
SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SIAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
St. George Thanas Hedges 53 24 
Desafio 2 Peter Kerney 
La Sara3 Ignacio del Valle 
Fredsuel Bent. Brown 20 9 1/3 
Santa Marta4 Crispin Hill 50 24 ý/3 
Totals for two years and six months trade in 123 58 
the second trading period (5 voyages) 
1. FRdferences 
2. The Desafio introduced contraband goods worth 4., 184 pesos. 
3. The La Sara introduced contraband goods worth 2,001 pesos. 
4. The entire return cargo of the Santa Marta was seized during the second 
represalia, and sold for 1,667 pesos 7 reales. It included 22., 000 pounds 




Jonathan Sisson certificate, 25 April 1726., AGI., Santo Domingo 654. 
Govemor of Maracaibo to Philip V., 10 December 1726, AGI, Santo Domingo 654. 
De la Casa to Philip V., 13 June 1726., AGI,, Ind.. Gen. 2804. 
Royal officials testimony,, 10 August 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805. 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced, 31 July 1734, AGI., Contadurfa 268. 
Account by Joseph Sdnchez Mosquera et al., 16 January 1733., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 31 July 1734., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811. 
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SANTA MARTA 1722-1728 1 
DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
AND ORIGIN PIEZAS, DE INDIA 
26 March 1725 Sarah Thomas Litterdale 35 18 
Jamaica 
4 June 1725 Sarah Thomas Litterdale 29 10 
Jamaica 
c. JulY 1725 84 38 1/2 
Total for five months trade in the second 148 66 1/2 
trading period (3 voyages) 
Royal, ýofficials to Philip V., 23 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813; 
Royal officials to Philip V., 23 August 1735., AGIý Contadurla 268; 
Pazo to Philip V., 10 July 172% AGI., Ind. Gen. 28N. 
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SANTO DOMINGO 1722-172 1 
DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & FL40UR INTRODUCED 
AND ORIGIN 
December 1726 Loyal 
Curagao Thanas 
PIEZAS DE MIA (barrels) 
292 1203 
Li 
8 May 1727 Maria Sarnuel 741, /6 100 
cura. gao (50 tons) Sporfort 
18 June 1727 Leonora Thomas 
Roit 
24 June 1727 Loyal Thomas L- -F ý U1 LN.. o .LI f- I Ajkdy CL-L LLi%-4110 5 St. Christopher Thanas Ball 25 19 1/2 
Totals for seven months trade 61 23 2/3 220 
in the second trading period 
(4 voyages) 
1. References 
2. This includes 18 men and 11 wcmen. 
V, 
3. This flour was seized as being contraband, and sold for an average of 
15 pesos 7 reales per barrel. 
4. The net sale price of these slaves was 1,170 pesos, an average of 
167/1 per slave. 
5. The net sale price of these slaves was 3,012 pesos 4 reales, and average 
of 125/4 per slave. 
i- c flour was sold 
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Santo'Domingo 1722-1728 
Royal officials certificate., 22 and 29 July 1727,, AGI., Estado 9,, Ramo 1. 
Testimony., 8 may 1727., AGI, Estado 9, Ramo 1. 
Visita of the Loyal Thomas, 29 Decerrber 1726, AGI, Estado 9. Ramo 1. 
Visita, 24 June 1727, AGI., Estado 9., Ramo 1. 
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Third Trading period slave introductions and retums,, 1729-1739 
Factory Years NuiTber Nurber Nu*nber Ratio 
or of of of of 
Pieza to 
Licensed Trade Voyages Slaves Piezas Slave 
Trade 
Buenos 8 years 16 5,824 4,686 11/15 . 80 
Aires 1 month 
Cartagena 6 years 33 5., 238 4,956 3/4 1/2 . 95 
7 mnths 
Havana 8 years 38 2,931 2,503 1/3 . 85 
10 months 
Panwm &9 years 44 10,224 7,604-4 . 74 
Portobelo 2 months 
1 
Santiago 5 years 18 615 523 est. 85 
9 months 
Vera Cruz 10 years 19 1,252 1., 141-4 1/4 . 91 
mnths 
Cairpeche 5 years 20 622 45ýý 3/20 . 74 
3 montha I 
Caracas 10 years 32 3,422 2,6og 1/4 . 76 
3 mnths 
Guatenzla 1 year 2 159 127 3/10 . 80 
7 rmnths 
Maracaibo 4 years 9 276 158 . 57 
1 mnth 
Puerto Rico 2 years 6 115 70 3/4 *62 
5 months 
Santa Marta 1 year 3 299 269 2/4 1/2 . 90 
3 months 
Santo 2 years 103 59 3/7 . 57 
Domingo 6 months 
Totals 10 years 244 31,080 25,330 . 81 
5 months 
1. This estimate is based on the ratio of pieza de india to slave in 
Havana., where slaves were similar2y employed. 
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Factory 4vg. No. Slaves 4vg. No. Slaves Known Indulted Slaves & 
or per Voyage per Month Contraband Piezas de India 
Licensed (pesos) 
Trade 
Buenos 364 6o. o4 
Aires 
Cartagena 158-73 66-30 7., 097/5 7 
Havana 77-39 27.65 15,048 41 
Panama & 
Portobelo 232-36 92-95 423 289-5 5/6 
Santiago 34-17 7.59 
Vera Cruz 65-89 10.02 43271/3 55 47-2 5/6 
Campeche 31.1 9.87 6 
Caracas 106.94 27-82 
Guatemala 79.5 8.37 473/7 1/2 
Maracaibo 30.67 5.63 
Puerto Rico 19-17 3.97 
Santa Marta 99.67 19-93 
Santo 25-75 3.43 4,636/5 
Domingo 
Totals 127-38 252.68 31j527/4 1/2 532 337-1 2/3 
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Factor7 Pesos Cattle Cacao Ipgwood Sarsaparilla Snuff 
Returned Hides (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) 
Buenos 752,438 72,474 
Aires + 17 ingots 
269 marcos 
8 ounces 
CaracaB 53700 7573578 
Cartagena 972; 118/51-2 




-359 375 6j7Olj693 
313 
Panama & 1., 526,449/4 137., 003 239,521 
Portobelo 
Santiago 8., 222 4,659 33662 + 56sl7O 
75 serones 
Vera Cruz 149., 577/1 
140 marcos' 
7 2/2 ounces 
Carpeche 23,000 9s000 39736,500 29250 
La Gu'aira 12., 563 7323754 
Totals 3., 782s8l6/Pi 77,, 919 1,639., 997 4,0249029 2429146 6Mls693 
986 marcos 75 serones 
3ý ounces 
17 ingots 
Factory Leaf Sugar Cochineal Indigo Contrayerva, Copal 
Tobacco (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) 
(bundles) 
Havana 764--46614' 7113123 S 8,033 bales 
Santiago 343191 1ý4183155 
+ 249 + 294 boxes 
tercics 
Vera Cruz 5,099 4oz. 
1., 975 
1,182 
Campeche 100 7., 750 4, ooo 950 
Totals 798,657k 231293278 5,199 4 oz. 9,725 43000 2j132 
+ 8,281 bales + 294 
& tercios boxes 
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Factory Castor Oil Achiote Copra, Wool VicufIa Wool Dye root 
(pounds) (pounds', (pounds) (pounds) (roots) 
Buenos 36 650 49271 50 
Aires 
Panama & 66., 4og 
Portobelo 
Santiago 1 box 
Cairpeche 667 
Totals 36 667 1 box 650 70,680 50 
Factory Bindweed Tallow Rice Chamois skins 
(pounds) (pounds) (pounds) 
Buenos 113 101891 
Aires 
Havana 1,875 598 
Totals 113 10"891 1,875 598 
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BUENOS AIRES 1729 - 1739 
DATE OF ORIGIN 
ARRIVAL 
2 January Angola 
1730 
11 March Angola 
1730 
12 July Madagascar 
1730 
20 August Madagascar 
1730 










































420 Frank Pearse 
240 John Pinkethman 
370 Charles Burnhaln 
NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
579 4ol 1/3 
287 225 1/2 
267 225 
290 Francis Williams 204 180 













226 191 1/3 
534 437 2/3 
551 457 2/5 
Frank Pearse storeship 
I 
John Pinkethman 444 386 
Thanas Hill 399 345 
2. This sbip was often referred to as the Mermaid. 
The Anna Galley and the Assiento were not owned by the Corrpany. 
Geraldino was particularly concerned that they were carrying large 
quantities of merchandise.. 
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DATE OF ORIGIN SHIP TONS CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
ARRIVAL PIEZAS DE INDIA 
1 April Guinea Hitchcock John Butler 243 182 
1736 
2 March Angola Galera de 270 Abraham 347 287 
1737 Genoval DLnanesque 
25 Assiento John Bennett 289 203 2/3 
January 
1738 
25 Asia Henry Fisher 283 206 2/3 
January 
1738 
Tbtals for eight years and one month trade in 
the third trading period (16 voyages) 
5,824 4,686 11/15 
1. Two slaves,, one fran the Galera de Genova and the other from either the 
Assiento or the Asia, purchased their freedom. The circumtances 































PESOS CATILE COSTS DUTY VICURA WOOL 
19ETURNED HIDES (PESOS) (PESOS) (POUNDS) 
12,183 429 300 
8., 788 302/1- 
8,463 123790/2k 330/4k 
73000 10., 579/2 273/A 
3,048 43606/4 118/7k 
33960 52964/7 154/6 391 
53896 8,910/6ý 230/2-ý 13 June 17 ingots., 






22 ft 18,000 in 
1733 factors' 
salaries 
21 May 4oooo 
1733 





Hitchcock 4 October 70,000 
1736 




5,129 7., 751/41ý 200/3 
lj5ll 2,275/7 59/1 426 
513 737/3h 20/1 240 









1. The returns also included very minor amounts of wool, castor oil and dye 
root, plus 10., 891 poundso of tallow returned on the Assiento. 
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Buenos Aires 1729-1739 
To Varas y Vald6s., 12 Decenter 1729., AGI., ContadmA 5145. 
Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de Buenos Aires, en los aflos de 
1731-1733, account made by T. Geraldino on 24 March 1734., Am., Contadurýa 267. 
Wescarb to Newcastle, 29 March 1729, PRO, S. P. 36/lo part ii,, f. 73. 
Royal officials testimorW, 9 June 1730., AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V,, 14 August 1730., AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 12 July and 9 October 1731, AGI., Contadurfa 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 15 March 1732., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2809. 
Smith to Geraldino., 16 June 1732., AGS, Estado 7010. 
From Spackman & Faure, 6 May 1733., AGI., Ind. Gen 2790. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 21 and 22 May 1733, AGS, Ind. Gen. 2809. 
Account of slaves introduced at Buenos Aires since 1715,, 27 July 1734, 
AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Quintana to Philip Vj 27 July 1734., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794. 
Geraldino to Patiflo,, 18 November 1734., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2790. 
Infonne de la, Contadurfa, n. d.., AGI., Santo Datingo 382. 
Factory accounts by Messrs. Spackman & Faure, 18 February 1735, AGII 
Contadurla 266. 
Account of slaves introduced between 30 September 1733 and 9 September 1734, 
18 February 1735, AGI., Contadurla 266. 
Geraldino, to Quintana, 4 July 1735., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2792. 
Royal officials to Philip Vj 28 July 1735., AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Geral. dino to Patiflo, 26 April 1736., Am., Ind. Gen. 2792. 
Quintana to Philip V., 8 October 1736, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Quintana to Geraldino., 22 October 1736., AGS, Estado 7006. 
Royal officials certificate., 27 October 1736,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Geraldino to de la Quadra., 24 January 1737, AGS, Estado, 6902. 
Geraldino to Torrenueva,, 24 January and 7 February 1737., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
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Quintana to Philip V, 10 March 1738, AGI, Buenos Aires 591. 
-Quintana. to Philip V., 20 August 1738, Am., Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Junta del asiento de negros, 8 March 1739., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2771. 
From Castro and Miranda, 11 June 1739., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817. 
. de Studer., la trata de negros pp. 200-201. 
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DATE OF SHIP 
ARRIVAL 




St. Jame s 
9 St. George 
December 
1730 
28 Don Carlos 
Decenber 1730' 
1730 
4 St. George 
February 
1731 
4 May Prince of 
1731 Asturias 
30 June Prince of 
1731 Asturias 
6 August Prince'of 
1731 Asturias 
12 San Felipe 
November 
1731 
4 January San Felipe 
1732 





NO. OF SLAVES & DATE OF 
PIEZAS DE INDIA DEPARTURE 
182 176 
150 146-3/4-2/4 
199 193 5 JanuarY 
1731 
Edward Femell 200 193-6/4 25 JanuarY 
1731 
John Rogers 270 260 13 APril 
1731 
William Blackbum 198 194 12 May 
1731 
William Blackbum 200 195 14 July 
1731 
William Blackbum 240 230 25 August 
1731 
John Cleland 169 163 27 
Noverrber 
1731 
John Cleland 150 145 15 MaY 
1732 
John Paris 72 6-2/4 
John Cleland 100 95-3/4-2/4 
Thomas Weir 150 144-3/4-2/4 15 JulY 
1 1732 
10'March The Sarah 
1732 (provision ship) 
19 April San Felipe 
1732 
9 July Providence 
1732 
16 August Providence 
1732 
5 St. George 
Noveriber 
1732 




Thomas Weir 200 195 5 
September 
1732 
Thanas Butcher 118 112-3/4-2-A 11 
Decenber 
1732 

























6 May Pearl 
1734 
5 October Don Carlos 
1734 











2 April Don Carlos 
1735 
27 June Union 
1735 
























NO. OF SLAVES & DATE OF 
PIEZAS DE INDIA DEPARMTE 
230 222 28 April 
1733 




120 117-3/4-2/4 20 March 
1734 
120 116-3/4-2/4 18 May 
1734 
140 135 21 July 
1734 
260 255-3/4-2/4 13 October 
1734 
200 193-1/2 December 
1734 
200 193-3/4-2/4 Februar7 
1735 
99 95-3/4-1/2 April 1735 
90 87 
Robert MacCullough 152 147-3/4-1/2 July 1735 
Thanas Quay 60 57-3/4-1/2 November 
1735 
Robert MacCullough 164 158 January 
1736 
Robert MacCullough 149 142 April 1736 
Thomas Quay 138 132-3/4-1/2 March 
1736 
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DATE OF SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & DATE OF 
ARRIVAL PIEZAS DE INDIA DEPARTURE 
17 June Union Robert MacCullough 60 
1736 




Totals for six years and seven months trade 5., 238 4., 956-3/4-1/2 
in the third trading period (33 voyages) 
379 




St. George 5 January Jamaica 24)720/511 
1731 
Don Carlos 25 January Jamaica 20,723/4 
1731 
St. George 13 April 
1731 Jamaica 21,218 
Prince of 12 May Jamaica 22,773/3 3/4 
Asturias 1731 
Prince of' 14 July Jamaica 38,377/5-3ý 
Asturias 1731 
Prince of 25 August Jamaica 243093/1 3/4 
Asturias 1731 
San Felipe 271an Cle Jamaica 42s363/5 3/4 
Noveirber 
1731 




Providence 15 JulY Jamaica 34,9481 
1732 
Providence 5 Jamaica 38,982/5-, ý 
September 
1732 
St. George 11 Jamaica 55,, 570/4 
December 
1732 
St. George 8 Jamaica 38,625/6 3/4 
February 
1733 
St. George 28 April Jamaica 37,420 
1733 
Pearl 13 51, ý584/ 3/4 Noveuber 
1733 
Spanish officials seized 5., 195 in contraband pesos on the Prince of Asturias. 
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SBIP 
Prospe ty 1 
DATE OF DESTINATTON PESOS MURNED 
DEPARTUFF, 
The Beecher 20 March 
1734 
Don Carlos 2 18 May 
1734 
Pearl 21 July 
1734, 
Don Carlos 13 October 
1734 
Don Carlos December 
1734 
Don Carlos February 
1735 
Don Carlos3 April 1735 
Don Carlos 
Union July 1735 




Union April 1736 
St. George March 1736 
Union 
San Fernando October 1736 
1 
Totals: 
32., 568/2 3/4 
38., 351/5 1/2 
30,700/3 1/2 
20,53o/6 3/4 
65., 958/1 3/4 
48., 989/7 1/4 









The returns from the sale of the slaves introduced on the Prosperity 
were actually shipped on the Pretty Sarah, Captain Benjamin Fisher., 
which left Cartagena on 21 November 1733. 
2. Spanish officials seized 1,902/5 in contraband pesos on the Don 
Carlos. 
On this trip a-medical-7chest was introduced illegally on the Don Carlos. 
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Cartagena 1729-1739 
Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de Cartagena en los afios de 
1731-1733, AGI,, Contadurfa 267. 
Salas to Philip V3 13 May 1730., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2794. 
Royal officials to Philip Vj 26 may 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794, 
Philip V to governor and royal officials, 22 February 1734, AGI3 
Santa Fe 432. 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1714., 2 June 1734., 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. 
Accounts of Messrs. Crowe and Ord, 18 February 1735, AGI, Contadurfa 266. 
Royal officials to Philip V3 18 May 1735., AGI., Santa Fe 1088. 
Philip V to the governor and royal officials., 20 August 1735, AGI3 
Santa Fe 432. 
Royal officials to Philip V3 1 September 1735, AGI,, Contadurla 144o. 
Vaamonde y Favoada to Philip V3 28 February and 19 March 1736, AGI., 
' 442. Santa Fe 
Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies fr= 9 September 1734, 
25 April 17363 Am., Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Account of returns from, several factories between September 1734 and 
September 1735,3 MaY 17362 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Salas to Philip V3 11 June 17363 AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 




DATE OF SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF STAVES & 
ARRIVAL PIEZAS DE INDIA 
11 July William Jxnes Phelps 69 67 
1729 






1 Undulted slave) 
6 May Virgin Samuel Webster 200 173 1/2 
1730 
17 JulY John Andrew Bissett 15 15 
1730 
10 Prince of William Blackburn 147 126 
Noverrber Asturias 
1730 - --- 1 1, 
27 Granada John Gibson 200 176 2/3 
Noverrber 
1730 
13 March Harmibal Robert Turner 199 162 1/2 
1731 
4 April JOIUý Andrew Bissett 10 10 
1731 
18 April 1 Undulted slave) 
1731 
27 May William Alexander Imes 14 12 1/3 
1731 
1 June 8 Undulted slaves) 
1731 
16 June Charles John Seymour e"198 
81 2/3 
1731 
16 July St. George Edward Fennell 232 201 1/2 
1731 




2. - The John carried three Spanish passengers illegally on its return voyage. 



















28 March Samuel and 
1732 Mary 
15 MaY John and 
1732 Mary 
20 June Adventure 
1732 





1 Decenber Adventure 
1732 
28 May John 
1733 




1,15 & 17 
Septenber 
1733 





George Eaves 263 221 1/2 
James Phelps 180 164 2/3 
Peter Kearney 30 28 2/3 
Matthew Wolfe 27 27 
Thanas Poynter 80 73 1/3 
NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
1 Undulted slave) 
Robert Pearson 118 ill 
John Wood 113 98 1/3 
Peter Kearney 40 37 2/3 
Samuel Kearne 247 227 1/3 
Robert Turner 25 25 
Peter Kearney 13 13 
Andrew Bissett 20 15 
2 Undulted slaves) 
1 Undulted slave) 
6 (indulted slaves) 
Robert Warring 46 32 2/3 
1. Captain Eaves was discharged for carrying J., 201 pesos in contraband. 
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NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS LE INDIA 
1 Undulted slave) 
Undulted slave) 





2 Undulted slaves) 
March 













12 July St. George Jack Renton 10 6 2/3 
1734 
October 1 Undulted slave) 
1734 
January 1 Undulted slave) 
1735 
20 Armstrong Andrew Armstrong 
Deceirber 
1735 




14 Constant Edward Phillips 
January 
1736 
1. Three hundred ninety two barrels of flour were introduced illegally on 
the Lion ý and an illegal sale of ship Is stores made 4,636 pesos. 
2. These figures represent thd canbined totals of the ArmstEM&, Charles 
and Constant, a breakdown for each ship being unavailable. 
10 (indulted slaves) 
Lion' Evan Bowen 12 
385 
DATE OF SBIP 
ARRIVAL 
27 JulY Cork Sally 
1736 
27 JulY Adventure 
1736 








7 June Lovely Betty 
1737 
12 July James 
1737 
13 April Sea Horse3 
1737 
CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
Domingo Verdon 6 
Peter Kearney 114 110 2/3 
Robert Sutcliffe 15 
Andrew Armstrong 20 
George Wane 30 
Edwaýý Nelson 30 
James Welleys 70 57 
Totals for eight years and ten months trade 2P931 2,503 1/3 (plus 41 indulted 
in the third trading period (38 voyages) slaves) 
1. This figure represents the total of piezas de india introduced on the 
Cork Sally and Adventure. The Cork Sally carried 9,013 pesos in 
co contraband on the return voyage. 
2. The A=trong carried 198 pesos in contraband on the return voyage. 
3. The Sea Horse, James and Lovely Betty were all detained in Buenos 
Aires when war broke out in 1739. 
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SBIP DATE OF DEPARTURE PESOS SNUFF TOBACCO LOGWOOD 
AND DESTINATION F=NED (pounds) SMOKING, ETC. ) (pounds) 
John 








Channin August 1730 
Jamaica 
Palmito October 1730 
Jamaica 
John November 1730 
Curagao 
Virgin December. 1730 
Jamaica 
Prince of January 1731 
Asturias Jamaica 
La Granada 14 Februaxy 1731 
Portsmouth 
Adventure April 1731 
Kingston 
John MaY 1731 
Canpeche 
H6nfiibal 24 June 1731 
Portsmouth 
Don Carlos 15 JulY 1731 
Portsmouth 
St. George 26 August 1731 
Portsmouth 
La Ventura Septen-ber 1731 
Jamaica 
John Decerrber 1731 
Portsmuth 
Bellawnt 1 Noverrber 1731 
Portsmuth 
loo., 000 
4,000 262., 500 25 tercios 
1 
63500 307,125 
30., 000 37,500 
100 111250 
1383700 3,9000 
13000 51., 250 
113000 1123500 
133000 309,9000 930 
333000 
bales 
38,000 -' 536,660 
& 2,380 oz. 
silver 
18,000 134, ooo 




1000000 55,000 & 
2., 8oo 
bundles 
802000 278,447 ' 
la Ventura February 1732 43)750 5,625 








1. In pounds unless shown otherwise. 
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SHIP CATTLE BROWN SUGAR WHITE SUGAR MOLASSES TOTAL COST OF 
HIDES (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) CARGO (pesos) 
John 
William 







La Granada 63,299 42., 154 
Adventure 82 
John 1 8)750 1., 375 
34,, 701/ 3 1/4 
Hannibal 2 50,874/ 7 1/4 
Don Carlos 11,819/ 4 1/2 






Wil II arn 
i., 4oo 25., 356/ 6 1/4 
Maria 3ý, 785 4j5O9 3,, 200 45s4O9/2 
Betty 12,824/7 
St. Jams 11,410/ 3 1/2 
John and 41,504 29,665 2., 650 402570/ 1 
Mary 
1. The John, also returned 1,875 pounds of rice. 
2. The Hannibal also returned 375 pounds of sarsaparilla and 598 chamois 
skins. The cost of the cargo does not include these items. 
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SBIP DATE OF DEPARTURE 
AND DESTINATION 
Catherine February 1732 
Kingston 
William APril 1732 
Portsmouth 
Marla 20 March 1732 
Portsmouth 
Betty 15 March 1732 
Portsmouth 
St. James 4 August 1732 
Portsmouth 
John and 16 August 1732 
Mary Portsmouth 
Rochester J 18 Novenber 1732 
Success APril 1733 
Portsmouth 
John September 1733 
Portsmouth 
La Ventura October 1733 
Junaica 
San Diego 15 November 1733 
Portsmouth 
Union June 1734 
Portsmouth 
St. George July 1735 
Portsmouth 
Lion November 1735 
Portsmouth 
Armstrong March 1736 
Portsmouth 
Constant MaY 1736 
Portsmuth 
Cork 1 October 1736 
London 
2-72'1, 




12 July 1733 
Cadiz 
Nuestra 12 July 1733 
Seffiora de Cadiz 
los Dolores 
PESOS SNUFF TOBACCO (=, 







2,000 486, ooo 700 manojos 11,200 
23., 000 148., 75211 
15., 000 121,600 
lo., 000 383,854 
18., 000 348,091; 1 158,045 20,000 
40,000 
23., 000 125jOOO 
1., 500 
225ý488ý 14,127 







273,989; ý 78s582 
22j278 1/4 
Totals:, 332)747/7' 6)7010693 764,466 1/4 2312359 
+ 4,604 oz. + 8,033 in bales of 
silver various sizes 
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SBIP CAT= 'BROWN SUGAR WHIM SUGAR MOLASSES TOTAL COST OF 
BIDES (pounds) ' (pounds) (pounds) CARGO (pesos) 





Union 28,900 23,850 
St. George 
Lion2 18,445 17., 807 
Armstrong 
Constant 1ý. 9762 19., 762 
Cork 23j709 47., 152 
Armstrong 22., 865 35s551 










ý86 367., 033 344,090 72250 365ý092/ 1 1/2 
1. The Rochester carried cigars, snuff and various other types of 
tobacco as gihs for the directors and for Banjamin Keene in Sevilla. 
2. The Lion also retuiýnbd'-11-1182 pounds of copal. 
The Nuestra. Seffora, del Carmen and Nuestra, Seffora, de los Dolores were 
consigned by Company factors in Havana to William Cayley in Cadiz on 
the Company account. 
4. The cost of 3,424,895 pounds of snuff returned was 324,287 pesos 
7 reales (3/4 real per pound) and the duty paid 4,169 pesos 1 real. 
The cost of 62,959 pounds of logwood returned was 806 pesos 2 1/2 reales 
(1/10 real per pound) and the duty paid 17 pesos 7 reales. 
The cost of 172,302 pounds of brown sugar returned was 11,086 pesos 7 
reales (1/2 real per pound) and the duty paid 226 pesos 6 1/2 reales. 
The cost of 160,793 pounds of white sugar returned was 15,, 233 pesos 7 
reales (3/4 real per pound) and the duty paid 323 pesos 7 1/2 reales. 
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Havana 1729-1739 
Royal officials account of returns,, 7 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de la Havana en los affos 
1731-1733, n. d., AGI, Contadurfa 267. 
Royal officials to Philip V, 6 July 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Minute cam-dttee of correspondence, 19 March 1733, EM., Add. 25,554, f. 10. 
Benjamin Woolley account., 15 November 1733., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2790. 
Benjamin Woolley invoice,, 10 March 1734., AGS., Estado, 7008. 
Account of slaves introduced in Havana, 12 April 1734, AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Sequeira to Patifio, 29 April and 12 Noverrber 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Geraldino to Patiflo., 18 May 1734., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790. 
Governor and royal officials to Philip V, 6 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2826. 
Sequeira to Patiflo, 25 February 1736, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and 
September 1735,3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Geraldino to Patifio, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792. 
Account of slaves introduced fýrm 1715 to 1736,25 June 1736, AGIS 
Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Royal officials certificate of returns., 7 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812. 
Royal officials certificate of seized slaves, 23 July 1736., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 
2812. 
Account of goods loaded on the Armstrong,, 1 October 1736., AGS., Estado 7013. 
Messrs. Welden and Lambert certificate., 1 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814. 
Lambert to Geraldino, 8 October 1736., AGS,, Estado 7006. 
Royal. officials certificate., 9 October 1736, AGS., Ind. Gen. 2813. 
Sequeira to Patifto, 22 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813. 
Geraldino to Torrenueva, 20 December 1736.,, AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Gu*emes y Horcasitas to Torrenueva,, 24 June 1737., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 26 June 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814. 
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Anthony Welden account, 6 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7013. 
Certificate of the Armstrong, 6 August 1737, AGS., Estado 7010. 
Sequeira to Geraldino., 6 August 1737., AGS,, Estado 7006. 
Sequeira to Torrenueva,, 25 May 1738., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Extract., Welden to directors, 6 August 1738, BM,, Add. 32,800, f. 86. 
rPjrry to Torrenueva., 22 January 1739., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2851. 
392 


















11 March St. James 
1730 
24 may St. James 
1730 
8 July Don Carlos 
1730 







10 St. James Sarnuel Hearne 
January 
1731 
13 March Prince of 













San Felipe John Cleland 
St. James Samuel Hearne 
San Felipe John Cleland 
St. James Samuel Hearne 
San Felipe John Cleland 




NO. OF SLAVES & 









145 92-5 2/3 
134 96-4 5/6 
100 71-5 1/2 
221 153-6 
167 132-5 1/3 
399 293-2 1/2 
299 236-1 2/3 
1. References 
DATE SHIP 
16 Prince of 
November Asturias 
1731 
21 Prince of 
February Asturias 
1732 
26 April Prince of 
1732 Asturias 
28 June San Felipe 
1732 
5 August St. George 
1732 
20 San Felipe 
November 
1732 
10 San Felipe 
February 
1733 
4 March St. George 
18 April San Felipe 
1733 
13 JulY St. George 
1733 
10 St. George 
September 
1733 




24 March St. Geor-ge 
1734 
13 Don Carlos 
August 
1734 
12 St. Thanm 
September 
1734 
May 1713 - September 1734 




CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & INDULTED SLAVES 
PIEZAS DE INDIA & PIEZAS 
William Blackburn 300 229-4 1/2 
William Blackburn 298 210-2 
Willimn Blackburn 284 211-2 516 
John Cleland 350 276-2 V6 
Thanas Butcher 287 214-3 1/3 
John Cleland 299 228-2 
George Stevens 300 246-4 
Jack Renton 71 
George Stevens 300 231-3 1/3 
Jack Renton 298 215-5 1/2 
Thanaz Butcher 300 207-6 1/2 
Jack Renton 15 10-2 1/2 
342 235-5 
Jack Renton 71 - 
48-2 
Edward Femell 200 149-3 1/2 
Thcmas Pitts 99 75-3 
63 45-5 
Thomas Pitts 198 166-1/7 
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DATE SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & INDULMD SLAVES 
PIEZAS DE INDIA & PIEZAS 
4 April St. Thanas Thanas Pitts 400 367-1/2 
1735 
30 June St. Thomas Thomas Pitts 300 234-5/7 
1735 1 






7 St. Thomas Thomas Pitts 299 231-3 1/2 
January 
1736 
22 April San Felipe George Stevens 250 183-5 
1736 
10 July Don Carlos Edward Fennell 149 log 
1736 





22 San Felipe George Stevens 200 132-1/2 
Decerber 
1736 
26 March San Felipe George Stevens 250 162-2 
1737 
7 August San Felipe George Stevens 300 212-5 1/2 
1737 
18 San Felipe George Stevens 400 287-4 1/2 
Deceirber 
1737 
6, Ia Bretaffa John Davison 150 129-1/2 
December 
1738 
14 St. Thomas Thomas Pitts 300 215-3 
December 
1738 
6 and 12 march and 4 April 1739 
2 1-1J3 
1 
15 8-2 5/6 
Totals for nine years and one month trade 10.0224 7ý607-4 423 289-5 5/6 
in the third trading period (44 voyages) 
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SHIP DATE OF PESOS VI CURA SARSAPARIIIA CACAO 










Prince of 30 April 
Asturias 1731 
San Felipe 30 April 
1731 
St. James 30 April 
1731 
San Felipe JulY 1731 
Prince 11 JulY 1731 
William 
St. James 
San Felipe 20 SepteTrber 60,000 8,898 
1731 
St. Jalres 11 October 31j000 
1731 
Prince of 5 January 50,682/3 1/2 
Asturias 1732 
Prince of 6 march 1732 41., 250 
Asturias 
Prince of 31 May 1732 30., 937/4 
Asturias 
San Felipe 15 JulY 1732 14,437/4 
St. George 22 September 









1. The actual inventory figure is 60 serones (oftem,, spelled Ilzurron" in the 
eighteenth century). The-seron is not an exact measure. An average of 
148.3 pounds per seron of sarsaparilla was calculated from examples where 
both serones and pounds were known. 
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SHIP DATE OF 
DEPARTUM 
PESOS VICURA SARSAPARILLA CACAO 
URNED WOOL (pounds) (pounds) 
(pounds) 
San Felipe 8 Decenter 63,937/4 
1732 
San Felipe 20 February 
1733 
333299/3 
San Felipe 12 May 1733 46,577/6 
St. George 30 JulY 1733 38,776/3 
St. George 12 October 30,000 
1733 
St. George 30 JulY 1733 
St. George 14 January 
1733 




50,600 plus 1,652 4o., ooo 
13 marcos de 
plata labrada 
39,600 plus 2 6s434 
boxes of plata 
labrada 
St. Thomas Novenber 1734 33, sOOO Plus 160 marcos de 
Plata labrada 
St. Thomas February 173ý 39,140/2 24,025 est. 
St. Thomas June 1735 153,095/4 12,100 35,9150 21j750 
St. Thomas October 1735 32,478 1,250 103000 59j750 
Union 
St. Thanas 26 February 56,016/6 1/2 10,950 est. 4,004 est. 
1M 
San Felipe June 1736 34., 360/ 1/2 41200 est. 
San Felipe November 1736 61,666 6ý276 7,9227 
San Felipe January 1737 40,718 Plus 
400 marcos 
6 1/4 oz. de 
Plata labrada, 
San Felipe 4 July 1737 94,600 plus 9., 265 6,024 est. 
57 marcos de 
plata labrada 
1. An average of 150 pounds per sack of vicu: fta wool was calculated firm 
exan*ples where both sacks and pounds were known. 
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SHIP DATE OF PESOS VICURA SARSAPARILLA CACAO 
DEPARTURE RETUMM WOOL (pounds) (pounds) 
(pounds) 
San Felipe 7 November 18,, o68/2 1/2 
1737 
San Felipe 28 February 77,356/3 1/2 
1738 
T-a Bretafia 29,875/6 1/2 
St. Thomas 7 March 1739 67., 390 
9., 036 529072 
3,431 
Totals: 1,526,449/4ý 66,409 2392521 137sOO3 
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Panam and Portobelo 1729-1739 
Manuel de Alderete to Philip V,, 9 February 1730., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2749. 
Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1715., 16 April 1734, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. - 
Lista, de las facturas de retornos hechos en Portobelo, 1730-1731., AGIj 
Contadurfa. 267. 
Royal officials account., 25 June and 17 September 1734,, AGi., Panama 364. 
Juan Aguirre certificates, 6 Septezrber 1735., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Pedro de-Urriola, certificatesi 28 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Juan Aguirre certificates., 16 January 1736., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Juan Aguirre certificates., 22 Septenber 1735,, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2813. 
Aguirre to Philip V. 9 22 September 1735, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2813. - 
Bernardino Calvo certificate, 6 December 1735., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Juan Aguirre certificates., 16 January., 31 May and 12 September 1736, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies ftxn 9 Septenber 1734, 
25 April 1736ý AGi., Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Account of returns from several factories between Septenber 1734 and 
September 1735,3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
SumlaX7 of Bernardino Calvo letter, 27 April 1736., AGI, PanaTna 364. 
Juan Aguirre certificates,, 31 May and 12 September 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Juan AguirTe certificate., 22 Septerrber 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Royal officials certificates of returns., 7 Novernber 1736,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Luis de Paz certificate., 30 January and'4 July 1737., AGIs Ind. Gen. 2814. 
Juan de Berroa certificate, 1 April 1737., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Francisco Vicente Garcia certificate, 22 August 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Isidro de Alva certificate, 11 Noverrber 1737., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Francisco Vicente Garcia certificate3 2 January and 15 April 1738, 
AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
399 
Isidro de Alva certificate, 24 February 1738., An., Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Isidro de Alva certificate, 21 May 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Francisco Vicente Garcla certificate, 12 January 1739., AGIS Ind. Gen. 2818. 
Calvo to Philip V., 1 June 1739, AGI., Panama 364. 
John Read copy of -accounts, 18 February 1735., AGI., Contadurla 266. 
Royal officials accotmt., 19 January 1735., AGI., Panama 364. 
Geraldino to Patifio,, 11 February! 1734., AAGT,, IIrid., ýGen.. --2790. 
Royal officials certificate, 4 Septerrber 1733., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810. 
I Relacion. de los navfos despachados los ahos de 1731,17323 AGI, Contadurýa 
267. 
Relacion de los navfos despachados el aflo 1733-1734, AGI, Contadurfa 267. 
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DATE SHIP 
February Don Carlos 
1731 









June 1732 Prince of 
Asturias 












19 March Warwick 
1735 
18 April Union 
1735 
9 June Triton 
1735 
25 August Constant 
1735 




CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
Gordon 70 
Toll 12 




William Blackburn 40 
George Stevens 12 
Samuel Phelps 10 
Benjamin Fisher 10 
John Bradshaw 10 
Leonard Arnold 4 1/2 
Leonard Arnold 12 6 1/2 1/3' 
Robert McCullough 63 
John Racket 66 
Sarmel Vincent 7 
Deal 
Robert MacCullough 30 
Thtals for five years and nine months in 
the third trading period (18 voyages) 
615 - incanplete 
1. References 
LLni F-. &. 
SHIP CAPTAIN DATE OF DESTINATION PESOS 
DEPARTURE RET'URNED 
Don Carlos Gordon 
The Argyle George Hamilton 2Q -- Portsmouth 
February 
1731 














John Cavannagh 4 April Cartagena 
1732 
William Blackburn 
George Stevens 18 July "for carpany 
1733 account" 
Betty Samuel Phelps 12 "for conpany 
February account" 4., ooo 
1734 
Beautiful Sarah Benjamin Fisher Arrived in London in' 19492 
October 1734 
Triton John Racket 20 August London 
1735 
cori8tant Samuel Vincent 
Nassau John Bradshaw 20 
January 
1735 
Warwick Leonard Arnold 
Warwick Leonard Arnold 




Total: 8., 222 
1. The Beautiful Sarah's return cargo was sold in Amsterdam. 
1 
2. Records for returns only were found for The ýMle., the St. Michael and 
the Hibernica. 




Comerford 30 MaY 1739 Portsmouth 480 
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SHIP WHITE COST BROWN COST MBACCO COST 
SUGAR (pesos) SUGAR (pesos) (bundles) (pesos) 
(pounds) (pounds) 
The Argyle' 91j325 5j5O7/1 136,402 5,493/2 1/2 5,133 817/2 1/2 
Fellows 78,228 4., 693/7 1/2-158j348 63333/7 3/4 169743 5,437/6 1/2 
St. Michael 16,083 1,2 86A 233975 1,439/ 1/2 63949 19550/2 
San Felipe 69,172 43150 1173561 49702/3 1/2 
Betty 65j562 3,934/3 1, /2 lol. 870 4,074/6 1/4 5,366 959/2 
Beautiful Sarah 113,752 6,949/1 
(est. ) (est. ) 
Triton 1963763 122020/2 249 
(est. ) tercios 
Nassau 228,889 13,982/7 
(est. ) 
Hibernica 111,550 6,9814/6 107,878 4s315 
(est. ) (est. ) (est. ) (est. ) 
Totals: 2 8793999 532831/7 646. %034 26)358/4 1/2 34,191 & 8s764/2 1/2 249 tercios 
--------------------------------------- 
SHIPAY, gyle TANNED COST CACAO COST LOGWOOD COST 
HIDES (pesos) (pounds) (pesos) (pounds) (pesos) 
The Argyle 852 543/1 
Fellows 13128 2,392 2., 369 1., 381/7 
San Felipe 655 409/3 
Betty 193 120/5 13293 517/1 1/2 12s834 120/5 
Beautiful Sarah 624 
Triton 180 
Nassau3 836 
Hibemica lo43 11,122 
(est. ) 
43., 336 
Totals: 4,659 3,465/1 143784 1,899/ 1/2 56., 170 120/5 
1. The ý; Mle was the only vessel with indigo on its manifest. It 
carried 1,975 Pounds which cost 624 pesos 1 1/2 reales. 
2. There were no returns., or records were not found for them., on the Don 
Carlos, Paradox, Prince of Asturias3 Constant, Warwick (two Voyage-sj-, 
Virgin Ftý, vo-v-oy-ag-e-55-, union, or 15-mg-stZTý. 
3. The Nassau also carried one box of copra, $ weight and cost unknown. 
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Santiago--1722-1739 
Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de Santiago de Cuba en los arlos 
1731-1734, AGI, Contadurfa 267. 
Geraldino to Patifio, 8 October 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen.. 2790. 
Geraldino to Patifto, 27 October 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792. 
Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 
25 April 1736,, AGi. Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and 
September 1735,3 May 1736, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Fran Patifio., April 1736., AGS., Estado 7010. 
Tyrry to Quintana, 13 August 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851. 
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VERA CRUZ 1729-1739 
DATE OF ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES,, MEN) 
ARRIVAL WOMEN & PIEZAS DE INDIA 
9 March Jamaica Ratliffe John Cleland 30 28 4/4 
1729 
5 JulY Jamaica Assiento Nathaniel Uring 79 74 
1729 
5 MaY Jamaica Assiento Nathaniel Uring 117 108 1/4 1/2 
1730 
8 Campeche Soledad Joseph Martinez 16 12 1/2 
November 
1730 
15 Jamaica Assiento Nathaniel Uring 100 91 3/4 1/2 
January 
1731 
2 Campeche San Antonio Simon Joseph de 54 3/4 
January de Padua Mateos 
1732 
16 Jamaica St. James Samuel Hearne 130 log 2/4 
January 
1732 
12 July Jamaica Pearl Alexander Gordon 109 99-5 1/2 
1732 




3 June Jamaica Don Carlos Edward Femell, 50 47-4 
1733 
T 17 July , amaica Charming Henry Bennett 15 13-4 1/2 
1733 Betty 
12 Caracas Blandon 35 2 33 1/3 
Decenber 
1733 




2. Indulted slaves 
The sale price for 94 slaves from the Charminz Betýy was 25,470 pesos. 
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DATE OF ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, 
ARRIVAL WOMEN & PIEZAS UE INDIA 
21 July Jamaica Don Carlos Edward Femell 101 59 42 91-2 1/2 
1735 
30 July Blandon Antonio Andrade 31 
1735 
2 August Jamaica St. George Thomas-Quay 50 44-6 1/2 
1736 (50 tons) 
22 Jamaica St. George Thomas ý Quay 50 44-3 1/2 November 
1736 
22 May Jamaica St. George TharihsaQuay 50 49 112 
1737 
17 Jamaica St. George ThoniasaQuay 60 20 40 58 4/1 1/4 
January 
17-38 
4 March Goleta -I'lg-'LeSa 
1738 Inglesa 
7-6 1/2 
16 April El Triunfo Joseph 81 6-3 
1738 Carrpuzano, 
12 July Jamaica San Frank Renton 60 35 25 55-2 1/2 
1738 Fernando 
27 Jul-Y Jamaica Britania John Davison 100 66 34 93 1/2 
1739 (150 tons) 
Totals for ten years and five months in 11252 180 141 1,141-4 1/4 
the third trading period (19 voyages) 
1. Indulted slaves. The totals for indulted slaves are 55 and 47-2 5/6 
piezas de india. 
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SHIP DATE OF DEPARMME PESOS COCHINEAL FEMARKS 
AND DESTINATION RMURNED (pounds) 
Ratl I ffe 
Assiento 22 September 1730 9,000 
Jamaica 
Assiento February 1731 
St. James 17 March 1732 15,, 000 1,183 1/2 
Jamaica 
Pearl 20 December 1732 9., 000 2.6go 
Jamaica 
Don Carlos Noveirber 1733 6., oo6 
Jamaica 
Channing 26 December 1734 17,685/4 12237 3/4 
Betty Jamaica 
Don Carlos 13 September 1735 
Jamaica 
St. George 15 September 1736 
Jamaica 
St. George 24 January 1737 
Jamaica 
St. George 20 July 1737 
Jamaica 
St. George 24 March 1738 
Jamaica 










7 1/2 ounces 
of silver 
13,744 
Relief ship for the Prince 
Frederick. See above p. 
232 pesos in umarked silver 
seized fnn the Assiento 
The Ch Betty also 
returned one box oý Ccmpariy 
books and accounts. 
Returned one Cmpariy book 
of accounts 
Returned three Ccnpany books 
of accounts 
Returned three Conpany books 
of accounts 
Returned several Ccrrpany 
books of accounts 
Carried contraband worth 4., 271 pesos 3 reales 
149_s57Q75_____5, _Ill-J. 74-_- -- 
and 
140 marcos 
7 1/12 ounces' 
ILnr7 
rw ( 
Vera Cn= 1729-1732 
Fran the royal officials., 9 February 1731, AGI, Contratacion 4729. 
Frias to Geraldino,, 15 September 1736, AGS., Estado, 7006. 
Davila to Geraldino., 30 January 1733., AGS., Estado 7006. 
Fran Messrs. Avila and Alarcon y Ocafio, 3 February 1733., AGS., Estado M6. 
Lista de las facturas de retomos hechos de la Vera Cruz., n. d., AGI,, 
Contadurfa 267. 
Royal officials account, 8 November 1732, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Juan de Avila et al certificate., 3 February 1733., AGS., Estado 7006. 
Royal officials certificate, 11 May 1733, Ak. Ind. Gen. 2785. 
Royal officials certificates., 12 April and 9 November 1734., AGij 
Ind. Gen. 2789. 
Royal officials certificate., 23 November 1734., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794. 
Account of slaves introduced since 1716,12 April 1735, AGIj Contadurfa 268. 
Ochoa to Philip V, 26 April 1735, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2789. 
Pedro Foral Va-1de/s certificates., 22 July and 13 September 1735, AGIs 
Ind. Gen. 2813. 
Pedro Foral Valde"s certificate, 24 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811. 
Governor and royal officials to Philip V., 13 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Messrs. Hays and Butler account, 16 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789. 
Pedro Foral Valde"s account, 22 December 1735, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2789. 
Royal. officials to Philip V., 22 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Royal officials certificate, 29 December 1735, AGI, Mexico 861. 
Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 
25 April 1736., AGi., Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and 
September 1735,3 may 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Royal officials certificate., 18 September 1736., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Royal officials certificate, 15 March 1737, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2814. 
408 
Frias to Philip V., 31 March and 28 Septerrber 1737., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 3 August 1737, AGI, Mexico 861. 
Extract of returns on the St. George-, - 24 March 1738, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2817. 
Royal. officials certificate., 16 July 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Frias to Philip V., 28 December 1738., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818 (several letters). 
Frias to Philip V,, 30 December 1738., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2818. 
Royal officials certificate., 30 July 1739., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2817. 
Frias to Philip V., 1 September 1739., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2818 (several letters). 
From Castelfuerte, n. d., c. 1729., AGI., Contadurla 812. . 
4.09 




May 1731 Essex 





June 1732 Firtree 
July 1732 Five Brothers 
August San Quintin 
1732 
March 1733 Derby 
9 Derby 
Septenter (170 tons) 
1734 
14 San Quintin 
Decenter (-ýno 
1734 
March 1735 EEagle 
(300 tons) 





NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
20 13 9/10 
Burn 15 10 
Chanters 20 3.1 3/8 




20 15 7/8 
20 12 4/8 
20 8 1/4 
20 11 3/8 
Robert Cathcart 
Robert Cathcart 
12 9 1/8 
40 32 2/8 
John Hamilton 80 65 3/8 
George Haynes 150 112 3/8 
A 
Edward Oliver 150 119 3/4 
9 July George & Mary Edward Heller 
1735 
July 1735 Sea Hor-se 
JulY 1735 Duchess of 
Portman 
July 1735 Revolution 
25 April Beautiful 
1736 Sally 




Benjamin Fisher 35 25 
Totals, for fiVe years and tbree monthstrade 
-in, the- 
Z t1did"trading period (20 voyages) 
6 Undulted slaves) 
62ý 2 3/20 
1. References 
2. In addition there were six indulted slaves. 
41o 
SHIP DATE OF DESTINATTON PESOS LCGWOOD COPAL DYEWOOD 
DEPARTURE RETURNED (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) 
Derby January London 5,, 000 416, ooo 
1735 
George & Mary 9 'July. ý- 
1735 
Sea Horse JulY 1735 
Duchess of July 1735 
Portman 
240,000 
1., Ooo 3202000 
2802000 
Revolution JulY 1735 400,000 
Drake 9 August London 2,, 000 650,000 550 
1735 
Eagle October 3, tOOO 614, ooo 1735 
Liml October 
1735 
Beautiful 27 June London 
Sally 1736 
San Quintin February London 6,000 816)500 4oo 1,9750 
1737 
San 3 Februax-j 6,000 6,000 Francisco 1737 
Totals: 23,000 3)736s5OO 950 7j750 
1. The Linn returned 9,000 pounds of cacao and 4,000 pounds of contra-yerba. 
2. The San Quintin also returned 2,250 pounds of sarsaparilla. 




Joseph de Saravia certificate, 24 July 1735., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813. 
Campeche accounts between 1730-1733., n. d.., CL Shel. vol. 43., f. 267. 
Navlos despachados de Jariaica con permiso, 1731-1733., AGI2 Contadurfa 266. 
Navýos despachados de Jamaica con licencias., 1733-1734, AGI, Contadurla 266. 
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CARACAS 1729-1739 1 
DATE OF ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES,, MEN, 
ARRIVAL WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS 
DE INDIA 
8 Curagao Hermosa Frank Travers 20 8 12 00 14 2/4 
February Ana 
1729 
27 MaY Caesar Thomas Somers 50 
1729 






Witbh-of Spaffer 24 20 3/8 
Lancashire 
Caesar Thomas Somers 151 ill 9/14 
June 1731 Prince Thomas Somers 142 103 15/28 
Ferdinand 
August Prince Thomas Somers 145 122 11/14 
1731 Ferdinand 




Suzanna Pweskin 34 25 
February Don Carlos Thomas Saners 148 115 6/7 
1732 
March 1732 Adventure Peter Kearney 40 31 4/7 
May 1732 Courier Areskin 64 48 2/7 
July 1732 Don Carlos Thanas Saners 134 97 4/7 
September Suzanna, H. Ogilvie 75 56 5/7 
1732 
December Suzanna, H. Ogilvie 51 36 3/7 
1732 
January Don Carlos Thanas Saners 121 86 6/7 
1733 





ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL No. OF sLAvEs,, MEN 
ARRIVAL WOMEN, BOYS., GIRLS & PIEZAS 
DE INDIA 
19 June Don Carlos Thomas Saners 198 
1733 
1 July Curagao Errpress Jeremiah Burch 10 
1733 
5 St. 
September Christopher Suzama H. Ogilvie 70 
1733 
19 Caesar 61 
November 
1733 
2 April Curagao Don Carlos Thomas Somers 92 53 39 
1734 
August Barbados Elizabeth Benjamin Dick 147 47 51 21 29 
1734 
30 March Santo St. Andrew Robert Brown 22 16 6 
1735 Domingo 
26 may Barbados Mennaid Thomas Gilbert 100 51 49 
1735 
July 1735 Caesar 22 
15 Barbados Elizabeth Benjuain Dick 200 
December 
1735 
June 1736 Barbados Elizabeth Benj wiin Dick 256 
22 Barbados Caesar Thomas Somers 139 69 70 
November 
1736 
20 July Barbados Elizabeth Benjamin Dick 236 
1737 
28 St. 
February Christopher Triton Alexander Adair 232 
1738 
17 April Barbados El Fuerzo 
1739 








167 3/4 1/2 
226 2/4 1/2 
127 6/4 
214 2/4 1/2 
195 1/4 
194 1/2 
Totals for ten years and three months trade 3,422 244 227 21 29 2,609 1/4 
in the third trading period (32 voyages) 
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SHIP SALE PRICE FLOUR DATE OF DEPARTURE PESOS CACAO 
OF SLAVES INTRO. & DESTINATION EE71URNED (pounds) 
(pesos) (barrels) 
Hermosa Ana 2061 
Caesar 200 
Charlotte 193 
Don Carlos 6,863 for 19 APril 1734 6., 863 104,168 
27 slaves London (received for 
65 slaves) 
Elizabeth 29 February 1736 
Barbados 
St. Andrew 5., 700 for 
20 slaves 
Mermaid 23., 49o for. 16 July 1736 
-wo slaves Baxbados 
Elizabeth March 1736 
Elizabeth 66., 052 for 
130P366 
269 1120 
2ýu slaý, ies September 1736 358,672 
Caesar 37,, 270 226,200 
Totals: 139., 375 599 l2s563 1,091,426 
5, *700 2,900 (received for 
2 slaves) 
Duty was paid on only 156 barrels of flour introduced. 
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Caracas 1729-ý-1739 
Certificate of Measurement of slaves, 8 February 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807. 
Autos., 27 May and 8 June 1729., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807. 
Royal officials certificate, 8 May 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807. 
Navlos despachados de Jamaica con pemisos, 1731-1732, AGI2 Contadurfa 267. 
Navlos despachados de Jamaica con licencias,, 1733, AGI., Contadurfa 267. 
Navlos despachados de Jamaica con licencias., 1733-1734., AGI2 Contadurfa 266. 
Royal. officials certificate., 27 July 1731., AGI., Contadurfa 268. 
Alvarez certificate., 31 May and 2 June 1734, AGI, Contadurla 268. 
Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from, 9 September 1734, 
25 April 1736., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Royal officials to Philip V., 29 November 1734., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Alvarez certificate, 21 April 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Fran Phelipe Romero., 16 July 1735,, AGS.. Estado 7006. 
Alvarez to Patiflo., 27 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Alvarez to Philip V., 23 December 1735., AGI,, Ind. Gen. 2814. 
Alvarez certificate., 30 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817. 
Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and 
September 1735., 3 May 1736,, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793. 
Joseph de Armas certificate., 5 July 1736,, AGI., Contadurla 268. 
Royal officials to Philip V, 16 November 1736,, AGis Contadurla, 1633A. 
Domingo IZpez certificate., 24 April 1737, AGI., Ind. Gen. 2815. 
Royal officials certificate., 24 April 1738., AGi,, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
Royal officials to Dlaz., 30 April 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816. 
FernLdez to Philip V., 7 July 1738., AGI., Ind. Gen. 2817. 
Royal officials certificate., 5 January 174o., AGi., Ind. Gen. 2817. 
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GUATEMALA 1729-1739 1 
DATE OF SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, 
ARRIVAL WOMEN, BOYS & PIEZAS DE INDIA 
5 Guatemala 
Septeraber (25 tons) 
1731 
66 4 35 27 45 11120 
5 March Fitzroy 
2 
Roger Paxton 93 
1733 (40 tons) 
Totals for one year and six 159 
months in the third trading 
period (2 voyages) 
81 6/8 
127 3/10 
. 4, 1. References: From Juan de Guman, 18 March 1733., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; 
from Castillano, 5 March 1733., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Royal officials to 
Philip V., 1 December 1740., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817; N6fos despachados de 
Jamaica con perimiso., 1731 and 1733, AGI, Contadurla. 267. 
2. The Fitzroy., which sailed fran Jamaica., carried contraband goods of 
uns I pecified value including pewter., plates., mirrors,, silk hats, mat., 
bread, rLzn, wine and rifles. Goods embargoed frm the Fitzroy, 28 
March 1733., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811. 
c) H 5-- 00 
ct (D 
ý31 ct ý: 5 
(3 RZ 
(D 
0-, ýý ýi 0' ýo ct (D Co 
F-1- 0 

















%. w- Co 
el wl 1-i N 
0%,. 
Co 
!ý ýp 1-i p 1--i ý-) a 00-4 w ct %-m t A) c 
(D CO 0 
CD 
ct 
i-t ;r cil . OF ý-s o ý-s - 
ct g- p- H. 
1-3 cl ril 













4 %, n ON PL) 
F-i 
%-n c0 IV 
ru 
1*-, 
ro ý- r\. ) P r) CC) --4 N) --4 -tr wo w LA) 





N) p N) 






Vtl cn 02 Cn c-) 
ýt t ct ý5 
ct ct ct ct ct 



















_tr A. ) A) %D r-:, 
LA. ) I-j ý-j ý-j 
C> Ch Ul 0W 
W, -lý i P., $Z tr . 9=1 J-- =I 












'September St Phillip 
1731 
November St. Phillip 
1731 
March St. Phillip 
1732 
3 MaY San Juan 
1733 
PUERTO RICO 1729-1739 
CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & 
PIEZAS DE INDIA 
William Williams 18 10 
William Williams 15 10 
William Williams 12 6 3/4 
William Williams 15 9 
William Williams 22 14 
28 June Santo Domingo William Williams 33 21 
1733 
Totals for two years and five months 125 70 3/4 
in the third trading period (6 voyages) 
References: Navlos despachados de Jamaica con licencias, AM., Contadurfa 
266; Navfos despachados de Jamaica con pennisos., 1731., AGI, Contadurfa 267. 
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SANTA MARTA 1729-1739 
DATE OF ORIGIN SHIP CAPTAIN TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, ADUIM, 
ARRIVAL CHILDREN & PIEZAS rE INDIA 
17 June Beautiful Thanas Quay 140 129 3/4 
1734 Sally 
9 July Jamaica Hermosa 140 129 3/4 2/4 
1735 Peggy 
23 August Sarah 
1735 
19 8 3.1 lo 
Totals for one year and three months in 
the third trading period (3 voyages) 299 269 2/4 2/2 
1. Reference: Royal officials to Philip Vs 23 August 1735, AGI* 
Contadurla, 268. 
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SANTO DOMINGO 1729-1739 
DATE OF SHIP CAPTAIN NO. OF SLAVES & COMMAND 
ARRIVAL PIEZAS DE INDIA (in pesos) 
June 1732 Elizabeth William Williams 36 19 3/7 
Noverrber Ann William Williams 30 14 
1732 
30 August Santo Domingo William Williams 37 26 4,636/5 
1733 
Novenber Lion Eban Barber 
1734 
Totals for two years and six months in 103 59 3/7 4,636/5 
the third trading period (4 voyages) 
References: Navfos despachados de Jamaica con penniso, 1732, AOIO 
Contadurfa, 267; Navfos despachados de Jamaica con licencia, 1733-1734, 
AGI,, Contadurla, 266. 
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Total Number of Slaves Introduced 
at each Factory or Licensed Trading Pos-t 
Factory or 1714 - 171b 1722-1726 
Licensed No. of No. of No. of No. of 
Trading post slaves Piezas Slaves Piezas 
Buenos Aires 3P560 2,9385,9,1/6 5,834 41541, sl/3 
Cartagena ls588 1,3942s5/7 40122 3p952$921 
Havana 1,479 1,085 22026 ls747a. 1/7 
Panama 
& 3,767 2s583ssi 6,481 49275ss3 
Portobelo 
Santiago de est. 
Cuba 508 373 
Vera Cruz 523 482.,, 5 1,1027 950P#5/28 
est. 
Campeche 46 24#58 
Caracas 488 376 221 138, j2/4 
Guatemala 
Maracaibo 123 58 
Puerto Rico 
Rio de la est. 
Hacha 24 12.82 
Santa Marta 148 661 
Santo Domingo 100 61 23,92/3 




Licensed No. of No. of No. of No. of Average 
Trading post Slaves Piezas Slaves Piezas Ratio of 
Pieza to 
Slave 
Buenos Aires 59238 4,68611 15,218 11,613 15 
3_1 Cartagena 52238 4s956y -y 10,941 10y304 
Havana 29941 20031 6,446 5,335 3 
Panama 









Puerto Rico 115 
Rfo de la 
Hacha 
Santa Marta 299 
Santo Domingo 103 
est. 
523 11123 896 
12141-41 29802 29575 
459--2 668 484 20 
127 3 159 127 
10 
158 399 216 
70 3 115 71 if 
24 13 
2692 1 447 337 'ý 2 














This figure is not realistic. The 100 slaves introduced 
during the first trading period were all men in prime 
condition destined to work on construction. Therefore 
the ratio of pieza to slave would have been high, but no 
figures are available and there were no similar 
circumstances from which figures could beestimated. 
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Number of Slaves Introduced Per Year 
1 
First Trading Period 
Year 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 Total 
Number 174 1,, 8o8 2j603 3sl2l 4,065 242 12sO13 
of. 
Slaves 
Second Trading Period 
Ye ar 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 Total, 
Number 12638 39857 5PO76 5,177 2s787 10476 102 20,, 113 
of 
Slaves 
Third Trading Period 
Year - 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 Total 
,, Number 514 
42223 6,906 5,119 2,989 2,701 22,452 
of 
Slaves 
Year 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 Total 
Number 2,535 2,648 1,678 1,444 323 8,628 
of 
Slaves 
Grand Total 63j206 




With the Acquisition of the asiento contract in 1713 England acquired an 
advantage over the French and the Dutch in trade to the Spanish colonies. The 
vehicle for the conduct of this trade was the South Sea Conpany. Despite its 
favoured position,, the Conpany's trade was not particularly profitable. There 
are several reasons for this. 
Theoretically., because of its location Jamaica was an ideal place for an 
entrep8t from which slaves could be supplied to Spanish merchants in the Indies. 
However this advantage was not fully exploited. No atteapt was made to assess 
the relative demand in the various Spanish colonies according to regional 
economic activities or slave profitability. Slaves were made available at 
random, leaving the market alternately glutted or inadequately supplied, thus 
encouraging contraband trade. Secondly., the selection of Compary personnel was 
haphazard; few factors or agents demnstrated particular allegiance to the 
COMpany, v and 'many robbed 
it of revenue by their own illicit activities. 
Thirdly., during the Anglo-Spanish wars of 17182 1727 and 1739 considerable 
Company property was seized, little of which was 6ver restored. Fourthly, trade 
ceased during these wars,, greatly limiting profits. Fifthly, contraband trade 
by Carpany enployees was never eliminated, thus the Carpany and the Spanish 
crown were both defrauded of revenue throughout the period of the contract. 
Spanish officials in Madrrld were suspicious of the Ccrnparly's intentions 
fran the beginning. These suspicions were confimed when Mathew Plowes and Dr. 
Burnett furnished proof implicating Coupany personnel and Spanish officials in 
extensive contraband trade. Although Spanish factors were appointed to mnitor 
the trade., and diplomatic measures were taken for the same purpose, contraband 
continued mainly through the cooperation of pliable Spanish colonial officials. 
The economic impact on the Spanish colonies of the South Sea Conpany's 
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various activities is diffi6ult to quantify, not only because Company accounts 
are incomplete, but also because comparative figures for other foreign and Spanish 
trade are unavailable. For the 17 years between 1715 and 1732., the Company 
introduced into Spanish America on seven amual and two licensed ships registered 
merchandise worth approximtely E2,101,487 , an average of 1123,617 annually. 
These figures are based on the actual cost of the merchandise purchased by 
the Corrpany. 
1 
Fýgwea for the quantity and value of British exports to Spain and the 
West Ind; LeS dUr1ng this period are based primarily on the Ledgers of Imports 
and Exports of England and Wales. Actual quantities are listed., but values are 
based on a predetermined official value which was not necessarily the actual 
value. The official figures, changed little frm year to year. Moreover the 
official British figures for exports to Spain and the West Indies do not indicate 
the percentage of goods actually sold in Spain's American colonies. Therefore 
any comparison between the South Sea Company's recorded exports and the total 
official British exports can only give an approximate percentage of the market 
possessed by the Carpany. 
The following comparison of Company trade to the Spanish American colonies 
with the total British exports to Spain and the West Indies during the years in 
which annual and licensed ships sailed indicates that the Ccmpany controlled 
over 25% of British exports to Spain and the West Indies. Considering various 
factors: the inadequacies of the available statistics, the extensive and 
unrecorded contraband shipments made by Company employees as well as by private 
British merchants, and the unknown quantity of merchandise shipped to Spain and 
the West Indies which actually reached Spanish colonists, it is likely that the 
,------, - '-KZ 
The accounts of the second voyage of the Ro th 
_yal 
Prince and that of e Prince William listed the total expenses of the voyage including the cost 3f the cargo,, salaries,, victualling and other miscellaneous expenses. Me approximate cost of the cargo was calculated by comparing the total expenses to the ratio of the cost of the cargo to the total expenses incurred on the first voyage of the Royal Prince. 
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uorrpany exported to Spanish American colonists considerably more than 25% of 
ý11 British exports that eventually were consumd there. 
Table 12 
-Total British exports-to Canpany Ccrrpany % 
Spain and the West Indies Exports of trade 
(value in L) (value in Z) 
'1715 799,000 3703753 46 
858 000 2333500 27 
4,1717 3 
`1721 ls053,000 2523347 24 
`1723 lj0533000 274,320 est. 26 
ý1724 1)053,000 264,964 25 
. 1. 
T. 
1 . 352 ,,, 
ý725 1,053,000 290 28 
, ý'1730 
1,053,000 234,436 est. 21 
il 
, ": 1732 ljl63JO00 18o. 815 16 
2.1101,487 25-82 k,: Total 8,137,000 
For similar reasons it is possible only to approximate what percentage 
of the total number of slaves introduced into the Spanish colonies between 1713 
, 
'and 1739 were Company slaves. Although it is clear that the Corrpany introduced 
.. most of 
the slaves into the Spanish colonies at this time., these figures cannot 
. 
be compared to the volume of trade carried on by previous asentistas becatme 
that trade has not yet been quantified., or to the total number of slaves 
introduced during the period when the Company traded., because of the large 
quantity of contraband slave iintroductions , many by Company aiployees. 
Sow idea of the extent of the slave market controlled by the Company can 
be surmised by looking at the figures for slave exports from Jamaica during 
the period of the British asiento contract. Between 1715 and 1739s 74,925 
2. D. C, Platt; 'Latih Ametida'and British'TtadLi'1806'-ý1914 (London, 1972) P 34 Elizabeth Bo6cV Schumpeter; English'Overseas Trade 'Statistics '1697 16080 (oxford, 196o), pp. 1-4. 
427 
slaves were exported from. the island. During the same pe od the C rt aMarZr 
introduced 63., 206 slaves into the Spanish colonies. Thus, most slaves exported 
from Jamaica,, probably about 75%, were Company slaves because Jamaica was the 
principal Coupany entrep6t and transhipment centre *3 
While it is clear that foreign merchants trading to the Spanish colonies 
Proftted from Spaints econanic decline from the seventeenth century,, it would 
-be illusory to speculate on the economic impact of the South Sea Ccapany's 
asiento trade until further research is done on Spanishj British and other 
foreign trade to the colonies during the same period. Nevertheless the impact 
, must have been great. The British asiento contract was the largest contractual 
arran6ent to deliver slaves during the entire colonial period. Moreover with 
the protection of the British goverment., the Conpany changed traditional trading 
patterns to Spanish America. Resident British merchants seriously threatened the 
stability of Spaints technical economic monopoly in America by opening small 
banks. issuing letters of credit and exchange., remitting Spanish money and 
effects in contravention of Spanish law and avoidance of Spanish taxes. 
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